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FROM EARTH'S LAST ISLANDS 
The global origins of Green politics 
by Christine R. Dann 
Since World War Two the world has undergone a profound economic and political 
transformation, from an international economy and internationalist politics to a global 
economy and globalist politics. The Bretton Woods international financial institutions 
have 'structurally adjusted' Third World countries, and similar structural reforms 
have occurred in First World countries. The environmental consequences of 
globalising economic activity have been severe and also global; the social 
consequences of the structural reform process are equally severe. National 
sovereignty has been radically compromised by globalisation, and previous 
nationally-based initiatives to manage the activities of capital in order to mitigate its 
negative impacts on society and the environment, such as social democrat/labour 
politics, have ceded their authority to globalism. Green parties have arisen to contest 
the negative environmental and social consequences of the global expansion of 
capital, and are replacing socialist parties as a global antisystemic political force. 
Green politics had its origins in the world-wide 'new politics' of the New Left and the 
new social movements of the 1960s, and the world's first two Green parties were 
formed in Australia and New Zealand in 1972. A general history of the global forces 
which gave rise to Green politics, and a specific history of the first two Green parties, 
demonstrates the interplay of global and local political forces and themes, and 
provides an opportunity to redefine the core elements of Green politics. 
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Introduction 
What more do we need to know about Green politics? 
(and how should we find it out?) 
Questions for investigation 
For some twenty years, merely by being a New Zealander of an inquiring and historical bent of 
milld, who was an active participant in the world's first national-level Green party (the New 
Zealand Values Party), I have been in possession of information not readily available to others who 
have studied Green politics. No stranger to 'new politics' in theory or practice, I have also 
participated in and written for and about the peace, environmental and feminist movements, 
including a history of the Women's Liberation Movement in New Zealand, 1970-1985 
(Dann,1985b). 
In 1990 I embarked on researching a history of the environment movement in New Zealand - a 
project which over six years changed shape and direction and evolved into the current work. It 
seemed to me that while a narrative history of the New Zealand environment movement would be a 
worthwhile and useful work (and certainly one which I would have appreciated referring to while 
researching Green politics), it was not the way to gain further understanding of Green politics as 
possibly the most important development of late twentieth century global* politics . 
... A note on terminology. When using the word global in this work I mean it in the sense used by Castells (1996, 92) 
i.e. a world-wide economic, political and social system operating in real time through virtual networks; globalist refers 
to the ideology of a world wide economy dedicated to continual growth; globalisation is what results from global and 
glohalist activities, and is described in detail in Chapter Two. 
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This became clear to me as I read more widely on Green politics, including the literature on Green 
parties.' I became concerned that ignorance of (and/or lack of interest in) the actual historical 
origins and development of Green politics was leading to severe distortions in our understanding of 
what Green politics was, is, and will become. Nor did some of the academic conclusions being 
drawn about Green politics tally with my firsthand experience of three Green parties (the New 
Zealand Values Party, the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, and the Australian Greens). 
A number of questions began to rise in my mind. They included: 
(1) Was it coincidental? or a freak? that Australia an:d New Zealand had the world's first two 
Green parties? 
(2) If not coincidental, was it of any partiCUlar significance? To whom, and on what scale? 
(3) If Green politics is or was primarily environmental politics (politics about and for the 
physical environment), why did it start in Tasmania and New Zealand, where the seemingly 
clean and uncrowded cities and the unpolluted and pristine natural environment are the envy 
of the rest of the 'developed' world? 
(4, The Values Party and the United Tasmania Group were not formed. from or by the 
environment movement, or the environment movement alone, and nor were most 
subsequent Green parties. Is it therefore correct to define Green politics primarily as 
environmental politics? 
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(5) If Green politics does not derive directly and/or principally from the environment 
movement, from whence does it derive? 
(6) What, if anything, was significant about the timing of the first Green parties? Were they a 
direct response to the perceived 'environmental crisis' of the late 1960s, or were there other, 
more significant factors at work? 
(7) Could one of these factors be the post-World War Two acceleration and proliferation of 
global econoinic activity, which certainly led to a deepening of environmental problems, but 
also to a change in economic and social relations? 
(8) Other political parties, and most particularly social democrat parties, began to develop 
policies on the environment, and to lobby and legislate for better environmental protection 
and standards, from the late 1960s onwards. If they were sincere about taking care of the 
environment, and were able to be elected to government to do so (unlike most minority 
parties in most jurisdictions), why were Green parties felt to be necessary or desirable? 
These questions sparked off a number of subsidiary questions, which formed part of my exploration 
of the global context and development of Green parties. The essence of the approach adopted in 
this thesis (which I explain in detail in Chapter One) is to ask historically and geographically 
specific questions. Also to derive historically and geographically specific answers, rather than to 
attempt to derive a grand explanatory schema of what Green politics is in any abstract sense, 
severed from the time(s) and space(s) in which it takes place. This requires particular attention to 
the issue of scale - selecting the appropriate length(s) oftime and breadth(s) of space to make sense· 
ofthe fit between research questions and data. 
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Beginning with the initial questions set out above - which were further refined into four absolutely 
basic questions, set out in Chapter One - I then went out exploring for answers on both a global and 
a local scale, and within both a 'contemporary' (1960s-1990s) and a 'modem' (1780s-1980s) time 
frame. I decided that the best way to find answers was by engaging in: 
(a) a proper comparative history of the development ofthe first two Green parties; 
(b) a summary of relevant post World War Two developments in world history, having 
particular regard to: 
(i) the acceleration and proliferation of economic globalisation 
(ii) the 'new politics' phenomenon, from the New Left in the early Sixties through the new 
social movements in the late Sixties to the first Green parties in the early Seventies 
(iii) the rise and decline of social democracy as a parliamentary route to modifying and/or 
ameliorating the adverse social and environmental impacts of globalised capitalism. 
The answers I arriv~d at (or failed to find) are covered in the appropriate chapters - which also 
suggest more questions which are not within the purview of this thesis. (The questions for further 
investigation are given in Chapter Eight.) At no point in this work do I try to derive a hierarchy of 
causative factors or provide a simple 'working model' of Green politics. The past is not a 
laboratory. In Marx's famous words, 'Men make their own history; but they do not make it as they 
please, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past' (Marx, 1978, 
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595). To understand what is going on, we need to study not just the 'men', but also the 
circumstances. Chapters Two, Three and Four concentrate on three sets of circumstances 
(economic globalisation, the decline of social democracy, and global new social movements,) 
which seemed to me, when read against the actual history of the first two Green parties, to be of 
primary salience to understanding the global Green phenomenon. (This is not to imply that these 
sets of circumstances are in any way independent, non-human factors. Indeed, it is the interaction 
between the creation of 'new times' and 'new politics' that we are able to understand why and how 
not just the Greens but other political formations wax and wane.) 
Nor in selecting these sets of circumstances do I intend to suggest that they are the only salient sets 
of global circumstances. There are at least two other subject areas that I believe require close 
attention before we can fully contextualise and comprehend the development of global Green 
politics. The first of these is the expansion of the capacities and use of new information and 
communications technologies, from gene technologies to the Internet. These technologies have a 
strong bearing on both the subjects and the means of global politics in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. The second issue of relevance to the development of Green politics is what is 
currently happening to the nation-state as a site of political activity. The debate about the 'end of 
sovereignty', and what opportunities this opens and forecloses for new political formations 
(especially those with a democratic and parliamentary orientation), is extremely relevant to Green 
parties and their prospects. Manuel Castells (1985, 1989) has specialised in charting and analysing 
th~ global 'network society', and has recently drawn this work together with studies on what is 
happening to global society and global politics (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998). In Chapter Eight I use 
his work to frame the historically specific data on the development of Green party politics given in 
the rest of the thesis, and discuss the interplay between global generalities and Green specifics 
which will determine the future of Green politics.2 
5 
Since there are so many factors that need to be considered in order to gain an understanding of the 
complexities of Green politics, I am reluctant to engage in a ranking exercise. Either within the 
three sets of circumstances I chose for fuller investigation, and/or between those circumstances and 
any other factors. I have no doubt that the three I chose are all extremely important; and I am also 
sm~ that trying to rank them in some sort of universal priority order, as the causative factors behind 
global Green politics, would be a worthless and pointless exercise. Therefore I confine myself to 
outlining and exploring the connections (and also the discontinuities) between these particular sets 
of circumstances and the historical development of Green politics, and to contextualising specific 
historical events, actors and practices which have hitherto been considered in isolation, or in a 
partial context only. That is, if they have been considered at all - and as a large part of this work 
consists of presenting previously inaccessible information and in making original connections 
between it and existing information, I make no apologies for concentrating on a manageable 
compass of key factors. 
Theoretical frameworks 
Finding (and where necessary developing) a theoretical framework within which to locate my 
investigations proved problematic at the outset. I was initially at a loss as to which framework to 
adopt. It was plain that the nation-state and state actor-centred theorisation o(politics', which is the 
dominant approach taken by the discipline of political science, would not serve my purpose of 
explaining a global political phenomenon which is based on mass new social movements rather 
than elite state actors. Indeed, I had already run into the limits of this approach as a political science 
graduate, when I proposed conducting research into the Women's Liberation Movement (Dann, 
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1974). My research proposal was initially criticised on the basis that the research would be more 
appropriately conducted in a sociology rather than a political science department. 
But it was plain to me then (and now) that political movements can not be understood purely as 
. social' phenomena. They are not reducible to an aggregate of social characteristics such as the age, 
sex, race, class, nationality, religion, etc. of their participants. Their political goals, practices and 
discourses must be taken seriously as having an existence which is related to, but not necessarily or 
inevitably a product of, the social characteristics ofthose who create it. Political movements are 
also historically specific, and the historical circumstances that give rise to them are at least as 
important as the social characteristics of the participants in explaining what they consist of and why 
they arise. 
An extremely important set of such historical circumstances is the economic circumstances in 
which each political generation finds itself. Thus the approach taken by contemporary 'political 
economists' seemed to provide a better theoretical framework for reconciling the political, social. 
economic and historical dimensions inherent in a study of global Green politics. 'Political economy' 
is a fairly loose term, sometimes used as, or believed to be, synonymous with a 'Marxist' approach. 
This is not necessarily the case, and it is possible to put some tighter boundaries on what the 
approach consists of when used as a way of analysing national and international political and 
economic phenomena. This is what Palan and Gills (1994) and their contributors do in 
Transcending the State-Global Divide: a Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations, and it 
is their 'neostructuralist' approach to such phenomena that I use in this thesis. 
Considering that Green politics is a global political phenomenon of over twenty years standing, it is 
perhaps surprising that this theoretical approach has not already been applied to understanding it. 
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In fact it should be a matter of concern to scholars of global politics that my work breaks new 
ground in this area, and I find it hard to explain why an approach which seems to me to be both 
obvious and effective has not been used before now. It may be because the increasingly critical 
salience of the environmental dimension of Green politics has distracted commentators from its 
economic and political underpinnings, or caused them to concentrate on the environmental 
dimension to the neglect of other factors. Mostly, however, I believe that they have remained 
trapped within ways oftheorising Green politics that are inadequate to the task of describing and 
assessing its global and social characteristics and significance. 
From both a theoretical and practical point of view, therefore, it is important that existing mistakes 
and omissions are rectified. Hence this thesis may be seen as carrying a significant sub-text, or to 
constitute an argument in itself, for more sophisticated theorising about the causation and 
development of global political phenomena. It is not only a matter of looking at factors other than 
the formally identified actors in the global political system; it also requires a deeper examination of 
the structures underlying the linkages between economic and social phenomena, and environmental 
and social phenomena. 
The question then arises - what is the best way to do this? This opens up another area of theoretical 
interest - and difficulty. In pursuing this study I have had to engage in a large amount of academic 
disciplinary 'boundary-crossing'. In particular, I have had to make use of work created within the 
varied 'disciplines' of history, geography and the social sciences. The issue or'boundary crossing' 
really constitutes a critique (and potential revision) of educational theory rather than political 
theory, and is therefore far from the subject and purpose of this study. However it did have 
implications for my methodology, and it is worth outlining the way in which the 'conflict of 
interest' is conceptualised and resolved by Immanuel Wallerstein (1991). 
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Wallerstein considers the different approaches taken by those who study the meaning(s) of the past 
(historians) and those who study the meaning(s) of society (sociologists), and discusses the traps 
into which each side can fall. On the historians' side there is the danger that focussing on 
constructing meticulous chronologies of specific events (the idiographic approach) ends up telling 
us nothing about the meaning or significance of those events. This is partly because the historical 
record is flawed, and researchers ofit can't be sure that every 'significant' event and actor has been 
properly accounted for. But mainly and more importantly it is because the significance of historical 
events is not a function of how large they loom in any particular and partial narrative, but rather of 
how they fit into a wider picture of social and political change over time. This is where the role of 
the social scientist in constructing theories of human individuals and societies comes into play. 
In this case, however, there is the danger that the creation or'universat' theories of human 
behaviour (the nomothetic approach) loses sight ofthe specific historical location of societies and 
individuals, and the interplay between the abstract and the specific. It therefore ends up with broad 
get"~ralisations which also fail to explain the significance of particular events. 
It was clear to me that it was necessary to adopt a rigorous historical approach to understanding 
Green politics as a global phenomenon, and to work on a much larger historical and geographical 
canvas than any previous studies. However I was not interested in narrative for the sake of 
narrative, and thus the social science approach to past and present politics was necessary in order to 
find out exactly what story I was telling. Finally, it was important to ground the study in the 
changing physical realities which Green politics is in many ways caused by and reacting to - hence 
the necessity of understanding global geography in its economic, social and physical aspects. 
9 
While not aspiring to a 'grand theory of everything', therefore, I have opted for a broad rather than a 
narrow approach to what needs to be considered when developing theories about how a global 
politics came into being, and how it will develop. I have aimed for an integration rather than a 
separation ofknowledge(s) as the basis for a better understanding of the Green political 
phenomenon. 
Methodological considerations 
Within the thesis I traverse the boundary between the Scylla ofnomothesis and the Charybdis of 
idiography, sometimes condensing towards the former and sometimes expanding towards the latter. 
Having decided that the work needed to employ both historical and social science methodologies in 
order to provide a complete account ofthe subject under consideration, the next question was how 
to do this without compromising standards in either of these disciplinary orientations, In my 
preliminary reading on the topic I was repulsed by some ofthe breathtaking 'historical' 
generalisations made on the basis of (deliberately?) restricted source material, by writers whose 
ideological axes can be heard grinding in their interpretations of~the 'facts' they present. (Two 
prime cases in point, one from the 'liberal' and the other from the 'socialist' end ofthe political 
spectrum, are Bramwell, 1989 and Pepper, 1993). 
Therefore it seemed to me that a first priority was to provide an accurate and comparative historical 
record of the first two Green parties. In doing this I chose to work wherever possible from primary 
SOlirces (party archives and publications, and interviews and correspondence with Green activists). 
This was partly because the published record is meagre, and unpublished secondary sources are 
also extremely limited. Mainly, though, it was because the mistakes and omissions in these sources. 
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(These ranged from minor misquotations and inaccuracies in dating through to gross errors, such as 
the representation of a conservation policy as an economic policy.) This convinced me that further 
primary research was needed. In pursuit of this more accurate history I spent many hours working 
with the Values Party papers archived in the Turnbull Library in Wellington, New Zealand, with 
the Kunowski Collection in the MacMillan Brown Library at the University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, and with the United Tasmania Group papers archived in the 
Tasmaniana collection in the State Library of Tasmania in Hobart . 
. I also conducted interviews and had conversations and correspondence with leading activists in the 
Values Party and the United Tasmania Group, and related political movements, in Australia and 
New Zealand. As I was working on an historical analysis rather than a sociological description of 
the Green political phenomenon, I concentrated in both my archival research and in the interviews 
and correspondence on which events had taken place where and when, what was said and done by 
the key actors, and how those events and words were understood and interpreted at the time by 
those involved.3 Conferences on 'Environmentalism, Public Opinion and the Media', 'Ecopolitics' 
ana 'The Values Party: A Quarter Century Retrospective', in Hobart, Canberra and Auckland 
respectively provided further opportunities for contact with those studying and practising Green 
politics, and another chance to get feedback from the activists on academic interpretations of their 
work. 
Secondary sources used included theses and research papers on the Values Party and the United 
Tasmania Group. (There are only four and a half on the former and two on the latter.). Also books 
and academic journal articles which consider the various facets of the Green movement in 
. 
Australasia (not very many ofthose, either). Finally, political serials that were published during the 
period under study (1970s/80s) that paid some attention to the 'Green' as well as other political 
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currents of the period (of which the most useful were the Australian journals Arena, Social 
Alternatives and Australian Left Review). 
So far this is a fairly simple and standard historical research methodology, but it covers only the 
'local' side of my questions, and does not address the 'global' side. Completing this side of the 
equation involved a major change in scale. This included a shift in time-scale (from the 1970s/80s 
to a period beginning in the late eighteenth century but in particular focussed on the 1960s through 
to the 1990s). Also a shift in space (from the islands joined by the Tasman Sea to 'the globe', but 
more especially those countries which were at the forefront of initiating and driving economic 
globalisation). It also required a shift from working with simple political documents and activist 
statements in order to construct a coherent narrative, to investigating extensive literatures on 
diverse SUbjects. These literatures included those on economic globalisation, the history oflabour 
and social democratic parties, contemporary social movements, wilderness, landscape and 'Nature', 
the industrialisation of primary production, and Green party politics in Europe. From these sources 
I was able to build up an in-depth picture of the circumstances which gave rise to and continue to 
infl1lence Green politics. 
In two instances I proceeded by way of conducting a case study or 'thought experiment' using one 
or more of the literatures. These are outlined in Chapter One. Although very little from them 
appears in the thesis proper, they proved a valuable means both of exploring and testing the limits 
of my theoretical framework, and of answering certain important subsidiary questions which had to 
be addressed before I could go on to answer the main questions. 
A specific case in point is the question begged in one of my initial queries, concerning why Green 
parties emerged first in countries with 'unpolluted', 'natural', 'pristine' physical environments. Were 
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the"e environments really as 'clean and green' as they appeared to be, and ifnot, why not? My first 
case study brought together the general literatures on economic internationalisation and the 
industrialisation of primary production with the specific history of the commercial colonisation of 
New Zealand and the development of farming in nineteenth century New Zealand. The results are 
summarised in Chapter One - they show that despite superficial appearances to the contrary, the 
logic of globalised capitalism and industrialisation means that New Zealand and Australia are 
ideally placed to generate Green politics. 
Although in working with' glob at' literatures from a variety of national and international 
perspectives it was not possible (or in most cases necessary) to'go back to actual primary sources, 
I continued to use this approach where it did seem useful and desirable. Principally, when dealing 
with the words and deeds of non-Green party and political movement activists (covered in Chapters 
Three and Four) I approximated as closely as I could the methodology I used for Green activists in 
Australasia i.e. the use of verbatim primary material. Hence the use of source documents on the 
Australian Labour Party collected by Ebbels (1965) in Chapter Three, and the use of equivalent 
collections from the New Left/the Movement' by Goodman (1970) Jacobs and Landau (1967) and 
Teodori (1970) in Chapter Four. 
Of course contemporary quotations can be misused so as to give a false verisimilitude rather than 
the actuality of 'how things really were'. Nevertheless, if chosen carefully on the basis that they are 
the best representations ofthe tenor ofthe times, and not because they pander to the author's 
prejudices, and if they are used to flesh out the context rather than to distort it, they can give us 
something that second-hand interpretations cannot do. This is a 'feet' for how it was, for what our 
political ancestors actually said and the way that they said it, which is both different from now and 
yet has the power to reverberate in what we say and feel today. 
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When Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit (l~69) conclude their book on the May 1968 events in 
France with the words 'C'est pour toi que tufais la revolution.' (and the translator ofthe English 
edition, and presumably the authors, choose to leave this sentence in its original- and intimate-
French), the original citation is to my mind worth a dozen pages of exegesis on how New Left 
activists saw and felt about their political activity. This is part ofthe actual legacy they bequeathed 
to the Greens, for better or worse, and I feel it is valuable to record it verbatim where possible. 
Apart from a small survey of party members attending the 1995 New Zealand Green Party annual 
cor.ference, I did no quantitative research for this thesis. The 1995 survey was mainly an attempt to 
assess whether there had been any significant change in Green party activist characteristics since 
the larger survey done by Miller in 1991, and the findings are included in Chapter Six. Most of the 
questions I sought to answer were not resolvable by this means. Further, my active involvement in 
Green politics over the period I was researching and writing the thesis certainly gave me rich 
sources of information and opinions that I would not otherwise have been able to access. These 
have played an important role in helping me select questions and frame answers.3 However this 
work is in no sense a 'participant observation' study, in the anthropological or sociological meaning 
of me term. I was not interested in the way in which people make meanings - my focus is entirely 
on the meanings that they make as expressed via their political practices and verbal discourses. In 
subjecting these practices and discourses to critical scrutiny I attempt to identify what is 
problematic about the practices and discourses in themselves, rather than in the individuals or 
groups who create them. 
In summary, therefore - it is in the interplay between global literatures and local narratives, 
between grand themes over time and small events in space, between the abstract theories of social 
scientists and the specific accounts of historians, that I locate this work and the way that I do it. 
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Notes 
1. Works or part-works about the Gennan Greens, originally in English, or in translation, include Frankland and 
Schoonmaker (1992) Frankland (1995) Hulsberg (1988), Kolinsky (1989), Langguth (1986), Markovits and 
Gorski (1993), Mililer-Rommel (1989), Papadakis (1984), Poguntke (1993), Sarkar (1994), Spretnak and 
Capra (1984), while there are also numerous journal articles, and chapters in collections on Green politics, for 
example Frankland(1995), Poguntke (1992), Pridham (1978) and Wiesenthal and Ferris (1993). 
Works, part-works and articles about non-Gennan Green parties (andlor comparisons with the Gennan 
Greens) include Bomberg (1998); Bridgeford (1978), Bennahmias and Roche (1992), Buerklin (1987), Church 
(1992), Doherty (1992), Eckersley (1992), Evans (1993), Frankland (1990), Kemp and Wall (1990), Kitschelt 
(1989), Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990), Kvistad (1987), Maier (1990), McCulloch (1992), Milller-Ronunel 
(1989, 1995), Miiller-Rommel and Poguntke (1995), Parkin (1989), Porritt and Winner (1988), Prendiville and 
Chafer (1990), Richardson and Rootes (1995), Rootes (1995), Pybus and Flanagan (1990),.Riidig et (1991), 
and Riidig and Lowe (1986). 
2. Castells (1997, 122) asks 'Why did ecological ideas suddenly catch fIre in the planet's dried prairies of 
senselessness?' and in answer says 'I propose the hypothesis that there is a direct correspondence between the 
themes put forward by the environmental movement and the fundamental dimensions of the new social 
structure, the network society, emerging from the 1970s onwards: science and technology as the basic means 
and goals of economy and society; the transfonnation of space; the transfonnation of time; and the domination 
of cultural identity by abstract, global flows of wealth, power, and infonnation constructing real virtuality 
through media networks.' 
3, Subjects for interview and correspondents were selected on the basis that they play(ed) a leading role in key 
'Green' events and organisations in New Zealand and Australia, both party and non-party political, and the 
interviews focussed on the public role(s) played by these people in the relevant events and organisations in 
which they participated, Personal information about interviewees was not solicited or supplied (except 
occasionally where relevant to the political chronology e.g. two of the interviewees were married as a political 
gesture in a church due to disappear under the waters of a hydro-dam.), and at all times the focus of the 
interviews on the activities rather than the activists. Interviews were therefore structured to take subjects 
chronologically through events and organisations they were involved in, and allowed-for infonnation on other 
subjects to be freely volunteered. 
Two types of data were gathered from the interviews: 
(1) infonnation on the events and organisations the activists were involved in, which was used to 
supplement andlor correct infonnation in the archival and published records; 
(2) opinions, interpretations and analysis of events, organisations 
and personnel from the activist's perspective and experience. 
Data in the fIrst category provided for greater accuracy in factual details, and enabled identification of areas of 
confusion requiring further work. The views of activists in the second category often suggested further lines of 
inquiry andlor alternative interpretations that were worth exploring, and in some cases replaced existing 
questions and answers. 
My access to suitable interviewees and correspondents, and my ability to conduct comprehensive interviews 
with them (or elicit quick answers from them), was greatly facilitated by the circumstance that I was known to 
most of them, and had worked with some of them, as a fellow Greetl activist. Most of them were, like me, 
tertiary-educated people who are familiar with the conventions of academic research, and in general my 
relationship with them was one of collegial equality. I found that most of them had both the ability and the 
inclination to reflect on their political practice, if given the opportunity. Their considered opinions were as 
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valuable to my research process as the infonnation they supplied about their activities, often causing me to 
revise my own views, or to work harder to provide evidence for them. 
A list of the people I interviewed can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Chapter One 
Time, Space and the Greens 
Auf Erdballs letztem Inselriff 
Begreif' ich, was ich nie begriff. ' 
(At the farthest island reef of Earth 
I grasp what I never understood before.) 
Karl Wolfskehl l 
In 1938 the poet Karl Wolfskehl came to New Zealand, seeking refuge from the 
horrors of Europe descending into war. Sixty-nine years old, he entered a strange 
new world, very different both physically and culturally from the urbane nineteenth 
century Gennany in which he was socialised. He characterised his experience as a 
dream - 'Bin ich noch Ich? Ich traue kauml Dem Spiegel, alles wird mir Traum .. 
(Am I still me? I scarcely trust the mirror, everything seems to me a dream). Part of 
his dreaming was a green dreaming - 'Traumwandernden Traum-Gran erfrischt' 
(Dream wanderings in a green dream refresh me). 
One imagines the lonely, aging exile finding his way to the Waitakere ranges to the 
west of the city of Auckland, and wandering dreamily along muddy tracks among the 
great tree ferns; nikau palms and the many broadleaf evergreens which dominate the 
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northern New Zealand flora. He would then return to the city refreshed by this 
contact with living green things. 
Wolfskehl's Antipodean dreaming did not include a vision of the Green parties 
which were to be created there three and a half decades later, yet his story provides a 
link between the European past and Australasian present which resonates in many 
ways with the themes of the age. 
Karl Wolfskehl was a German national who lived in Germany for most of his life. 
He thought and spoke and wrote in German. Yet he saw himself as ' ... einen Burger 
der Welt, einen Sohn unseres Planeten' (a citizen of the world, a son of our planet), 
. 'judisch, romisch, deutsch zugleich' (Jewish, Roman, German equally) (Asher, 1956, 
65-66). The inscriptions on his tombstone in Auckland are not in German (or 
English) but in two ancient 'world' languages - Hebrew and Latin. 
A descendent of the people of the first recorded diaspora, Wolfskehl 's life and death 
epitomise the dominant theme of world history in the past half-century -
globalisation. New Zealand was a refuge from the imperialist designs of Hitler 's 
. Reich, (which had no place for 'world citizens' like Jews and gypsies). 
Paradoxically, however, New Zealand existed as a modem nation-state, able to offer 
refuge from Hitler's global expansionism, only by virtue of the imperialist designs 
and economic expansionism of Britain in the previous century. 
Yet it was in this place, unlikely as it may seem, that the world's first national-level 
Green party, the New Zealand Values Party, was founded in May 1972, closely 
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following the world's first state-level Green party, the United Tasmania Group, 
which was founded in March 1972, 
Most people who know anything about global Green politics at all are usually under 
the impression that the world's first Green party was the Gennan party, Die Griinen, 
Die Griinen came together in West Gennany in 1979, contested its first federal 
election in 1980, and was successful in 1983, when twenty-six Greens took their 
places in the Bundestag and became the world's first national level Green elected 
political representatives. Die Griin;m certainly was the first political party to use the 
name Green, and it has undoubtedly been the most significant ofthe Green parties in 
tenns of gaining parliamentary representation, political influence, international 
profile and scholarly documentation.2 
Indeed, in acknowledging the formation of Die Gn'inen, the Values Party hoped that 
it would become 'a useful model', Values Party officeholder John Horrocks (1980) 
went on to say that Die Griinen was 'the overseas party nearest in character to 
Values '. He noted the difficulties (as Values knew from experience) of sustaining a 
group made up of diverse political elements, and he commented favourably that Die 
Griinen was further to the Left than other 'Values-type' parties, such as Britain's 
Ecology Party and the Australian Democrats. This meant, he thought, that Die 
Griinen held the promise of becoming 'more than just a coalition of protest groups. ,3 
So Die Griinen was first in name but not in kind - the first place in world Green 
party history goes jointly to the two parties from 'Earth's last islands '. The dreaming 
of Green politics is a world dreaming, and this is where it first took party fonn. 
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In this work, I examine salient aspects of the global economic, political and social 
context in which Green politics arose, and then go on to look at the specifically local 
origins and characteristics ofthe Values Party and the United Tasmania Group. 
I conclude with a discussion about what the origins of Green politics, and the 
evolving global context, may tell us about how Green politics is likely to develop in 
the twenty-first century. But to begin with, it is necessary to consider the meanings 
of the term 'Green', and how the term will be defined for the purposes of this study. 
What do we mean by 'Green'? 
The term 'Green' has been in political currency since the late 1970s, and has 
acquired many shades of meaning. It is commonly used to encompass a wide and 
diverse range of political and social activities and lifestyle practices. A collector of 
'Green' literature can soon amass a shelf of books with titles like The Greening of 
Medicine, The Green Family Cookbook, The Green Cleaner, The Green Alternative 
Guide to Good Living, The Little New Zealand Green Book, The Green Consumer 
Guide and It's Easy Being Green. They are more numerous than overtly political 
volumes such as A Green Manifesto and Green Parties An International Guide.4 
The common thread running through the popular usage of the term 'Green', as 
evidenced by these examples, is an awareness of the physical environment and an 
advocacy of the protection and enhancement of that environment. Farmers, 
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homeowners, doctors and citizens at large are exhorted to become 'Green' in their 
work and play, and in Australasia the epithet 'clean and green' is perceived - and 
contested - as a prime marketing tool for attracting tourists, and for trading in 
agricultural produce. 
In this sense 'Green' appears to be a-political, and to resemble common sense beliefs 
and practices (rather like personal hygiene), which are universal and not connected 
with any particular political theory or practice. Political parties of all kinds now talk 
about their 'green' policies, meaning their explicitly environmental policies. Does 
this mean that when it comes to defining Green, anything goes? 
Stephen Young (1992) has attempted to capture the range of political meanings in 
the term 'green' within a flow chart entitled Different Dimensions of Green 
Politics '. This is · ... designed to separate deep ecology ideas from shallow ecology 
approaches; and to identify the dimensions of study and action that each gives rise 
to.' (Young, 1992, 12-13). Everything starts with Box 1 ('From the Industrial 
Revolution to the late twentieth century: population growth; economic growth; and 
industrial expansion). In response to this situation comes Box 2 ( 'Criticisms of 
industrialisation and limitless growth from a green perspective - the emergence of 
Green Politics). Then the chart divides into the Deep Ecology' side ('Solutions 
based on dark Green ideas aimed at radical economic and social change) and the 
'Environmental Reformism' side ('light green shallow ecology ideas based on 
mitigating the effects of industrialisation and continued growth '). The rest of the 
chart elaborates on the different inputs and outputs contributing to and stemming 
from these divergent responses to the environmental 'crisis '. On the 'deep' side these 
21 
.. , J 
DU' 6COLOC r: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 
..,. , 
fro. e,. .. Ind,urrllJ "."Oh,rIOn 
S~'ru.~~on,~.e::~~~ ~~r. 1<-------------------1 
r.dl~.1 .... lUI •• ,f: &ltd 
.oc,.' c/lI(l§1 
,..1 
'rinClph. 
l.rnd.rlyM" 
"Ie .IfIC.llYbl. 
.oC',.~y 
.., .. 
• n!lelh.I'''''''-' 
f •• cur •• of tn. 
10. Ii 
.~rr.· 
'."' •• "£.1''' 
.U'., •• ,." 10 
"rin, Cr ... " 
4. .o~'.ty .. bollt 
(or C,. •• II Jd •• ~: 
.co-pIIllo~pJJy 
..,.,J 
,tlll·.Ctlll, nlpporr fro. 
" ... .-oc,., _ .. __ n, .. 
I "'1 .l.,eto,..,. 
Flow chart dcsigncd to separate deep ecology ideas frolll shallow ccology 
approaches; amI to idcntify Ihe dimensions for action and study Ihat each gives 
rise to. 
Copyright Stephen Young, 1991 
S Y ICS/Ci PO I JJ02 
THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF GREEN POLITICS 
lot 11 
"., .. If 
SCII.,r.!,,: CO_U/U, .. 
'.U4nl .. ., .. 'ron....,r.l , .. s .... . 
allfo 1101",c.1 .,.n~ .. . , 
dllflT.tlr I .... ' .. 
Io:r 10 
Illf.ruat,on.l 
or,arUNE,o".: 
~.""Ct of .to"'II. 
"' ... r." •• ~ of 
.,. •• ,. ' •• 1.1 •• on 
1101'("-_.,11, 
P~ •• s •• 
60:, 11 
""",o"al 
,o"·""'."ts: 
'.""cor gf ,tg .. ,,,. 
..... ·,..".s. of 
,,. •• ,, ,s ..... Gil 
I1OI'C" __ .II,II, 
IIroc ••••• 
.." JIJ 
f" ... , • ... eror 
'.'pOIIS •• C" 
Cl'lln'ln, ,roul) 
lind con;u.lr 
d ...... .w.; IUtf/ 
reI c~'«1 
,00'1(,,, .. ,,, 
.(CltW •• 
....... 
include spiritual dimensions, eco-feminism, Green parties, extra-parliamentary 
strategies, different fonns of democracy, and the principles and practice of 
sustainability. On the 'shallow' side are getting environmental issues on to political 
agendas at different levels, environmental projects by non-profit groups, private· 
sector responses such as 'green' consumerism, environmental pressure groups, and 
policy making and implementation (See Figure 1). 
Young's typology shows that even when looking at just the 'ecology' dimension 
(and if this work does nothing else, it wi11 at least show that there is more to 'Green' 
politics than a single-minded focus on the physical environment), there is a wide 
divergence of theory and practice. In the rest of his paper he unpacks his boxes to 
show the complexity of green politics in its many facets, and how some parts just 
don't fit together snugly, or even at all. The gulf between those who believe that 
radical change of a rotten system is necessary, and those who think that tinkering 
with a basically sound system will suffice, is often impassable. 
Young locates Green parties (correctly) on the 'deep' side ofthe divide. However 
this must be principally because they advocate a radical analysis of the 
environmental crisis and radical solutions to it, rather than because they necessarily 
believe or fully endorse the eco-philosophies of 'deep ecologists' (such as Arne 
Naess), or the practice of deep ecologist militants, (such as Earth First!). 
So just what does the 'deepness' of Green parties consist of, and where does it come 
from? In limiting my compass in this study to Green parties - their programmes, 
policies and actual practices - I do not deny the existence or relevance of all those 
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other fonns of green politics. However, in narrowing my focus to the more 
manageable consideration of structured Green political organisations, I avoid the 
confusing plethora of environmental and lifestyle groups and practices which are 
considered (or consider themselves) to be 'Green'. Paradoxically, I also extend the 
definition of Green, since Green parties do not restrict their programmes to 
environmental and lifestyle concerns, nor their practices to conventional fonns of 
participation in existing political structures. 
Further, while Green parties were the first political parties to build their party 
platfonns on an explicitly environmental plank, and the environmental dimension is 
certainly fundamental to them, the environmental plank is only one of four 
foundational principles common to Green parties. The fundamental importance of 
the other dimensions of Green politics as defined by Green parties is perfectly 
illustrated by events at the foundational conference of Die Griinen. 
More titan environmentalism 
In October 1979, at a tense and drawn out congress in Offenbach, Gennany, the 
'four pillars' of Green party politics were decided upon by the proto-party which was 
to be come Die Griinen, the first party to use the name 'Green'. While none of these 
principles were politically novel in themselves, their combination into the basis of a 
party platfonn certainly was. As August Haussleiter described the fraught and 
historic moment: 
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"Although agreement seemed impossible, I took a piece of paper and wrote four 
words on it: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and non-violence. 
Then I called Gruhl (leader of the conservatives) and Reents (leader of the left) into 
the room where the journalists were and said 'Sign '. We then went back into the 
convention hall and announced We have a programme.' (Parkin, 1989, 120). 
Within a year (and after two more foundational and programmatic conferences) 
individuals and groups with past or present right-wing connections and/or 
programmes (including Haussleiter himself) were no longer in Die Griinen 
(HUlsberg, 1988,94-'96). But the four foundational principles agreed to at Offenbach 
were entrenched as the original and defining Green party principles. 
These principles have been translated into many languages in the succeeding years, 
and were the inspiration for the Green Charter formulated by the Green Party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand at its foundational conference in March 1990 (see Appendix 
A). They were also prefigured in 1974 in 'The New Ethic' of the United Tasmania 
Group (see Appendix B). What do they mean? 
Under the heading ecology comes the Green concern for ecological sustainability. 
This means that the quality, quantity and diversity oflife on planet Earth (and the 
physical environmental elements on which it depends, such as soil, air and water) are 
not further compromised by pollution, degradation, extinctions and so on. Also that 
where possible habitats and ecosystems are restored and/or enhanced to improve 
already compromised quality, quantity and diversity. By social responsibility Greens 
mean that both individuals and social institutions are under obligations of mutual 
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respect and aid. Both must play their part in ensuring that every member of society is 
accorded the rights and the means to realise their full potential both as an individual 
and as a contributor to society. Grass-roots democracy is a Green ideal, involving 
extending democratic participation beyond formal and token activities at the 
representative parliamentary level through to equal participation at community level, 
in the tradition of the ancient Athenian assemblies or the contemporary New England 
town meeting. Finally, non-violence is not just the absence of armed conflict and a 
commitment to national and international disarmament, but includes positive 
alternative ways of resolving conflicts at international, national, local and even 
domestic levels. 
As defined by Green parties, therefore, Green politics means more than 
environmentalism; it means a foundational linkage of environmentalism with the 
three great goals of 'progressive' politics in the West since the eighteenth century-
justice, democracy and peace. In choosing to focus on Green politics as defined by 
its practitioners and theorists in Green parties, and in choosing to exclude the wealth 
of Green theorising conducted by a wide range of philosophers, and the practice of 
people in the broader social movements who would consider themselves 'green', 
I do not deny the salience of either academic theorising or lifestyle practice to Green 
politics. On the contrary, much of what the non-party philosophers and practitioners 
come up with ultimately finds its way on to Green party platforms. Practitioners 
working in the areas of sustainable production, appropriate technology, human 
rights, species conservation, co-operative enterprises, local scale economies, energy 
conservation, alternative health care, animal welfare and so on frequently provide the 
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real working models on which Green policies presented to the electorate can be 
based. 
However, it is Green parties which have taken on the job of attempting to make a 
coherent political programme out of these seemingly disparate areas of interest and 
expertise, and of offering it as a 'package to fellow citizens as a democratic choice. 
Two terms one frequently encounters when researching Green politics are 'rainbow' 
and 'holistic'. Green parties have set themselves the probably impossible task of 
reconciling the rainbow of new social and environmental politics into an holistic 
philosophy and a coherent political programme. 
Without denying the important role of non-party Greens, therefore, it is to Green 
parties that we must tum to explore the full meaning of Green politics as it is played 
out in today's world. To understand the role played by Green parties globally it is 
necessary to understand the context within which they take their place on the stage of 
world politics. In the rest of this chapter I consider the ways in which we might gain 
that understanding, and how I came to prioritise certain routes over others. As part of 
that process it is necessary to begin by clarifying and correcting some common 
misconceptions about the origins of Green politics. 
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Case studies in conceptualising the origins of Green politics 
In trying to select the most salient factors that have precipitated and influenced 
Green politics as a global phenomenon, one is faced with what seems like a 
bewildering array of choice. There are Green voices arguing for a variety of 
precipitating factors. These include a loss of wilderness (Hay and Haward, 1988), 
industrialism (Porritt, 1984), spiritual malaise (Spretnak and Capra, 1984) and just 
about every other ill of modem global society, including over-population, the energy 
crisis, resource depletion, consumerism, pollution, structural unemployment, 
exploitation in the Third World, and nuclear energy and weapons. 
Theorists within the Green movement are supplemented by academics who 
emphasise the role of the subject matter of their discipline. These include 
sociologists looking at new social and political movements (Boggs, 1986), political 
scientists examining 'value change' in voting publics (Inglehart, 1977; 1990) and 
political economists considering changes in the world economy (Lipietz, 1988, 
1992). The arguments from the activists are generally limited to special and partial 
pleading based on a restricted selection of data, and sometimes an ideological bias. 
The academic accounts, even where free of overt ideological bias, can also be 
limited, often taking on the aspect of being little more than an effect ofthe 
methodologies typically employed by the discipline (see, for example, Levine, 1975, 
on the limitations of Rokeach 's value dimension scale). How is it possible, therefore, 
to select what has real explanatory value, and what warrants further investigation, 
from the range of possibilities? 
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I decided that it was necessary to start by investigating the 'assumptions behind the 
assumptions', Behind the assumption that Green politics is a radical fonn of 
environmentalism lie two further assumptions about what constitutes and/or 
precipitates environmentalism or ecology as a politics, In heavily urbanIsed and 
heavily popUlated Western Europe the discourse of environmentalism is largely 
around the pollution and degradation of human living and working space and the 
depletion ofthe natural resources used for industry, In equally urbanised but not 
quite so heavily populated North America and AustralaSia there is an additional (and 
sometimes dominant) concern about the degradation and depletion of 'Nature' and 
'wilderness " The European position is sometimes characterised as 'anthropocentric' 
or 'shallow', being concerned primarily with protecting human standards of living; 
the Europeans can easily riposte that the preservation of Nature' position is riddled 
with philosophical and practical contradictions, 
Both these positions are canvassed below, via case studies in which I attempted to 
tease out just why neither approach is able to answer fundamental questions about 
the timing, location and actual content of Green politics, For a 'common sense' 
attempt to derive environmentalism as a politics generally, or Green parties 
specifically, from either industrial pollution and depletion or attacks on 
nature/wilderness would surely conclude that Green politics would (should) have 
started in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, not New Zealand in the late-
twentieth, Obviously just what we mean by 'industrialisation' and 'nature' therefore 
require further examination, 
28 
Against Growth? 
The trashing of the immediate environment is as old as human history (I still 
remember with wry pleasure that inspirational marine ecologist Professor John 
Morton quoting to me - in the original Latin - Horace's complaint at the pollution of 
the Tiber by the effluent of ancient Rome). But it is only in the last two centuries that 
human beings have developed the technological capacities and the commercial 
imperative to lay waste to and deplete the resources of an entire planet (not to 
mention exploit or destroy literally millions ofthemselves). The Industrial 
Revolution, based on the new technologies of steam power and industrial chemistry, 
and with its associated depopulation of the countryside and rapid urbanisation of 
Western Europe, was responsible for the acceleration and exacerbation of existing 
environmental problems such as water and air pollution and over-crowding. Also for 
the creation of new ones, such as the toxic processing and adulteration of food on a 
mass scale. 
In the twentieth century breakthroughs in physics (especially the jet engine and 
nuclear fission) further increased the range of environmental hazards and rendered 
them globally ubiquitous, creating a 'risk society' (Beck, 1995). The science of the 
twentyfirst century, which is already upon us, is biology. The genetic codes oflife 
are being cracked and shuffled between species with as much care - and as little 
thought - as nuclear tests were conducted in the American, Australian and Soviet 
'desert' lands in the 1950s and 60s.( Accounts of just how much (usually terminal) 
damage those tests did to people who were never told that they were being 
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experimented upon, and the places where they lived, can be found in Alcalay (1988; 
1995); Alcalay and Todd (1994); Dibblin (1988); Johnson (1984); Kerr et al (1984); 
McClelland (1985); Miliken (1986); Smith (1985) and Tame and Robotham (1982). 
It gives me no pleasure to contemplate providing a similar listing for genetic 
engineering experimental damage on unsuspecting and non-consenting human 
subjects and other species twenty years hence.) 
The enormity of the environmental impacts of the widespread application of these 
technologies has certainly created environmentalism or 'political ecology' as a 
politics of resistance to the destruction. But environmentalism is essentially a 
reactive politics, addressing symptoms rather than causes. This is not to say that it is 
a useless or futile politics, since it is generally worthwhile to ameliorate distressing 
symptoms, even as one searches for a cure. But it is not the same as Green politics, 
which has theories of causation that Green parties develop and address in their 
platforms and policies. 
The causes of ecological and social distress and dysfunction most often cited in the 
early Green literature are 'industrialism' and 'consumerism' - two forms of highly 
organised social behaviour which are both the means and the ends of 'economic 
growth '. Economic growth is a goal which Greens reject both as an end it itself, and 
as a means to achieving 'the good life '. While not opposed to economic growth in 
principle, when it is achieved in ways which are ecologically and socially benign, the 
Green critique of economic growth rests on its reification, by other political 
tendencies, into a sacred cow of national and international economic management. 
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The rejection of economic growth as a major focus and function of contemporary 
state-craft remains the original and abiding difference between Green politics and 
other forms of party politics, of both the left and the right. Hence the Green 
scepticism towards both socialism and capitalism, where these are touted as superior 
ways of achieving economic growth, and Green neutrality towards both planning and 
markets as economic tools for organising production and distribution. The Green 
approach is to assess particular plans and particular markets with regard to their 
ability to deliver ecologically sustainable and socially equitable production and 
distribution outcomes. 
If the unquestioning, unchecked drive towards economic growth is a primary cause . 
of environmental destruction then the roots of Green politics can be found anywhere 
where expansionist industry and commerce have made their mark on environments, 
and also on societies where the mass of people have been deprived ofland and of 
sustainable, equitable, secure livelihoods. What better place to examine this thesis 
than a country which only came into as existence as a nation-state by means of its 
new found role as a participant in the expanding world economy? 
In a case study entitled 'Colonisation and Alienation: the origins of Green politics in 
the world market economy and industrial agriculture in the nineteenth century , 
(Dann, 1995a) I cast a critical eye over the 'discovery' of New Zealand, and its later 
development. New Zealand was given its current name in 1642 by the leader of a 
Dutch trade expedition. Abel Tasman's expedition was a commercial failure, but 
James Cook's late eighteenth century explorations identified several 'natural 
resources' which had become important items of world commerce at that time. Seals, 
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whales (for oil), fibre (for ropes and sails) and timber (for masts and ships' planking) 
were valued principally because they provided raw materials for the industries which 
produced the growing fleet of ships that made the expansion of global trade possible. 
The first, and purely exploitative, phase of New Zealand's economic 'development' 
began on a beach in a remote fiord of southern New Zealand in 1792. There a gang 
of sealers constructed a rude barracks and began an escalating regime of slaughter 
that was to culminate in the destruction of an estimated 90% of the New Zealand fur 
seal population (Clark, 1949,49-50). (The sealskins were in demand as a fashion 
clothing commodity for the growing European and American middle classes.) 
Pure exploitation of natural resources was followed by a settlement phase, where the 
chief commodity traded (in England as well as in New Zealand) was land. The 
creation of markets in land, which had taken centuries to come to pass in Europe, 
(Polanyi, 1980) was well established as standard practice in Britain by the nineteenth 
century. This system was rapidly superimposed on the non-market land acquisition 
and utilisation systems of the indigenous Maori people, eclipsing their systems 
completely (not without creating gross injustices and major grievances which are 
only finally being rectified via a special tribunal set up for the purpose over one 
hundred years later). 
The third phase in New Zealand's economic development was that of industrialised 
primary production, which secured its ongoing participation in the world economy. 
At first this was based on grazing sheep on extensive range-lands, which were 
converted from native grasses and shrubs to more palatable albeit less stable exotic 
species by widespread burning, repeated annually (Stephens, 1965). Wool was 
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removed from the sheep in large shearing factories, known as woolsheds, where up 
to two hundred workers at a time carried out the labour in a highly 
compartmentalised fashion. There was (and is) rigid separation of the tasks in and 
around the woolshed. The jobs were split into herding and handling the sheep before 
and after shearing; shearing itself (where the tasks are further divided into the 
relatively unskilled removal of dirty wool from the hindquarters only, and the highly 
skilled rapid removal of a whole, clean fleece); trimming, pressing and baling the 
fleeces; and keeping the shed tidy. This organisation oflabour was the epitome of 
'Taylorist' or 'Fordist' assembly line industrial production - John Martin (1990) 
provides a good account of industrial work practices on large farms in New Zealand 
in the nineteenth century. 
With the invention of refrigeration technology in the late nineteenth century meat 
processed in 'freezing works' and butter and cheese made in 'dairy factories' were 
added to New Zealand's export commodities. The dairy products sounded the final 
death knell for the once-extensive lowland podocarp and mixed broadleafforests, 
which grew in damper areas more suitable for conversion to dairying (Petersen, 
1965). The wool went straight to the textile mills that were contributing to the 
pollution of northern British towns (and creating urban labour markets therein); 
the meat and dairy produce to the mouths of the growing urban popUlation of Britain. 
Both economies grew - and slumped - and grew - and slumped throughout the 
nineteenth century - mutually dependent on an increasingly internationalised 
economic framework. The title of Simkin's (1951) history of the New Zealand 
economy says it all- The Instability of a Dependent Economy. Farmers (and their 
economic interests) dominated New Zealand politics in numbers and influence right 
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up until the 1960s, with labour politics being equally tied to the international 
economy (as we shall see in Chapter Three). Indeed, 'labour' itself was a product of 
the mode of industrialised development of New Zealand, being unknown to the 
Maori and not much favoured by them when they were first introduced to the 
concept. First sealers and whalers, then farm labourers, freezing workers, dairy 
workers and so on worked for low wages in conditions which were conducive to 
developing a politics oflabour which contested the recently established 'fact' of 
economic life - the creation of markets in labour (Polanyi, 1980, 72-73). 
The 'naturalness' of markets inland and labour (and capital), and their relative 
importance, is taken for granted by late twentieth century participants in the world 
economy. Somuch so that it comes as a shock to read contemporary accounts from 
the nineteenth century that show how the new system had to be explicitly promoted 
and defended, and its claims to dominance reinforced, by all manner of apologists 
and advocates. These included the shipping reporter of the Lytte/ton Times in 1858. 
His report in the November 24 issue of the paper on the arrival of the barque Indiana, 
(which brought my assisted immigrant great-grandparents John and Jane Lee from 
Sunderland in north-east England to New Zealand), was telling. It included the 
words 'There are not a few also of that class, the first and second cabin passengers, 
who help to maintain the balance of capital against labour. ' 
With the imposition of markets in land and the application ofmarketised labour, and 
with the concomitant failure to recognise for purposes of necessary conservation and 
wise investment something that is readily recognised for the purposes of profiteering 
- namely that natural resources within a capitalist context constitute a form of capital 
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- the natural environment in New Zealand suffered grievous blow after grievous 
blow.5 A descriptive audit of the carnage was undertaken by Andrew Hill Clark 
(1949) in the mid-twentieth century, and it was found to be extensive. Generation 
after generation of 'nature lovers' lamented it and attempted to redress it, via 
legislation, lobbying, and the purchase of reserves (Dalmer, 1983; Lochhead, 1994; 
Potts, 1882). 
The preservation and planting of forests even became an issue capable of triggering a 
major reformation of New Zealand's political structures (Wynn, 1977). In the mid-
twentieth century a new profession of soil and water conservators (Roche, 1994) was 
created. Their mandate was to try and turn around the frightening loss of soil and 
water resources that came in the wake of the deforestation, overgrazing and 
proliferation of pest plants and animals which was attendant upon the imposition of 
industrialised agriculture. 
New Zealand, as a nation state, has never known anything other than a fully 
industrial, commercial, capitalist approach to land and other 'natural resources '. 
It has always been conscious that its 'standard ofliving' (which, as Greens were to 
argue, is not necessarily synonymous with its 'quality of life) is directly related to 
its successful supply of primary produce to the global economy. Devoid of the 
ameliorating legacies of previous economic and social systems that prevailed in 
Europe, or the capacity to be economically self-sufficient like the USA, New 
Zealand is a particularly clear example of the interplay between industrialised 
methods of production, the expansion of the world capitalist economy, and the 
destruction ofthe natural environment. The negative results of these interactions are 
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identical to those identified and excoriated by the American green fanner-
philosopher Wendell Berry (1977) and are thus an unsurprising seedbed for the 
growth of Green politics. 
For Nature? 
But is this explanation of Green origins the only one, or the definitive one? In my 
exploration of the assumptions that conflate environmentalism with Green politics, I 
came across another major explanatory strand of thinking on the origins of the Green 
political impUlse. In this perspective primary attention is paid to the psycho-social 
dimension in the history of humanity, to the functioning of structures of dominance 
and subordination, oppression and exploitation. In this telling of history, 'Culture' is 
opposed to Nature', and Nature is invariably the loser. Some accounts (see, for 
example, Griffin, 1980; Gray, 1981) make explicit connections between forms of 
human exploitation/oppression and the exploitation of Nature generally. 
The Nature' perspective on Green politics has a much longer history and a far 
greater literature (both polemical and scholarly) than economic approaches. 
For every Alain Lipietz (1995) wooing a nervous left-wing friend with accounts of 
why the Greens have a better analysis of the world's economic, social and 
environmental ills and better proposals for addressing them than socialist parties, 
there are dozens of appeals to a love of and concern for Nature as a (self-evident) 
basis for Green political action. 
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The most erudite scholarship and bewitching literary style has certainly, and no 
doubt fittingly, been brought to bear on the subject. From Thoreau's Walden (1854) 
to Annie Dillard's (1974) Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, through Gary Snyder's poetry 
and essays (1970, 1974, 1992, 1995), not to mention accounts of specific areas such 
as Barry Lopez (1986) on the Arctic, this is a literature where reading can give 
almost as much pleasure as being there, and probably a lot more insight. Academic 
approaches can even reach the same heights - between the pinnacles of Leo Marx 
(1964) and Simon Schama (1995) there is a wealth of other almost as well-written 
explanations and evocations ofthe landscape/culture connection, and what it means 
to live in, with and by 'Nature,.6 
The low threnody that one hears running through and behind this literature rises to a 
shrill pitch in the Nature polemicists. Taking as their text Thoreau's 'In wildness is 
the preservation of the world " writer after writer (representative exemplars include 
Burton, 1990; Grumbine, 1995; McKibben, 1990; Shepard, 1992; Sessions, 1995 -
most of the writers on this subject are male and North American or Australian) 
bemoans the moral, material and spiritual calamity of the destruction of Nature in 
general and Wilderness in particular. They also advocate the necessity of protecting 
'wild' places and 'wild' creatures. A case has even been made (Hay and Haward, 
1988) for the philosophy and practice of protecting wilderness as an historically 
anterior and philosophically superior basis for Green politics. 
The idea that the protection of wild Nature is both the major cause and the major 
goal of Green politics is certainly plausible. Can. we therefore stop reading here? Not 
yet, for there is still another literature - one which examines the Nature literature 
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from a new critical perspective. Fortunately or unfortunately for the Nature writers, 
in the 1980s they received the attention of readers influenced by the 
deconstructionist approach ofthe intellectual trend of 'post-structuralism' or 'post-
modernism '. In their rejection ofthe 'Grand Narratives' of modernity, these theorists 
included a rejection of the posited antithesis of 'innocent Nature' with 'corrupt 
Civilisation '. They set out to demonstrate that 'wilderness' is a construct of the very 
Western 'civilisation' which was primarily responsible for destroying or damaging 
the species and lands on which the geography and ecology of wilderness is 
physically based. (The debates and their protagonists are covered in a variety of 
ways in Dansereau (1975), Evernden"(1992), McLaughlin (1993), Oelschlaeger 
(1991), Plumwood (1993), Simmons (1993), Soper (1995), Worster (1979) and 
Young (1985), to name but a few of the excellent works which uncover the specific 
historical links between 'Nature' thinking and practices.) 
Nor was the 'naturist' position seen as more fundamental or coherent 
philosophically, or more likely to lead to Green (or even environmental) politics than 
an 'anti-naturist' one. 'Nature' and 'natural' have always been politically loaded. 
terms, carrying a negative or positive change depending on who uses them. Jonathan 
Dollimore (1991, 3-18) documents the persistent efforts of the writer Gide to justify 
and promote the 'naturalness' of homosexuality as part of his survival strategy as a 
writer and an individual. This was certainly more successful than Oscar Wilde's 
intellectual and personal refusal to accept any normalisation or naturalisation of his 
behaviour. Robert Po is (1986) discusses the way in which the Nazis used the concept 
of 'natural' in order to justify a number of unpleasant activities. These included the 
extermination of 'inferior' humans and the promulgation of rigid sex roles which 
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kept 'superior' women breeding more 'superior' men to conquer more territory for 
the 'superior' race to expand. Simon Schama (1995,67-70) documents the tender 
protection which Hermann Goring bestowed on the primeval Polish forest of 
Bialowieza, where in the midst of war every natural leaf and animal was to be 
preserved - and every Jew who lived there to be destroyed. It is not difficult to show 
that 'doing what comes naturally' is not as straightforward as it seems, and appeals 
to Nature are at least as often (probably more often) used to justify regimes of 
domination and scarcity as those ofliberty and plenty. Paradoxically, as Neil Levy 
(1998) points out through a comparison ofthe positions ofthe 'naturist' philosopher 
Heidegger and the 'anti-naturist' Foucault, a just and democratic environmental 
politics may well be more safely built on an 'anti-naturist' foundation. This is the 
point Donna Haraway chooses to make in her 'Cyborg Manifesto' (Haraway, 1991, 
149-182). She urges the 'grand narrative' politics of socialism and feminism (which 
she espouses) to loosen up a little and understand the positive political implications 
of embracing the 'non-natural' in the form of the part-animallpart-machine identity 
of the cyborg, who will be the 'normal' political actor of the twenty-first century. 
Moving from the philosophical to the practical, the desirability and possibilities of a 
technics of nature (specifically, sustainable forestry) based on a postmodernist 
re-conceptualisation of the scientific project are canvassed by Dean Walker (1996) in 
his study of New Zealand native beech forest management. 
Finally, to complete the rout of Nature as a basis for politics, there has been a revolt 
of 'the natives '. The 'Noble Savages " whom the Romantic imagination fondly 
believed to dwell in rude simplicity and harmony in 'the Wilderness', began to fight 
back in academic fora. The march of Western 'civilisation' across the rest of the 
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globe had largely dispossessed their ancestors from whatever simalcrums of Arcadia 
they had managed to occupy and/or create. They were deprived of the opportunities 
to make a 'natural' living in 'the wilderness' by. deforestation, other ecological 
damage, and the institutions of private property and markets in land. They were 
reduced to a precarious relationship with the labour market, and decimated by the ill 
health consequent on introduced diseases, poor diet, alcohol, and enforced 
overcrowding. To add further insult to injury they were even driven out of 'the 
wilderness' in order to make it more 'wild' (the fate of the Ahwahneechee Indians of 
Yosemite - see Schama, 1995, 186). Thus rendered into natural paupers, the only 
further thing the original inhabitants of the Americas and Australasia appeared to 
have to offer Western culture was a form of 'nature spirituality' which placed great 
emphasis on conservation of resources and reverence for other species. But alas, 
even that has been exploited - to the point of trickery - by the politicking over 
Nature being fought out within Western paradigms. (For the sadly disillusioning tale 
of the manufacture of Chief Seattle's much-reprinted inspirational statement of a 
right relationship with nature see The Gospel of Chief Seattle is a Hoax' by 
Hargrove (1989). 
When 'the natives' do get to speak for themselves, a key point they are insistent 
upon is that what Westernised people c~lled wilderness, they called home~ ( 'Anyone 
who claims that land where Aboriginal people lived for thousands of years is 
'wilderness' ignores that behind each rock, each gully, each cave, each river lies a 
story, a legend. From those legends Aboriginal people were guided in their 
movement. How can you get lost in your own home? ') (Mansell, 1990, 104) (See 
also the example given by McLaughlin, (1993, 10), regarding the inability of a 
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contemporary Asian hunter-gatherer to translate - or even comprehend - the 
sentence 1 am lost in the jungle. ) 
The primary political interest of indigenous peoples ever since their expropriation by 
wilderness-loving and wilderness-destroying Westerners has been getting back the 
title to their erstwhile homes. This has been a long project, with many and various 
tactics employed. In 1887 in New Zealand the leadership of the Ngati Tuwharetoa 
tribe even managed to parlay the nascent Western passion for 'wilderness' into a 
·way of protecting their ancestral mountains and securing tribal title to them. This 
was done by incorporating them into what became Tongariro National Park - the 
world's fourth national park (Harris, 1974). Other indigenous peoples - and other 
Maori tribes - have not fared so well. Hence we have the 'nation within a nation' 
politics of indigenous peoples in Australasia and the Americas, as they struggle to 
right the severe environmental and other wrongs that have been and are being done 
to them (Johnston, 1994). A Green politics built upon the relationship of indigenous 
peoples to 'Nature' is therefore not one that romanticises that relationship in the past, 
but rather one that seeks to rebuild it on the basis of secure title in the future. 
In Australia this has been expressed in practice by unwavering support from 
the Australian Greens for the provision and extension of Native Title legislation; in 
New Zealand by Green Party support for the land restitution processes of the Treaty 
ofWaitangi Tribunal. 
Despite these reservations about wilderness discourse and practice, however, and the 
salutary corrections to colonialist assumptions from indigenous perspectives, plus all 
the debunking and deconstruction of simplistic notions of an a-historical, essential 
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'Nature', writers like Bill McKibben (1990) in The end of nature still seem to have a 
valid point. Radical changes have taken place in the natural environment in the past 
two centuries, and the pace of change appears to be accelerating. Some of those 
changes are now either irreversible, or so difficult to tum around it may take 
generations of human lifetimes to do so. This must surely have a deep impact on 
human consciousness, and hence on politics? 
I investigated this possibility with a case study entitled Wildness in the West: has 
Nature become an Agent of History? J (Dann, 1996). I began by studying the major 
changes in the natural environment which have indeed taken place in the twentieth 
century. They include: 
(1) the burden of nuclear radiation from weapon explosions and nuclear 
accidents, which causes genetic mutation and other damaging effects long 
after the original event; 
(2) the destruction of natural habitat, the proliferation of environmental toxins, 
and the lack of proper protection which has led to an extinction rate for 
mammals, birds and flowering plants that is now more than 1000 times above 
t~e natural geological base rate - this means that as many as one third of the 
species of this planet will be extinct by the mid twenty-first century, and that 
vertebrate evolution may have already ended in North America; 
(3) the impact of the accelerating production and application of ever greater 
numbers of synthetic chemicals in agriculture and manufacturing, which is 
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known to be a major contributor to wildlife mortality and morbidity, and has 
recently been shown to affect humans in similar ways; 
(4) the industrialisation of primary production, with first machinery, then 
chemicals, and finally biological technologies, such as genetic engineering, 
has in the words of Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson (1987, 153) 'eliminated 
land and nature " Open air farms have been replaced by inhumane animal 
factories, with animals engineered to grow faster and give more of their 
'products', Genetic engineering is at the service of transnational corporations. 
whose primary concern is profitability and who are not much interested in 
downstream environmental effects (Coghlan, 1998); 
(5) the destruction of the ozone layer, and climate change associated with global 
warming, which both have major impacts on nature on earth, as species 
struggle and sometimes fail to adapt to altered conditions, and humans 
substitute dubious 'cures' (sunscreen and insurance) for more-difficult-to-
achieve preventative measures, We may also speculate on what impact an 
increase in the frequency and ferocity of hurricanes, to the scale of Hurricane 
Mitch, which devastated parts of Central America in 1998, will have on the 
global economy and on local politics, 
From the evidence from all sides, then, there is no doubt that damage to the natural 
environment, both locally and globally, is so severe, and so widespread, that a Green 
politics based on redressing and preventing it, and it alone, makes perfect sense, 
Even if we have base 'anthropocentric' motives (such as having healthy children, 
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eating safe food, avoiding cancer, using 'wilderness J for recreation, and saving on 
insurance premiums), we can see how taking an 'ecocentric J approach to political 
programmes will help us achieve these goals, while providing positive spin-offs for 
other species as well. 
But what is the motor force behind all the destruction? Simon Schama (1995) 
provides example after example of nature appreciation and protection or preservation 
going hand in hand with, and even being practised by, the very individuals and 
Classes who were driving the economic expansionism and exploitation which was 
destroying the nature they purported to love. The American paper magnate Zenas 
Crane, for example, who in what Schama calls 'the most remarkable case of 
unembarrassed cultural schizophrenia' (Schama, 1995,207) actually commissioned a 
superb painted elegy to the giant redwoods to grace his walls - trees which in the 
business context were just so much proto-pUlp. First aristocrats, and then 
industrialists and merchants (and as we have seen, even Nazis) preserved the great 
forests of Europe, with 'the poor J cast in the villain role of 'destroying the 
environment' in their need to personally cut down trees and kill animals for fuel, 
housing, food and clothing. 
The same arguments regarding the greater environmental destructiveness of the poor 
are tediously advanced today. They are generally presented in the benevolent guise 
of accelerating the 'development J of the Third World so that the people there will 
spend less time scratching a living directly from the land. They will then presumably 
pass their days like their Western counterparts, 'sustainably' in air-conditioned 
offices, perhaps trading in 'futures J in the commodities of world commerce such as 
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oil, minerals, grain, etc. Which could once again be produced (to the detriment of the 
local environment) in the erstwhile First World countries? 
It is in exploring this ridiculous false contradiction between the supposedly wilfui 
desire of the majority to make a living. at whatever cost to the environment, and the 
seemingly benevolent inclination of the few to get rich, in order to better appreciate 
Nature, that we reach the limits of finding the roots of Green politics in attitudes and 
practices towards Nature. Nature is not an independent variable; it is a highly 
dependent and contested battleground. Green parties· can not derive their politics and 
policies from a 'Nature J which is in itself a politically charged concept, not an 
eternal verity. 
I therefore concluded my investigation into Nature politics with the view that there 
was no getting away from human agency. Rather than projecting our good and bad 
sides on to 'Nature', and thence into politics, and seeking to derive explanations for 
political behaviours at a remove, it was more useful to focus on historically specific 
trends and events. In particular, it is important to examine the global expansion of 
capitalism, for better explanations as to why and how the environment is being 
damaged on an historically unprecedented scale and at an equally unprecedented 
rate, and how this is connected with social and political change. This required a 
proper theorisation of world political phenomena, to which I now tum. 
45 
The historical structure of world politics 
Green politics, like its internationalist nineteenth century predecessors socialist 
politics and feminist politics, is a world historical phenomenon. It first manifested 
itself in party form in Australasia in 1972, but within twenty years it was observable 
right around the globe, with Green parties appearing in Europe, Asia, Africa and the 
Americas. By the late 1990s, these Green parties were linked via the Internet, were 
holding regional and international congresses, and were undertaking joint regiollal 
and global initiatives on issues of mutual concern, such as nuclear testing and 
nuclear waste disposal. 
The vast majority of previous accounts of Green party politics have concentrated on 
it as a national or at most as a regional phenomenon. The most extensive literature is 
on the Green parties of Western Europe. This includes works which focus on one 
country alone, especially Germany, but the other countries of Western Europe are 
also considered separately, or are compared with the German scene.7 
One work (Parkin, 1989) covers all of the then existing Green parties in the world, 
giving a brief description ofthe history, structure and achievements of each one, but 
it is now well out of date, and does not attempt an analysis of Green politics as a 
global phenomenon. Two works which use the German Greens as the main object of 
study (Markovits and Gorski, 1993; Spretnak and Capra, 1984) also contain attempts 
to assess the wider international significance of Green politics. However, they are 
both flawed by the author's biases towards explaining certain features at the expense 
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of others. In Markovits and Gorski's case the over-emphasis is on the 'leftism' of the 
German Greens, while Spretnak and Capra claim a universality for the 'spiritual' 
dimension of Green politics, which they emphasise heavily. Neither work considers 
Die Griinen as an exemplar ofthe global political trends that have brought forth . 
Green parties on all continents. Stephen Rainbow's thesis (1991) gives an account of 
Green politics in New Zealand (principally the Values Party) which is contrasted 
with Scandinavian Green party politics, but again Rainbow does not analyse Green 
politics as a global phenomenon, but concentrates on criticising its shortcomings, 
both theoretically and in specific nation-state contexts. 
The study of Green party politics to date, therefore, has been largely confined within 
the conventional boundaries and concepts of the discipline of political science, where 
the nation-state is taken as the prime organising structure for politics, and parties are 
studied chiefly as actors within that structure. International comparisons are 
precisely that - inter-national - and give primacy to nation-state level structures. 
This state-centred approach to political analysis is now being contested by some 
political scientists (see for example, Magnusson, 1996), and it has always had 
limited utility to those wishing to analyse the other levels and dimensions of the 
exercise of power. While national and regional level accounts of Green party politics 
are both necessary and useful, even if they are all added together they fail to address 
the driving forces behind Green politics as a global phenomenon. They are a 
collection of trees that obscure one's view of the wood. They can not answer basic 
questions about Green politics as a global and historical phenomenon, including the 
questions which I began this study by asking. 
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A different theoretical approach to understanding global political phenomena is 
therefore required. There is already an existing and highly developed literature on 
world or global political activities which falls under the general rubric of 
1nternational Relations '. As it deals principally with the interactions between 
nation-states and their governmental representatives and military forces, it is of little 
theoretical or practical use for examining Green politics as a global activity 
conducted largely by non-governmental actors. In the preface to her book 
The Retreat of the State The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy Susan 
Strange (1996) discusses what the state-centred approach leaves out, and why the 
discipline of international relations is inadequate to the task of analysing and 
comprehending the multiplicity of forces at work in global politics today. 
The study of non-governmental global political actors is just one important facet of 
world politics that is conducted outside the international relations theoretical 
framework, mainly by sociologists, geographers, historians and political economists. 
They have developed alternatives to the international relations approach, as it is 
summarised here by Barry Gills and Ronen Palan 
'Formerly, the dominant theories of state transformation took each state to be 
an ontologically distinct and organic entity. The preponderance of theoretical 
work durin~ the post-war period was unilinear and evolutionary, privileging 
endogenous factors of change over exogenous or "external ", "international" 
stimuli of transformation. '(Gills and Palan, 1994,3) 
Contrasting this with the structuralist approach represented by dependency theory 
(whose major theorist is Andre Gunder Frank), and world-systems theory (whose 
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major theorist is Immanuel Wallerstein), Gills and Palan claim that while the shift to 
understanding that there are global as well as national forces was welcome, there was 
a tendency to 'over-correct '. This occurred by focussing • ... too intently on the 
governing processes on a world scale without always sufficiently problematizing the 
domestic level of response and transformation.' (Gills and Palan, 1994,3). 
In describing a neostructuralist approach, Gills and Palan advocate putting the 
transformative processes themselves at the centre of analysis (Gills and Palan, 1994, 
3), rather than merely the relations between the governments of states. 
Neostructuralism is an attempt to provide a more rigorous and useful theoretical base 
for the analysis of global politics. Like dependency theory and world-systems 
analysis, it is more of an approach than a definitive method. The key features that 
distinguish structuralist approaches from the international relations approach relate 
to the way in which the historical, economic and social dimensions of global activity 
are integrated with the formal political realm. Specifically, there is a different 
conceptualisation of political space and time, of political actors and agents, and of 
political economy, and there is a much greater emphasis on the politically 
transformative role of science and technology. The main differences are set out 
briefly below. 
Political space and time 
Political space (i.e. the boundaries of nation or other states, and of regional blocs) is 
considered within the framework of political time (i.e. the historical economic, 
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political and social factors which have led to these spatial political phenomena). 
Political spaces are essentially transitory and contestable, and should not be used as 
the base unit of analysis for understanding global processes. (For an outline of this 
conceptualisation of political time/space see Wallerstein, 1991)8 
Political actors and agents 
If the geographically-based state is not the base unit of global political analysis, then 
it follows that such analysis is not confined to state-based actors and agents, and can 
and should include actors and organisations within what is quaintly but perhaps 
inadequately named 'civil society'. Indeed, neostructuralist approaches are 
frequently more interested in the actions ofthese individuals and organisations as 
agents of global historical change, since they are arguably more significant than the 
majority of nation-state actors. Studies of such agents range from those of powerful 
transnational corporations, some of which are larger and wealthier than many nation 
states (see, for example, Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994; Korten, 1996), through to 
citizen-based environmental and anti-nuclear global movements (see, for example, 
Falk, 1982; McCormick. 1989; Wapner, 1996). 
Political economy 
Neostructuralist approaches to world politics are not necessarily (or even usually) 
economic determinist approaches, but they sometimes attract this criticism from the 
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international relations camp because of the greater emphasis given to the effects of 
changes in economic theory and practice on global politics. Political space and time. 
and political actors and agents, are certainly heavily influenced, even if not 
completely determined, by economic factors. It would be impossible to understand 
where many ofthe nation- states existing in the world today came from, for example, 
without reference to the phenomenon of European economic expansionism, and 
associated colonisation and de-colonisation. Nation-states were and are economic 
actors in their own right, and move politically to gain economic advantage. 
However, they are not the only ecoriomic/political actors on the global stage, and a 
neostructuralist approach seeks to encompass the political effects of all economic 
activities. 
Political sciences 
Weaving through the historical, economic and social strands in neostructuralist 
approaches to world politics is a strong consideration of the role of science and 
technology, harnessed to economic and political ends, in determining political 
outcomes. Again, the approach seeks to avoid determinism while still giving proper 
weight to the way in which new scientific technologies open up new global political 
possibilities, from nuclear holocaust through to cloning humans and animals to fulfil 
certain roles. Global politics in itself effectively began with modem transport and 
communications technologies, and every change in those technologies, from the 
steam train to Concorde, from the telegraph to the Internet, has had the effect of 
'shrinking' the globe as a political space (Leyshon, 1995). Some theorists make 
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explicit links between the dominant technological mode and the dominant political 
mode - an example being Donna Haraway's quasi-mathematical statement of 
proportion on the shift from nuclear to gene technology with its associated political 
shifts: 
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TRANSURANIC ELEMENTS :TR"\l\fSGENIC ORGANISMS:: 
THE COLD WAR.: THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
(Haraway, 1997,52). 
Manuel Castells (1997, 123) sees in the ambiguous and deep connection of science 
and technology with Green politics the opportunity to develop a true science oflife 
rather than life under science. 
Technology is certainly not politically neutral in the global context, and when . 
considering the global role of Green politics, in particular, it must be given greater 
consideration than it would receive using an international relations approach. 
Without committing itself to any particular (neo )structuralist approach, therefore, 
this study of Green politics in its global context definitely draws on the strengths of 
developing more sophisticated concepts of the matrix of influential global political 
factors, and of focussing on transformative processes rather than on discrete entities. 
It seeks to understand Green politics as a global political phenomenon that both acts 
and is acted upon by world historical social, economic and technological changes. 
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Subsidiary explanations 
Although it is in my view necessary to go beyond current ways oftheorising politics 
in order to understand the Green phenomenon, it is still necessary to look at what 
existing approaches have contributed to our knowledge of the subject, before 
attempting to extend that knowledge. The lit~ratures on the industrialisation of 
primary production, on Nature and wilderness, on economic globalisation, on the rise 
and decline of social democracy, on new social movements and on contemporary 
Green parties do not exhaust all the possible sources of causation theories for Green 
politics. After deliberately leaving aside the possibly influential role ofthe new 
communications technologies, and the changes that are occurring in the concept and 
function of the nation state in a glob ali sed world, there are at least two other major 
avenues that have to be explored for possible explanatory value. 
The first of these is the thesis first promoted by Ronald Inglehart (1977), that voting 
publics in Western democracies were showing signs of a 'value shift " from 
'materialist' to post-materialist' reasons for voting. Considerable further work has 
been done on Inglehart's hypothesis, both to extend and follow up on his particular 
surveys. Such studies include Dunlap and Van Liere (1978); Flanagan and Inglehart 
(1987); Inglehart (1981, 1990); Knutsen (1990); Kreuzer (1990) Milbrath (1984) and 
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980). Further investigations and analysis of election results 
in specific countries within a 'post-materialist' framework has also been done. 
Australasian examples of such work include Bean et al (1990); Vowles (1991, 1993) 
54 
and Vowles and Aimer (1993). Does this point us to the true origins of Green 
politics? 
Fortunately an extensive investigation of the connection between 'post-materialism' 
as an electoral hypothesis and the actual theories and practices of Green politics has 
already been done. Tim Tenbensel (1994, 1995) has explored the content and 
boundaries of the 'value change' approach and concluded that it is of limited 
explanatory and predictive value in understanding Green politics as a global (or even 
a national) political phenomenon. He found it impossible to pin down aset of 
consistently related 'values' and policy orientations even for bona fide Greens, let 
alone for a wider voting public. He further noted that while it may be highly 
significant to show that Green voters and supporters tend to come from the 'new' 
middle classes, this is not because all or even most members of these classes exhibit 
'post-materialist' or 'Green' values. In fact an equally significant grouping of them 
are supporters of economic rationalist policies, and other 'values' which are 
antithetical to 'Green' values. In brief, he concluded that this approach was a dead 
end when it comes to understanding where Green politics is coming from, let alone 
where it is going. Nevertheless, it continues to be used by political scientists 
interested in voting behaviour, and in the course ofthe surveys they conduct there 
are occasional valuable snippets of information about Green politics. (Any such 
information relevant to this study can be found in Chapters Five and Six.) 
If the quantitative survey approach to uncovering the origins of Green politics is 
unhelpful, is the qualitative assessment of ideas more useful? While many people 
have advanced 'Green' theories about how the world works, and how it needs to 
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change, most of them have been at the level of polemic and pop philosophy-
engaging and even inspirational though some of them may be. Good examples of the 
genre include Bahro (1984); Brown (1990); Capra (1985); Kelly (1984); Porritt and 
Winner (1988) and Tokar (1987). 
A few theorists have gone more deeply into 'ecopolitics', and Robyn Eckersley 
(1992) has made a critical examination of their contribution to environmentalism as a 
political theory. She assesses the work of political/environmental theorists coming 
from a leftist position, such as Andre Gorz, Jiirgen Habermas, Murray Bookchin and 
Herbert Marcuse, and compares it with the work of theorists claiming to be 
'ecocentric' rather than 'anthropocentric' in their approach, such asWarwick Fox 
and various ecofeminists, and finds the leftists lacking from an ecocentric 
perspective. However the ecocentrics are vulnerable to the criticism that they neglect 
or fudge equally important Green political principles, and especially the principle of 
democratic decision-making - a criticism elaborated by Albert Weale (1993) in his 
review of Eckersley. 
The subject of the connection between democracy and other Green political ideals is 
such a critical one that Green theorists are now developing critiques and new 
formulations on the matter. Examples can be found in the volume edited by Brian. 
Doherty and Marius de Geus (1996), to which Eckersley contributes a chapter on 
Greening liberal democracy. The debate around this issue as conducted by its activist 
protagonists is further canvassed in Chapter Four - it is sufficiently divisive and 
unresolved to show that Green politics is not simply based on being more rather than 
less ecocentric in orientation. Nor, indeed, on anyone particular philosophical or 
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theoretical underpinning, as the diversity of approaches taken in the volume 
Ecopolitical theory: essays from Australia (Hay and Eckersley, 1992) underscores. 
This is developed further by Andrew McLaughlin (1993) in his discussion of 
anthropocentrism and deep ecology. Work on and by green theorists is helpful for 
assessing which strands of green thinking do (or do not) contribute to Green party 
programmes. But there is no way in which Green politics as it was and is actually 
practised can be 'read off' from any particular theorist or group of theorists. 
The deep roots of Green politics 
If global Green party politics is not a direct result of the pollution and degradation of 
the physical environment, the destruction of Nature', a shift in voter preferences, or 
an over-arching political theory - how much deeper do we have to dig to find the 
true roots? I now had four absolutely basic questions to address: 
(1) What was causing the global environmental and social degradation and 
destruction that Greens were reacting to in their distinctive fashion, and when 
did it start operating? 
(2) Why were no other party political tendencies coming up with a 'Green' 
response? 
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(3) Who (which individuals and groups) actually created Green politics, and who 
were their direct political antecedents? 
(4) What were the connections between the locally specific creation of the first 
Green parties and the global factors that give rise to Green politics? 
As I had discovered via the case studies and literature reviews outlined above, there 
was no literature that directly addressed these questions, let alone answered them in 
ways that I thought were satisfactory. With the honourable exception of Alain 
Lipietz (1988, 1992, 1995), and the India-based analysis ofBandyopadhyay and 
Shiva (1989), very little writing on Green politics, by Greens or others, pays much 
attention to the global economic framework within which nation-state and 
international politics has been conducted in the late twentieth century. Indeed, 
the overwhelming impression one gains from an overview of the literature on Green 
politics, as it has been developed by both Greens and academics, is of an endless 
debate around ecology and ethics, with remarkably little attention paid to the power 
of economic forces to direct and shape that debate. This is not to say that Greens are 
not interested in or do not write about economics, because there is a considerable 
literature in which Greens and their sympathisers construct critiques of neo-classical 
and 'free' market economics and posit alternatives. (Examples include Eckersley, 
1994; Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Henderson, 1988; Kemball-Cook et aI, 1991; Lutz 
and Lux, 1988; Rosewame, 1994; Seabrook, 1990). Greens have also developed new 
forms of micro-economics (Douthwaite, 1996; Meeker-Lowry, 1988; Partridge, 
1987). They have also attempted to develop economic and commercial theories and 
practices based on the physical realities of energy and ecosystems (Costanza, 1991; 
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Daly, 1977, 1980; Ekins, 1986; Group of Green Economists, 1992; Hawken, 1994; 
Jacobs, 1991; Peet, 1992; Perrings, 1987). But there is a gap when it comes to 
putting politics and economics together, so that much of the writing comes across as 
hopelessly idealistic, with optimum political scenarios developed without reference 
to the (existing and potential) economic constraints on achieving them. Conversely, 
exciting economic alternatives are proposed within a political vacuum. While in this 
work I am not attempting to write a full-blown political economy of the Green 
phenomenon, I do make a start on rectifying the huge lacuna in the literature by 
focussing on both the economic and political dimensions in tandem, and on the play 
of power between them. 
The second area of omission that I address is the remarkable change in left politics 
that took place in the 1980s, especially with regard to parliamentary leftism. There is 
one comparative study (Castles et aI, 1997) of the changes that took place under the 
Australian and New Zealand labour party governments of the 1980s, and one 
international study (Piven, 1992) that looks at the decline in social democrat/labour 
parties as an artefact of 'post-industrialism'. However, there are no studies that look 
at what was happening to social democrat/labour politics on a world scale as a result 
of globalisation. As I shall document, the changes that took place in the global 
economy were both part of and more than changes in the industrial mode of 
production which provided a basis for mass labour politics (Hobsbawm, 1989). 
The political changes involved governing parties in the First World democracies, no 
matter what their ostensible label and orientation, actively imposing 'structural 
reform' on their nation-state economies and societies. While all governing parties 
were prepared to implement these reforms, it is of more interest that social 
59 
democrat/labour parties were and are prepared to do so. This was in direct 
contradiction to their previous political strategy of building up and controlling the 
economy of the nation-state in order to meet the needs of their working class 
constituency. I could find no analytical studies of why and how this change occurred, 
yet it seemed to me to be a vital part of the explanation of why and how Green 
politics came to find a place on the parliamentary political spectrum. Therefore this 
was another major omission that had to be addressed. 
With regard to who created Green politics, and who their political ancestors were, 
there is a lot more published research available, especially on the New Left and the 
new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The books and other material 
consulted for this work include Anderson (1995), Astin et al (1975), Borkin and 
Rosenstone (1972), Breines (1989), Campbell (1991), Considine (1992), Frankel 
(1993), Fraser et al (1988), Gitlin, 1980, 1987), Gombin (1975), Goodman (1970), 
Gordon (1970), Jamison and Eyerman (1994), Jacobs and Landau (1967), Jennett 
and Stewart (1989), Lyman (1995), Offe (1985), Pakulski (1990), Piven and 
Cloward (1977), Scott (1990), Teodori (1970), Touraine (1981) and Whalen and 
Flacks (1989). However, none of these studies start from the personnel and platfonns 
of particular, historically and geographically specific Green parties, and works 
backwards to uncover the connections. Carl Boggs (1986a) George Katsiaficas 
(1987), however, go further than most in developing where the linkages lie, and I 
make extensive use of their work in Chapter Four. The 'New Left to Greens 
connection' is therefore another gap in the historical record that I close in this work, 
with the first two Green parties providing good sources of genealogical information. 
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Finally, one uncovers many, many passing references to Green politicsbeingglobal, 
and hence one concludes that this must be an important feature of Green politics -
but to date there has been no analysis of what this really means. This is probably due 
to the lack of attention paid to the motor of globalisation - economic forces. 
However, it also encompasses the lack of attention paid to the whys and wherefores 
of Green politics being embedded in certain key artefacts of globalisation, such as 
the global electronic media and the Internet. This is the fourth under-researched and 
under-analysed element of Green politics that I start to examine in this work, 
although I am unable to study it exhaustively. 
My approach to these elements, the concerns I try to address, and the way I structure 
this work accordingly, are outlined below. 
Globalisation 
It is necessary to take a much closer look at the world economic system, with a view 
to discovering the ways in which first the internationalisation of economic activity, 
and latterly the transnationalisation (or globalisation) of such activity has created 
unprecedented environmental and social effects. These effects are of concern to 
Greens, and are contested by them. 
Therefore in Chapter Two I examine the phenomenon of economic globalisation and 
its impacts on politics. Some of these are brutally direct, such as the destabilisation 
of the national control of economies, and hence the partial disenfranchisement and 
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increasing redundancy of citizens (at best) and armed conflict over resources (at 
worst). Some are less direct, but arguably no less brutal, such as the unprecedented 
effects which globalising economic activity has had on the natural environment. 
These include climate change, ozone depletion, global deforestation and accelerating 
species extinction. On human society the impacts include the widening gap between 
rich and poor (observable at both the national and the global level) and the severe 
increase in financial indebtedness at the personal and the national level. Of major 
economic and geographical, as well as social impact, are the extensive translocations 
of economic migrants and refugees from state to state and continent to continent and 
the consequent social impacts on the 'host' countries and 'guest' workers alike. For 
the first time in history the entire world has come to be dominated by one economic 
system, with massive and comparable social, political and environmental outcomes 
which cross nation-state boundaries. As a result, the physical environment and its 
'resources' have become a prime site of global political contestation. It is not 
possible to understand the political parties which embody a response to the new 
politics of the environment and society without understanding the underlying forces 
of economic globalisation which brought the new environmental and social problems 
into being. 
In Chapter Two I give a brief summary of those forces, including their historical 
development and their geographical reach. I also examine the seeming paradox that 
Green parties first appeared before the worst negative effects of globalisation 
became apparent. In fact they and their New Left and new social movement 
precursors appeared at a time when the world economy was booming, and young 
people, in the First World at least, had 'never had it so good'. And yet in the midst of 
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this time of economic 'progress' and general prosperity there was a world wide 
'revolution' (the protests, strikes and riots of 1968, which occurred right around the 
world), which was based on the seeds of the Green critique. Why and how this was 
so is also given further consideration in Chapter Four. 
The decline of social democracy 
A thorough examination of what happened to the parlianientary party politics that 
arose from and contested some of the harsher features of the first phase of creating 
an international economy is also necessary. This politics was known generically as 
'social democracy', and parties within this tendency called themselves social 
democrat or labour parties. These parties were strongly nationalist in their approach 
to economic management, and the goal of their economic policies was to improve 
the standard ofliving of the majority ofthe citizens in the nation-states of which they 
were sometimes the government.. 
I use the past tense in describing these parties, as although parties with these names 
... ~ still exist, and indeed are currently in government in some states, they no longer 
espouse or practise nationalist economics as a means of improving the lot of citizens. 
Instead they put their faith in greater participation in the global economy as the route 
to general national prosperity. This makes their economic policies almost 
indistinguishable from those of the 1iberal' or 'conservative' political parties with 
whom they share parliamentary power. 
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This obviously has significant implications for parties which do take a different 
approach to globalisation, and in Chapter Three 1 take up the task of contextualising 
the internationalist and globalist political party scene, within which Green parties 
locate themselves. Curiously, there are no substantial nationally-based accounts of 
how Green parties relate to their closest rival and closest ally in the party political 
spectrum, the social democrat/labour parties, let alone any consideration of social 
democracy as an internationalist phenomenon, and its relation to Green politics. 
This is despite the fact that West European Green parties have shown an 
overwhelming preference for forming· coalitions with social democrat and other 'left· 
parties, rather than with conservative and other 'right' parties. (1 use quote marks for 
the terms 'left' and 'right', as their meaning is not as clear cut as it once was. This is 
explored in Chapter Three with reference to what happened to social 
democrat/labour parties, and in Chapter Seven with regard to the first two Green 
parties.) 
As well as the evidence from actual coalition formation in Europe there is supporting 
evidence from voter and party member studies in Australia and New Zealand (Bean 
et aI, 1990; Dann, 1995b; Mackwell, 1977; Miller, 1991; Vowles and Aimer, 1993). 
This shows quite clearly that Green voters have generally been more likely to give 
their second preference to Labour than any other party (in Australia), or to vote 
Labour in the absence of any (or any viable) Green candidate (in New Zealand). 
Within global party politics, therefore, Green parties and their members are 
associated more closely with 'left' parties. 
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In Chapter Three I therefore provide a brief comparative history of the rise and 
decline of social democrat/labour politics, from the late nineteenth century to the late 
twentieth century, and show how a politics founded on (inter)nationalism comes to 
founder on globalism. It is in their rejection of their formerly successful nationalist 
methods of achieving socialist economic goals, and their failure to adapt globalist 
means to socialist ends, that social democrat/labour parties have ceased to be parties 
of the left in all but a rump of sentiment. In so doing they have created a space in the 
political spectrum for a Green critique of and opposition to capitalist globalisation. 
Understanding why and how this came about is important to understanding the 
political legacy bequeathed to The Greens from the Left, and what room it gives or 
takes for their political manoeuvring. 
New social movements and new politics 
Political parties are social institutions. While this may appear to be such a self-
evident statement that it is not worth making, in fact in my study of Green politics I 
have been surprised at how feeble a grasp some commentators appear to have ofthis 
basic fact. While Green politics has its fair share of charismatic individuals and 
daring theorists, these do not, of themselves, a political party make. A successful 
party politics depends upon literally thousands of unnamed, unsung, 'ordinary' 
individuals co-operating to play out prescribed social roles within the party 
framework, (such as candidate, spokesperson, chairperson, secretary, organiser, 
publicist, campaign manager, fundraiser, etc.). So many people making such a 
commitment to what is usually unpaid work do not suddenly spring from nowhere. 
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By the time a politics takes party fonn it has been through considerable trials and 
refinements in other social groups. 
There has been little attention paid to exactly which social groups gave rise to the 
Greens, and in what order, and what this means in tenns of the political theories and 
practices adopted by Green parties. Therefore I undertake a detailed examination of 
the principal political ancestors of Green politics outside the parliamentary arena -
the New Left and the new social movements, which fed directly and rapidly into 
Green parties, but only slowly and incompletely into other parties. Chapter Four 
consists of an historical investigation into the global development of each of the 
major new sociaVpolitical movements that have influenced Green politics. Special 
attention is paid to the global environmental movement, although this was actually 
the last of the major new social movements to develop historically, and has 
contributed the least to the political structure and processes of Green parties, 
although it has made a major contribution to their political content. 
Green parties 
The influence of the new social movements in the fonnation of the first two Green 
parties is clearly discernible in Tasmania and New Zealand. In inspiration, rhetoric 
and practice these parties both were, and were conscious of being, part of a 
movement that was global in its range and impact. 
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Therefore in shifting the focus of the work from the global and general to the local 
and specific in Chapter Five I pay particular attention to the ways in which global 
economic, political and social trends were highly significant within the local context 
of the 'settler colonies' of Australia and New Zealand. The labour parties in New 
Zealand and Tasmania were resistant to the 'new politics' and they supported the 
industrialisation of the local economy and the pursuit of consumer-led economic 
growth as keenly as parties to the right. New social movements of all kinds were 
highly active at this time in Australasia, and provided a seedbed of ideas and 
personnel for the new Green parties, which were open from the beginning to . 
influencing and being influenced by global trends and changes. 
Chapter Six covers the small amount that is known about the group characteristics of 
the first Green party members that has a bearing on their ability to create a globally-
oriented form of politics. Chapter Seven focuses on what differentiates Green parties 
from both the social movements that fed in to them, and from other 'left' or 
'progressive' political parties, within the global framework. Following on from the 
history of 'new politics' ideas and practice given in Chapter Four, it looks 
specifically at what differentiates Green party policies from all other party policies, 
including policies on the environment. This is Green economics, and Chapter Seven 
discusses the way in which the Values Party developed the world's first recognisably 
Green economic policies. Since what happened to the definition of Left and Right is 
one of the key questions of global political theory at present, and since the Greens 
are deeply implicated in the process ofre-definition, it also covers the debates that 
the first Greens themselves had on the subject. 
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The future will be Green - or not at all? 
One of the major criticisms levelled at Green politics - with some justification - is 
that it lurches between gloom-mongering and doom-saying to idealist Uto'pianism. 
Greens can be likened to the White Queen in Through the Looking Glass, reminding 
Alice that The rule is, j am tomorrow an9 j am yesterday - but never j am today. ' 
(Carroll, 1910,94). All too often Green tracts read as whinging about how bad 
society and the environment are today - tiresome even though it may be true. They 
then make a sudden leap into a glorious future where the lion of industrialism will lie 
down with the lamb of nature, and all will be well within and between the peaceable 
federations of independent and co-operative bio-regional communities. 
While it is easy to satirise Green visions and methods, the persistence of Green 
politics for over a quarter of a century shows that the Greens, at least, take 
themselves and their cause seriously. They also intend to continue to playa part in 
trying to influence national and international thinking and practice in a Green 
direction. My subsidiary purpose in investigating the global origins of Green politics, 
once a fuller and more accurate account had been established, was to see what this 
account might have to suggest to us about where Green politics might be going. 
To know where one is going, it helps to know where one has been, and what baggage 
one is carrying along the way. Of course not only Green parties are moving on the 
world stage, and so in considering where Green politics is going it is necessary to 
look at what is happening in the global economy, and within party politics and social 
movements as well. 
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Therefore I conclude with a chapter which considers both the internal and external 
challenges facing Green parties in the twenty-first century, and the likelihood that 
they will be able to rise to meet them, given both their past history, and the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. 
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Notes 
1. The full poem reads 
Auf Erdballs letztem lnselriff 
Begreif' ich, was ich nie begrifJ. 
lch sehe und ich uberseh ' 
Des Lebens wechselvolle See. 
Db mich auch Frohsinn lange mied, 
Einschllift das Weh, das Leid wird Lied. 
Bin ich noch ich? Ich traue kaum 
Dem Spiegel, alles wird mir Traum. 
Traumliicheln lindert meinen Gram, 
Traumtriine von der Wimper /cam. 
Traumspeise wird mir aufgetischt, 
Traumwandernden Traum-Grlin erfrischt, 
Hab aufTraumhellen einzig Acht. 
So ward der Tag ganz Traumesnacht, 
Und wer mir Liebeszeichen gibt, 
Der fUh/e sich, wisse sich traumgeliebt! 
The poem and a brief account ofWolfskehl 's New Zealand exile (in German) can be found 
in John Asher (1956) Des Erdballs letztes Inselriff, Deutsche erleben Nellseeland. Munchen: 
Max Hueber. 
2. The works or part-works about the German Greens, originally in English, or in translation. 
include Frankland and Schoonmaker (1992) Htilsberg (1988), Kolinsky (1989), Langguth 
(1986), Markovits and Gorski (1993), Muller-Rommel (1989), Papadakis (1984), Poguntke 
(1993), Sarkar (1994), Spretnak and Capra (1984), while there are also numerous journal 
articles, and chapters in collections on Green politics, for example Frankland (1995), 
Poguntke (1992), Pridham (1978) and Wiesenthal and Ferris (1993). 
3. The formation of Die Grlinen was recorded in the Values Party's monthly newspaper, Vibes 
(then in its fifth year of publication) early in 1980. John Horrocks wrote: 
The German "Greens" have now formed a nation-wide political party. Over 1000 delegates 
met at Karlsruhe in January to formally establish the Green Party ... As in Values, the 
members of the new movement are drawn from very diverse backgrounds and include 
dissatisfied liberals, communists, opponents of nuclear power and other environmentalists. A 
commentator in the Badische Zeitung saw this diversity as a potential source of strength and 
suggested that the Greens could become a gathering point for the "undogmatic Left" as well 
as offering an acceptable alternative to the middle class voter who is dissatisfied with 
traditional parties. 
The experience of Values is that this type of grouping is difficult to sustain. The Greens 
seem, however, to have emerged as the overseas party nearest in character to Values and, if 
successful, could be a useful model. Most other parties with an ecological bent, such as 
Britain's Ecology Party ... and Australia's New Democrats lack the left-wing thrust of the 
Greens ... their openness to the Left gives a promise that the Greens may become more than 
just a coalition of protest groups. '(Horrocks, 1980,2). 
4. For full references see Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville (eds) (1987), Davis and Hodge 
(1991), Elkington and Hailes (1989), Gell and Beeby (1989), Irvine and Ponton (1988), Lord 
(1989), Parkin (1989), Pietroni (1991), Smith (1991). 
5. Most poignant of all, even the 'progressive' politicians of nineteenth century New Zealand 
were deeply implicated in the destruction of indigenous ecosystems and their replacement by 
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ersatz European replicas. For example William Pember Reeves, a Liberal politician, friend of 
labour, and a feminist, sentimentalised and romanticised the replacement 'old New Zealand' 
with 1ittle England' in verses like 'A Colonist in his Garden' (1895) and The Passing of the 
Forest' (1898) (Temple, 1998,97,84). 
6. Good examples of the genre include Bunce (1995), Halpern (1995), Ruth (1972), Nash 
(1967), Oelschlager (1992), Powell (1977), Runte (1979), Schmitt (1969) and Wilson (1992). 
7. Works, part-works and articles about non-Gennan Green parties (and/or comparisons with 
the Gennan Greens) include Bomberg (1998), Bridgeford (1978), Bennahmias and Roche 
(1992), Buerklin (1987), Church (1992), Doherty (1992), Eckersley (1992b), Evans (1993), 
Frankland (1990), Kemp and Walls (1990), Kitschelt (1989), KitscheIt and Rellemans 
(1990), Kvistad (1987), Maier (1990), Parkin (1989), Porritt and Winner (1988), Prendiville 
and Chafer (1990), Richardson and Rootes (1995), Rootes (1995), McCulloch (1992), 
Miiller-Rommell (1989,1995), Pybus and Flanagan (1990), Riidig et (1991), and Riidig and 
Lowe (1986). 
8. Wallerstein (1991) builds on the classifications of historical time first postulated by French 
historian Fernand Braudel, to develop the ideas of 'phasic' time and 'ideological' space. 
L 'histoire conjuncturelle or 'middle tenn' history is the history of cycles or phases within 
'structural' time. Wallerstein has written a history of the development of world capitalism 
from its origins in the sixteenth century to the twentieth century, (Wallerstem, 1974, 1980) 
and identified the 'conjuctural' shifts that have taken place within this longue duree. One of 
these is undoubtedly the shift that occurred in the 1970s, which is discussed within the 
overall context of the history of the twentieth century by Robsbawm (1994). 
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Chapter Two 
The global shift 
'Think globally Act locally' -is a slogan that appears on Green party and other green 
literature right around the world. Is it just a cunning piece of advertising puffery, or 
does it capture something essential about the Green approach to politics? In this 
chapter I provide a brief history of globalisation, examining the economic, social and 
technological dimensions ofthe phenomenon, and how they interact both with each 
other and with the sphere of formal politics to generate new political possibilities and 
actualities. I pay particular attention to the negative impacts on the natural 
environment and on society which have resulted from the successful pursuit of an 
agenda of global economic expansion. I also consider the interplay between the 
technologies of globalisation and economics and politics in general; and I provide a 
New Zealand case study of globalist politics in action. Finally I look at the first signs 
that globalisation was creating a new antisystemic politics, and I conclude that the 
association between thinking globally and going Green is not at all coincidental, and 
requires further historical investigation, which I undertake in succeeding chapters. 
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Global action, Green reaction - the case of the MAl 
Green politics appears at the point in world history when the world economy makes 
a conjunctural' shift, from intemationalisation to globalisation. New international 
economic institutions and entities (the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, transnational corporations) and 
new transport and communications technologies were developed immediately post 
World War Two. By the 1960s they were having major impacts on everyday life 
around the globe, especially in the 'developed' nation states. The relentless 
expansion in national and global level economic activity was also - for the first time 
in world history - having global environmental impacts. 
The trend towards economic globalisation accelerated in the 1970s, until by the 
1990s it had been recognised as a new phase in world history, and was being closely 
studied. A little attention had also been paid to the political dimension of 
globalisation, with consideration given to whether and how the prime locus of 
anti systemic political activity could or should shift from the national to the global 
(Camilleri and Falk, 1992) or from the national to the local (Magnusson, 1996). 
By April 1998 the DECD proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl) among its member states was effectively (if temporarily) stymied after 
concerted global lobbying by non-government organisations (NGOs), whose efforts 
were facilitated by extensive use of the Internet. At this point the new economics, 
politics and technologies of globalisation appeared to have merged. Writing under 
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headlines such as 'Network Guerillas' and 'How the Internet killed the MAl', 
journalists reported senior OEeD negotiators making comments like' "This is the 
first successful Internet campaign by non-governmental organisations .. .It' s been very 
effective." '(Drohan, 1998), and' "This episode is a turning point. . .It means we have 
to rethink our approach to international economic and trade relations." , (de 
Jonquieres, 1998) 
Green parties were part of the global 'coalition' of anti-MAl activists, with a Green 
member moving the anti-MAl motion which was supported by an overwhelming 
majority ofthe European Parliament, and this particular campaign encapsulates the 
changes that have taken place since Green parties were first formed in the 1970s. 
These changes include problematising previous ways of conceptualising politics 
conducted on a world scale. Economic globalisation has definitively altered political 
spaces, perhaps most dramatically by adding cyberspace to geographical space as a 
realm of political action. The creation of cyberspace is in itself frequently considered 
to represent a form of annihilation of geographical space. This is of course not total, 
and it would be unwise to neglect the role of geographical realities in geo-politics. 
Especially not at a time when much of the content of geo-politics being contested in 
cyberspace is now based around unprecedented transformations to geographical 
realities, such as rainforest destruction and fisheries depletion. However, the relative 
by-passing of physical time and space which is possible via the Internet must now be 
factored into a consideration of the nature and purpose of international politics, along 
with the different consciousness which globalisation impresses upon political actors. 
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In this chapter I look first at the visible and palpable impacts that globalisation has 
had on the physical environment, and on daily reality for those living in the countries 
which brought forth the first Green parties. I then go on to consider how the 
changing structures and processes of the world economy are reforming and 
reformulating everything we once took for granted about politics - and even about 
life itself - and how this is fundamental to creating Green politics. 
The experience of giobalisation 
The experience of globalisation at the level of the (First World) individual was 
apparent during the global stock market crash of 1987. Panic spread from Wall Street 
to Wellington and back around the world. Ten years and a few days later it all 
seemed to be happening again, this time with the run starting on the Hong Kong 
market. Thanks to globalised media a New Zealander could get the latest results 
when the New Zealand market opened, hear how Wall Street did 'overnight', then 
wait a couple of hours for the Australian markets to open - and so on round the 
world. The sense of being a chemical (or a catalyst) in a global chain reaction was 
total, and this is a major part of what makes globalisation different from 
internationalisation. While people living on the geographical edges of the globe in 
the nineteenth century were undoubtedly part of the international economy and 
polity, prior to the advent of electronic communications and rapid air travel their 
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sense of participation was at best partial, and definitely 'international' rather than 
'global' . 
Speaking of this qualitative shift, Malcolm Waters states that 'Globalization involves 
a phenomenology of contraction ... Because space tends to be measured in time, to the 
extent that the time between geographical points shortens so space appears to shrink. 
Insofar as the connection between physically distant points is instantaneous, space 
'disappears' altogether. A more recent phenomenon is that localizations of time 
disappear - if, for example, a Korean house-spouse can watch with an American F A-
18 pilot as she bombs a chemical factory in a Middle East war, their time frames 
become synchronized. Globalization implies the phenomenological elimination of 
space and the generalization of time. ' (Waters, 1995,62-83) 
Andrew Leyshon also uses the example of the Gulf War of 1991 to demonstrate the 
contemporary experiential nature of globalisation as brought to us by the electronic 
media, thus: 
'The instantaneous nature ofthe coverage meant that this was a war 
conducted simultaneously in three time zones. It was conducted in the 'real' 
war time of the Middle East, but it was also fought with more than an eye to 
the time in Europe and the United States, with the result that military 
briefings were scheduled to coincide with the deadlines of European and 
North American media .. .!t is also worth noting that the initial attack by US 
and UK military planes on Baghdad took place in the early hours of the 
morning local time - and that this was 18:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the 
beginning ofthe peak viewing period on US television.' (Leyshon, 1995, 15) 
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In the 1990s people were not only living in a globalised world, they were also able to 
know that they were part ofthe 'global village'. They were able to know this not just 
because it was on their TV screens, but also because it had become part of everyday 
experience. In their interactions with the natural environment and with their fellow 
human beings they were experiencing the impacts of decisions and processes which 
originated somewhere else on the planet, and had been spread or applied right across 
the globe. 
These impacts come right down to the level of daily diet, with chicken pieces 
processed in Malaysia becoming generic transnational chain hamburger components 
in New Zealand. Similarly, 'Australian' brand-name frozen confections are 
manufactured in Portugal and shipped to Australia for sale, with the brand-name 
royalties accruing on the Australian sales being remitted straight to Nestle's 
transnational headquarters in Switzerland (Burch, 1997; Pritchard, 1997). 
The impacts are also to be found in the air, water and atmosphere surrounding 
people, in the soils they live on, in the urban, rural and 'wild' landscapes they 
cherish, and in the other species they share the planet with. Environmental problems 
stemming from economic activities are no longer restricted to slag heaps in the 
Midlands, smog in the Rhineland, or deforestation in the French Alps. The 
concurrent globalisation of both economic activity and degradation of the 
environment needs to be analysed more closely, and I outline the main issues below. 
77 
Atoms, acid, ozone, genes - environmental gIobalisation 
World War Two was the first truly global war, moving in time and space across the 
globe and affecting non-combatant as well as combatant states. Internationalist 
political movements had observed the trends in conventional rearmament in the 
1930s and there were local and international interventions of various kinds to try and 
prevent rearmament and oppose fascism. Some 45,000 male and female volunteers 
from 53 different cowitri'es (Cockburn, 1995, 73) went to support the Republican 
side in the Spanish Civil War. In retrospect, the novelty of foreign combatants in a 
national conflict being volunteers defending international principles, rather than 
professional mercenaries, gains greater salience as a sign of the way the world was 
heading. National and international pacifist organisations also flourished at this time. 
with strong links with the labour and women's movements. 
The globalisation in time and space that this represented was brought home to me in 
July 1982 when I attended a rally against nuclear warship visits in Melbourne. A 
retired unionist reminded the crowd that in the 1930s wharfies refusing to handle war 
materiel (iron destined for Japan, which had just invaded China) were punished by 
the state. The progressive section of the Australian labour movement did not wish to 
be party to furthering Japanese imperialism. Crushed by 'Pig Iron Bob' (Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies) in this instance, within a few years the wharfies were 
loading supplies on to troop ships taking soldiers and sailors into the Pacific to fight 
Japan, or further on to North Africa and Europe. 
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Japan's intentions in that war were audaciously global, and are exemplified by its 
pioneering of the use of long range aircraft to strike at targets thousands of 
kilometres away from Japan - a 'globalising' feature not available in previous 
conflicts. Yet the archetypal symbol ofthe shift from intemationalisation to 
globalisation that occurred post World War II was the global weapon that ended that 
war - the atomic bomb. 
Atomic weapons and their delivery systems epitomise the time-space compression 
that Harvey (1989) identifies as a key characteristic of globalisation. Before aircraft 
could be used to 'shrink' the world for positive civilian purposes (the boom in 
civilian use of aircraft did not begin until the late 1950s), they were used to 
demonstrate the extreme vulnerability of civilians in a global conflict. For the first 
time civilians could be attacked with relative ease and impunity by missiles and 
plane-delivered bombs - and they were. Great capitals like London and Berlin and 
obscure and isolated towns like Darwin were equally vulnerable. This was bad 
enough with conventional bombs - but the atom bomb achieved much more. 
Not only could far fewer bombs cause a much greater degree of devastation in space 
- the A bomb could also continue to kill in time, as nuclear radiation took its toll on 
individuals not born or even conceived when their parents were exposed to nuclear 
fallout. Radioactive molecules decompose at differing rates, with some taking 
thousands of years to lose their destructive power. During that time they can move 
not only directly into human tissue in the immediate vicinity, but also, borne by the 
wind and water currents that circle the globe, into global food chains. This was 
brought home forcibly to Britons in 1986 when the explosion in the Chemobyl 
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reactor thousands of kilometres away in the Soviet Union sent fallout as far as 
Britain, contaminating food growing in and grazing on the ground for months and 
months. 
Nuclear radiation (whether released by weapons or by 'peaceful' accidents) is 
therefore a global threat on a scale that has never been experienced before. The 
systems set up to produce, process and deliver radioactive material are also global. 
Uranium mined in Australia, for example, may cross the world to France for use in 
nuclear power plants. As Australia has no control over the material once it reaches 
France, however, there are no guarantees that none of it ever found its way back to 
the Pacific in French bombs that were tested at Moruroa. By the 1990s nuclear waste 
from Europe was regularly passing through the Pacific on its way to be reprocessed 
in Japan, while both Japan and the USA were looking for nuclear waste storage 
facilities in the Pacific. Raw and spent nuclear material thus circles the globe -
provoking an outcry from Green parties, Greenpeace and other global political 
formations. 
The delivery systems for nuclear weapons are also organised on a global basis. One 
of the first jargon terms a novice studying this field must learn is ICBM, standing for 
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. Although they were the ancestors of ICBMs, the 
V 1 and V2 rockets of Wodd War II now seem closer to medieval cannon balls than 
to missiles that can cross the Pacific Ocean. Not only is the range of these missiles 
global, but their firing pads are also conceptualised and implemented globally, with 
nuclear capable ships and submarines cruising the globe and able to launch an attack 
literally from 'nowhere'. 
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Nuclearisation is thus truly global- and it brought forth a global anti-nuclear 
movement. Jim Falk (1982, 90-109) documents the beginnings of anti-nuclear power 
and weapons organisations independently of each other in Japan, the USA, Britain 
and West Germany in the 1950s. In 1959 a European Federation Against Nuclear 
Arms was set up, and by the 1960s it was linking not only European anti-nuclear 
groups but also bringing in activists from the Americas and Australasia to report on 
anti-nuclear activities in other parts of the globe. The anti-nuclear movement 
inevitably linked up with, drew from and fed into the other new social movements of 
the Sixties. It thus provided a highly significant and influential global perspective on 
oppositional politics that was to reverberate throughout the movement and on into 
the Green parties which came out of the Sixties ferment. 
Another source of 'global' thinking derived from an environmental problem was the 
issue of acid rain that surfaced in the 1970s. While acid rain is more of a regional 
than a global problem, it is a prime example of the irrelevancy of state boundaries to 
preventing the spread of molecular-level industrial pollution, which can be dispersed 
by wind and/or water over large areas. Such pollution not only goes sideways across 
the globe, it also goes upwards into the atmosphere. In the 1980s the widening hole 
in the ozone layer over the Antarctic, .and the thinning ofthe ozone layer generally, 
was added to the list of global environmental threats. New Zealand children produce 
none and consume very little of the chemicals that thin the ozone layer. Yet they still 
must learn a new personal hygiene regime of 'slip, slap and slop', drummed into 
them by schools, health authorities and the mass media, to get them to wear shirts, 
hats and sun creme when outdoors in summer. This is to try and ward off rising rates 
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of sun-induced cancer (Henzell, 1999). A paradox of globalisation is that its effects 
can be highly localised, and even personalised, as this example shows. 
Hard on the heels of ozone depletion and international efforts to contain it via the 
Montreal Protocol, signed in 1987, came a growing awareness of the global impact 
of' greenhouse' gas emissions (especially carbon dioxide) which was referred to first 
as 'global warming', and then, more accurately, as 'climate change'. This has proved 
a much harder problem to resolve in international fora, as round after round of 
climate change summits since Rio in 1992 have failed to get consent to and/or 
implementation of realistic C02 emission reduction targets. Unlike ozone depletion, 
which can be addressed by a simple phasing out and substitution of specific 
chemicals, making major reductions in carbon emissions strikes right at the motor of 
economic globalisation. 
The dramatic expansion of production and especially of world trade post World War 
II has been based on a concomitant increase in the use of fossil fuels, the prime 
source of carbon emissions. The model of' development' which has been promoted 
by the Bretton Woods international financial institutions (IFIs - the World Bank, 
IMF and GATT) has consisted first of attempting to industrialise, and then of 
economically 'restructuring', the 'Lesser Developed Countries' and linking them 
into the world economy via strategies like 'export-led growth'. But industrialisation 
and exporting require energy, and energy obtained from fossil fuels creates 
greenhouse gases, while energy from nuclear fuels creates huge safety problems both 
in production and disposal. Even so-called clean energy, for example hydro-
electricity, is not without its environmental downside. As we shall see in Chapter 
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Five, it was the 'hydro-industrialisation' of Tasmania which catalysed the world's 
first Green party. 
Energy-greedy mass production and distribution of products is one side of the global 
environmental jeopardy equation; the other side is mass consumption. The first 
Green critiques of industrialism recognised the foundational link between 
industrialist productivism and mass consumerism, and concentrated heavily on 
attacking the latter. Their simply produced complaints (see for example, the dull 
black and white type of the Values Party's first manifesto, which devotes three pages 
to making links between mindless consumerism and rising unemployment) were no 
match for the blandishments of the advertising and public relations industry. This 
industry soon had transnational companies of its own busy purveying the sales 
messages of the transnational producers and putting a 'spin' on their environmental 
transgressions (Beder, 1997). 
However, when attention is paid both to what is consumed, and to the amount and 
varieties of waste produced by different styles of consumption, it is no longer 
possible to ignore the fact that the world is more divided than ever along 
consumption as well as production lines. Nor that differing styles of consumption 
have very different environmental impacts. The Worldwatch Institute has analysed 
the inhabitants of the planet according to their 'category of consumption', and 
concluded that there are 1.1 billion people in the 'consumer' class. These people live 
in households whose annual income per member is above $7,500, they eat meat and 
processed foods and drink soft drinks, travel in private cars, and most of their 
possessions and tools are designed or intended to be thrown away after a short time 
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in use. In stark contrast are the 1.1 billion in the 'poor' class, with annual incomes 
under $700, subsisting on insufficient grain and unsafe water, with only their feet for 
transport and all tools and possessions being derived from the local biomass. In 
between are 3.3 billion people who have adequate amounts of grain to eat and clean 
water to drink, who travel on bikes and buses, and who own and use durable tools 
and possessions. (Baird, 1997, 10) 
The environmental impacts of the 'consumer class' have been evident since the 
1970s, principally in the fonn of huge and increasing amounts of waste as 
'disposable' goods are thrown away. These cause pollution-related problems to 
humans and other species in the form of unprotected hazardous waste sites, dump 
fires, toxic leachate, toxic algal blooms, vermin, disease and other ills. There has also 
be,en a dramatic rise in noise pollution caused by increasing road and air traffic, and 
the extended ownership and use of power tools and appliances. Another downside of 
increased consumption is the scarring of the landscape with advertising hoardings 
encouraging more consumption, and increasing amounts of 'throwaway' items, from 
rusting car bodies in ponds through to fast-food packaging, strewn along the roadside 
and around the countryside. 
Litter has become a global problem, dirtying and degrading the environment for 
humans, and endangering other species, such as the sea birds and mammals strangled 
by discarded plastic strapping from beer cans dropped by individuals and discarded 
fishing nets left to roam the oceans by companies fishing in international waters. 
Finding ways to internalise the 'external' costs of production and consumption, 
which include the proper disposal of waste, remains the reluctant responsibility of 
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nation-state regulatory authorities. Few of these are even prepared to go as far as 
Germany in passing a law which allows consumers to discard unwanted packaging at 
the point of sale -let alone to require minimisation of wasteful packaging altogether. 
The problems of wasteful consumption in the 1990s have definitely overshadowed 
the old 'limits to growth' arguments against industrial expansionism advanced by 
Greens in the 1960s and 1970s, when the emphasis was on the finite and rapidly 
depleting stocks of non-renewable natural resources, especially energy resources like 
oil and coal. The 'oil shocks' and 'energy crisis' were a result of globalisation - but 
of changes in global financing rather than changes in global production. Rightly or 
wrongly, the emphasis has shifted to the limited capacity of the planet and its 
atmosphere to absorb and contain the pollution effects of the global expansion of 
production, trade and consumption. These effects have literally gone stratospheric, 
and are impacting on millions of people who had no hand either in creating them or 
in enjoying the 'good life' based on global consumerism. Millions are also being 
exposed to other negative environmental outcomes resulting from the globalisation 
of production, trade and consumption. 
The industrialisation and globalisation of food production, for example, has not led 
to increased food security for the poorest third ofthe world's population. However it , 
has reduced land-based employment, and exposed producers and consumers (and 
non-human species) to the known risks of agricultural chemicals and the potential 
risks of genetic engineering. The global risks of synthetic agricultural chemicals first 
became apparent in the 1960s, when Rachel Carson (1962) documented the 
deleterious effects of chemicals like DDT on wildlife across North America, 
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including species living in supposedly uncontaminated areas, such as eagles in the 
high mountains. DDT was banned in the USA and other 'developed' countries, to be 
replaced by chemicals that were allegedly safer. However, the update on Carson's 
Silent Spring (Our Stolen Future) shows that the new generation of chemicals is now 
globally Ubiquitous, being found in the fat of polar bears inside the Arctic Circle and 
the bodies of toads in the mountainous jungles of Costa Rica. In both places they are 
endangering the reproductive capacity and ultimate survival of the species affected. 
(Colborn et aI, 1996) 
Nor are humans exempt from this internal pollution. It is no longer possible to find a 
sufficiently isolated and hence 'pure' human population to use as a control group in a 
study of the effects of these chemicals. The Inuit living alongside the polar bears in 
the Arctic are as contaminated as their ursine neighbours - and as their human 
cousins in Toronto or Boston. As with the non-human animals, the main effects on 
humans from synthetic chemicals appear to be reproductive system abnormalities 
and serious reproductive dysfunction. 
The problem has been fully globalised - there is literally no 'away' to escape to. City 
and wilderness dwellers, First or Third World inhabitants - all are at risk. As with 
carbon emissions, reductions and substitutions in synthetic chemical use must 
happen globally, not just locally. To make this happen will be as difficult as reducing 
carbon emissions, because global industrial production, both primary and secondary, 
is predicated upon the widespread use of chemicals. A reduction in chemical use, in 
the absence of cost effective non-chemical substitutions, would mean a reduction in 
production and hence a likely reduction in profit - a result which global investors 
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will not contemplate. While it is certainly possible to make a transition to 'clean' 
substitutes (as it is with energy), this will not solve the problem so long as industrial 
methods of production and delivery are adhered to. For example, hydro-
industrialisation has the deleterious environmental effect of destroying wild rivers 
and is therefore merely a displacement of rather than a solution to the problem of 
sustainable energy supply. Similarly, the substitution of 'organic' chemicals (i.e. 
chemicals approved by organic growing organisations) for synthetic chemicals in 
industrial forms of farming will lead to the same problem of the build-up of pest 
resistance, while simultaneously reducing the armoury of 'safe' pest controls. 
Fundamental to globalisation is the establishment and generalisation of systems that 
direct and regulate productive and other economic and social activity within narrow 
parameters that are understood and applied globally - regardless of the impacts on 
local sustainability. 
This is particularly apparent in the case of the latest global environmental issue that 
has been problematised by Greens - genetic engineering. Gene technology 
represents the biological pinnacle of time-space compression. In From Farming to 
Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial Development, Goodman et al (1987) 
demonstrate the ways in which the industrialisation of agriCUlture eliminated first 
space (land) as a consideration in primary production. This was via feedlot, battery 
and other space intensive methods for animals, and by mechanisation, selective 
breeding for higher yields, greenhouse cultivation and chemical applications for 
crops. It is now proceeding to eliminate time via genetic engineering. The creation of 
transgenic organisms, such as soy beans with Arctic fish genes which increase cold 
tolerance, and pigs with rabbit growth genes to make them double their weight in 
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halfthe time, (Macer, 1990) is largely directed towards eliminating normal cycles of 
growth and reproduction. This allows plants to mature faster, or grow out of season, 
and remain edible for longer after harvest, while animals become biological 
factories, producing more milk, meat, fibre or eggs in less and less time. 
The gene technology industry, like the information technology (IT) industry that it so 
closely resembles, is impossible to describe without reference to its generic globalist 
features. Like the IT industry it was created by and is dependent upon a global 
network of scientists and technicians working through internationally standardised 
channels of communication and appraisal (albeit in a highly competitive and 
secretive manner a good part of the time). Also like the IT industry it initially drew 
significant numbers of personnel and significant amounts of funding from defence 
sources (Wilkie, 1993). As with the IT industry the initial small, innovative 
companies (many with university connections) have been rapidly swallowed up by 
large companies - in the genetech case mostly chemical, pharmaceutical and food 
transnationals. As a science-based industry with such obvious market applications 
and implications for national economic competitiveness gene tech also expects and 
receives state support, and markets itselfto political decision-makers as the key to 
prosperity (Haraway, 1997,90-93). 
In her essay 'Femaleman_Meets_Oncomouse. Mice into Wormholes: A 
Technoscience Fugue in Two Parts', Donna Haraway draws together the strands that 
connect the splitting of atoms and the splicing of genes with global politics and 
economics in the late twentieth century, and summarises them in a cod mathematical 
statement of proportion, thus: 
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'TRANSURANIC ELEMENTS: TRANSGENIC ORGANISMS:: 
THE COLD WAR: THE NEW WORLD ORDER' 
She then unpacks this statement as follows: 'The expanded fonn of the proportion 
reads: The transuranic elements (such as plutonium produced by nuclear reactors) 
are to transgenic organisms (such as the genetically engineered mice and tomatoes 
produced in biotechnological laboratories) as the Cold War (fuelled by its core 
generator of nuclear culture) is to the New World Order (driven by its dynamic 
generator of transnational enterprise culture).' (Haraway, 1997,52-53). 
Haraway's statement encapsulates the contemporary indissolubility of 
'environment', 'politics' and 'economics', and the globalisation of these spheres of 
action. This represents a profound shift in reality and in our understanding of it, 
which has only a tenuous connection with politics as defined by party and pressure 
group politicians taking pro or anti 'environment' positions within the historical 
nation-state political arena. Global environmental politics is not merely the 
quantitative expansion of nation-state resource, pollution and conservation politics 
on to an international stage, but also (and more significantly) a qualitative shift in the 
very concepts 'political' and 'environmental'. 
The nuclear and gene industries are both creators and creations of globalisation. 
Humans need to breathe, drink and eat to live. They are now breathing global air, 
drinking global water and eating global food - all of them containing global 
contaminants. Global corporations, (dozens of which are larger and more powerful 
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economic entities than many member states of the United Nations), make global 
decisions about these quantity and quality of life issues by default, simply by 
following the capitalist imperative of seeking an increased rate of return on 
investment. They engage in vigorous globalised political activities aimed at 
preventing or avoiding the application of environmental and/or social restraints on 
global production, investment and trade, (with the MAl being the most recent case in 
point). They also have representation within global 'international' financial 
institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, where ordinary citizens, NGOs, 
and even governments are not represented. 
The 'environment', whether measured as air quality, water quality, species 
sustainability, landscape aesthetics or by any other biophysical or cultural criteria, 
does not normally influence the production and investment decisions of the 
transnational corporations and their nationally based subsidiaries and contracting 
companies. The only environmental protection restraints on their activities come via 
direct action from consumers (e.g. boycotts of drift net-caught fish), or legislative or 
regulatory constraints imposed at nation-state level, or voluntary, unenforceable 
agreements at international level. Monitoring for compliance of regulations and 
agreements at national level is variable in quantity and quality, while at the 
international level it is risible.2 This goes a long way to explaining why the trend in 
global environmental health indicators has been consistently downwards since the 
first international environmental conference (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972, 
despite all the ink that has been spilled and talk fests that have been held to alert the 
public and governments to the problems to try and get action on them. Global 
corporations bothered by environmental restraints in one location have the option of 
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moving to a less restrictive regulatory environment - an option which they may not 
have to exercise if they can parlay the threat of it - and hence loss of local 
employment - into laxer standards in their present site. Global public relations and 
advertising companies are at the service of global chemical, oil, food and other 
companies, whose products have global environmental impacts, to professionally 
and attractively deny, disguise, downplay or otherwise manage any bad pUblicity 
resulting from environmentally unfriendly activities (Beder, 1997; Burton, 1995). 
Similarly, hordes of global corporate lawyers are available to hamstring pro-
environment activities, with the long running 'McLibel' trial being a case in point 
(Beder, 1997,68-69), while public relations firms are willing and able to whitewash 
even the execution of environmental activists (Beder, 1997, 121). 
The global capitalist economy of the late twentieth century is literally bringing an 
end to billions of years of evolution on planet Earth. The delicately balanced mantle 
of gases which surrounds the earth, a protective covering beneath which all life 
evolved, has changed in composition with frightening rapidity in the past two 
decades. Not only are whole states and parts of states (Kiribati, Bangladesh, the 
Maldives, the Netherlands) at risk of being inundated as a result, but more 
importantly for global politics the impact on human health and the health and 
viability of other species is of utmost concern. Adding to, rather than subtracting 
from, the 'energy crisis' problems of the late twentieth century, nuclear radiation 
from nuclear power plant 'accidents' during production, transport and storage of 
radioactive materials has been causing deaths, terminal and chronic illnesses and 
genetic mutations since the 1970s. They will continue to do so long after nuclear 
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power generation is finally abandoned. The cost to human society is great; the cost to 
other species incalculable. 
The loss of other species as a direct or indirect result of human economic activities, 
(including pollution, deforestation, agro-industrialisation, unsustainable fishing 
techniques, climate change) continues to increase despite desperate efforts to reverse 
the trend by international bodies like the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature. This has led some scientists to the conclusion that vertebrate evolution is no 
longer possible (Sessions, 1995,361-362). Biodiversity reduces by the day as 
another hectare of virgin tropical forest falls somewhere in the world, while the fires 
that follow the logging continue the damage (Given, 1996). 
Mono-cultural plantations of a limited range of genetically engineered crops, which 
'succeed' the destroyed forest, drive the final nail into the coffin of biodiversity, and 
epitomise the intellectual and social bankruptcy of global industrialism (Shiva, 1991; 
1995). Not only can very little else survive the chemical and mechanical regime of 
industrial primary production, but with the creation of transgenic organisms the core 
principle of evolution - natural selection - is utterly confounded. While genetic 
engineering has thus far been restricted to plants and animals of economic 
significance, the first reports of transfer effects to wild species have already appeared 
(Lefol et aI, 1995). Despite reassurances from global corporations and the scientists 
in their employ that eating genetically engineered food is 'safe', the effects on 
humans have yet to be properly studied. Indeed, it is difficult to know how one could 
conduct an ethical controlled study on human beings, as even if volunteers were 
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readily available, they would be volunteering not only themselves but also their 
unwitting descendants. 
In assessing the significance of the 'short twentieth century' (1914-1991) historian 
Eric Hobsbawm believes that from the perspective of the third millenium the most 
outstanding feature of the last century of the second millenium will not be the 
confrontation between 'capitalism' and 'socialism'. This will be a matter oflimited 
interest, comparable in significance to the Crusades· of an earlier period. What will 
be of much greater importance is that the end of the twentieth century was also the 
end of the seven or eight millenia of living from the land, which had endured ever 
since the invention of agriculture some time in the Stone Age. It was the end ofthe 
long era in which the overwhelming majority of the human race lived by growing 
food and herding animals (Hobsbawm, 1994,9). 
In seconding Hobsbawm's view I would also add that the way in which humans have 
made this shift, via global ising industrialism as a way of producing things, and 
markets as a way of distributing things, is creating systemic biological, ecological 
and physical dysfunction among humans and other species. Thus the political history 
of the next millenium will increasingly deal with conflicts arising from these 
sources. 
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The world makes money go round - economic globalisation 
. Just how did this state of affairs come about? Globalisation now has many facets, 
and different theorists choose to highlight different aspects. Is globalisation the end 
of geography? (O'Brien, 1992). The end of sovereignty? (Camilleri and Falk, 1992). 
A facet of modernity? (Giddens, 1991). The compression of time-space that marks 
another phase in the development of capitalism? (Harvey, 1989). Virtual capitalism? 
(McMichael, 1997). A collapse of universalism and particularism into a global 
culture? (Waters, 1995). 
It may well be all of these things, and more - but underpinning the theory and 
practice of globalisation is the expanding global economy. Although globalisation 
has economic, social, political, technological and cultural dimensions, which can not 
be disentangled, and which each impact upon the other, there is considerable 
agreement that the driving force behind globalisation is the economic expansionism 
inherent in capitalism. Capital can only grow itself by finding or creating new 
products and new markets. Whereas before the mid-nineteenth century access to 
products and markets was limited geographically, the new technologies of steam 
power and telegraphic cable meant that by the late nineteenth century production and 
marketing could take place on an international scale with much greater ease 
(Leyshon, 1995,28-30). 
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World trade began to expand accordingly - between 1800 and 1913 international 
trade as a proportion of world product grew from 3% to 33%, with most of the 
increase taking place after 1870 (Waters, 1995,67). Capital flowed into the 'settler 
colonies' of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Uruguay and Argentina 
to set up banks, meat processing plants, grain and wool stores, timberyards, railways 
and other facilities and businesses. These were part of a global chain of such 
enterprises, owned by and responsible to off-shore investors and proprietors. 
(Denoon, 1983) Although these were technically the first multinational enterprises, 
they were tightly linked with the old imperial structures, and trade between the 
imperial power and its colonies was not perceived as 'trans' national, but rather as 
transfers within one political entity, the empire. Nevertheless, they pioneered a way 
of doing global business using new technologies and management structures which 
were readily adaptable to the post World War II era, when transnational companies, 
most of which were initially based in the USA, overtook the old imperial companies. 
After the Second World War world trade grew tremendously quickly, with an 
increase of over 800% in commodity exchange. Between 1950 and 1975 foreign 
direct investment by US based companies grew more ten times, and the returns from 
abroad increased from 7% to more than 25% in the same period (Teeple, 1995,60). 
By J 980 transnational companies based in the USA accounted for 80% of that 
country's exports and over 50% of its imports. Transnational companies took up 
almost 30% of world trade outside the socialist bloc by the 1980s, while over 30% of 
world trade currently takes the form of intra-firm transfers (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, 
70). 
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Post World War II, therefore, world trade not only changed dramatically in quantity, 
it also changed qualitatively, with trade between nationally based enterprises 
becoming much less significant compared to trade between and within transnational 
companies with a global reach. Critics of the globalisation thesis frequently point to 
the unevenness of this alleged global coverage. It is certainly true that large parts of 
the world - in particular most of sub-Saharan Africa - are currently of little interest 
to transnational traders producing and marketing what are, in global telms, luxury 
commodities like vehicles and carbonated beverages. As McMichael points out, 
roughly 80% of world income is produced and consumed by 15% of the world's 
population, and the other side of this coin is that 80% ofthe world's population does 
not have access to consumer cash or credit. Therefore, he concludes, we must 
consider the world economy to be global in relational terms, but not necessarily in 
social or geographical terms (McMichael, 1997, 15, emphasis added). (For details on 
exactly how the world's income is divided, see Chossudovsky, 1998,39.) 
In any case, the growth in transnational trade in real commodities, although 
substantial, has been and always will be limited by the genuine physical constraints 
involved in finding real resources, making real products and marketing to real 
consumers who can afford to buy the goods. The really dramatic side of economic 
globalisation is not the increase in trade in real commodities, but the stunning 
escalation in trading in what we would now name a 'virtual' commodity i.e. money. 
How has this happened, and what are its political impacts? 
In the late nineteenth century the telegraph greatly enhanced the capacities of money 
markets and the stock exchange. Global trading in currencies, stocks and bonds 
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became possible for the first time. This change required a considerable adjustment in 
the relationship between nation-states and internal markets (Cerny, 1994). A major 
development was the creation of an internationally strong benchmark currency, . 
backed by the gold reserves of a nation-state. This 'backer' role was the one 
performed by Britain and the pound sterling before World War I. When the financial 
hegemony of Britain collapsed in the 1920s, and the world plunged first into a 
depression and then into another war, there was a consensus among the Allies that 
the key to future peace was a return to global financial stability. Hence they met at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 to conclude an agreement which, by 
tying the US dollar to the gold standard, ensured that the USA would become the 
post-war global hegemonic power. At the same time they also set up institutions to 
oversee global financial management - the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. Three years later the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs completed the troika of global financial institutions, which by the promotion 
of certain policies and the suppression of others, have effectively ended nation-based 
economic sovereignty across the globe. 
These non-elected, non-democratically accountable organisations gained in power 
when the US abandoned the gold standard and thus its role of financial hegemon in 
1971. This set in motion a chain reaction in the global economy which led to the 
massive 'de-regulation' of national economies which took place in the 1980s. In its 
tum this linked states more closely with the global market regime and reduced 
opportunities for independent and sovereign action (Cerny, 1994; Chossudovsky, 
1998; Kelsey, 1997; McMichael, 1996; Oman, 1996; Teeple, 1995). 
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By the time de-regulation was taking place the telegraph had long been superseded 
by international telephone linkages and associated facsimile transmission 
technology, and computer networks had moved from specialist military to 
widespread civilian application. It was easier and faster than ever before to trade in 
money products - and with the abandonment of fixed exchange rates (which was 
forced upon 'developing' countries as a condition of receiving IMF and World Bank 
financial assistance) it was also much more lucrative. By the 1980s the money 
market was the biggest and fastest growing market in the world. The turnover in the 
. foreign exchange component alone surpassed $1000 million per day in 1993 
(Leyshon, 1995,39), while the mid-80s global exchanges in goods and services 
($4 trillion per annum) were dwarfed by gross financial exchanges ($60-$70 trillion 
per annum). Trade between the USA, Europe and Japan grew at an average rate of 
8% between 1980 and 1986 - unimpressive set alongside a rate of 54% for gross 
capital exchanges (Cerny, 1994,231-232). By 1997 it was possible to conclude that 
'Developments in the late-twentieth century seem to have reversed our 
ontological bearings: no longer does money make the world go around, rather 
it is the world that makes money go around - more than US$2trillion 
circulates globally every day. At present the total annual value of global 
financial transactions are twice the total value of world production, and the 
real economy in foreign exchange transactions is down to 2.5% with the 
remaining 97.5% speculative.' (McMichael, 1997, 1). 
O'Brien (1992, 89-90) concludes that the capital market is now genuinely global, 
and that this is truly a new phenomenon. Integration at the level of financial markets 
is fuelling the drive towards complete economic integration at the super-regional 
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level. The European Union was the first example, being the first to take the common 
market route, and now the common currency route. Other common market initiatives 
followed Europe, including Australia and New Zealand with the Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement of 1983, and the USA, Canada and Mexico with bilateral 
agreements and then the trilateral North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) 
in the 1990s. O'Brien sees the super-regional blocs as an attempt to replace lost 
national sovereignty with a form of regional sovereignty. This is a project which 
Cerny (1994,227) thinks is unlikely to constitute a serious, countervailing power to 
globalising finance, while Teeple (1995,63) sees them as yet another indicator of 
'profoundly circumscribed national sovereignty'. 
Despite the debates over details, the overall picture is clear. Where once the 
regulation of currency and its flows was a vital part of constituting nation-states, now 
the replacement of nationalist and internationalist regulatory bodies by global ones 
has played a crucial role in de-constituting the nation state. For while there is debate 
over the exact linkages between the nation-states which began forming in Europe 
from the late seventeenth century onwards, and the global expansion of capitalism 
(some of which is canvassed in Palan and Gills, 1994), there is agreement that the 
relationship was complementary. The era of European imperialism, from the 
conquest of the Americas onwards, was both economic and political, with states 
following markets and vice versa. 
States and markets were, in fact, self-constitutive. McMichael (1997) following 
Polanyi (1957) expresses the relations between the development of nation states, 
national currencies and national and international markets thus: 
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' ... British capitalists used their political power in the post-Napoleonic era to 
create markets for land, labour and money to facilitate machine production 
and its insatiable need for price-governed inputs and market outlets. Thus 
was born the ideological construct ofthe 'self-regulating market', as a market 
complex relatively untrammelled by government intervention. Projected 
globally, this apparent self-regulating market needed a universal commodity 
equivalent, gold, to facilitate global exchanges among national and imperial 
markets. Gold became the world money, standardised in sterling balances 
held by governments in London, and through which the City redistributed 
liquidity to make the world go around. In turn, central banks used monetary 
policy to adjust the value of the national currency to the standard of value set 
by sterling/gold as the world money. Constitutional governments arose to 
represent those interests affected financially by currency adjustments.' ... 
'While British measures to institute commodity markets subjected the 
nineteenth-century world to the dynamics of industrial capitalism, they also 
generated the famous protective cycle of market regulation across the world 
of constitutional states. In this movement lay the various national forms of 
regulation: land markets and agricultural trade generating agricultural 
tariffs ... ; labour markets generating social democratic responses (in domestic 
labour legislation and early import-substitution industrial strategies); and 
money markets generating currency management to stabilise national 
economic relations. Polanyi emphasized the "constitutive importance of the 
currency in establishing the nation as the decisive economic and political unit 
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ofthe time" (1957: 203). In short, the protective response was formative of 
the nation state.' (McMichael, 1997, 4-5). 
If this is how nation-states were created, just how are they being destroyed? 
Specifically, how exactly did abandoning the gold standard in the 1970s and 
subsequent global·financial deregulation lead to the de-formation of nation-states? 
Michel Chossudovsky (1998) has made a study of the globalisation of poverty via 
the activities of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The IMF, World Bank 
and {since 1995) the World Trade Organisation are the 'new interventionists' of the 
world economy. The structural adjustment programmes which they enforced first on 
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and then on the Balkans and Eastern Europe, 
involve the same set of steps. Steps which separately and collectively have the effect 
of destroying the nationally-based economy and making whatever economic activity 
remains part of the global system. The steps will be familiar to many First World 
citizens too - particularly to New Zealanders who will recognise that they were all 
applied locally, beginning the moment that the fourth Labour government was 
elected in 1984, and continued with renewed vigour by the National government 
elected in 1990. Belinda Probert (1994) provides an excellent summary of the 
generic global processes behind specific national restructuring, using Australia as a 
case study. Details of the New Zealand case can be found in Barry (1996), Boston 
and Dalziel (1992), Easton (1989; 1997), Holland and Boston (1990), Jesson (1989), 
and Kelsey (1997). Easton (1997,82-83) has a comprehensive listing of the specific 
reforms which took place in New Zealand post 1984.) 
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While the consequences have not been as extreme in absolute tenns, since New 
Zealand started from a higher economic and social base than most Third World 
countries, in relative tenns New Zealanders are now worse offthan they were in 
1984. Higher unemployment, lower average incomes, a bigger gap between rich and 
poor, poorer health, reduced access to education, and higher levels of crime and 
violence are the legacy of the refonns. Le Heron and Pawson (1996) provide a 
geography of restructuring in New Zealand which shows that this has been the most 
rapid and severe period of radical change in New Zealand's history. Those who 
started with the least e.g. women and Maori, had still less again (BunkIe, 1996; Else, 
1997). Further, in a classic 'blame the victim strategy', by 1996 government 
agencies had begun talking about a supposed pathology of psycho-social 
'dependency' which was held to be a cause rather than an effect of poverty (O'Brien, 
1997). This was followed in 1997 by the Department of Social Welfare hosting an 
international conference called 'Beyond Dependency', at which American neo-
liberal 'experts' advocated further savage cuts in social welfare assistance to the 
unemployed and solo parents (O'Brien and Briar, 1997). What did it take to achieve 
this state of affairs? In New Zealand as in the countries 'restructured' by the IFIs the 
necessary steps included: 
(1) devaluing the currency 
(2) removing exchange controls 
(3) de-indexation of wages and other wage depression measures 
(e.g. removal of collective bargaining structures and opportunities) 
(4) removing the Central Bank from national, democratic control 
(5) instituting cost recovery ('user pays') for health and education services 
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(6) progressively lowering the 'acceptable' level of the national budget deficit 
(7) putting public works out to international tender 
(8) eliminating price controls and/or subsidies 
(9) reducing/eliminating tariffs and import quotas 
(10) privati sing state assets and enterprises 
(11) changing the tax structure to undermine domestic production and 
consumption 
(12) de-regulating the banking system 
(13) shrinking the state sector (especially in health and education) 
(After Chossudovsky, 1998,55-67.) 
The social impacts of implementing these economic measures are both massive and 
disturbing. Firstly, unemployment and under-employment increases dramatically. 
State sector workers are thrown out of their jobs in order to 'make up' the fiscal 
deficit. Small and medium-sized productive enterprises are faced with the effects of 
devaluation-induced inflation (rising costs), enforced competition with cheap 
imports, and falling returns for exports on a glutted world market - all of which 
means they can no longer afford to stay in business and provide employment. 
Declining health standards are another significant consequence, as cost recovery to 
the user and lack of investment in urban sanitation and public health infrastructure 
start to bite on popUlations (Philp, 1999). As a result communicable diseases which 
were formerly well controlled in the Third World (e.g. cholera, yellow fever, 
malaria, dengue, bubonic and pneumonic plague) are now resurgent (Chossudovsky, 
1998, 71-72). Tuberculosis, which was considered to be virtually eradicated in First 
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World countries, is the top global disease (ahead of AIDS and malaria), and is 
staging a comeback in First World countries among populations with poor housing 
and sanitation, and resistance to therapeutic drugs. This points to the other major 
connection between globalisation and disease - diseases are also spreading and 
getting worse as a direct result of the very practices of globalisation, such as mass 
tourism, and the industrial production and mass consumption of medical drugs, 
leading to the transport of disease right across the globe, and the qevelopment of 
'super-bugs'(Lyons et aI, 1995 ,24-45). 
Education standards are another victim of economic restructuring, with the state 
pushing the responsibility for providing and funding education and training on to 
private providers and individual 'users'. Welfare provision is increasingly left to 
charitable organisations reliant on private rather than state support. New Zealand 
provides an extreme example ofthe rapid tum around from the welfare state, where 
basic needs were met by public provision, to private charity. In 1980 there was one 
'food-bank' in Auckland, helping needy families. By 1994 there were 365 of them 
throughout the country, most of them church-run and supported, giving out 40,000 
food parcels a month, with an estimated annual value of $25 million. In 1999 the 
Christchurch City Mission alone gave out 35,000 food parcels. (See Leslie, 1996; 
McClure, 1998,245-7; McGurk and Clark, 1993; Olds, 1991, for details on the New 
Zealand food-bank phenomenon.) 
Rising levels of crime and violence are another consequence of structural 
adjustment. In the First World crime and violence are still largely contained at a 
domestic or intra-state level. Nevertheless, Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1994) 
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makes a case for considering this to be a state of 'molecular' civil war as surely as 
the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Chechnya which are largely or 
partially attributable to social stresses resulting from harsh 1FT interventions. Civil 
war has been endemic in Latin America for the past two decades - it is hard to think 
of a country there that has not experienced significant state and counter-state 
violence - or close IFI attention. As the global number of people living - and dying 
- in scenes of poverty and violence attributable to structural adjustment rises to 
millions we are witnessing a destruction of human life which puts all previous 
nationally-based genocides in the shade. 
Where is the political will to contest this, and what form can such political 
contestation take in a world in which the three centuries old institutional basis of 
political action on an international scale - the nation-state - no longer has an 
economic rationale for its existence? 
The Internationale divides the human race? - political globalisation 
The world in 1972, when the first Green parties formed, was an internationalised 
world that was in the throes of globalisation. As in economics, so in politics - world 
history records a shift from political internationalism to political globalism that 
begins to occur at this time. But first let us look at what preceded it. 
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By the late nineteenth century internationalism had become imbedded as the 
dominant way of understanding world scale politics, from the perspective of both the 
rulers and the ruled. In addition to an expansion of inter-state relations across the 
globe, specifically international movements and organisations began to arise. 
The most prominent of these was socialism, principally because it entered the realm 
of nation-state politics by forming political parties which (whether communist or 
social democrat) had considerable success in gaining state power. While this state-
oriented approach was controversial and was hotly debated within both social 
democrat and communist circles in the nineteenth century, by the twentieth century 
'socialism in one country' as an approach had largely triumphed over the alternative 
of internationalist proletarian solidarity. World War I was probably the watershed 
experience which symbolised the end of the 'workers of the world unite' dream, 
when even the more revolutionary social democrats in the Reichstag initially voted 
for war credits to arm German workers against French and British workers. 3 
To focus on the trajectory of socialist parties as exemplars of internationalist politics 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may obscure the achievements 
and salience of equally internationalist but non-statist movements of the period. The 
most significant of these were the women's rights movement and its offshoots the 
peace and temperance movements. While by no means global in the contemporary 
sense made possible by satellite broadcasting and the Internet, the women's 
movement was at least as consciously internationalist as the socialist movement. 
Dorothy Page (1993,5) notes the significance of the steamship mail link which 
opened between Auckland and San Francisco in 1871 in bringing New Zealand 
within the ambit of the women's suffrage and women's temperance movements in 
106 
the United States. The huge women's suffrage marches in London in the early 
twentieth century grouped the marchers according to nationality as well as by 
occupation and other categories. New Zealand suffragists visiting or living in 
London were pleased to march as an example of enfranchised womanhood, and they 
also lobbied vigorously for the vote for British women. (Dalziel, 1993; Page, 1993, 
19-21). 
Returning the interest and support, feminist activists from the U.S. and the U.K. 
regularly toured Australasia. The result of all these exchanges was the development 
of a movement that had generic international goals (female suffrage, equal pay, equal 
education and employment opportunities, better health care, voluntary maternity), 
but nationally specific ways of achieving them. 
International politics had thus been in existence for approximately a century, in both 
party and movement forms, before the era of 'globalisation' arrived. When the 
women's movement revived in the 1960s it rapidly internationalised, as did the anti-
war and anti-nuclear movements of the same time. By the 1970s three new 
internationalist movements were also active across the world. The environment 
movement had set up new international organisations (e.g. Friends of the Earth). 
Indigenous peoples' movements began linking up and creating international councils 
and forums. The Gay Liberation Movement set an example of' grass roots' 
internationalisation by publishing 'The Pink Pages' and other travel and advice 
guides. These made the gay and lesbian resources of the 'gay' cities ofthe world 
available to both nationals of the countries they were in and to the many international 
gay and lesbian visitors. The GLM perhaps achieved the epitome of combining 
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political, economic and social globalisation when some of its places and events 
(certain districts of New York and San Francisco, the Mardi Gras parade in Sydney) 
entered the global economy as significant tourist attractions/destinations. 
The first Green parties were part of this internationalist/globalist trend. Despite the 
seeming geographical marginality of Australia and New Zealand, (from a European 
or North American perspective) they were and are actually located in the 'heartland' 
of internationalisation and globalisation."In fact, by the centrality oftheir 
participation in world trends they prove the internationalisationlglobalisation thesis. 
The example ofthe early achievement of female suffrage which first New Zealand 
(1893) and then Australia (1894-1908) were able to extend to the rest ofthe world 
via the efforts of New Zealand and Australian nationals in the international women's 
movement were paralleled by precocity in labour politics. The world's first 
successful labour parties were formed in Australia in the 1890s, precisely by those 
workers (shearers, dockers, seamen) whose prospects were then most closely linked 
with the fortunes of the international economy. When communism rose to 
prominence as a state political power following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 
the example was not lost on China - or on New Zealand. Communist parties were 
established in both countries in the same year, 1920. 
With this tradition behind them, the United Tasmania Group and the Values Party 
conceptualised themselves from the beginning as exemplars of a politics that had 
international political significance, and they pulled every internationalist string 
available to them, from personal contacts to the mass media. Details of this are given 
in Chapter Five, and show the considerable effort put in by various international 
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secretaries and other party members to network the globe with news and views from 
the parties, and to insist on the global significance of their new political 
formulations. 
The tradition of internationalisation in oppositional politics goes a long way towards 
describing and providing an understanding of the initial form of Green politics. If we 
were to leave it at that we would have an understanding of Green politics as mid-
twentieth century socialism plus late twentieth century environmentalism, with a 
dash of 1960s libertarianism throWIi in to leaven the lump. This is indeed how some 
commentators (e.g. Markovits and Gorski, 1993) characterise it, making it difficult 
to distinguish Green politics from the 'reformed' social democracy of the 1980s, 
which was more sensitive to environmental issues, more liberal on lifestyle issues, 
and less militarist than before. Are the Greens, as enthusiastic users of the new 
communications technologies4 merely supreme practitioners of an internationalist 
progressive politics gone global? 
I contend that this is a superficial understanding of Green politics. For as we have 
seen, at the basis of Green politics is a profound resistance to the environmental and 
social impacts of globalisation, and hence to globalisation itself. The Green use of 
the new communications technologies can be seen more as a way of fighting fire 
with fire, or of retrieving whatever positive capacities the new technologies hold (for 
play, for friendship, for working together on a wider scale than previously possible). 
Further, I believe that without globalisation there would be no Green politics, but 
rather a continuation of nation-state based leftist politics with stronger environmental 
and libertarian dimensions. The New Zealand case study presented below traces the 
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connections between the politics and economics of globalism as an ideology, and 
gives the grounds for Green politics as oppositional politics. 
Social and environmental 'reform'-
the globalist political agenda at play in New Zealand 
That Green politics is the natural anti systemic successor to previous nationalist and 
internationalist forms of progressive politics has always been clear to the creators, 
owners and managers of the international financial institutions and transnational 
capital. Also to their propagandists, even if some Greens are still confused about 
how they seem to have made a giant leap from cleaning up a local toxic waste site or 
planting an organic garden to taking on the might of global capital. 
A good example of how the personal and political connections are made within the 
context of one small nation-state which is subservient to the ideology ofneo-liberal 
globalism is provided by the 1989 conference of the Mont Pelerin Society, which 
was held in Christchurch, New Zealand.s 
The Mont Pelerin Society is one of the oldest and most influential international New 
Right economic think tanks, founded in 1947 by the 'grandfather' of contemporary 
economic liberalism, Friedrich von Hayek. In 1989 it chose to hold its annual 
conference in the Southern Hemisphere for only the third time in its history - for 
reasons which will become clear. Attendance at what was touted (by the conference 
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organiser) as ' ... the most intellectually significant event in New Zealand for many 
years to come .. .' consisted of the cream of New Zealand's neo-liberal establishment, 
who were especially invited to attend. (Mont Pelerin Society gatherings are closed to 
non-members - only members and those invited by them may attend). Some local 
academic invitees expressed unease at attending a closed conference, especially 
given that the ostensible purpose of holding the gathering was to honour the liberal 
philosopher Karl Popper, who wrote his most famous work, The Open Society and 
its Enemies, while resident in New Zealand. This is an important point, and Barbara 
Vincent (1995) has analysed the extent to which the neo-liberalism advocated by the 
New Zealand Business Round Table (New Zealand's most powerful New Right 
lobby group) constitutes a religious ideology, impervious to refutation by real world 
mismatches between theory and practice. Brian Easton (1999) is also conscious of 
the irony ofneo-liberals choosing to claim Popper as one of their own. Such 
reservations about neo-liberalism were and are lost on most of the guests at the 
conference, who included the architect of New Zealand's very own 'structural 
adjustment programme', former Labour Party finance minister Roger Douglas, and 
his National Party successor in that role, Ruth Richardson. Both Douglas and 
Richardson are now members of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers 
(ACT), a neo-liberal political party formed in 1994, which in 1996 won eight seats in 
. the New Zealand parliament (Rainbow and Sheppard, 1997, 178-179). 
Two people who were to become part ofthe ACT parliamentary caucus (Maori 
businesswoman Donna Awatere and Lincoln University resource economist Rodney 
Hide) were also present. Environmental neo-liberalism was represented by National 
Party MP Simon Upton (who ten years later was Minister for the Environment and 
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chair of the U.N. Commission for Sustainable Development), and Maruia Society 
chief executive and founder of the Progressive Greens party, Guy Salmon. At least a 
dozen key figures in the New Zealand business establishment, who were responsible 
for advising both the 1980s Labour and 1990s National governments on the whys 
and wherefores of structurally adjusting New Zealand, were there. So were several 
highly-placed civil servants from Treasury and the Reserve Bank. To complete the 
honoured guests list there were economists from four of New Zealand's seven public 
universities, with the largest contingent coming from the University of Canterbury; 
the New Zealand centre for training in neo-liberal economics. 
While it may not have been the most significant intellectual event in New Zealand in 
that or any other year (especially as it was not open to intellectuals, like a normal 
academic conference), the 1989 Mont Pelerin Society conference is certainly 
significant for other reasons. Firstly, the key elite shapers of the globalisation 
agenda, both national and international, can seldom have been brought together in a 
way which so clearly shows the overlap and synergy between the business, party 
political, governmental and academic players in the global game. The smallness of 
New Zealand made this possible - as indeed it made the Roger Douglas blitzkrieg 
(Easton, 1997b) on the economy possible. The Mont Pelerin Society conference was 
merely the tip ofthe iceberg - Brian Roper (1992) documents that ways in which all 
the major business lobby groups (farmers, manufacturers, commerce) came to adopt 
neo-liberal positions and to pressure the government of the day to follow suit. 
A second significant aspect of this conference was that one of its purposes was to 
'expose' the efforts of the Green movement to protect the environment by 'illiberal' 
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(i.e. non-market) means. Papers presented at the concluding session on 'Economics, 
Politics and the Environment' included one entitled 'Controlling the Environmental 
Threat to the Liberal Order'. The author of this paper did not actually mean that 
environmental degradation was calling into question 'the liberal order', and therefore 
urgent steps needed to be taken to address environmental problems. Rather he 
focussed on the role of the environmental movement as the 'threat', and blamed it 
for an assortment of damage done to business and individuals (even the allegedly 
hundreds of 'extra' road deaths he claimed were a result of Americans being forced 
to switch to smaller, more fuel-economic cars). This individual was one of several 
'experts' who came to tour New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s at the invitation and 
expense of business lobby groups such as the New Zealand Business Round Table, 
and the think tanks that they finance, such as the Centre for Independent Studies. 
Their task was to argue against the reality of global environmental problems such as 
climate change, and against the efforts of environmental organisations and Green 
parties to address them. 6 
Thirdly, and most importantly for New Zealand, the conference reinforced the 
personal and political connections between the local globalists, and between the local 
and foreign globalists. (There were ninety-three New Zealanders present and 
ninety-one foreigners, with the largest foreign contingents being from Australia and, 
the USA.) In a series of case studies on the 'commercialisation' of New Zealand 
Brian Easton (1997) documents how this close matching between individuals with a 
shared ideology and shared interests in business, academe and government was 
responsible for the speed and severity of the structural reforms that were imposed on 
New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Chossudovsky (1998, 17) asserts that 'The global economic system is ... characterised 
by two contradictory forces: the consolidation of a global cheap-labour economy on 
the one hand and the search for new consumer markets on the other.' (Emphasis in 
the original.) New Zealand has certainly cheapened its labour - indirectly by 
increasing unemployment and directly by depressing wages via a range of 
mechanisms - from legislation which replaces collective employment contracts with 
individual ones through to a 'work for the dole' scheme. It has also tried to expand 
its markets. However, doing this via the 'trade liberalisation' route has merely meant 
a frenzy of importing consumer goods which further contributes to the balance of 
payments deficit. Since 1995 New Zealand has run a continuous balance of 
payments deficit, and by the end of the century this meant a combined trade deficit 
of over $2 billion. A good part of this was due to the importing of vehicles following 
the systematic closure of New Zealand's car assembly plants (Donald, 1999). 
However, despite the 'market medicine' exacerbating rather than curing economic 
and social ills, the same dose has been deemed appropriate for the environment. In 
1997 the Minister for the Environment (Mont Pelerin Society member Simon Upton) 
reneged on his 'promise' to apply a carbon tax if New Zealand industries could not 
reach agreed carbon dioxide emission reduction targets voluntarily (they hadn't). In 
1998 he embarked on a review of New Zealand's seven year old Resource 
Management Act with a view to pushing through a privatisation of the consent 
granting process, and watering down the act generally (Fitzsimons and Burtt, 1998). 
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New Zealand politics is thus an increasingly perfect case study in global economic 
push and local political pull. This is nicely exemplified by the recent fortunes of the 
National Party, the leading party of the right. Failing to get an outright majority at 
the 1996 election, National fonned a shaky coalition with the New Zealand First 
party, which had campaigned vigorously and successfully on an anti-globalistlpro-
nationalist platfonn. Once in government, however, New Zealand First acquiesced 
with most of National's economic programme, and it was not until Jenny Shipley 
replaced Jim Bolger as Prime Minister in 1998 that she called New Zealand First's 
bluff by taking the ·coalition to the wire over the privatisation of Wellington airport. 
NZF blinked, and first the coalition government, then the NZF caucus fell to pieces. 
National then fonned a minority government, which was dependent largely on the 
grace and favour of the ACT party, (led by the former Labour minister who drove 
the privatisation of state assets process in the 1980s), for its continuance in office. 
This is the globalist context writ small on the national page within which the Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand (and Green parties elsewhere) struggle to find a 
political purchase for the alternatives they espouse. 
Seeing through the glitter of globalisation 
The contrast between the 1990s and the 1960s is huge. Even in 1972 Australia and 
New Zealand still had full employment, public health, education and social welfare 
systems that were the envy of the rest of the world, very low crime rates, and most 
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families were able to take a relaxed, affordable summer holiday at an unpolluted, 
uncrowded beach. That all this would be transfonned to its opposite within twenty 
years was beyond most people's wildest nightmares. 
Paradoxically, the first signs that the globalisation dream would end in nightmare 
were picked up by certain 'canaries' living in the privileged First World, for the first 
phase of globalisation was virtually indistinguishable from the long post-war 
economic boom. In Westem(ised) countries full employment was the nonn, the 
numbers of young people in higher education rose dramatically (see Chapter Four); 
lUXury goods for mass consumption rolled off mechanised assembly lines, and 
business boomed. The power of computers was applied to civilian life - production. 
consumption, education, participation - for the first time. The only apparent 
downside appeared to be the pollution generated by the industries creating the goods 
for mass consumption, and the wastefulness of producing so many varieties of 
non-necessities, with their associated packaging. 
The costs ofliving in a fully industrialised, mass consumerist society, expanding on 
a global scale via new scientific and technological means, were initially felt as 
psychic rather than material costs. As we shall see in Chapter Four, the Situationists 
kicked off theorising the new antisystemic politics with a scathing critique of 'the 
society of the spectacle' . They attacked the boredom, inanity, oppressiveness, 
stupidity and environmental insanity of the industrial production and mass 
consumption of commodities. Their alternative was a total redefinition and 
realignment of art and life via the re-construction of the physical plant of cities and 
the lives of those who lived in them (Knabb, 1981). 
116 
The first salvos in the new antisystemic battle were delivered by American and 
French students defending their right to criticise 'the system' and to put a spanner in 
the works. Mario Savio, the leader ofthe Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which 
brought that campus to a halt in 1964, expressed it as: 
'There is a time when the operation of the machine is so odious, makes you 
so sick at heart that you can't take part; you can't even tacitly take part, and 
you've got to put your bodies upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and 
you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run 
it, the people who own it, that unless you're free the machine will be 
prevented from working at all.' (Savio in Stem, 1970, 156) 
The Situationist students who wrote the manifesto 'On the Poverty of Student Life' 
(Knabb, 1981, 319) in 1966 went even further, calling for the suppression of 
commodity production, and hence ofthe proletariat and of work itself. They were 
tried for using students' association money to publish and distribute these views. 
Their characters, and the nature of their opposition, were described by the judge as 
follows: 
' ... these students, scarcely more than adolescents, lacking any experience of 
real life, their minds confused with ill-digested philosophical, social, political 
and economic theories, and bored by the drab monotony of their everyday 
life, make the empty, arrogant and pathetic claim to pass judgement and even 
to heap abuse upon their fellow students, their professors, God, religion, the 
clergy, the government and political and social systems in the entire world. 
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Rejecting all morality and restraint, their cynicism does not hesitate to preach 
theft, an end to all studies, the suspension of work, total subversion and 
world revolution with unlicensed pleasure as its only goal.' (Cohn-Bendit, 
1969,26). 
The 'bad' example was not lost on other French students, including Daniel and 
G<l:briel Cohn-Bendit, who made sure that Situationist material was widely circulated 
and even discussed in class on the Nanterre campus, where the (eventually 
nationwide) French student revolt broke out two years later. There was a confusing 
and chaotic flowering of critiques. These ranged from the high-flown 
intellectualising of the French to the simple slogans of American students, who took 
the computer as the prime symbol of what they were objecting to, and came up with 
lines like 'Are you a student or an IBM card?' (Stem, 1970, 156) and 'I am a human 
being - do not spindle, fold or mutilate.' 
The first intemperate, and in some cases Luddite, critiques of the new 
communications and transport technologies which facilitated globalisation are nicely 
represented by Eduardo Rothe's views on the space programme. 'The conquest of 
space is part of the planetary hope of an economic system which, saturated with 
commodities, spectacles and power, ejaculates into space when it arrives at the end 
of the noose of its terrestrial contradictions.' (Rothe, 1981,292). They were not 
supported by systematic, quantitative criticism until the 1970s. By then Ivan Illich, 
Andre Gorz and Theodore Roszak were pointing out that while the new global 
technologies promised to liberate people from drudgery and physical constraints, in 
practice they did not live up to their promises. To the contrary, they frequently 
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contributed to human alienation and disempowennent rather than relieving it. 
Moreover, the 'people' who had access to such material benefits as were made 
available by industrial production and consumption and global trade continued to be 
divided upon predictable national, race, gender and class lines, with the global 
majority missing out (Gorz, 1982, 1985; Illich, 1973, 1978; Roszak 1969, 1973). 
However, the same technologies greatly facilitated the expansion of global business 
in general, and global financial business in particular, and their critics were largely 
ignored by governments who were also trying to get a slice of the action. 
Most of the students erecting barricades on the Left Bank in Paris in May 1968 did 
not have access even to descriptions, let alone analysis and criticism, of the full 
extent and potential impacts of globalisation. They were as critical of 'obsolete 
communism', as it was practised in the Soviet Union and by its 'fellow traveller 
parties in the West, such as the French Communist Party, as they were of the 
capitalist side of the Cold War divide. But how could they have known that despite 
the frightening nuclear stand off between 'communism' and 'capitalism' the two 
ostensibly opposing sides had almost completed the virtually subterranean 
construction of a global (capitalist) financial system, with communist countries 
opening disguised Eurodollar accounts in the West from 1949 onwards? (McLellan, 
1999). In fact the youthful protesters, focussing on lifestyle rather than economic 
issues, would have been mostly unaware of the very existence of Eurodollars. They 
could not have sunnised that the rapid expansion in trading in the Eurodollar market 
in the late Sixties would soon put intolerable pressures on the American financial 
system and cause the abandoning ofthe gold standard, with all its flow-on effects in 
tenns of economic restructuring. They could scarcely conceive how this would 
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eventually come back to affect students·as contemporary right-wing governments 
(whatever their ostensible party label) cut back on 'free' tertiary education provided 
by previous reforming social democrat governments. The main indicator and 
motivator for most ofthe protesting students of the Sixties who began to critique 'the 
system' was paradoxically what they experienced by way of the factory-like 
conditions and standards of learning imposed upon them in the new tertiary 
institutions they were now able to attend. Documents from the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement of 1964 (Teodori, 1970, 150- 161) show the student leaders adamantly 
opposed to the concept of the University of California as a 'multiversity', a service 
centre producing information and personnel for industry, business, government and 
the military. 
Manuel Castells was a participant in the Paris 1968 events, and says of the student 
and other social movements that they' ... were not reactions to the economic crisis. 
Indeed, they surged in the late 1960s, in the heyday of sustained growth and full 
employment, as a critique of the "consumption society",' Rather, the Sixties 
movements were' ... a multi-dimensional reaction to arbitrary authority, a revolt 
against injustice, and a search for personal experimentation.' (Castells, 1998, 339). 
As we shall see in Chapter Four, they were part of a project of actually realising 
liberty, equality and above all community,. which globalisation, even it its first 
glittering phase of economic growth and mass consumption, could not satisfy. 
They were also definitely connected to Green party politics. This was recognised by 
the first International Secretary of the Values Party nine years later, when he wrote 
of the student protests in France in May 1968: 'That challenge was seen as left-wing, 
but it had the added dimension of being decentralist and strongly critical of 
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communist state bureaucracy. In fact, many ideas that we think of as Values ideas 
emerged from discussions in the occupied Sorbonne.'(Straton, 1977, 1). 
Be that as it may, even in the First World in the Sixties and Seventies most people 
were not students, and most students were not involved in protest action. Although 
some (particularly the young) shared the student movement's sense of frustration-
and some of its analysis of the causes - for most people the problems of globalising 
industrial production and consumption became part of the popular experience in 
other ways. The first major indication that trouble might lie ahead on this route came 
with the 'oil shocks' of the early Seventies, when the luxury levels of transport fuel 
usage in and by Westem(ised) countries appeared to be in jeopardy. These 
engineered 'crises' actually represented a hiccup in the deployment of global 
economic power, rather than a genuine shortage of fuel, but once again the critics 
(such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger)7 who made a causal connection between the 
globalisation of capital and its social effects, and argued for a more sophisticated and 
critical approach to 'environmental' issues, were largely drowned out by the 
dominant explanations of the time, such as the much-discussed Club of Rome report 
(Meadows et aI, 1972). 
Nevertheless, no one could avoid noticing the boom starting to go bust in the 
'stagflation' of the early 1970s. The theory and practice of social democrat economic 
management appeared to have been discredited (see Chapter 3 for more on this). 
Even though ostensibly liberal/conservative governments persisted with 
'protectionist' and 'interventionist' approaches to national economic management 
throughout the 1970s, by 1980 the new 'monetarist' and 'supply side' brooms 
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wielded by the Thatcher and Reagan governments were sweeping out the British and 
American economies. By the mid-Eighties the same economic approaches were 
being applied by labour governments in Australasia. The international financial 
institutions were applying the same 'structural refonn' medicine to the heavily 
indebted Third World - and so we come full circle to the development of the new 
Green fonn of anti systemic politics. 
This is a politics that begins with questioning the fake prosperity that leads to 
genuine poverty. A politics which questions the 'Left' (which has supported the 
globalisation project just as enthusiastically as the 'Right'), as much as the Right, 
thereby calling into question the relevance of those time-honoured political labels, 
that were developed in an earlier era of social and economic distress. In the next two 
chapters I go on to look at how the non-revolutionary left moved from economic 
nationalism to economic rationalism, and hence globalism; and at how the first social 
and political opposition movements on a global scale were formed, and led to the 
Green movement and Green parties. 
Notes 
1. The use of the word 'conjuncture' to describe a medium term phase in a world-historical 
phenomenon is explained by Wallerstein (1991) in 'The Inventions of Time Space Realities: 
Towards an Understanding of Our Historical Systems'. As an example of its application, see 
McMichael (1997) for a discussion of the changes in world food production regimes in 
relation to conjunctural shifts in global capitalism. 
2. Paul Wapner (1996,21-23) gives examples of both national regulations and international 
agreements which have not been complied with, to the considerable detriment of the 
environment and endangered species. He also cites the views of critics who claim that 
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international treaties and the like always represent lowest minimum standards negotiable. 
rather than the optimum for the environment. 
3." This retraction from the ideal of international proletarian solidarity is covered in further 
detail in Chapter Three. Magnusson (1996, 38-40) argues that success at state level 
undermined the original internationalist project of socialism and has ended in the rout of 
social democracy in the late twentieth century, with the majority of social democrat parties 
being indistinguishable from conservative and liberal parties - and repressive dictatorships -
in imposing globally driven 'economic restructuring' on the states they rule(d). 
4. Statistical information on new technology use by different political tendenCies has yet to be 
created, so the information we do have is necessarily subjective and anecdotal. My 
impressions of Green use of new communications technologies have been formed from 
watching the New Zealand Green Party make extensive use of computer-based 
communications, including conducting executive-level discussions and making executive 
decisions via e-mail.(This is covered in more detail in Chapter Eight.) One prime example of 
how 'wired' New Zealand Greens are can be found in the response to a 1998 on-line poll 
conducted by New Zealand's National Business Review via its website. Responses to the 
question 'Who would you vote for if an election were held tomorrow?' put the Green Party 
in front with over 30% of the votes cast, followed closely by the New Right party ACT. Next 
came National, then Labour, and lastly the Alliance. This was at a time when scientific 
random telephone polling had National first with over 30%, Labour second, then the 
Alliance, then ACT (with around 5%), and fmally the Greens with around 1 %. As the cyber 
poll was entirely voluntary and unprompted, what this result shows is not actual party 
preferences, but rather how 'politically wired' the Greens and the New Right are, compared 
to older/more conservative political parties. For a further discussion of Greens and cyber-
politics see Chapter Eight. 
5. Information on what happened at the conference and who attended it was obtained from 
'Bludgers Prizegiving', (1990). The article on the conference cites and quotes several other 
New Zealand media sources on the conference and its participants. Further connections 
between attendees at the conference and their subsequent role in the 'commercialisation' of 
New Zealand are given by Brian Easton (1997b). 
6. For an account of such tours and how they were too much even for the Minister of the 
environment see Speden (1995). 
7. Enzensberger's 1973 essay 'A Critique of Political Ecology' (in Enzensberger, 1988) 
differed from most of the contemporary socialist/communist critiques in not denying the 
realities of environmental degradation. It also differed from contemporary Green critiques in 
being aware that the burden of environmental degradation and deprivation was not and is not 
distributed evenly or fairly, but according to existing class and other social cleavages. 
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Chapter Three 
The rise and fall of social democracy 
'The militant reform associated with the early history of social democratic 
parties, which secured limited but important concessions from dominant 
classes, has gradually dissolved. The over-riding objective is no longer the 
execution of a clearly defined programme of economic, social or political 
reform but the exercise of the power of patronage which the state apparatus 
confers on those who administer it. Social democracy no longer articulates, 
much less carries through, transitional strategies aimed at the transformation 
of society. It lacks the will, the analysis and the means needed to challenge 
the current direction of advanced capitalism. It has outlived its historical 
mission.' (Camilleri, 1986,58) 
The international gives way to the global 
Joseph Camilleri's epitaph on social democracy may have seemed a little premature 
in 1986, but it was in fact extremely prescient - by 1996 his conclusions had been 
124 
well documented in Australia and New Zealand by numerous studies, which began 
to appear shortly after Camilleri's critique. They include Bell and Head (1994), 
Boston and Dalziel (1992), Boston and Holland (1987), Burchell and Mathews 
(1991), Castles et al (1996), Denemark (1990), Easton (1989, 1997b), Jesson (1989), 
Johnson (1989), O'Brien and Wilkes (1993), Oliver, 1987), Pusey (1992) and Scott 
(1991). The common theme ofthese studies is that it was labour governments, not 
libera.l/conservative ones, which were primarily responsible for instituting economic 
and social reforms and restructuring in the 1980s. These reforms were intended to 
increase national participation in the global economy, and were readily adopted and 
further developed by liberal/conservative governments that shared the same globalist 
orientation. 
In this chapter I examine the relevance ofthis shift in social democrat/labour politics 
to development of Green politics. To do this properly involves going back to the 
origins of social democrat/labour politics in the internationalisation of the world 
economy in the late nineteenth century. Then I 'fast forward' to the 1970s and 19808 
to show how the nationalist systems of state economic management developed and 
defended by social democrat/labour parties were ultimately rejected by them in 
favour of globalisation. Thus although these parties worked hard in the 1970s to take 
on board the messages ofthe new social movements with regard to gender and race 
equality, in the final analysis these remained as 'clip-ons' to an economic policy 
which limited their realisation. In turn, this provided a political space within which 
Green parties could develop and prosper, and even function as the 'Left' within 
parliaments which no longer have a genuine Left. (See Chapter Seven for more on 
this point.) 
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For although parties retaining the labour name continue to exist and attract 
significant voter support in Australia and New Zealand, their economic policies are 
no longer the same as those promoted and implemented by pre-1980s labour 
governments. Far from challenging the current direction of advanced capitalism i.e. 
globalisation, they endorse it and seek to foster it. In this respect, if they have not 
outlived their historical mission, they have certainly redefined it to become the 
opposite of what it previously was. 
In doing so they have delivered a major blow to established forms of 
non-revolutionary leftism, which now no longer have a party with a chance of 
becoming government to support, infiltrate or influence. In Australasia voters and 
political activists wanting 'leftist' parliamentary options have had to look towards 
reconstituting labour politics, e.g. the New Labour Party in New Zealand. Also to 
liberal centrist parties like the Australian Democrats, or to 'rainbow' solutions like 
the Alliance of five parties (the Democrats, the Greens, the Liberals, Mana 
Motuhake, the New Labour Party), formed in New Zealand in 1991. Finally, there is 
the Green party option (the Australian Greens formed in 1992, and the Green Party 
of Aotearoa New Zealand formed in 1990, which joined the Alliance in 1991, and 
left it in 1997). Of these options, the Green parties are the only ones that are part of a 
global movement of related political parties. They also have an economic 
programme which, while seeming to contain and combine elements of both leftism 
and liberalism, is based on different premises (the formation of this economics in 
New Zealand in the 19705 is discussed in Chapter Seven). 
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Does this mean that Green parties can and will eventually be as dismissive of social 
democraUlabour parties as Trotsky was of the Mensheviks? ('You are bankrupt. You 
have played out your role - go where you belong: to the dust-heap of history! ') 
(Deutscher, 1954,314). The answer to that would seem to lie in a better 
understanding of the forces that created social democracy as an international politics, 
and that caused it to founder on the shoals of globalism. 
In this chapter I consider the extent to which social democraUlabour parties were 
both a creation and a creator of internationalist world politics, and how this had to 
change or die with the shift to globalism. Also at how this affected their economic, 
labour, social welfare, national security and environmental policies in ways which 
left them open to both the forces of globalism, and the Green critique. I use the 
Australian and New Zealand labour parties and governments for most of my 
historical examples, as they provide the best case studies of the nationalisUglobalist 
shift in social democraUl;;tbour politics, but I also use supplementary examples from 
European social democraUlabour parties. 
Despite the difference in name, social democrat and labour parties both originated in 
and were the creations of the wider labour movement which began forming in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. There.are undoubtedly strong national and 
cultural differences between social democraUlabour parties in countries as different 
as Germany and Australia, and each country with such a party has its own unique set 
of historical circumstances which shapes its labour politics. However, in the final 
analysis the parallels between social democrat politics in Europe and labour politics 
in Australasia are both striking and significant, and their politics and economics are 
127 
directly comparable (Denemark, 1990). This is not surprising, given that both were 
and are being shaped by the same international forces, and hence the same trends can 
be observed in Europe and Australasia. 
Whether called social democrat or labour, these parties all attempted to work out an 
'historic compromise' between labour and capital. The goal was to successfully 
manage a 'mixed economy', which provided a good rate of return on capital on the 
one hand, and low unemployment, good wages and a high 'social wage' on the other 
(przeworski, 1980, 1985). However by the 1970s the conditions under which this 
compromise had been temporarily possible were changing. Capital was using new 
technologies and going global to increase the rate of return. On the labour side, as 
Hobsbawm (1989) notes, by the 1980s only two the five factors responsible for the 
rise of mass labour/socialist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries still had some historical life left in them. This pointed to the conclusion 
that they were all historically determined and historically specific, and a new politics 
was needed for new times. Thus Hobsbawm entitled his essay on the subject 
'Farewell to the classic labour movement?' Belinda Probert (1986) was similarly 
moved to ponder on why erstwhile socialist or left parties might no longer be the 
only or the best means of achieving socialism. In considering the globalist influences 
that brought about such changes I focus in this chapter on the commonalities which 
were important in creating a point of resistance - and of departure - for Green 
politics. 
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From economic nationalism to economic rationalism 
The mutually constituting relationship of national markets, national currencies and 
ponstitutional nation-states within the context of the expanding international 
economy and politics of the nineteenth century has already been noted in Chapter 
Two. To recap - constitutional nation-states were required to defend national 
currencies and expand international markets. The political parties that became the 
vehicle for constitutional parliamentary politics rose and fell principally on their 
actual or perceived ability to manage the national economy and defend the 'national' 
economic interest internationally. The international economic hegemony of Great 
Britain was due to the adoption of the pound sterling as the international benchmark 
currency. 
This was the international economic and political milieu within which the socialist 
parties and international socialist movements that began to create themselves from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards had to operate. Social democracy had its 
beginnings in Germany in the 1860s, with the formation of various labour leagues, 
followed in 1869 by the Social Democrat Workers Party, which merged with the All-
German Workers Association in 1875 (Breuilly, 1987). In Scandinavia the 
Norwegian Labour party was formed in 1887, the Swedish Social Democrat Party in 
1889 (Castles, 1978). Political labour associations formed in Australia in the late 
1880s, with the various state-level Labor organisations joining up in the 1890s to 
create the Australian Labor Party (ALP). National level labour politics in Australia 
thus preceded the constitution of Australia as a federated nation-state, and the ALP 
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long predates the major liberal and conservative parties in Australia. The closeness 
of the timing is not coincidental- the linkage between nationhood and labour politics 
was fundamental to the economic programmes and electoral success of Australasian 
labour parties. In his introduction to The Australian Labor Movement 1850-1907 
L.G. Churchward says that 'Perhaps the greatest achievement of Labor in Federal 
politics in the period up to 1914 was to give political expression to Australian 
nationalism.' (Ebbels, 1966). 
In New Zealand and Great Britain a leftist form of liberalism which was electorally 
successful delayed the formation of separate labour parties capable of forming a 
government until the early twentieth century. However various labour leagues and 
social democrat parties were set up in both places from the 1870s onwards (Hinton, 
1983; Roth and Hammond, 1981), and both countries were definitely part of the 
international trend. 
The formation of the ALP is a textbook illustration of the push and pull between 
national and international economic factors. Prior to the invention and widespread 
application of refrigeration technologies, Australia (and New Zealand's) chief export 
and main contribution to the world economy was unprocessed wool. Removing the 
wool from the sheep required a large labour force of shearers; getting it to the ports 
and then overseas required large numbers of transport workers, dockers and 
seafarers. It was these workers, organised into labour unions in both Australia and 
New Zealand, who participated in the Maritime Strike of 1890 (the first Australasian 
strike) - and were soundly defeated by their employers on both sides of the Tasman 
(McMullin, 1991, 1; Roth and Hammond, 1981, 38). 
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Queensland pastoralists then decided to capitalise on the post-strike weakness of the 
unions by announcing wage cuts for shearers, and refusing to negotiate. A strike of 
shearers and associated workers began in early March 1891, followed by a general 
strike later that month. Severe state repression ensued, with strikers convicted, 
imprisoned and dragged in chains for contravening an obscure 1825 conspiracy law, 
which had been repealed in England but not in Queensland, and the strike collapsed 
in mid-June (McMullin, 1991,3). The main lesson which Australian labour drew 
from these major industrial defeats was that it needed to increase its efforts to gain 
political representation. A secondary lesson was that to do so it had to modify its 
political platform. 
In Queensland the 'People's Parliamentary Platform', drawn up by Utopian socialist 
William Lane for the Australian Labor Federation in August 1890, advocated 
nationalising all sources of wealth and all means of production and exchange in 
order to provide funds for education, sanitation, pensions for invalids, the elderly and 
children. It also called for 'social justice [for] every citizen'. It was replaced in 
March 1891 by a platform which rejected wholesale nationalisation but called for 
electoral reforms, a statutory 8 hour day, protective labour legislation, free 
compulsory education, pensions for orphans and the elderly, a state bank and state 
control of irrigation and water conservation (McMullin, 1991,6). 
Labor parties in the other states adopted similar platforms in the 1890s, and the ALP 
was elected to the federal parliament and even formed the world's first labour 
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government, albeit briefly, between April and August 1904. In 1905 the federal 
platfonn of the ALP set out the following objectives: 
'(1) The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the maintenance of 
racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and 
self-reliant community. 
(2) The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the 
collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and 
economic functions ofthe State and Municipality.' 
The key planks of its 'Fighting Platfonn' were 
, 1. Maintenance of a White Australia. 
2. Compulsory Arbitration. 
3. Old Age Pensions. 
4. Nationalisation of Monopolies. 
5. Citizen Defence Force. 
6. Restriction of Public Borrowing. 
7. Navigation Laws.'l 
(cited in Ebbels, 1966, 222) 
The concepts of 'nation' and 'nationalisation' can thus be seen to be foundational to 
labour politics in Australia. Similarly, organised labour in New Zealand at that time 
was mostly giving its support to a Liberal government that discriminated against 
citizens of Asian origin, and was opposed to Asian immigration. Yet it was also 
prepared to pass a compulsory arbitration act and provide old age pensions (the latter 
were initially for white citizens only). 
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The early twentieth century labour concept of 'nation' is now well out of fashion. 
Labour governments in Australasia in the 1980s began the moves to privatise state 
monopolies, restrict state and local government enterprise, and reduce levels of tariff 
and other forms of economic protection. These were all put in place by their 
predecessors in order to create a 'self-reliant community', and secure 'the full results 
of their industry to all producers'. 
Until the 1980s about-face, however, the corollary of nationalism in economics was 
a commitment to improving the participation and welfare of all citizens of the nation 
state, not merely the elite. Hence the early labour emphasis on the extension of the 
suffrage, both in law and in practice. Also important were the protection of wage 
workers (via compulsory arbitration and other industrial relations reforms), and a 
universal social welfare programme. This usually began with old age pensions and 
moved on via widows, orphans, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits to 
the creation of the 'welfare state'. Although somewhat limited, in late twentieth 
century terms, due to its elevation of the status of the white male wage earner 
relative to other non-elite groups, this approach was nevertheless a substantial 
departure from previous conceptions and practices concerning the role ofthe state. 
n also required a different approach to national economic management. When social 
democrat/labour parties were able to gain government power for any meaningful 
length of time, they were able to implement their new approach. 
By the 1930s, after two major world depressions, it was clear that laissezJaire 
economic doctrines could not guarantee full employment. Social democrat/labour 
parties therefore had little hesitation in adopting policies of the type advocated by 
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lM. Keynes, which included a different role for the state in the management and 
planning of the economy, one which was more focussed on securing full 
employment and social se~urity rather than providing opportunities for rentiers, 
speculators and other 'investors'.z Such policies were electorally popular in the 
1930s and 40s, and when coupled with efficient and effective state management (as 
in Sweden and New Zealand) ensured long terms in office for social democrat/labour 
parties. Where labour governments were replaced by conservative/liberal 
governments (as they were in Australasia in the 1950s) those governments continued 
a commitment to the state's role in maintaining employment, though they placed a 
greater emphasis on stimulating or assisting private rather than public provision of 
jobs. 
Social democrat/labour parties saw a role for direct state provision of jobs, although 
they took different approaches to achieving this aim. In Britain the Labour Party 
placed a heavy emphasis on nationalisation of major industries i.e. on maximising 
the power ofthe state to create or maintain employment by extending the economic 
enterprises in state control. In Germany and New Zealand, despite socialist sentiment 
within the parties in favour of this route, it was never given such a high priority. 
The parties focussed instead on ensuring that strategic assets (especially the major 
transport, communications and energy facilities) were maintained in, transferred to, 
or established in state ownership. The ALP gave nationalisation higher ideological 
priority, but Labor attempts to widen state control to include interstate airlines in 
1947 and banks in 1948 fell foul of restraining interpretations of the Australian 
constitution by conservative judges on the High Court. In the case of banks there was 
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also a vigorous campaign against the proposal by interested parties which led to 
Labor losing power in New South Wales (McMullin, 1991,246-250). 
By the 1960s there was still some life in the nationalisation debate in Britain, but in 
Australasia and Germany the mixed economy was firmly supported by the labour 
parties and the German SPD. The SPD had moved slowly and erratically away from 
socialisation in the 1940s and 50s. By the time of the tradition-breaking Bad 
Godesberg Programme of1959 (in which it abandoned the last vestiges of Marxist 
goals and terminology) it was committed only to publicly owned coal-mining and 
atomic energy industries, plus central planning for the power industry (Childs, 1966, 
92-106). 
Rather than pursue nationalisation of all existing key industries, the German and 
Australasian approach was to create state versions of those industries as competitors 
to the private concerns e.g. banks, insurance companies, shipping lines. This was 
particularly feasible when the state could be in at the beginning of industries based 
on new technologies, such as hydro-electric and nuclear power, aviation and 
telecommunications, and set them up as state enterprises. Labour governments also 
played a pro-active role in the establishment and subvention of manufacturing in 
Australasia, not always wisely or successfully. The failed Nelson cotton mill 
experiment of the 1957-60 New Zealand Labour government is a case in point. 
Similarly, for all the state subsidisation of New Zealand's only aluminium smelter 
(a project initiated by the same Labour government) it is impossible for independent 
researchers to establish whether the project has ever made a corresponding financial 
return to the community (Bertram and Dann, 1981). 
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The 1972-75 Labor government in Australia probably represents the last full-blown 
effort by a labour government to actively manage a modem mixed economy in 
accordance with social democratic economic principles. At the same time it also had 
to try and stimulate growth and investment to compensate for the stresses and strains 
which were starting to show in the world economy. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
was committed to a nationalist form of productivism, and saw a community of 
interest between labour and industry, which he expressed in this way: 
'I believe there is no section of the section ofthe Australian business 
community which shares greater common interests, more common ground 
with the present Australian government than Australia's manufacturing 
industries. It is an historical fact that the strength of Australian manufactures 
and the strength of the Australian Labor movement have grown together. 
This has been no accident. It is of the essence of the political and industrial 
development of this nation; and this community of interest between Labor 
and industry was never greater than at this time in our history when we have 
an Australian Labor government.' (Whitlam in Johnson, 1989,55) 
Co-operation between business, industry and the state was essential to the Whitlam 
government's method of achieving increases in social welfare, which was based on 
surpluses to be derived from national economic growth. Carol Johnson summarises 
the three central flaws in this approach as the following assumptions' ... that a 
capitalist economy would function smoothly as long as it was properly managed; 
that high levels of economic grc;wth, necessary to Labor's plans for social reform, 
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could be achieved; and that a massive expansion of public expenditure would have 
no detrimental effects on the private sector.' (Johnson, 1989,54). 
It would also have helped to have had an economically literate Prime Minister 
capable oftaking an interest in and guiding the process, rather than one who was 
more interested in foreign affairs. Whitlam turned managing the economy over to a 
rapid succession of Treasurers, (three in as many years), all of whom had some bona 
fide qualifications for the job but none of whom retained Whitlam's confidence and 
support for long. It is therefore no wonder that the Whitlam government is 
remembered chiefly for its non-economic achievements, such as its progressive 
foreign policy, its reforms to the education system, its extension of medical care, and 
its elevation of the status of women and Aborigines. 
It was certainly not up to dealing with the assaults on national economies that began 
to occur in the 1970s, of which the most visible symbol was the series of 'oil shocks' 
or crises of the early 1970s. In a bizarre but telling series of blunders based around 
the efforts of Rex Connor, the arch-nationalist Minister of Minerals and Energy, to 
secure cheap loans of the petrodollars that were sloshing around the world economy, 
the Whitlam government lost all credibility as sound economic managers. Bill 
Hayden's relatively conservative 1975 budget, which' ... attempted to find a "middle 
way" between the two extremes of "excessive" government spending and an 
"excessive" cut in government spending', was offered after Hayden had concluded 
that Keynesian policies could not be simply applied in a world which no longer 
operated according to Keynesian principles (John:~n, 1989, 75). Despite this, the 
budget was still blocked by the Opposition in the Senate. Further, the 'loans scandal' 
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was kept before the public, both by the Opposition and by a hostile press, as a reason 
for denying confidence in the government. 
While this was not the only factor contributing to the downfall ofthe government, it 
was a major catalyst, and peculiarly apt. To unsuccessfully attempt to use an artefact 
of globalisation (loans of petrodollars) to fund economic nationalist goals, and to 
thereby precipitate the loss of governmental powers to achieve those goals, is one of 
the major ironies of Australian Labor history. 
Out of government for a further eight years in Australia, (and nine in New Zealand), 
when the labour parties returned they were determined to do things differently. 
While ostensibly still committed to traditional labour social goals, they began to use 
radically different economic means. Such means began with floating the dollar -
something that was contrary to previous labour economic management principles 
and a major departure from nationalist labour ideology3 - but certainly didn't end 
there. 
Making work/or the workers 
One of the major goals the labour governments of the 1970s and 80s were still 
committed to, at least according to their election manifestos, was full employment. 
Even where particular state-sponsored employment schemes failed, the principle of 
the creation of employment via the creation of state owned or subsidised enterprises 
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remained valid as far as both social democrat/labour and even their successor 
conservative/liberal governments were concerned right through to the 1970s. 
If anything it became more salient once the post-war boom went bust in the early 
1970s. The New Zealand National Party government 1975-1984 desperately pursued 
an increasingly unsuccessful strategy of attempting to stimulate economic growth, 
and hence reduce the rising unemployment rate, by pouring millions of dollars of 
state money (much of it borrowed) into state-owned and operated energy projects, 
and associated private projects. These 'Think Big' schemes were supposed to 
generate 160,000 jobs in the first few years, while the whole National growth 
programme promised 410,000 new jobs by the end of the 1980s (New Zealand 
National Party, 1981). They were also supposed to develop electricity and natural 
gas supplies to fuel industrial expansion by foreign-owned companies (Wilson, 
1982, 60-96). 
A similar situation had existed in Tasmania for much longer, where the Hydro 
Electric Commission which was set up in 1930 had virtual carte blanche to plan the 
industrial development of Tasmania, with active support from the Labor 
governments in power from 1934-1969 and 1972-1982 (Thompson, 1981). The 
consensus on the desirability of this approach to development did not start to crack 
until the early 1970s, when Lake Pedder was about to be sacrificed to another hydro 
scheme. Public outrage and the efforts of the world's first Green party, the United 
Tasmania Group, were easily quashed by Labor in the 1970s, but by the 1980s and 
the Gordon-below-Franklin dam dispute Labor in Tasmania was on shakier ground, 
with Doug Lowe, (Labor Premier 1977-1981), unsuccessfully opposing the Franklin 
scheme. Labor at federal level was persuaded to act against the hydro-electric 
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development paradigm and stop the scheme - which was a popular move with the 
Australian environmental constituency. 
With forestry resources in Australasia, as with energy resources, there was an 
equally huge gulf between those who advocated state 'development' and subvention 
as a route to economic growth and full employment, and those who wanted the state 
to playa conservation role. The green opposition did not say categorically (as New 
Right critics would later say) that the state had no valid role to play in creating 
employment or developing resources. However, it did object strongly to the way in 
which Australasian labour governments in the 1970s and their conservative/liberal 
successors interpreted this role. This was indicative of the new political and 
economic thinking that emerged with the Greens. 
Perhaps it was 'wrong' of social democrat/labour parties in the twentieth century to 
interpret the socialist maxim 'socialisation of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange' as meaning nationalisation of the same, and to give such a large role 
to the state. This was certainly argued by the 1980s labour governments in 
Australasia, which claimed to have a better way of doing things. Historically, 
however, when it was first promoted nationalisation was seen as the solution to 
chronic, endemic unemployment. The New South Wales Political Labour League 
Fighting Platform of 1896 had as a foundational principle '7. Abolition of the 
Unemployed' and in more specific terms as 'Absorption of the unemployed by the 
establishment of State farms and labor colonies.' (Ebbels, 1965,217-219). 
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Although still in name and form the party which had been founded to secure state 
power for the working class because the unionist approach to guaranteeing work for 
the workers was inadequate, the Labour Party in New Zealand in the 1980s abjured 
its belief in and practice ofthis role. It not only started to sell off productive and 
profitable state enterprises, it also made drastic cuts in genuinely 'public' 
employment, by shrinking the public service both directly (by abolishing some 
departments of state and cutting budgets and staff in others), and indirectly (by 
cutting health and education spending). Traditions were cast aside in other areas too, 
as we shall see below. 
A/air day's work/or a/air day's pay? 
Another major goal of the first labour parties was higher incomes and better working 
conditions for wage workers. With the 1980s abdication of a state role in providing 
employment came a new attitude, which in New Zealand amounted to an abdication, 
of the state's role in supporting a negotiated approach to better wages and conditions. 
A foundational demand of the ALP - Point 2 on the 1905 Federal Platform - was 
compulsory arbitration for industrial disputes and wage claims (Ebbels, 1965,222). 
Interestingly, while Australian laborites were fighting for this demand, militant 
labour in New Zealand was fighting against it - specifically in the form ofthe 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, enacted by the Liberal government. 
While the application ofthe Act was initially satisfactory to labour, which was in a 
demoralised state after its defeat in the great maritime strike of 1890, its 
disadvantages soon became obvious. By 1902 a delegate to the Wellington Trades 
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Council could describe the Act as 'the biggest curse Labour has ever had put on it.' 
(Roth and Hammond, 1981,62), and the Federation of Labour formed in 1908 (a 
radical organisation popularly known as the 'Red Feds') advocated that unions 
should not compromise their right to strike by registering under the Act (Roth and 
Hammond, 1981, 79). 
At the heart of labour ambivalence to compulsory arbitration or other wage-fixing 
mechanisms as a way of improving wages and conditions is a problem which labour 
parties have not been able to overcome. The problem is that the desirability of the 
mechanism to labour is entirely dependent on the level of employment prevailing at 
the time. In times of full or high employment arbitration systems act to slow down 
wage rises, while in times of high unemployment they can similarly retard wage 
falls. Thus workers seeking to maximise their wages would not want full 
employment and compulsory arbitration at the same time. The ALP therefore acted 
in accordance with labour tradition in negotiating its 1983 Accord with labour at a 
time when it knew that its policies of removing government support and tariff 
protection were going to reduce employment and cause other stress to workers. 
The NZLP, on the other hand, took a legislative approach to controlling labour. 
In 1985 it restored compulsory unionism, which had been abolished by National in 
1983, but its Labour Relations Act of 1987 ended the state's role as an enforcer of 
industrial awards and abolished second tier bargaining. The aim of the latter change 
was to shift workers off national awards and on to enterprise agreements. Whenever 
unions managed to achieve the opposite of this intention it merely increased pressure 
from the strong business lobby to deregulate the labour market, which was secured 
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with the Employment Contracts Act introduced by National in 1991 (Walsh, 1992). 
That this result was not achieved earlier was not due to Labour government ministers 
and their Treasury advisers not trying for it. Margaret Wilson provides details of the 
struggle within the Labour Party by senior members to wrest some say in making 
industrial relations policy back from New Right ministers and senior bureaucrats 
(Wilson, 1989, 100-104). 
While the enthusiastic embrace of economic rationalisation and globalisation 
policies by the labour parties in the 1980s has probably been the main cause of the 
fall in real wages and the social wage in Australasia in the 1980s and 90s, the labour 
parties must take responsibility for ensuring that the industrial relations mechanisms 
needed to pursue the policies were in place. The Australian Accord may seem to be-
and certainly promised to be - a much more pro-union, pro-workers and their 
families arrangement than the New Zealand Labour Relations Act. However in 
practice what was promised was not delivered, and ' ... conservative elements of the 
Accord such as wage restraint were strengthened while many other reforms were 
watered down or not introduced.' (Johnson, 1989, 98). Treasurer Paul Keating 
boasted in his 1986 budget speech of a cut in real labour costs of 7% under Labor, 
and promoted Labor and the Accord to business as preferable to what the Opposition 
would offer with its wages 'free for all' policy (Johnson, 1989,98-99). 
By the 1990s, then, the Australasian labour parties in government had reversed the 
original social democrat rationale for state-supported mechanisms for wage fixing, 
and were even, in the Australian case, prepared to force workers into worse deals 
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than they may have obtained in a non-managed system. Another foundational 
principle had been stood on its head. 
Welfare to workfare? 
The establishment ofthe bare bones of a welfare state in Germany, Great Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand preceded the election of social democrat/labour parties. 
Yet those parties were most strongly identified with the concept, and can take most 
of the credit for developing and strengthening 'cradle to grave' welfare provisions. 
These include not just the payment of social security benefits to the obviously needy 
but also the 'social wage' provisions of 'free' public health and education systems. 
There were, however, differences between European and Australasian social 
democrat/labour parties in the way in which the welfare state was conceptualised and 
developed. In Australasia the financing of welfare provision came primarily from 
income tax paid by employees. The difficulties this poses as unemployment rises are 
obvious, and are part of the explanation for the speed with which Australasian labour 
governments abandoned the goal of full welfare provision in the 1980s. It also 
provided the justification for the imposition of other forms of taxation. The . 
introduction ofa Goods and Services Tax in New Zealand in 1985 was ajoint 
exercise between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social Welfare, with 
the latter minister putting out a Green Paper supporting GST as a means of filling 
emptying welfare coffers. Arguments from the labour movement that GST is a 
regressive tax that impacts more heavily on low-income people were not heeded in 
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New Zealand. However they played a major role in securing Labor one more term in 
office in Australia in 1993 when the Liberal Party proposed introducing this 
unpopular tax. 
In Germany there had always been a greater emphasis on the role that capital (in the 
form of the large employer) was expected to play in ensuring social welfare. Hence 
conservative as well as social democrat governments enforced significant employer 
contributions towards superannuation savings and unemployment insurance, and 
used heavy company taxes for social ends. In Germany and in Sweden there have 
also been serious (although partial) moves towards worker ownership of major 
industrial concerns, which have provided some perks for employees. Such moves 
were never even contemplated by labour governments in Australasia. 
When the global economy entered a new and disturbing phase in the 1970s, 
therefore, the Australasian labour parties were faced with a tough call. How could 
they protect the high standard of living that their welfare state and full employment 
policies ofthe 1930s and 1940s had helped to construct, which were now jeopardised 
by the economic 'crisis'? As Roger Douglas, architect of the economic about-face of 
New Zealand's fourth Labour government expressed it in his book ofthe same name 
'There's got to be a better way!' (Douglas, 1980). 
The way chosen by the Australasian labour parties was already being promoted by 
the governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the USA. 
A clutch of measures was at the core of this economic 'reform' process. Srnithin 
summarises the four main routes taken to strengthen the role of market forces as 
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' ... privatisation (that is, the sale of fonnerly state-owned industries to the private 
sector), deregulation, changes in labour and trade union legislation, and a reduction 
in the scope ofthe so-called 'welfare state'. " (Smithin, 1996, 33). (These general 
headings cover the specifics already given in the list derived from Chossudovsky 
(1998) that can be found in Chapter Two.) Not all members ofthe labour 
governments and parties in Australasia endorsed this approach, and a majority of the 
party rank and file in New Zealand appears to have been opposed to it. It must surely 
be a major reason for the 61 % drop in NZLP membership between 1981 and 1990 
(Vowles, 1999, Table 4). However the disaffected failed to mount a substantive 
challenge to the economic refonns juggernaut (Oliver, 1989). The NZLP President 
(who had reservations about the pro-market approach) was deliberately not invited to 
the important Economic Summit convened by the Labour government in September 
1984 to try and build a consensus among major players in the economy on the need 
for economic refonns (Wilson, 1989,45-46). 
The shrinking of the welfare state prescribed by the economic refonners in the 
ascendancy in the 1980s therefore proceeded apace in Australasia, with social 
welfare spending in Australia declining throughout the decade, while in New 
Zealand the increase per capita reduced to 0.25% per annum. In both countries there 
was an increase in the targeting of provisions, and steps towards 'user pays' for 
previously free services (e.g. medical prescription charges in New Zealand) (Castles 
and Shirley, 1996,95-97). 
In a detailed and relatively kind comparative assessment of the Labo(u)r government 
welfare measures in the 1980s Francis Castles and Ian Shirley show that New 
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Zealand had more to lose in the first place so that its losses appear to be greater,
whereas Australia, which started from behind, appears to gain in this period (Castles
and Shirley, 1996). (Australia, for example, extended health care and education
provisions that were behind New Zealand's, whereas New Zealand cut back its
superior provisions.) However, both governments set the policy framework for
further cuts to welfare and social wage provisions by subsequent conservative
governments. The National government elected in New Zealand at the end of 1990
followed through by slashing welfare benefits by up to 12% and bringing 'user pays'
to the public hospital system.
The greater severity and 'commercialist' style (Easton, 1997) of the New Zealand
Labour government, which contrasted with the gentler, more 'corporatist' approach
of Australian Labor, was less successful in realising the promised goals of economic
growth. It also failed to deliver the increased emplOYment which was supposed to
stem from this growth (Castles et aI, 1996, 18-20). The greater size and complexity
of the Australian bicameral federal political system made change harder to
implement swiftly than New Zealand's unitary unicameral system, and the wider
ideological diversity within the ALP compared to the NZLP also constituted
something of a brake on the reforming zeal of the economic rationalists. Yet
economic rationalism was as alive and well in Canberra as in Wellington (Pusey,
1991), and was the lodestone for economic and social policy formation by the Labor
government. In both countries top policy makers in the 1980s believed that society
existed to serve the economy, not the other way round, and that ensuring low
inflation, economic growth and a good return on investments were the top priorities
for government managers. Full emplOYment: good wages and social welfare were no
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longer the primary goals of government, but would either be ensured by the 
achievement of the primary economic goals or not at all. 
Economic nationalism was thus moribund in Australasia - killed by the very parties 
that had first promoted it and practised it. This had huge implications - not just for 
the labour and welfare policies of the Australasian labour governments of the 1980s, 
but also for their policies in other areas. At first glance the upside of labour 
abandoning nationalism in the economic sphere would appear to be its move towards 
a more progressive, pacifist, egalitarian form of internationalism. The Whitlam 
government epitomised this shift, while the Kirk government in New Zealand at the 
same period was still socially conservative at home although stronger on human 
rights abroad. By the 1980s, however, the labour parties in both countries had gained 
significant support from the 'new social movement' constituencies that formed the 
backbone of Green parties. Labour parties/governments were expected to pay more 
attention to women, the environment, peace and other new social movement 
concerns, and in New Zealand a tendency for women to favour the National Party 
seemed to have shifted to a preference for Labour - or at least for some of Labour's 
policies. (For studies ofthe 'gender gap' in New Zealand electoral politics, which 
seems to be more apparent than real, see Catt and McLeay, 1993.) 
It is worth examining the environmental and peace/security policies and programmes 
ofthe Australasian labour governments in greater detail to see what happened with 
the shift from economic nationalism to globalism. The tension between nationalist 
and internationalist positions becomes further exacerbated by the shift to globalism, 
and highlights the difficulties in trying to find nationalist solutions to global 
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problems - difficulties which may have led some erstwhile labour politicians to 
abandon nationalism in good faith. Looking at the struggles of social democracy 
with this sphere of politics also throws the spotlight on to whether the Green 
approach of 'thinking globally, acting locally' is adequate to meet the challenges of 
achieving those goals - a theme to which I return in Chapter Eight. 
National security 
Socialist internationalism had an important influence on the defence and national 
security thinking of the early social democratic parties. The slogan 'Workers of the 
world unite' was in part an exhortation to fight the abuses of capital, and not each 
other. However, there was no foundational commitment to non-violence as a 
political principle, despite social democratic parties generally abjuring the violent, 
revolutionary road to socialism in favour of parliamentary gradualism. On the 
pacifist side the 1891 Erfurt Programme of the SPD included abolition of a standing 
anny (Tegel, 1987,21). The platform of the New South Wales Labor Party of 1890 
also included the 'abolition of the present Defence Force', and 'the establishment of 
our military system upon a purely voluntary basis.' (Ebbels, 1965, 212). In New 
Zealand the short-lived Social Democrat Party included the principle of a voluntary 
defence force in its 1913 platform, and the more conservative United Labour Party 
also opposed the 1909 Act which made military training compulsory. Militant labour 
was opposed to compulsory military training on three main grounds - that it was a 
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weapon of capitalist imperialism, that it would be used in internal class struggles, 
and that it created a militaristic class psychology. (Brown, 1962,21) 
On the other side, however, even a leading social democrat 'pacifist' such as Eduard 
Bernstein, a founding father of German social democracy, believed that workers 
should take up arms in certain circumstances - such as defending the fatherland 
against imperialism, or bringing 'civilisation' to 'backward' peoples (Fletcher, 1987, 
49). The 1905 Federal Platform of the ALP called for a Citizen Military Force 
(Ebbels, 1965,222) and Australia's first Labor Prime Minister, J.e. Watson, was a 
supporter of compulsory military training as the only method of giving effect to this 
plank of the platform (Ebbels, 1965,239). 
The outbreak of international conflict in 1914 mercilessly exposed the divisions 
within social democratic parties on this issue, and led to the SPD and the ALP 
literally falling apart. SPD deputies in the Reichstag had to decide whether to vote 
for war credits or not. Influential 'right-wing' social democrats saw support for the 
war as an opportunity to wrest pro-labour concessions from the government, and 
initially the SPD voted en bloc for the necessary credits. But as the war went on 
opposition to it increased both inside and outside the SPD, and by 1916 internal 
differences were so great that deputies who refused to vote for credits were expelled 
from the SPD Reichstag caucus. In 1917 these deputies and their supporters, 
numbering roughly one-third of the SPD, set up the USPD (the Independent Social 
Democrat Party) (Childs, 1966, 155). 
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Although opposed to the war the USPD was by no means a pacifist party, as it 
contained leading members who were not averse to revolutionary violence (Eley, 
1987, 66-67). The USPD and SPD were not reunited until 1922 - by which time the 
Communist Party formed in 1918 had taken up the 'revolutionary' position and was 
splitting the socialist/labour vote. 
In Australia conflict over the ALP position on conscription was deeply divisive and 
traumatic to a party which could pride itself on having produced the first state and 
federal level labour governments in the world. Labor Prime Minister William . 
Hughes introduced two referenda on conscription during the course of World War I, 
despite strong opposition within cabinet, caucus and the party at large. Hughes was 
expelled from the New South Wales Labor Party in 1916, but refused to leave 
national office. After the first referendum failed to endorse conscription he set up a 
'National Labor' minority government ofpro-conscriptionists. The ALP lost a lot of 
support at state level, with only Queensland remaining in Labor hands. Hughes and 
his non-Labor government remained in office for seven years after his split with 
ALP, and it was to be thirteen years all told before Labor was to form another federal 
government (McMullin, 1991, 104-114). The enOITIlOUS contradictions inherent in 
the 'patriots' being' imperialists', and the 'nationalists' being 'pacifists', in Australia 
at this time led to much social turbulence. Xavier Herbert provides an excellent 
account of what it did to him, his family and the people in his hometown in his 
autobiography (Herbert, 1976, 135-153). 
In New Zealand, things were much simpler. Contemporary pacifist Labour leaders 
are under the impression that Labour has always taken a principled stand against war 
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(see, for example, Wilson, 1989,56). However, the facts about World War One are 
that in New Zealand, which had never had a labour government to this point, the 
conscription issue served to unite rather than divide the labour movement. The belief 
among labourites that opposition to conscription would prove to be electorally 
popular served as an incentive to bring together the various New Zealand social 
democratic/labour organisations to form a united Labour Party in 1916. Labour 
historian Bruce Brown notes that it is remarkable that the issue that so bitterly split 
the ALP should have been the one that created the NZLP (Brown, 1962,21-26). 
These differences between 'sister' parties show that there was no universal analytical 
framework adopted by social democracy on issues of war and peace. There was no 
international platform, nor were there nationally or internationally consistent 
positions. Differences in the stand taken continued to surface between and within 
social democrat/labour parties and governments. Anti-conscriptionist during World 
War I, New Zealand's second Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser was responsible 
for ensuring peacetime compulsory military training from 1949 until it was abolished 
by the third Labour government 1972-1975. Similarly, John Curtin was a leading 
anti-conscriptionist in Australia in World War I, and a leading promoter of 
conscription while Prime Minister during World War II. 
After the Second World War the explicit defence/security issue which split social 
democrat/labour parties was not conscription and compulsory military training but 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The nuclear issue was located within a wider 
and more complex context of the Cold War, the 'Western' policy of the containment 
of the Soviet Union, and the nationalist (and militarist) aspirations of some of the 
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de-colonising states of the Third World. Nuclear deterrence via staying ahead in the 
nuclear arms race could be (and was) presented as an acceptable and positive 
alternative to the threat of Soviet imperialism and further outbreaks of conventional 
war, and as the 'modern' way of protecting national borders. 
That social democrat parties were prepared to go along with this analysis became 
obvious in Europe in the 1960s. One important effect of the major revision of the 
SPD programme that took place at Bad Godesberg in 1959 was an acceptance of the 
principle of national defence. At the time this implied embracing the NATO nuclear 
deterrent and the stationing of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems on 
West German soil (Carr, 1987, 197). The British Labour Party, on the other hand, 
went through years of debate on its defence policy in general and its nuclear policy 
in particular. There was a major split between those advocating unilateral British 
nuclear disarmament (as promoted by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament from 
its inception in 1955) and those preferring a multilateralist approach. The 
multilateralists retained the upper hand both within the parliamentary wing and the 
party at large (Hinton, 1983, 184-185; Howell, 1980,225-227). 
In New Zealand and Australia the labour parties supported the ANZUS military 
alliance formed b~tween Australia, New Zealand and the USA in 1951, when a 
National Party government was in power in New Zealand and a Liberal Party 
government ruled Australia. The ANZUS alliance has a strong nuclear component. 
Australia and New Zealand were expected to provide berthing for American nuclear 
powered and/or armed warships cruising 'America's Lake' (the Pacific Ocean) and 
to house communications stations which are part of the American nuclear weapons 
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delivery system (Hager, 1996; Harford, 1985; Hayes, Zarsky, Bello, 1986). This 
willingness and capacity to support the USA has generally been of strategic rather 
than practical importance to the parties involved, which means that it tends to wax 
and wane in political significance according to strategic considerations. Nevertheless 
it has been seen as a key obstacle to a peaceful, non-nuclear Pacific by the green and 
peace movements (Harford, 1984), and has reduced the ability of labour 
governments to manoeuvre towards this end. 
So despite withdrawing New Zealand army volunteers from Vietnam in 1972, taking 
a pro-active role against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and promoting a 
South Pacific nuclear-free zone (McIntyre, 1992,534; Wilson, 1989, 58), the New 
Zealand Labour government 1972-1975 did not follow through by disengagement 
from the war-making capacity of the global intelligence system. It remained 
committed to the intelligence and communications dimensions of ANZUS. This 
meant that peace movement attempts at persuasion to the contrary had no influence 
on New Zealand continuing to provide facilities for the American military (Wilkes, 
1973). 
This remained the case both before and after the passage of the New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 (McIntyre, 1992). 
The Labour government made every effort to maintain the ANZUS connection 
immediately after it was elected. New Zealand-based facilities remained part of the 
American military intelligence and communications network, and there was conflict 
between"the Labour Party and the Labour government over the ANZUS alliance, 
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with the government trying hard to hold on to the alliance (Dann, 1985a, 3-4; Hager, 
1996; McKinnon, 1993,278-301). 
In Australia there was a similar his~ory of Labor support for withdrawal from the 
Vietnam war, and especially - once again - opposition to conscription, and 
opposition to French nuclear testing. Labor delivered on both ofthese issues when it 
was in government between 1972 and 1975. There was also a parallel acceptance of 
American intelligence and communications bases, and less willingness to jeopardise 
the ANZUS alliance by banning nuclear warships in the 1980s. During the 
successful 1983 election campaign the ALP leadership stressed its support for the 
US alliance and Australia's role within it (Falk, 1983,220). This was consistent with 
Australia maintaining its general support for the USA as the leader of the anti-
communist camp, even though it did not support every US military venture. 
Australia has an additional potential contribution to make - or refuse - to global 
security. Its incredibly ancient rocks hold the element of global nuc1earism, uranium, 
and whether it should be mined and exported has been on the political agenda since 
the 1970s. The Whitlam government appointed an inquiry into uranium mining, 
which eventually released reports in 1976 and 1977 raising scientific doubts about 
the wisdom of such mining. In the late seventies the ALP (out of office) was in tune 
with the National Uranium Moratorium Campaign which was formed in 1977. At its 
1977 conference the ALP passed a motion in favour of an indefinite moratorium on 
uranium mining. However in 1981 it changed to supporting a one mine policy and in 
1984, after one year in office, it escalated to a three mines policy, which was 
reconfirmed by the 1991 conference (Burgmann, 1993, 195-198). 
155 
The Nuclear Disannament Party was fonned in June 1984 by activists who were 
frustrated by the failure of the ALP to meet the central demands of the huge 
Australian anti-nuclear movement (Prior, 1987,5-6). It recruited openly and 
successfully among anti-nuclear delegates at the July 1984 ALP conference 
(Burgmann, 1993, 216), and polled 7.2% of first preference votes in elections to the 
Senate and gained one senator (Jo Vallentine fromWestem Australia). Despite a 
very high vote in New South Wales it failed to secure a second seat in the Senate -
this was directly due to unfavourable distribution of preferences by the ALP 
(Papadakis, 1993, 181). The NDP fell apart within a year, split by policy and process 
disagreements. However Jo Vallentine went on to become Australia's first Green 
senator in 1990, thus exemplifying a foundational cormection between anti-
nuclear/pro-peace politics and Green politics which is absent from labour politics. 
Opposition to nuclear militarism was also a salient difference between the SPD and 
the emerging Green party in Germany. The Schmidt SPDfFDP coalition government 
of the 1970s had allowed the stationing of nuclear missiles in Germany (and was 
also committed to nuclear power developments). The failure ofthe SPD to support 
the large and dynamic nuclear peace movement in Germany left that movement 
looking for another parliamentary political vehicle - which indeed it helped to create 
in 1979/80 in the form of Die Griinen. High profile peace campaigner Petra Kelly 
continued to attract attention as a leader of Die Griinen and one of the first Green 
members of the Bundestag (Kelly, 1983; Parkin, 1994). She was merely the most 
prominent of the German peace movement/Green activists who adopted a global 
anti-nuclear approach to security issues. (See, for example, Maier, 1985, Europa auf 
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dem Pulver pass - Jiirgen Maier was International Secretary of Die Griinen 1988-
1991.) 
In review of social democrat/labour party positions on peace and national security 
issues, it can be seen that a commitment to non-violence was never at any stage a 
foundational principle. Thus social democrat/labour parties have felt free to make 
policy on the issues in order to maximise pragmatic political advantage. Sometimes 
they achieved the desired advantage (the NZLP in 1916) and sometimes they lost it 
(the ALP during World War I). Sometimes they won in the short term (the SPD in 
the 1970s) only to leave themselves vulnerable in the long-term to a party with a 
principled anti-nuclear platform. 
The Australian and New Zealand labour parties seemto have made careful and 
effective calculations regarding the consequences of their stands on nuclear matters -
and come up with different policies as a result. Labour Prime Minister David Lange 
was not a supporter of nuclear ship bans before taking office, and actively worked to 
water down party policy from a ban on nuclear armed and nuclear propelled ships to 
a ban on nuclear armed ships only. Public opinion polls eventually persuaded him 
that the party was right to promise to ban all nuclear warships and would gain votes 
as a result, and he gained great personal kudos in the international arena for 
promoting a stance which he only half-heartedly supported at home (Wright, 1984, 
131-133). Labour President 1984-1987 Margaret Wilson has given some indication 
of the lukewarm commitment ofthe Labour government to the nuclear-free policy. 
In her account of her time as Party president she describes the lobbying of Labour 
MPs by party members which she and two MPs orchestrated when it seemed 
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possible that the government would allow a visit by a nuclear warship in 1985 
(Wilson, 1989, 64). 
In contrast the ALP leadership correctly calculated that despite strong feeling within 
the party and among the public against continued participation in nuclear alliances 
and for a uranium mining moratorium, a continued commitment to those alliances 
and a shift to a three mines policy would not damage its electoral prospects. This was 
especially so in an electoral situation where green and peace movement preferences 
were directed to Labor, which in the 1980s and early 1990s they generally were 
(Papadakis, 1993, 174-178). 
After the passage of the Nuclear Free Zone Act 1987 the NZLP ceased to pay much 
attention to the wishes of the New Zealand peace movement. Thus in 1989 the 
Labour government signed the contract with Australia which committed New 
Zealand to $2.6 billion worth of expenditure on the ANZAC frigates (Tizard, 1989). 
This was despite a strong campaign by the Just Defence organisation and Peace 
Movement Aotearoa against doing the deal, and public opinion running against the 
project. 
The peace movement, therefore, has never found a consistently reliable ally in social 
democrat/labour parties. In some cases it has been able to use these parties - but in 
the case of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy it could also be characterised as a 
labour party using the movement. A party with a foundational commitment to peace 
principles should therefore have some appeal to the hundreds of thousands of New 
Zealanders and Australians who supported the anti-nuclear movement - but whether 
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they also support other Green objectives and in particular Green economics is 
another matter. 
National Environment 
Neither the socialist nor the liberal traditions that fed into the formation of social 
democrat/labour parties provided a secure philosophical basis for the protection of 
the natural environment. Despite good attempts to find a philosophical grounding for 
socialist environmentalism in the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx (see, for example, 
Benton, 1989) not even all socialists (for a contrary view see Grundmann, 1991), let 
alone environmentalists, are convinced. Honest 'red-greens' (Dunkley, 1992) admit 
that the environmental practices of the communist states, which were/are as wedded 
to the goal of industrial economic growth as capitalist ones, were in most cases as 
bad, and in some cases much worse, than their capitalist peers. 
The liberal tradition may be an even shakier foundation for an environmental ethic, 
because of its emphasis on individual rights and economic liberties, at the expense, 
if necessary, of public goods, which include collective resources like air and water. 
In practice within the social democrat/labour tradition there was a heavy emphasis on 
promoting industrial 'development' and economic growth which was identical to the 
national goals of the conservative/liberal parties. The main difference between left 
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and right on this issue was over how large a role the state should play in pro-actively 
pursuing these goals. From the 1950s to the 1970s this gap was not huge, with 
conservative/liberal governments also accepting a large role for the state. The NZLP 
and the ALP were both keen to develop manufacturing industries in New Zealand 
and Australia (with taxpayer subsidies if need be), and to replicate the developmental 
processes of Western Europe and the USA. 
The environmental impacts of such an industrial development programme focussing 
on secondary manufacturing industries did not become apparent until the 1960s, 
when the first thing to be noted in Australasia was the visual impact which 
development was having on local landscapes. This was starting to add up to a 
desecration as profound and problematic as the pollution and congestion which was 
choking European and American cities. Much more salient, however, were the 
environmental effects of the application of a century of industrialised primary 
production techniques. In Australia and New Zealand farming was constituted on an 
industrial basis almost from the beginnings of white settlement, and the participation 
of the two countries as nation state contributors to the world economy was dependent 
upon the mass production first of wool, then of meat and dairy products. 
The language of Australasian farming is crudely industrial- large farms are 'stations' 
or 'runs', meat for export is processed in 'freezing works', and butter and cheese is 
made in bulk in 'dairy factories'. Labour on the large stations in the nineteenth 
century was organised in industrial hierarchies, and in the twentieth century largely 
replaced by energy-intensive machinery. On-farm (shearing) and off-fann (meat and 
dairy) processing work was unionised very early on, and the labour itself was 
160 
organised along 'Taylorist' lines long before the word was coined (Dann, 1995a; 
Martin, 1990). 
The environmental consequences of fanning in this way were and are severe. The 
almost total destruction of native forest and grass cover (New Zealand retains only 
14% of its original pre-human settlement forest cover, most of it on steep mountains) 
has led to widespread soil loss and degradation. Under intensive pastoralism in New. 
Zealand hillsides have literally slipped into valleys and been washed out to sea, 
while in Australia intensive agriculture has led to soil loss through massive 
salination. The restoration and maintenance of sustainable landscapes is a billion 
dollar problem in both countries. Native species in both countries came under threat 
early on, and began to decline and/or disappear due to loss of habitat and 
displacement or predation by introduced species. Some ofthe introduced species 
have become noxious in their new environment, requiring millions of dollars to be 
spent every year in unrelenting attempts at eradication or contro1.4 
In the 1960s and 1970s a new generation of environmentalists in New Zealand began 
to speak of 'Heritage Destroyed' (Salmon, 1960), 'Rush to Destruction' (Searle, 
1975) and 'Who killed the Clutha?' (Powell, 1978), as native forests were logged, 
hydro dams swallowed up wild rivers, roads and power pylons marched across 
formerly pristine landscapes, noxious animals munched their way through forests, 
pastures and native species, dangerous pesticides came into frequent agricultural 
usage, artificial fertilisers were spread from aircraft, and pollution of waterways 
became a serious problem. Their voices were particularly strident in the late Sixties 
and early Seventies - in Australasia they were part of an international frenzy of 
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communication on the 'environmental crisis' which arose in 1968 and had peaked by 
1972 (Buhrs, 1991,92; Sills, 1975). 
In Tasmania the Labor Party would not be deflected from its pursuit of hydro-
electric development by the new environmental critique, but in New Zealand and 
mainland Australia the labour movement and its parties were willing to listen. 
The NZLP, which was in government in 1960, had signed the deal that gave 
Comalco access to cheap power, and hence encouragement to set up an aluminium 
smelter in New Zealand in the first place (Bertram and Dann, 1981). But twelve 
years later it was prepared to oppose a scheme to raise Lake Manapouri to help 
provide that power. It gained temporary electoral advantage by doing so, winning the 
November 1972 general election with a swing which was very pronounced in the 
south of the South Island where the lake is situated, and was attributed by both sides 
to the Manapouri issue (Peat, 1994). This was despite the National government 
taking the first steps towards formal governmental recognition of the importance of 
the environment. These included appointing a Minister for the Environment in 1972 
and setting up a new central government agency, the Commission for the 
Environment, which was charged with co-ordinating advice to the government on 
environmental policy (Buhrs, 1997,288). 
One commentator on the federal election result in Australia in 1972 said that 'The 
Labor victory seemed to be most significant for women and native fauna.' (Griffiths, 
1977, 143). In the case of the latter this was because trade in kangaroo products and 
thirty-seven other indigenous animals was banned. Labor did however have a wider 
environmental platform, which was first developed in 1969, and elaborated on in 
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1973. There was a strong emphasis on conservation e.g. greater protection of 
indigenous animals, the creation of new national parks, and setting up a national 
parks and wildlife service, and there were some good achievements in these areas 
(Papadakis, 1993, 188). 
A strong lead from the labour movement at large, in the form of the historic and 
effective 'Green Bans' imposed by the progressive New South Wales Builders 
Labourers Federation between 1971 and 1975, (which resulted in over thirty sites 
with cultural and/or natural significance being saved) (Burgmann, 1993, 192-195), 
was impressive, but insufficient. Even less progress was made on the critical urban 
environmental issues of the 1970s, such as energy conservation and the transition to 
renewable forms of energy. 
The distance between labour activists and others who were concerned about 
environmental issues, and the ALP leadership in the 1970s, can perhaps be gauged 
by further consideration of what was behind the loans scandal which contributed to 
the downfall of the Whitlam government. The Minister for Minerals and Energy, 
Rex Connor, tried to obtain major loans from a shadowy figure who claimed to have 
access to petrodollars. Connor wanted the money in order to 'develop' Australia 
along energy intensive lines. His programme included a transcontinental natural gas 
pipeline, a petrochemical plant, three treatment plants to convert uranium to 
yellowcake, the electrification of major railways, the redevelopment of coal ports, 
and the purchase of a year's supply of oil as a stockpile against future emergencies 
(Bolton, 1996,232). The unorthodox negotiating for and approval of the loan is 
shocking to those who expect a Labor government to show more respect for due 
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democratic process and financial prudence. However what is just as shocking from a 
green perspective is what the Prime Minister and Treasurer so casually signed up to -
namely a programme of increasing Australian dependence on non-renewable and/or 
environmentally unacceptable energy sources. The Treasurer who did the signing 
was Jim Cairns, a man whom of all the federal ALP politicians at that time seemed 
to be the one most understanding of and closely identified with the 'new politics' 
(see, for example, Cairns, 1972). Yet he was prepared to compromise due process 
and his career to provide support for a programme which no environmentalist could 
be expected to greet with enthusiasm. He may well have justified his actions in tenns 
of the pursuit of that important Labor goal of full employment, but the contradictions 
in this method of creating jobs should have been apparent. 
In the 1980s the Labor government continued to have a mixed record on 
environmental matters. Elim Papadakis (Papadakis, 1993, 189-194) characterises the 
positions taken by the Hawke government as based on careful calculations of the 
electoral consequences of supporting the environmental over the industrial lobby. 
Initially the environment was not of interest, with its importance to the Labor 
government signalled by the portfolio going to a minister outside of cabinet with 
little support from senior ministers. Labor subsequently lost ground with the growing 
environmental lobby over its weak stand on the protection of Queensland rainforests, 
and after input from environmental groups the position was upgraded to cabinet 
status in 1987. Senator Graham Richardson was given the job and was able to realise 
the strength of the environmental lobby and to play to it. Although still regarded as a 
'dealer' by environmentalists there is no doubt that his pro-active approach earned 
164 
votes for Labor and contributed to the so-called 'greening' of Australian politics at 
the 1990 federal election. 
At state level there also seemed to be possibilities of a green/labour rapprochement, 
and Peter Christoff discusses the way in which conservation groups were able to 
make use of consultation processes established by the federal and state Labor 
governments to make some conservation gains. However, he also notes that these 
consultations were largely tactical on Labor's part, generally occurring only after a 
public outcry on an issue, and frequently had the effect of saving face for Labor 
while draining the resources and energy of community groups (Christoff, 1993, 
A04). In Tasmania Labor was given a chance to promote green concerns in 1989, 
when Green candidates campaigned strongly and achieved 18% of the vote and five 
seats in parliament. With Green support Labor could govern, and so an historic 
Labor-Green Accord was negotiated, which contained strong pro-environmental 
provisions. However, eighteen months on, when Labor had dragged the chain on 
delivering most of these policies, and had actually breached some of them (e.g. it had 
increased not decreased wood chip quotas) the Greens left the Accord in disgust 
(Burgmann, 1993,217-219). 
The 1970s possibility that social democracy in Australasia could move to incorporate 
the ecological critique of industrial development and economic growth and change 
its programmes and policies accordingly was to fade in the 1980s. As the recession 
of the 1970s deepened jobs were lost, and organised labour wanted government to 
deliver employment. For those still locked in a modernist, industrial mind set, this 
meant large scale 'development' projects such as hydro-dams and irrigation 
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schemes, heavy industry, and mass manufacturing i.e. working on or against rather 
than with the resources of nature. Paradoxically, the logic of increasing economic 
globalisation, espoused by both the NZLP and the ALP, means basing national 
economic development on export-led growth within a 'free trade' global economy. 
This approach gives a low priority to species and resource conservation, while it also 
makes it harder to protect or create jobs within national boundaries. 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand Labour Party went into the 1984 general election 
promising significant changes in environmental policy, and the reform of 
institutional arrangements, in response to heavy lobbying from environmentalists 
(BUhrs, 1997, 289). The reform of institutional arrangements included the setting up 
the Department of Conservation in 1987. However the Labour government's agenda 
in creating this department is now understood by conservationist critics in the 
context of the radical government restructuring which followed. This included the 
privatisation and sale of state assets, including those formerly administered by two of 
the departments of state which were disbanded to form DOC, the New Zealand 
Forest Service and the Department of Lands and Survey (Molloy interview, 
2.10.1990). 
Labour also established two new environmental agencies in 1986 - the Ministry for 
the Environment and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. The 
Ministry, under its Act, does not have an advocacy role for the environment. The 
Parliamentary Commissioner does, but according to Ton Buhrs ' ... the effectiveness 
of the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment is hampered by 
extremely meagre resources, rising demands, a low public profile and vague 
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constituency, and some ambivalence with regard to what its role should be.' (BUhrs, 
1997,291). BUhrs also notes that overall the effectiveness of the three new agencies 
was and is reduced by the 'New Right' political climate. Hallmarks ofthis regime 
include economic goals being given precedence over environmental values and 
budgets being kept very tight. The legitimacy of government 'intervention' is 
continually questioned, and the commitment and performance of public servants is 
undermined by persistent claims that government officials and agencies are 'self-
serving' and cannot be trusted (Biihrs, 1997,291). 
BUhrs concludes that a significant result of the reforms since 1984 has been to 
largely remove the government from the processes of decision-making involving the 
allocation and management of resources, such as land, water, minerals and energy 
resources. It has abdicated policy in these matters to 'their efficient allocation via the 
market'. Since the market has become increasingly global, this has made it more 
difficult for local environmental advocates to obtain information about resource 
decisions and to participate in making them (BUhrs, 1997,290-291). 
The other major element in Labour's environmental management initiatives, the 
Resource Management Act, did not become law until 1991. However it was initiated 
by Labourwith a 'zero-based' review of environmental law, the Resource 
Management Law Reform process. The act was intended to rationalise and simplify 
environmental planning in New Zealand and to promote sustainable management of 
resources. In practice it has been found somewhat wanting. It has been criticised by 
environmentalists for its lax definitions of key concepts like 'sustainable' and 
'ecosystem' (Grundy, 1995; Round, 1995), which have not been improved by case 
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law interpretations. Another problem associated with the act are the frequently 
insunnountable financial barriers faced by objectors, which have recently come to 
include heavy costs awarded against bona fide public good objectors (BUhrs, 1997, 
292; Chapple, 1995; Ministry for the Environment, 1996). Brendan Gleeson (1996, 
251) notes that from its inception the Act has been' ... an uneasy legislative 
compromise between environmentalist demands for a more holistic approach to 
resource management and the agenda ofneo-liberal interests who have long wanted 
greater flexibility in planning practice to facilitate investment': Gleeson also 
considers that to date the neo-liberals have had the better deal: However, this was 
obviously not the view of the Minister for the Environment when he embarked on a 
review of the Act in 1998, beginning with commissioning a report from a known 
neo-liberal, and then another one from a group of private sector consultants. 
Environmentalists, as individuals or representatives of organisations, were not 
invited to contribute to the reports, which predictably enough advocated weakening 
the ecological definitions in the Act, limiting its coverage, and privatising some of its 
procedures (Fitzsimons and Burtt, 1998). The net effect of the environmental 
'refonns' therefore, seems to be a decreasing rather than an increasing amount of 
citizen participation in environmental decision-making. This is compounded by an 
increased amount of corporate influence, and a failure to make significant gains in 
environmental protection or sustainability, as the critical 1996 DE CD report on New 
Zealand's environmental status points out (DECD, 1996). 
The efforts by the Labor government in Australia to present a more dynamic 
environmental stance between 1987 and 1990, which Peter Christoff characterises as 
'a romance with lively environmental refonnism under Labor in power' (Christoff, 
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1993, A03), certainly paid off in the short tenn. Especially when the two major 
conservation organisations advised their supporters to direct their preferences to 
Labor at the 1990 federal election, and thus ensured its re-election (Burgmann, 1993, 
220-222). 
However this much touted 'greening' of Australian politics (Bean et aI, 1990) was to 
have little lasting effect. Aynsley Kellow claims that winning the Franklin campaign, 
which was a tactical success, led to entrenching a government with minimal regard 
for environmental values. It was therefore a strategic defeat. It also led to the 
environment movement narrowing its concerns rather than broadening them 
(Kellow, 1990,201-205). Senator Richardson was replaced by a less dynamic 
environment minister, Green candidates began to attract greater support in 1993 and 
1996, and by 1993 the romance with environmental refonnism was over and a 
'narrowly defined economic developmentalism' was dominating Labor's political 
agenda (Christoff, 1993, A05). Finally, in the Queensland state election of 1995, the 
'natural' direction of Green preferences to Labor was dramatically and 
controversially abandoned (Curran, 1996). 
Thus despite sterling efforts to be - or at least seem - 'green', the Australasian labour 
parties in the 1980s were unable to fully satisfy even the large, but narrowly 
focussed, conservation constituencies in both countries. When it came to the wider 
environmental issues of the late twentieth century, such as resource and energy 
conservation, population limitation, climate change, biotechnology, and pollution 
and waste reduction, there were difficulties in reconciling the goals of export-led 
economic growth and associated trade liberalisation with the green demand for 
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ecological sustainability as the new priority of good government. This dilemma led 
to double-talk and double-think on important environmental issues, an example 
being the Australian government's backsliding on the issue of controlling C02 
emissions (Rosewarne, 1996). Amidst a welter of green critiques of first GATT and 
then the WTO, the Australasian labour parties remain firmly attached to globalist 
trade and finance policies. They are reluctant to take on board environmentalist 
arguments against increasing the volume of world trade (for New Zealand examples 
of such critiques see Fitzsimons, 1996; Porter, 1991). 
Thus in reviewing the record of labour on the environment it can be seen that so long 
as the parties had a commitment to economic nationalism it was possible to 
implement some positive environmental protection policies in a way which was 
consistent with social democratic economics. There was always the danger, however, 
that the environment would be seen as mere 'resources' to be used for national 
economic growth. With the abandonment of both the theory and practice of 
economic nationalism, and the conversion to support for economic globalisation, it 
has become much more difficult to set and maintain independently high national 
environmental standards, as these entail, or are believed to entail, a loss of 
international competitive advantage. In a world where countries with no 'natural' 
advantages. except an abundance of cheap labour are prepared to sacrifice 
environmental quality as well as their citizens on the altar of' economic 
development', then this turns out to be 'true'. However, it is still regrettable that it is 
the position argued by the Australian government as the grounds for not reducing 
carbon emissions (Rosewarne, 1996). 
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As this position is indistinguishable from that adopted by conservative/liberal 
parties, there seems to be a space for a Green position which differs from the labour 
position, both in the higher priority it gives to environmental protection, and in the 
means by which it pursues this priority. 
The death of social democracy? 
Although the social democrat/labour parties are not yet fonnally deceased, in many 
ways they may be considered to be walking shells of their former selves, having long 
since abandoned any pretensions to socialism and having severed or severely 
reduced any meaningful connections with the labour movement. Studies in Australia 
(Scott, 1991) and New Zealand (Jesson, 1989) document the divorce oflabour 
politicians and labour party membership both from the working class and from 
sources of egalitarian and ecologist social and political radicalism. This process 
began in the 1960s and intensified in the 1970s and 80s, and was accompanied by a 
growing attachment to the new middle class milieu of political and economic 
liberalism. Comparisons ofthe (fairly consistent) international decline in voter 
support for social democrat/labour parties across twenty-three countries (Piven, 
1992, 10-11) show that the British Labour Party experienced the largest drop in 
support (-12.3%). Is it therefore surprising that going into the 1997 general election 
British Labour leader Tony Blair promised that the Labour Party would not support 
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or condone labour movement militancy, and the 'Third Way' which he now 
promotes is recognisable as globalist politics? 5 
After this metamorphosis in membership and leadership, it is also not surprising that 
social democracy suffered a crisis in theory and practice. By the mid-1980s the 
non-partisan Australian left was ready to contemplate what could or should happen 
'After Social Democracy' in a spe~ial issue of the journal Arena (1986, # 77) and to 
debate critiques of the sort offered by Camilleri (cited at the head of this chapter). 
Not everyone was ready to accept Camilleri's analysis. Indeed Bob Connell took 
Camilleri to task for focussing on the European decline of social democracy. Connell 
argued that 'Its application to the histories of colonies of settlement like Australia is 
almost nil.' and that 'The shape of the economy here was fundamentally different, 
and so was the shape of labour and radical politics.' (Connell, 1987, 177). 
In retrospect, however, it can be seen that Camilleri was correct in focussing on 
global similarities rather than national differences, and his approach offered a 
sounder basis for answering the key question under debate, which was whether the 
left should still support labour parties. Did their progressive record in other areas 
mean they still deserved leftist support? Or did their conversion to economic 
rationalism and globalisation negate their social liberalism? This raised the further 
question, of whether the labour parties were just giving the now-altered 'working 
class' electorate what it wanted. This is the interpretation of the 1983 victory of the 
ALP given by New Zealand Labour leader David Lange. In his words - " ... they did 
not say 'Look, this is what Labour is going to give you. They listened to what...the 
electorate wanted and sent it back to them as Labour policy." (Wright, 1984, 135). 
Whether Lange is correct or not, his attitude shows that he saw the NZLP operating 
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from a pragmatic rather than a principled basis - just like his counterparts in the 
ALP. 
This was an electorally dangerous thing for Labo(u)r to do, because once it ceased to 
. have an economic position which differentiated it from the conservative/liberal 
. parties it had to fall back on the promotion of significantly different policies in other 
areas. Brian Easton notes that as the social democrat economics practised by 
Labo(u)r in the 1930s, 40s and 70s were also nationalist economics, labour parties 
. were able to increase their electoral attractiveness by appealing to other forms of 
national achievement. When Labo(u)r abandoned the theory as well as the practice 
of the protected economy in the 1980s it was still able to trade on national pride in 
other areas, principally the nuclear-free moves in New Zealand and the espousal of 
repUblicanism by Australian Labor leaders (Easton, 1997a, 28-29). In both Australia 
and New Zealand the labour parties were able to gain electoral support when they 
appeared to be meeting the wishes of the 'new social movement' constituencies, 
particularly those of the women's movement and the environment movement. 
However by the 1990s most of the economic rationalists in the conservativelliberal 
parties were as comfortable as their counterparts in the labour parties with talking the 
talk (if not walking the walk) of feminism, gay liberation, land rights, repUblicanism, 
nuclear disarmament and 'sustainability'. This left only a genuinely conservative 
rump (mainly among rural dwellers and the elderly - who could be sidelined in small 
potential coalition parties, such as the National/Country Party in Australia and New 
Zealand First in New Zealand) to squirm and protest at such betrayals of 'traditional 
values'. The social movement j argon was, after all, the argot of the urban liberal 
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middle class milieu which both Labor/Liberal and LabourlN ational had come to 
represent. Now the only thing left to differentiate the parties was economic policy -
and here there was no difference. Easton castigates Labour for failing to put any 
intellectual effort into envisioning what social democracy in an open economy might 
mean, and how it could be implemented (Easton, 1997a, 32). 
There was a vacuum in social democrat policy - and by the 1990s the impacts of the 
new right ideology which Labo(u)r had adopted in lieu of developing social 
democratic alternatives to suit the times were hitting hard on Labo(u)r's traditional 
constituency of urban workers, taking their toll via high unemployment, poor 
housing and decreased access to health care and higher education. The negative 
effects of economic rationalism were also becoming apparent to the new social 
movement constituencies. These had started to realise that whatever headway they 
had made with regard to legal and managerial reforrns for their interest groups had to 
be set against the losses they had suffered in achieving equitable, sustainable 
livelihoods for people and other species. It was within this context that Green parties 
revived in Australasia in the 1990s, and set about reconstructing their earlier 
critiques of global industrial growth to include an additional critique of 'more 
market' economic policies and 'free' trade. 
In Australia Labor was trounced at the 1996 federal election, while in New Zealand 
Labour won only 28% of the total vote (a decrease of 6% since 1993). It was also not 
the preferred coalition partner of New Zealand First, despite a greater (pre-election) 
match of policies and the preference of Maori voters for a LabourlNew Zealand First 
government. It has clearly been floundering without gaining a new vision since its 
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1990 defeat (Easton, 1997). The SPD was out of power in the Bundestag for longer 
than the Greens had been represented there, and on its return to power in 1998 was 
able to fonn a government only with the assistance of the Greens. Labour in Britain 
made a significant and controversial shift in choosing Tony Blair as leader. This was 
a shift which finally paid off electorally, but one which was considered even by 
some ofthe newly returned Labour MPs to be at the expense oftraditional Labour 
policies and directions, and especially of any vestiges of leftism in the party. 
Australia, New Zealand and most other 'western' democracies are currently in the 
curious position of still having two 'major' parties claiming the 'centre' ground. 
They even continue to describe themselves as 'Centre Left' and 'Centre Right', 
despite the fact that the old criteria for detennining how left or right a party was -
their economic policies - no longer apply. Equally committed to globalisation, the 
policies of the 'centre' parties differ in degree rather than kind. It is also difficult to 
know how to characterise these policies on the old Left/Right scale, which was 
heavily associated with national endeavours. However most of the theorists behind 
them clearly belong to the neo-liberal or New Right camp, and financial and moral 
support for them comes primarily from powerful vested economic interests, both 
nationally and globally. (See, for example, Jesson, 1989 for details of big business 
subvention of the NZLP in the 1980s; Roper, 1992 on business political activism and 
state policy formulation in New Zealand in the 1980s; and Korten, 1996 for 
information on such activities on a global scale.) 
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A space for Green parties? 
This is the situation into which Green parties attempt to insert their economic and 
social alternatives. Their electoral successes to date seems to depend largely on the 
peculiar and specific electoral opportunities offered in certain polities at certain 
times, (especially times when the environmental 'crisis' is perceived to be salient), 
rather than on any widespread public understanding or endorsement - or even 
awareness - of Green economics. Despite evidence from Australian and New 
Zealand voter behaviour studies that some Labour voters will transfer their support 
temporarily or permanently to the Greens, to date this has not been sufficient to get 
Greens into coalition governments or electoral accords anywhere in Australasia 
except Tasmania.· Tasmanian participation has been possible due to its electoral 
system of multi-member electorates operating under the Hare-Clark form of single 
transferable voting for the lower house. In July 1998 the Liberal and Labor parties in 
Tasmania collaborated to introduce a bill to reduce the size of the lower house from 
thirty-five to twenty-five members, which effectively raised the threshold required to 
return Green members from 12.5% to 16.7% of the vote. At the snap election held 
two months later only one Tasmanian Green managed to pass that threshold. The 
Greens therefore appear to have been effectively leveraged out of playing a 
significant role in Tasmanian politics. 
• In March 2000 the New Zealand Green caucus of seven members elected in December 1999 
negotiated a protocol with the Labour/Alliance coalition government, which commits it to 
supporting the government on matters of confidence and supply, and both sides to sharing 
information to advance mutual policy goals. 
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In New Zealand the Green Party received almost 7% of the nation-wide vote in 
1990, but as the election was conducted under 'First Past the Post' constituency 
based voting this meant no parliamentary representation. Three Greens came into 
Parliament as part of the thirteen-member Alliance caucus in 1996. In 1997 the 
Greens decided to separate from the Alliance and contest the 1999 election as an 
independent party. Initially this seemed like the wrong move, with the Party polling 
below 1 % until mid-1999. However, it began to make a meteoric ~se in September 
1999, and finished with 5.2% ofthe vote, gaining it seven MPs - the first Green 
caucus in New Zealand history. In a curious twist of fate, the Greens had to wait ten 
days before special votes were counted and their election night loss was transformed 
into victory. This was plenty of time for the Labour and Alliance parties to formalise 
the coalition agreement they had been working on for over a year, which had no 
place for the Greens. The Greens are therefore excluded from government, yet hold 
the balance of power. 
This is perhaps a better position to be in than that of the German Greens, in formal 
coalition with the SPD in the Bundestag. It is hard to say, since it seems very likely 
that national level politics in democracies will continue to operate with a simulacrum 
of the 'two mass parties' system for some time to come. Changes in form and 
content in politics are frequently out of sync. For a good example of this one need 
look no further than the paradox and oddity of the constitutional monarchical form of 
the state in Australia and New Zealand. This is a form which no longer directs or 
reflects the day to day conduct of affairs of state or governance in either country, yet 
is still both theoretically and practically capable of influencing or even overturning 
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democratically elected governments, as we saw in the case of the Whitlam 
government. 
It is perhaps too early to say whether the era of 'left' and 'right' mass parties is 
finally coming to an end. But as this system was closely associated with nationalist 
democratic politics, if it does survive in a globalist era it may be only by becoming 
unrecognisable as its fonner self, as social democrat/labour parties have already 
become. (Parties of the right are also distinctly different from what they once were, 
but that is not within the scope of this study.) 
Showing that labour politics is not what it was, and how it is not what it was, and 
considering how that provides an opening for Green politics, (as I have done in this 
chapter), does not of course demonstrate what Green politics will or can be. 
That requires specific attention to where Green politics in its turn came from, and 
therefore in the next chapter I focus on the New Left and the new social movements, 
which failed to tum labour politics around, but provided a fertile seedbed for the 
Greens. 
Notes 
1. Navigation laws may seem a trivial anomaly in the list, but when spelled out in detail this 
represented a complete overhaul of maritime legislation. It included protecting Australian 
shipping against unfair competition, ensuring proper safety standards on all vessels, 
regulating hours and conditions of work. ensuring that vessels were properly equipped and 
efficiently manned, and so on. In other words, the navigation law reform was oriented 
towards securing and advancing Australia's place in the world economy without sacrificing 
the workers on whom it depended. 
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2. See Smithin (1996) for a discussion of the extent to which social democrat economics as 
practised by post-war labour/social democrat governments was actually based on Keynes, 
and where it departed from or ignored his work. Smithin also provides plenty of opportunity 
for reflecting on the neo-liberal canard on social democrat economic governance, namely 
that it is 'interventionist'. It is difficult to see how intervening in monetary policy to keep 
employment rates up is any different in degree or kind than intervening in monetary policy to 
keep inflation rates down. The Reserve Bank Act 1992 of New Zealand requires the 
governor of the bank to keep inflation below 2%, and prohibits him or her from managing 
the nation's money to ensure higher employment outcomes. If this is not' interventionist', it 
is hardly 'laissez faire'. 
3. The ALP floated the Australiari dollar in December 1983. Commenting on it in the National 
Times on December 16, 1983, GeoffKitney wrote: 
'It is not overstating the daring nature of the decision to say that Keating has placed 
his political future in the hands of the intermediaries and the traders who operate in 
the cut-throat world of the international financial markets. It was an action which 
was completely at odds with Labor's platform commitment to government control 
of the economy, and Labor's long and deeply held suspicions of the market place 
and its belief that market forces do not share resources equitably. ' 
( Wheelwright, 1984) 
The New Zealand Labour government which came into office in July 1984 had an immediate 
currency crisis on its hands, caused largely by its about-to-be Finance Minister, Roger 
Douglas, advocating a twenty percent devaluation. This was a promise that precipitated a 
foreign currency crisis as speculators took money out to the economy in the hope of cashing 
in after the devaluation. They got their profits - and the New Zealand dollar was floated later 
that year (Jesson, 1989,63-64). 
4. For information on the extent and nature of the environmental crisis caused by primary 
production in New Zealand and Australia, and what has been done about it, good sources to 
consult are Bolton (1981), Clark (1949), Crosby (1986), Dargavel (1995), Dovers (1994), 
Flannery, (1995), Kirkpatrick (1994), Lines (1991), Powell (1974), Roche, (1994), Watters 
(1992) and Wilson (1992). 
5. At the highest level- genetic engineering corporates have met with British Labour 
government officials 81 times since it was elected (Flynn and Gillard, 1999, 1), and Bill 
Clinton called Tony Blair in 1998 to insist that nothing be done in Britain to restrict the 
expansion of Monsanto and other biotech corporates (Monbiot, 1999, 12) 
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Chapter Four 
Greening antisystemic politics 
From the New Left to the Greens 
The third critical world-scale phenomenon that must be examined in some detail 
before we can complete a picture of the origins of Green politics is the so-called 
'new politics'. 'New politics' was first developed by the New Left in the early 
1960s, and was then taken up by the new social movements from the late 1960s 
through to the latel970s. Like previous forms of leftism and progressive politics (as 
we saw in Chapters Two and Three) these movements were organised, and 
communicated within and between each other, on an international scale. Unlike 
those movements, however, they had both the opportunity and the inclination to use -
and critique - the new technologies of globalisation, and to operate as genuinely 
global actors i.e. as part of networks operating in real time across the planet. The 
technological capacity grew in parallel with the movements, so that when the first 
Green parties were formed their networking ability was more of an attitude than: an 
actual real-time capacity (more on this in Chapters Five and Six. But the global 
orientation was and is as important as the physical machinery. 
Yet networking machines do not necessarily make a networking politics. Just as 
important as the global orientation in the creation of Green politics was the local or 
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community orientation. This shows itself not just in politics aimed at defending the 
ecological and social integrity of particular geographical spaces (i.e. 
environmentalism), but also in ways of doing politics. In particular, in ways of doing 
democracy which are egalitarian, participatory and consensus-oriented, based on the 
metaphor of the web rather than the pyramid. 
All the characteristics that we now think of as typically 'Green' can be found in the 
new politics of the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter I trace the intellectual and 
activist genealogy of the Greens, both globally and in the forms in which it came 
to/was developed in New Zealand and Australia, and was incorporated in the first 
Green parties. 
Pushing back the dates and defining the participants 
'Perhaps the Green political advances can be seen as the political 
concretization, however tenuous, of new-left goals and themes that for two 
decades were confined to the margins of political life .. .' (Boggs, 1986b, 870). 
This tentative view, advanced by Carl Boggs in a review of five books published in 
1984 and 1985 by several prominent Greens (RudolfBahro, Petra Kelly, Fritjof 
Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Jonathon Porritt, Kirkpatrick Sale), has been 
substantiated by further research, including that of Boggs' himself. As he goes on to 
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note about the Greens he reviews, they resemble each other, and the New Left, more 
than they resemble other political tendencies, in the following ways: 
'Despite some sharp disagreements, they share in common a great number of 
interests and priorities: a holistic restructuring of the environment, 
transformation of daily life in the direction of "human-scale" communities, 
grassroots democracy, a self-sustaining and communally-based economy no 
longer shaped'by growth for its own sake, the overturning of patriarchal 
social relations, and a shift away from nuclear politics tied to the competitive 
system of nation-states and superpower blocs. Underlying these aims is a 
strong commitment to peaceful methods of struggle and, ultimately, a non-
violent order characterised by harmony and equilibrium.' (Boggs, 1986b, 
870). 
Where did the Greens get this politics? A view held by some Greens, and also by 
some of those who study them, is that Green politics is derived from the science of 
ecology and/or the study of Nature. I This is a view which is deeply problematic 
from a theoretical perspective, involving as it does certain debatable and unprovable 
assumptions, for example that nature has historical agency, and that politics (a 
human activity the very name of which derives from the Greek term for those very 
human creations the city and the state) is somehow involved in, or can be read off 
from, ecological data.2 
After deciding to take this hypothesis seriously (given that it has important 
implications for anyone purporting to write an account of the origins of Green 
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politics) I went to considerable trouble to see whether it could be proven or 
substantiated, and reached the view that it could not (Dann, 1996). (The results of 
my investigation are summarised in Chapter One.) Further, I came to concur with 
Neil Levy (1998), that it is both unlikely and unprovable that Nature is an 
independent agent of history. As Levy has demonstrated via his comparison of the 
different political positions on Nature taken by Heidegger and Foucault, it is also a 
philosophically suspect position. Levy concludes, and I agree, that it is neither 
necessary, nor even desirable, to hold this position in order to be effective as a 
political ecologist. 
A much more sophisticated and plausible account ofthe connection between ecology 
and Green politics is given by Robyn Eckersley (1992a) in Environmentalism and 
Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. While acknowledging that the 
New Left made a major contribution to Green political theory and practice, she 
chooses not to expand on this contribution, but rather to enter new territory in 
examining the differences between 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' approaches to 
environmental politics. She pays special attention to recording and discussing 
emancipatory forms of political ecologism, especially the work of eco-socialists and 
eco-anarchists, and critiques this work from the perspective of ecocentrism. 
Emancipatory political ecologists like Bookchin, Roszak and Bahro have certainly 
had far more influence on the theory and practice of Green parties than pessimists 
who come to anti-democratic conclusions such as Heilbroner, Hardin and Ophuls. 
Their strong associations with other emancipatory movements, such as anarchism, 
socialism and the counter-culture, may in fact be said to be more important to their 
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politics than their knowledge and promotion of ecology - and indeed Eckersley notes 
their shortcomings from this perspective. However, Eckersley's work does not go on 
to give an account of the key theorists of ecocentrism, and in particular whether they 
are - or are necessarily - emancipatory. Proponents of the 'deep ecology' position, 
which is a major strand of ecocentric thought, have been heavily criticised by 
emancipatory political ecologists, including some ecofeminists, for failing to see 
how androcentric their 'ecocentrism' is. (An account of what this has meant in 
political practice is given in Seager, 1993, 222-236; while Val Plumwood, 1993, 
173-189, provides a philosophical critique of the claimed emancipatory nature of 
deep ecology, and Salleh, 1993, also takes issue with its claims to be inclusive and 
emancipatory. ) 
It is not difficult to find ecocentric theorists whose claims outrage the sensibilities of 
emancipatory greens - a good example would be Paul Shepard. In his 1992 essay 
'A Post-Historic Primitivism', for example, he advocates for 'wildness' rather than 
'wilderness' - a wildness which has no truck with even small-scale organic 
horticulture and agriculture, with vegetarianism, with animal liberation, and with 
feminist challenges to traditional sex roles - all in the name of 'ecology' (Shepard, 
1992). This form of extreme' ecocentrism' has had almost no influence on Green 
parties, which remain firmly within the emancipatory tradition, which they derive in 
the first instance from New Left and counter-culture predecessors. 
For this reason I concentrate on recording the actual historical development ofthe 
contemporary political ecology movement, and its documented historical 
contribution to Green politics. There is no need to devote any further effort to 
184 
developing an argument that Green politics is, has been, or can be derived from 
'nature', or 'ecology', or even from ecocentric thought alone. 
Eckersley made a beginning on tracing this particular genealogy, with her paper The 
'New Politics' ofthe Green Movement' (Eckersley, 1992b), and in this chapter I 
seek to provide further historical depth and breadth to our knowledge about these 
roots of Green politics. While it may seem cavalier to dismiss the 'Nature' debate in 
four paragraphs and two footnotes, (especially given the dominant position it 
assumes in current Green theorising), I have two additional and much stronger 
reasons for prioritising an examination of the origins of Green politics in the New 
Left activities of the 1960s. 
Firstly, there is ample evidence, (including thus far unanalysed and unpublished 
evidence from Australasia) for these origins. Secondly, the New Left positions on 
how to do politics which Green parties took up in the 1970s were similar to those 
espoused by the political ecologists, who also adopted them and organised politically 
around them, after they had been trialled and promulgated by the New Left. 
Chronologically, therefore, the New Left takes priority, and is a genuine ancestor of 
Green politics. Thus it warrants a proper examination for what it contributed. 
To do so will clear up a lot of confusion, including that unavoidably experienced by 
Juan Martinez-Alier in the 'Political Epilogue' to his comprehensive analytical 
history of ecological economics (Martinez-Alier, 1990). He gives the matter of 
Green political origins some consideration, and confesses that he is puzzled by the 
fact that left-wing ecologism grew in the 1970s, and that it grew more among the 
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youth of the most over-developed countries than in the Third World. He notes that 
the key elements of the ecological economics critique were available from the Sixties 
onwards, in the works ofBoulding (1966, 1971), Commoner (1971), Ehrlich (1968), 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Mishan (1967), E. Odum (1959), H. Odum (1971), Ward 
(1966), and others. Yet he remarks that 'It is a fact that the ecological critique only 
started to bite politically shortly after the student rebellion of 1968 which spread 
from Berkeley to Berlin.' (Martinez-Alier, 1990,237). This was despite the fact that 
in the USA (and in other anglophone countries) there had been a longstanding and 
dedicated conservation movement since the early twentieth century, and that 
European radical activists of the 1960s ' ... were still unaware of the basic principles 
of human ecology.' (Martinez-Alier, 1990,237). 
In fact, Martinez-Alier concludes that the strictly ecological analysis, based around 
phenomena such as the perceived 'energy crisis' of 1973 and the work of scientific 
ecologists in the 1960s and early 1970s, was not enough to start a movement of 
political ecology. In his view libertarian leftists thinkers like Murray Bookchin, 
Herbert Marcuse and Andre Gorz were much more important to kick -starting the 
new politics. 
Martinez-Alier's puzzlement on this issue is solely due to the unavailability of works 
which take the trouble to make the actual historical and theoretical connections 
between New Left and Green politics. He has correctly identified the sequence of 
relevant developments. This makes him less confused (and confusing) than later 
commentators like John Ferris. Ferris dates the origins of political ecology from the 
'Malthusian' debates of the 1970s and claims that 'What changed political ecology 
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after 1980, was the coming together of the peace movement and feminism with green 
concerns.' (Ferris, 1993, 150-151). As we shall see, this is not a correct dating for the 
origins of Green politics, which theoretically and practically date back to the 1960s, 
not the 1980s. Further, the feminist and peace movements were foundational to, not 
merely influential on, Green politics, and were certainly not a 1980s add-on to 
'green' (i.e. environmental) concerns. 
The chronological sequence from New Left/new social movement to Green, and the 
transfer of eco-activist personnel from the New Left into political ecology groups 
was quite apparent to those using survey methods to study 'value change' 
(cfInglehart, 1977; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980) as well as to the few commentators 
familiar with both movements. Stephen Cotgrove's study of Sixties and Seventies 
environmentalism, Catastrophe or Cornucopia (1982) collates most ofthe then 
available sociological data about pro and anti environmentalists, and environmental 
activists. It starts out with a clear statement that 
'The new environmentalism of the 1960s drew much of its support from the 
young, and especially in the U.S.A. It emerged in the wake of the civil rights 
and anti-war movements, which swept the campuses of American 
universities. It provided an expression for the emerging radicalism of the 
period, the so-called counter-culture. This was profoundly anti-industrial, 
with its decisive rejection ofthe work ethic, its condemnation of 
consumerism and material values, and its questioning of the rationality of a 
society which harnessed science to what were seen as the inhuman atrocities 
of the Vietnam war, and the ecological damage wrought by insecticides and 
industrial waste.' (Cotgrove, 1982, 12). 
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Kirkpatrick Sale makes the same point with regard to where the environmental 
activists of the Seventies came from (cited later in this chapter). 
Scholars of the New Left, who approach the question from the angle 'Where did the 
New Left go?' rather than 'Where did the Greens come from?' concur with Cotgrove 
and Sale. George Katsiaficas, considering the political legacy of the New Left, notes 
that after the dissolution ofthe New Left in the early 1970s there arose' ... alternative 
models for the organisation of a political avant garde in economically advanced 
societies .. .'(Katsiaficas, 1987,207). He discusses two of them - the Greens in 
Germany and the Rainbow coalition in the USA. He describes the German Greens as 
' ... the product of a diverse but unified constituency whose needs and 
aspirations stand in opposition to the anti-ecological and militaristic 
functioning of the present system .... they do not use charisma, huge amounts 
of money, or celebrities to win votes. Rather they attempt to involve 
thousands of people in creating a political force within the government as 
part of a larger movemerit aimed at qualitatively transforming the entire 
society.' (Katsiaficas, 1987,208). 
In considering the German Greens lack of politic all ideological unity, Katsificias sees 
this from a New Left perspective as a positive rather than a negative, because 
'As much as the divisions in the Greens reflect the decentralized nature of the 
party and its ability to conduct regional campaigns in accordance with local 
needs, the diversity of political viewpoints strengthens the organization, 
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makes participation possible by a wide variety of people, and provides for 
daily political discussions among a broad public.' (Katsiaficas, 1987, 209). 
He also sees the Greens as having a spiritual dimension and a utopian vision of 
qualitative economic and political transformation - ' ... a type of change which 
traditional political parties have long abandoned because of its "impossibility" or 
"undesirability".' (Katsiaficas, 1987, 210). He stresses the internationalist dimension 
of Green politics, cementing the connection which he sees between Left and Green 
politics with the view that 'As happened before in history, it could very well be ideas 
crystallised from the experiences of the German movement which provide the conte."ct 
for a new International.'(Katsiaficas, 1987,212). (Emphasis added.) 
Carl Boggs looked at the Greens in Germany specifically, and also at the global 
Green movement. From studying the German Greens he concluded that 'The Green 
vision of democracy - and of politics in general- probably owes more to new-left 
radicalism than to any other ideological current. .. the theme of overcoming 
alienation, the ideal of a countersociety, the emphasis on internal party democracy, 
the dynamic role of feminism, the commitment to nonviolence, an open and eclectic 
theoretical style' (Boggs, 1986a, 184). He then goes on to elaborate the way in which 
each of these New Left themes has been developed in Green practice in the German 
context. 
These characteristics of Green politics are not restricted to Germany, and in his 
review of Green thinkers Boggs looks at the transfer of not just personnel, but also 
political theory, in the transition from protest movement to Green parties. 
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He summarises the content of the shift to the Green vision of an ecologically-
balanced, non-hierarchical society as a profound departure from both the liberal and 
the Marxist traditions, ' ... neither of which has ever posed viable solutions to the 
pervasive crisis of industrialism in the West. Liberalism finds solace in mythical 
appeals to individual freedom and pluralist democracy that leave the corporatist 
power structure intact, while Marxism (in its politicised forms) is increasingly 
wedded to an Enlightenment faith in technological progre~s linked to material 
growth as the basis of social transformation.' (Boggs, 1986b, 871). 
In rejecting both liberalism and Marxism, and in attempting to balance individual 
liberation on the one hand and collective responsibilities on the other, Green politics 
is certainly the successor in content (as well as in style) ofthe New Left (youth, 
'protest') politics that swept the globe in the 1960s. This politics is epitomised in 
both its 'new' and its' global' character by the series of student revolts which began 
in France in May 1968 and were followed by others right around the world later in 
1968 and early in 1969. Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, in their study of 
anti systemic movements, record that there have only been two world revolutions. 
The first occurred in 1848, the second in 1968. 'Both were historic failures. 
Both transformed the world.' (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1988,97). 
The transformative power of the second lay not in the brief student revolts 
themselves (sometimes supported by workers or peasants - for documentation of 
these revolts see Katsiaficas, 1987, 37-70) - but rather in the theorising and 
organising that led towards and away from them. 'We cannot understand 1968', say 
Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 'unless we see it as simultaneously a cri de coeur 
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against the evils of the world-system and a fundamental questioning of the strategy 
of the old left opposition to the world-system.' (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 
1988, 101). 
What happened to this revolutionary impulse? Katsifiacas outlines what needed to be 
done to consolidate and continue the passionate desire for change in a more 
sustainable, committed form in a passage which could read as guidelines for a Green 
party: 
'In contrast to traditional views of revolution as a change in elites or the 
destruction of existing economic and political structures, however, the New 
Left had raised the idea of the transformation of power into a decentralized 
and self-managed form. Such a revolution, unlike a revolt, would be more 
than a struggle against inherited injustices and irrational structures and would 
not culminate in the mere seizure of national power, but in the transformation 
of centralized power through the building up of dignified processes of life 
and alternative structures for the expansion of the democratic rights of the 
individual. Such a transformation would depend upon the continual liberation 
of the sensibilities and needs ofthe vast majority of the people, not simply 
the seizure of power by an armed vanguard. The leap which would be the 
real "leap into history" would be prepared by the aesthetic and cultural 
transformation of individuals and groups, whose new needs would prefigure 
the political and economic transformation of society.' (Katsiaficas, 1987, 
182). 
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By 1995 Carl Boggs had also considered where the revolutionary, transfol1l1ative 
impulse went, after the 'implosion' ofthe New Left in the late Sixties and early 
Seventies. He rejected the view that there was a complete break between the New 
Left and subsequent political developments like the new social movements and 
Green parties. He states that 'The themes that permeated and galvanized the New 
Left - participatory democracy, community, cultural renewal, collective 
consumption, and the restoration of nature - have been typically carried forward into 
the modern ecology, feminist, peace and urban protest movements that have 
proliferated since the early 1970s.' (Boggs, 1995,331). 
Boggs gives several reasons for the failure ofthe New Left to build an ongoing 
radical opposition, including: 
' ... the inability to create durable forms of organisation, the absence of a 
coherent ideology that could link together the disparate groups and 
movements, a focus on momentary, demonstrative actions at the expense of 
building alternative forms, a fetishism of Third World liberation movements 
and their theories and a base of support largely confined to university 
campuses and college towns .... Underlying the fiery rhetoric was a 
spontaneity so strong that strategic thinking about social change (as opposed 
to mere tactical manoeuvring) was impossible.' (Boggs, 1995,337-338). 
This is an elaboration ofthe criticisms ofthe New Left provided much earlier by 
Christopher Lasch. Lasch was scathing about the American Old Left's mindless 
adoption of foreign models of 'socialism', and the New Left's failure to develop 
theories and strategies of working in genuinely new, democratic, and anti-
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bureaucratic ways. These new ways of working would have prevented the descent 
into hysterical, autocratic and violent militancy and carried the struggle against 
capitalism into the realm of ideology, where it ' ... becomes a demand not merely for 
equality and justice but for a new culture, absorbing but transcending the old.' 
(Lasch, 1970,212). 
Boggs also criticises the New Left collapse into v~olent, alienated, Leninist-style 
vanguardism, which represented a return to Old Leftism in rhetoric and style, but 
without the Old Left emphasis on discipline and commitment to participation in 
wider society. The traditional left, he reminds us, 
, ... extolled the primacy of parties, unions, manifestos and programs; a search 
for ideological certainty cloaked in the garb of "scientific" theory; faith in 
social progress through economic growth fuelled by science and technology; 
and attachment to conventional social and cultural nonns.' The New Left, 
before it imploded into quasi-communist sectarianism, was very different. 
It was ' ... anarchistic in its quasi-existential desire for free self-expression and 
creativity, in its attack on elitism, personality cults and bureaucracy, in its 
passion for alternative life styles and in its willingness to break with 
established patterns and experiment with new social arrangements.'(Boggs, 
1995,345). 
Green politics also exhibits the latter, New Left characteristics, as do the new social 
movements. Boggs believes that the new social movements had fewer revolutionruy 
pretensions than the New Left, but were more deeply oppositional in theory and 
practice. In his view the Green movement in Western Europe in the 1980s 
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, ... achieved a dramatic breakthrough of sorts .. .laying the basis of a radical strategy 
that had always eluded the New Left (and the diffusion of social movements that 
followed). Constructed on a unique convergence of citizens' initiatives and local 
movements, the Greens movement has sought to incorporate essentially New Left 
themes within a coherent party structure and electoral framework.' (Boggs, 1995, 
351}.3 
In the remainder of this chapter I provide documentation from the archives and 
experience of the first two Green parties (especially the Values Party, which had 
more fully developed manifestos and working papers), and from the contemporary 
political history of the USA, Australia and New Zealand, to explicitly demonstrate 
the connections between New Left, new social movement, and Green thinking and 
practice. I also examine the relatively minor role ofthe theory and practice of 
political ecology in the initial development of Green parties. 
The New Left, non-violence, and anti-nuclearism 
Although the New Left was a truly global phenomenon (as are Green parties) the 
focus is on the USA, Australia and New Zealand, for the reasons given below. 
The USA is chosen because it provides the first and purest examples of 
student/youth New Left organisations. Particularly important are the Student 
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Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, and the 
Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which were all formed in the early Sixties. It also 
provides the first examples of new social movements relevant to the formation of 
Green politics, especially the women's liberation movement and the anti-Vietnam 
war movement - which originated in the USA and then gained global counterparts. 
Australia and New Zealand also had strong student, women's liberation and anti-war 
movements - and the first Green parties. They were also, in the geopolitical realm, 
within the political, economic, military and cultural hegemonic sphere of the USA. 
However, the USA can not be considered to be globally hegemonic in the 
development of New Left politics, and still less so in the case of Green politics, and 
European examples and comparisons are given where appropriate. 
The role of political ecology as a praxis or ideology in the development, content and 
style of Green parties will also be considered, insofar as it was influential. Political 
ecology as a theory and practice post-dates both the beginning and the end of the 
New Left, and the radical ecology movement was the last of the major new social 
movements of the 1970s to develop. Hence it will be seen that in practice its 
influence on the first two Green parties was indirect, and came via the methods and 
ideas it had inherited from the New Left, rather than directly. The record of the first 
Green parties shows that Green politics as it is actually practised cannot be seen as 
something that is derived solely or even principally from ecology. Further, an 
understanding of the specific socio-political origins of the practices and processes 
characteristic of Green parties can only be found by analysing the Green progenitor 
organisations and movements of the 1960s. 
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This will necessarily involve a consideration of what is meant by 'left' - a debate that 
exercised the theoreticians of both the new and old lefts mightily during the Sixties. 
It was also of extreme salience to the first two Green parties, and their consideration 
of it is given in detail in Chapter Seven. But first let us explore how these debates 
came into being. 
Although the writing was on the wall for the Old Left as early as 1956 (Lynd, 1972, 
119), the first signs of an organised break came in the late 1950s. In 1957 the 
Situationist International (SI) was formed in Europe - the first ofthe 'new politics' 
organisations. The SI developed a critique of everyday life in general, and of the 
monotony, futility, alienation and wastefulness ofthe consumerist society and 
lifestyle in particular (Gombin, 1975,60-62; Knabb, 1981). This critique was to 
resonate throughout the New Left and become a cornerstone of Green politics, with 
the Values Party 1972 manifesto referring to New Zealand as being in the grip of a 
new depression - a depression arising from too much affluence - and suffering from a 
new malady - spiritual poverty. (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 1) This manifesto 
was the first to include specifically anti-consumerist policies, such as removing tax-
deductibility for display advertising. This was very small beer compared to the 
radical rejection of consumerist society advocated by the SI (see Knabb, 1981, for 
original SI documents, such as 'The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity 
Economy'). However, within a context in which every other political party was 
doing its best to make things easier for consumers and producers it was a step in the 
opposite direction.4 
196 
In 1959 in Britain the New Left Review was fonned from a merger of the Universities 
and Left Review and The New Reasoner (Jacobs and Landau, 1967, 17-18). One of 
the founders of the New Left Review, the historian E. P. Thompson, was to become a 
leading activist and theorist in the nuclear peace movement. Thompson typifies the 
radicalism (as opposed to the liberalism or Marxism) of the New Left - a theme that 
Thompson himself developed in both his professional and his political work 
(Thompson, 1978, 1980, 1982). Anti-nuclear war initiatives in Great Britain in the 
late 1950s came together in February 1958 as the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disannament(CND), while by a similar process of coalition the New Zealand anti-
nuclear initiatives came together and adopted the CND name in 1960 (Locke, 1992). 
In Australia in the 1960s peace activism was focussed on the Vietnam War, and 
especially on the issue of conscription for that war. It was not until the 1970s that the 
uranium mining issue heightened concerns about nuclear war, which fed into the 
strong and active nuclear peace movement that came together in the early Eighties. 
In the USA the first signs of a break with national ideological and practical 
adherence to a policy of nuclear 'security' came in the fonn ofa typically New 
Leftist total opposition to nuclearism, with the fonnation of a Student Peace Union 
in Chicago in 1959. As well as refusing to join one ofthe Cold War camps on 'the 
bomb' (a feature of Old Left peace organisations), the SPU was also a forerunner of 
the student New Left organisationally. It was the first nation-wide student political 
organisation, (and the largest before the fonnation of SDS), with some 3,000 
members across America. (Teodori, 1970, 125-127). 
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The nuclear peace movement was a genuinely global movement. The first anti-
nuclear war group was formed, understandably enough, in Japan in 1954. European 
initiatives were co-ordinated as early as 1959 by the European Federation Against 
Nuclear Arms, which began with the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and West 
Germany as constituent members. Within two years it was organising conferences 
which included representation from anti-atomic bomb organisations in Denmark, 
Norway, France, Italy, Brazil, Yugoslavia, the USA, and Australia (Falk, 1982,97-
98). 
The movement in Europe and the USA waned somewhat after the signing of the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast, it grew 
stronger throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This was in reaction to French and 
American testing of bombs and missiles, and to the presence of nuclear-powered and 
armed submarines and warships and the bases to service them (Harford, 1985; 
Hayes, Zarsky and Bello, 1986; Locke, 1992; Wilkes, 1973). While not everyone 
who was a member of the nuclear peace movement in Australasia considered 
themselves to be a radical engaged in anti systemic activity, the leaders and key 
activists were typically leftist in orientation. The majority ofthe younger activists 
were New Leftists of various persuasions (Boraman, 1997; Falk, interview 11.8.97; 
Hutton, interview 9.8.97; Rootes, 1988). 
Between 1965 and 1975 the movement against the Vietnam war also took on an 
increasingly anti systemic character, in the USA in particular, and was the main focus 
of opposition to American economic and military hegemony over other nations. 
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The linkage of the anti-war and student movements was particularly important in the 
USA in the late Sixties, while the two movements were almost synonymous in 
Australia at the same time (Rootes, 1988). (Australia and the USA were the only 
countries to conscript young men to Vietnam.) 
The nuclear peace movement was not solely a New Left movement, yet it came to 
have all the main features of the 'new politics' that characterised oppositional 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s. These in tum were fed into Green parties as anti-
nuclear activists helped create and h!ad Green parties in the 1970s and 1980s (Kelly, 
1984; Vallentine, 1987, 1990). 
The first of the features ofthe anti-nuclear war movement that resembled the New 
Left and the Greens, rather than the Old Left, was its refusal to align with the pro-
American or the pro-Soviet camps. Instead it developed an anti-nuclearist analysis 
which was hostile to the claims of both authoritarian communism and liberal 
democracy to be providing 'security' via the Bomb. This was in marked contrast to 
the Old Left, in both its communist party and trade union forms, which remained 
committed to the concept of 'the Worker's Bomb' (and to the nuclear power 
industry). It also differed from the liberal technocrats and defenders ofthe capitalist 
way of life who supplied rationales for nuclear policies like MAD (Mutually Assured 
Destruction) (for examples of the latter see Teller & Latter, 1958; Kahn, 1960 and 
1971). This 'a plague on both your houses' approach, and the search for a third way 
which would be both peaceful and just, was characteristic ofthe New Left in its 
strongest phase. Its influence on the Greens is epitomised in the Green slogan 
'Neither right nor left, but in front. ' 
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Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit typify the New Left disillusionment with the 
supposed alternatives - and especially 'the alternatives within the alternatives', 
offered by contemporary society and the Old Left. They claimed that the lack of real 
choice had destroyed politics as far as youth was concerned. They made fun of the 
situation thus: 
'Iflack of political understanding means the rejection of bureaucracies big 
(e.g. the Communists and the Social Democrats) and small (e.g. the 
Trotskyist splinter groups), and the denial that the workers mustbe led by a 
revolutionary elite; if lack of political interest means being bored with 
platform rhetoric, with theories that have no practical application, with 
resolutions, petitions, marches, congresses and annual dinners; if lack of 
political interest is the rejection of all the phoney alternatives (Communists 
vs Social Democrats; London vs Paris; Mendes-France vs Mitterand; Mali vs 
Guinea; gin and tonic vs tonic and gin; the King in his palace vs the palace in 
King St; the Six vs the Common Market) - if lack of political interest means 
all this, then indeed most young workers and working intellectuals have 
become eminently apolitical.' (Cohn-Bendit, 1969, 78). 
In offering the real alternative of a non-aligned, non-nuclear world, the nuclear peace 
movement was genuinely 'new political' for its times. Its second new politics 
attribute was its preference for non-violent direct action (NVDA) rather than 
bureaucratic forms of opposition. While much effort certainly went into collecting 
signatures on petitions, and researching and writing papers, submissions and letters 
to politicians, the actions that are more typical ofthe anti-nuclear movement are 
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public protests. These include the huge Easter marches (in Britain, West Germany 
and Australia in particular); the protest boats sailing into Pacific nuclear testing 
zones and against US warships in New Zealand and Australian ports; the women's 
peace camps at Greenham Common in the U.K. and at US bases in Australia and 
New Zealand; and the Hiroshima Day vigils held year after year . 
. Anti-nuclear activists may also be said to have pioneered the political application of 
the slogan 'Think globally, act locally' - nuclear war was a global threat which 
required a global response built up from thousands of local initiatives. Many 
initiatives were set up independently of each other, and only later came together in 
national and international coalitions and federations. Some (like the municipal 
Nuclear Free Zone Movement) began as an idea in one country and then snowballed 
across the globe. This initiative was most successful in New Zealand and Australia, 
where peace activists had begun pushing for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere 
('No Bombs South ofthe Line') from the early Sixties (Locke, 1992, 180-184; 
Magnusson, 1996, 115-116,263-272). The emphasis on local, direct, grass-roots 
action - literally 'citizens initiatives' - found in the nuclear peace movement is 
typically New Left, which preferred the anarchist confederation of equal, 
autonomous groups approach to building a political movement/structure to the 
centralised, bureaucratic, hierarchical Old Left model. Jim Falk (1983, 245) gives an 
account of how the peace movement in Australia began to grow spontaneously in 
1981 from a proliferation of small scale initiatives which then linked together. Such 
linking did not necessarily amount to anti systemic organisation, however. George 
Katsiaficas, (1987, 190-192) provides a critique of the way in which leaders ofthe 
American nuclear disarmament movement sought to ensure that the movement 
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remained single issue rather than antisystemic by suppressing political speakers at 
the enormous peace rally in New York City in 1982. 
Forming a political party, which is under constraints to fulfil certain legal structural 
requirements in order to contest elections and so on, would seem to inhibit the 
adoption of the informal, peace movement approach by Green parties. Nevertheless 
it was one with which they were in great sympathy, and sought to emulate. 
In the case of the Values Party, there was sometimes confusion over which hat the 
members were wearing. Suzanne Mackwell's study ofthe Values Party in 1976 
notes that Values members were so heavily involved in the anti-nuclear movement at 
both a grass-roots and organising level that they were on some occasions obliged to 
play down their party affiliations. Some even resigned from an anti-nuclear ship 
campaign committee in case the movement was characterised negatively as a 
'Values front' (Mackwell, 1976,88). The anti-nuclear power organisations and 
campaigns in New Zealand in the 1970s were also organised and supported by 
significant numbers of Values members, including several political candidates. 
(The most prominent of these, Jeanette Fitzsimons, went on to become foundational 
Co-Leader of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand in 1995.) Although the 
Values Party was electorally unsuccessful, its efforts to keep nuclear power out of 
New Zealand via other political means were completely successful, and it thus 
achieved one of its major political planks without becoming government. This 
helped reinforce the value in practice as well as in principle ofthe 'movement' 
approach to politics that has been typical of Green parties. Not that Greens could 
necessarily capitalise on this close association during election campaigns - Jeanette 
Fitzsimons in particular has expressed her disappointment that the sterling extra-
202 
parliamentary work of Values/Green candidates who are also active members in the 
new social movements has never been readily exchangeable for votes come polling 
day (Fitzsimons, pers comm.). A case in point which is well documented is the 
failure of the organisers of the Repeal petition (calling for the repeal ofa draconian 
abortion law) to acknowledge the Values Party as the only party with a pro-choice 
policy. It was also the only party that had worked for the petition, yet Repeal refused 
to advise pro-choice voters to support Values (Abortion strategy a bitter blow, 1978). 
A third major parallel between New Left, anti-nuclear and Green politics is in the 
process of the movements - the consensual, egalitarian ways of making decisions and 
organising activities. The nuclear peace/anti-war movement was not the only new 
social movement to use the Non Violent Direct Action (NVDA) model of facilitated 
consensus decision-making for meetings and shared leadership roles - this was also 
typical ofthe Women's Liberation Movement. However the high proportion of 
activists in the movement who were familiar with this process (especially those from 
Quaker backgrounds) meant that it was strongly applied and well modelled in the 
movement. The Greenpeace style of direct action protest can also be directly 
attributed to Quaker influence, with an American Quaker who was part of the 
forerunner of Greenpeace - the Don't Make a Wave Committee - introducing ' ... the 
group to the Quaker tradition of bearing witness, which focussed on passive 
resistance.' The group then chose to bear witness via sending a boat to the Amchitka 
test site, and to make sure that the world could witness to the wrong being done by 
nuclear testing by attracting media attention to the protest (Davis, 1997, 711). 
203 
Explicit training in NVDA was given in New Zealand in L971 by a British Quaker, 
and in 1972 by George Lakey, an American Quaker from the New Life Centre in 
Philadelphia (Locke, 1992,286). The philosophy and practice ofNVDA, as taught 
by Lakey, can be found in Oppenheimer and Lakey (1965). Three-time Values Party 
candidate and gay liberation activist Robin Duffwas among the Greens trained by 
Lakey (Duff, pers. comm.), while New Zealanders trained by Lakey later went to 
Tasmania and passed on the tech,niques to Tasmanian Greens in the UTG (Harries, 
pers. comm.). Others trained included members of the Progressive Youth Movement, 
New Zealand's major New Leftist organisation, of the anti-conscription organisation 
OHMS (Organisation to Halt Military Service) and of the anti-apartheid movement, 
HART (Halt All Racist Tours) (Cumming interview, 27.10.90). The training was 
used later by activists in the Save Aramoana Campaign (details below), as well as in 
the peace movement. 
The overlap between the parties and the movements meant that there was no 
question of the first Green parties adopting hierarchical, majoritarian styles of 
organisation, even though they were required to register relatively formal 
constitutions to qualify for electoral activity. 
Why and how things should be done in this new way is not well documented for the 
first Green parties. However an undated (almost certainly 1973) two page manuscript 
by Graham Butterworth of the Palmerston North branch of the Values Party 
discusses meeting process and how the Values Party should build on the new style 
which it tried to use at election meetings (' ... no ranting ... maximum opportunity of 
audience participation ... '). Butterworth's suggested process draws on the Maori 
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tradition of korero (speech, discussion) inside the whare nui (traditional meeting 
house), where all are encouraged to speak and are given an uninterrupted hearing. 
It is also based on the process used by the Society of Friends [Quakers], especially in 
their business meetings, where' ... decisions are made by the sense of the meeting not 
by taking votes.' Butterworth urges the party to ' ... search for a form that encourages 
the maximum participation.' 5 
A discussion paper on decision-making in the Values Party commissioned by the 
National Executive in December 1975, and prepared by Wellington members of the 
party for circulation in March 1976, contains an account of what making decisions 
by consensus means in practice. It refers the party to the 1975 Annual Handbookfor 
Group Facilities for guidelines on the consensus process (Wellington Region, 1976, 
9). Party Chairer Dave Woodhams summarised and elaborated on why and how the 
party made decisions this way in an article aimed at all members in the party paper 
(Woodhams, 1977,4). Thus there is no doubt that the new politics approach to 
decision-making and organising was understood and adopted by the first Green 
parties, and was in marked contrast to the practices followed by both the Old Left 
and liberal democracy. 
A fourth and final parallel between the organising style of the nuclear peace 
movement, the New Left and the Greens also pertains to where power resides and 
how it is articulated. The nuclear peace movement, in its heyday ill Australasia in the 
late Seventies and early Eighties, and in Europe and North America in the Eighties, 
consisted of literally thousands of small, autonomous groups organised at state 
and/or national level into alliances or confederations. Peace organisations that were 
205 
set up and organised from a central, national headquarters were the exception rather 
than the rule. Peace Movement New Zealand (now Peace Movement Aotearoa) is a 
typical example of such a confederation, set up to share information, link activities, 
and provide services such as research and a magazine (aptly named Peacelink), 
which small neighbourhood groups could not provide for themselves. Nuclear peace 
confederations typically make decisions regarding national or regional direction by 
consensus at large gatherings, the primary focus of which is information-sharing and 
'networking' (making and strengthening personaVpolitical contacts with counterparts 
from other parts of the country or sectors ofthe movement). There may bean' 
executive which services the confederation by maintaining an office, and so on, but 
it is never given the powers of directing or 'leading' the movement - rather 
spokespersons are chosen according to their expertise and media flair. 
This model of organising was pioneered by the New Left in the USA in the 1960s, 
particularly in the SNCC (Student Non Violent Co-ordinating Committee) and SDS 
(Students for a Democratic Society), both of which were formed in 1960. These 
organisations provided a model for other autonomous groups working on issues of 
civil rights and liberties, peace, draft resistance and so on, until eventually the 
political formation which resulted became known by its varied participants simply as 
'The Movement' (Goodman, 1970). The Women's Liberation Movement, which· 
began organising itself on this basis from 1967 onwards (beginning in the USA) is 
perhaps the purest example of this style of organisation, with most of its national 
level groups forming after the establislunent of local groups. These national level 
groups also tended to restrict themselves to specific issues, such as health, sexual 
violence, or pornography, rather than attempting to be all-purpose lobby groups. 
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Particularly vigorous local groups, such as the Boston Women's Health Book 
Collective, or the New York based group Redstockings, could have a national 
influence and set a national tone or style by virtue of the strength of their 
publications and personal contacts alone. Women's Liberation writers provided 
theoretical justifications for this style of organising (and also discussed some of the 
problems and dangers associated with its informality). It was a style that the 
feminists who helped found Green parties were familiar with, and they took with 
them into the parties.6 It was certainly a style that was wholly familiar to Catherine 
Wilson. Wilson was the first national secretary of the Values Party (1973-1974) and 
became the first female Deputy Leader of a New Zealand political party in 1974. 
She was an active feminist and a Quaker, and put a lot of effort into seeking a form 
of organisation which would be egalitarian (especially as regards to gender) while 
also being efficient.7 
In establishing a first Green party, therefore, the founders of the Values Party sought 
to follow the 'New Left' model as closely as was consistent with operating an 
effective nation-wide party. After experimenting with radical decentralisation and no 
national leadership for 18 months in 1973 and 1974, the Values Party reconstituted 
itself in the second half of 1974 with a clear statement of principle in its 1974 (and 
subsequent) constitutions. The principle was that 'No decisions should be assigned 
to higher levels in the organisational structure if they can be made just as efficiently 
at the lower level.' The 1976 review of decision-making in the Values Party mainly 
consisted of a discussion of how this principle was (or was not) working in practice, 
and what needed to be done by way of better definition of areas of accountability and 
responsibility to put it into effect'.8 
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Thus Green parties from the beginning have explicitly used (and further developed) 
New Left principles of organising style and process. It is not possible to understand 
why Green parties take the organisational forms that they do without a closer 
examination of where these ideas about process and style came from. 
The peace movement was only one of the new social movements to have a major 
influence on Green praxis. It would be possible to trace similar genealogies of 
influence from the Women's Liberation Movement and movements against racism 
and for Third World liberation. Similar influences came from - and spread to - a host 
of smaller but still powerful groupings focussing on citizens rights and 
responsibilities, especially in the areas of homosexuality, mental health, prison 
reform, drug reform, and so on. These movements in their tum derived their ideas on 
organisation from the New Left, since with the exception of the global nuclear peace 
movement (and then only just), New Left structures pre-dated or were exactly 
contemporary with new social movement organisations. The Black Power 
movement, for example, which grew directly out of the New Left civil rights 
organisation SNCC after Stokely Carmichael became president of SNCC and started 
promoting the Black Power line, dates from 1966. The origins ofthe Women's 
Liberation Movement in. the New Left have already been noted - the usual dating for 
the beginning of the WLM is 1967. 'The Resistance', the anti-Vietnam war 
movement organised along New Left lines, also began organising in 1967. Finally, 
the Gay Liberation Movement is usually dated from the Stonewall riots in New York 
in 1969, as previous homosexual rights organisations in America e.g. the Mattachine 
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Society and Daughters ofBilitis, were neither radical in aim nor militant in style, and 
had no connections with the New Left.9 
The rise of radical environmentalism 
By the time the radical environmentalist David Brower (Executive Director of the 
Sierra Club since 1952), was dropped from the board ofthe Club in 1969 and 
resigned from his job to found the first ofthe 'new' environmental organisations 
(Friends ofthe Earth), the 'new politics' model was firmly in place. The first sign of 
the extent and power of the new environmental movement (which was also 
organising in small grass roots groups across America) came in 1970. In that year the 
anti-war movement tactic of the 'teach-in' was deliberately and consciously copied 
for the first Earth Day (April 22), and according to Time magazine as many as 
20,000,000 people went to lectures, rallies and other environmental education and 
action events (Sale, 1993,24). A major difference between Earth Day and initiatives 
by the New Left and other new social movements, however, was that it was initiated 
from the top (by Senator Gaylord Nelson). It also received approval from leading 
establishment politicians, and even federal funding for staff to organise events in 
tertiary and secondary colleges across America (Lewis, 1997; Sale, 1993,24). Thus 
there was scepticism in the wider 'Movement' about the new ecology movement, 
with a comment appearing in the Movement paper the Spokane National in February 
1970 entitled 'ECOLOGY SUCKS!', which stated that ecology ' ... sucks the life out 
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of social refonn. It sucks the energy out of campus movements. It sucks irritants out 
of capitalism. It sucks change out of politics. It sucks reason out of thought. .. ' and 
went on to insist that if the ecology movement was to succeed it must 'oppose the 
police state', and oppose capitalism in the fonn of the military-industrial complex-
i.e. it must be antisystemic in character and practice. The article was cynical about 
the support for the aims and methods of the ecology movement being evinced by 
mainstream politicians, including Nixon cabinet members, and concluded 'It is 
madness to believe that an unresponsive, undemocratic government and corrupt 
economic system will or can save the earth. Just as it is madness to participate in a 
popular ecology movement that is endorsed by the very people who make the 
movement necessary .. .' (Goodman, 1970,519). 
Friends of the Earth may have countered some of these objections by its 
uncompromising anti-nuclear stance (which was one of the major differences Brower 
had with the Sierra Club). Its radical credibility may also have been enhanced by its 
mode of organising internationally via autonomous national organisations linked in a 
global International, and by its willingness to engage in confrontational actions like 
boycotts and rallies (Yearley, 1997). 
Although parts of 'The Movement' may have been suspicious of the new ecology 
movement, most of the new political ecologists drew explicitly on Movement ideas, 
style and rhetoric. Even the Sierra Club was prepared to countenance publishing the 
thoughts of young activists (more than half the contributors were under thirty) in a 
book called ecotactics (Mitchell and Stallings, 1970). The book begins by 'setting 
the scene' with contributions entitled 'Notes on the Conservation Revolution' and 
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'The Ecology of Revolution' , and then goes on to describe and endorse non-violent 
direct action methods for raising ecological awareness and bringing about change, in 
language which is recognisably familiar as Sixties 'Movement' language. In 1972 
Environmental Action, one ofthe new environmental organisations which sprang up 
to help organise Earth Day, published the even more militant Ecotage!, which was a 
compendium of very inventive (and often quasi-legal) direct action suggestions for 
environmentalists (Love and Obst, 1972). This ferment of environmental militancy 
did not go unnoticed by the far Right in America, which began to attack 
. erivironmentalists with a characteristically loony bile and vigour previously reserved 
for the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement, while the centre Right was 
suspicious (Lewis, 1997, 765-766). 
Despite the early revolutionary rhetoric applied to ecology, and some early but 
sporadic militancy, organised militant ecologism was slow to develop in the USA, 
not appearing until the early 1980s. Christopher Manes sees Earth Day as the high 
point of the reformist environmental movement which had been slowly building 
during the Sixties, with American mainstream conservationist and environmentalist 
organisations experiencing a substantial growth in membership (Sale, 1993,23). 
The Sierra Club, for example, experienced a sevenfold increase in membership 
between 1960 and 1970, from 16,066 in 1960 to 114,336 in 1970, and continued to 
grow dramatically throughout the Seventies and into the Eighties (Manes, 1990, 49). 
Similar patterns pertained in Britain, New Zealand and other countries with 
established conservation/environment organisations. See, for example, McCormick 
(1989, 133) for a table showing the significant increase in the membership of 
environmental organisations in the UK and USA between 1968 and 1984. Also 
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Dalmer (1983,62) for a graphic illustration of the gradual but steady growth of the 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society - New Zealand's oldest and largest 
conservation organisation - from 6,000 members in 1960 to 8,500 in 1970, and then 
a dramatic quadrupling in nine years to 32,000 by 1980. 
This dramatic increase in interest and activity was not necessarily welcomed by the 
leadership of conservation organisations. Manes cites Sierra Club president Philip 
Berry expressing his concern about the burgeoning membership 'of the Club in 1970 
- he feared that' ... the popularity of our cause has attracted some whose motives must 
be questioned ... " and among those whom Berry suspected were' ... anarchists voicing 
legitimate concerns about the environment for the ulterior purpose of attacking 
democratic institutions.' Statements like these merely served to confirm the view of 
Earth First! founder Dave Foreman and other militant environmentalists that 'The 
early conservation movement in the United States was a child - and no bastard child 
- of the Establishment.' (Manes, 1990,49-50). This was the conclusion which was 
reached more soberly and with historical documentation by Samuel Hays in 1959 in 
his study of the American conservation movement (Hays, 1959). It is also well 
summarised by Humphrey and Buttel in their overview of the historical roots of the 
American environmental movement (Humphrey and Buttel, 1982). 
Kirkpatrick Sale, who has written a large study of the SDS, as well as his shorter 
history of the Green movement (Sale, 1974; 1993) is clear that rather than 
contributing ecological politics to The Movement, the new environment movement 
brought Movement politics to environmentalism, in this way: 
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' ... the protest generation itself became the essential support base of 
environmentalism, joining the old-line conservationists first in trickles, then 
in waves ... The "graduates" of the sixties supplied not only the shock troops 
for political demonstrations and anti-corporate actions but a good many of 
the publicists, lawyers, scientists, and other professionals in the civil rights, 
antiwar, feminist and labor movements. This led to the growing influence of 
a younger set in most ,organisations, providing not only new ideas and styles 
but also new tactics, ranging from innovative methods of raising money and 
lobbying Congress to cutting down billboards and other forms of what was 
called "direct action". '(Sale, 1993, 13). 
Accounts of the origins of Earth First! agree that in the 1970s, 'In the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War, with counter-cultural influence on the wane, the environmental 
movement remained an issue that could unite both political activists and people of 
less liberal backgrounds.' (Schulte, 1997) and Earth First! founders included a 
former Yippie as well as employees of conservation organisations, who regardless of 
political origins were committed to a radical anti-industrialism (including primary 
industrialism on the 'rangelands' of the South Western USA), and a very personal 
approach to politics (Pendleton, 1997). Further connections between Sixties rebellion 
and the new environmental politics have been traced by Robert Gottlieb (1993). 
He looks at the writers and theorists who provided the ecopolitical grounding for the 
radical new environmentalism (especially Rachel Carson, Murray Bookchin, Paul 
Goodman and Herbert Marcuse), and at the transition and overlap from New Left to 
environmental activism. 
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Direct environmental action in America, however, was slow in coming compared to 
Australasia. It was New Leftists in the labour movement in Australia who launched 
one of the most comprehensive and successful forms of environmental direct action 
in the early Seventies - the Green Bans. Beginning in 1971 with Hunters Hill, an area 
of urban bush land in Sydney, within three years the New South Wales branch of the 
Builders Labourers Federation had prevented the destruction of over thirty sites of 
natural and/or cultural heritage value. They did this simply by banning demolition or 
'development' work on the sites by its members (Burgmann, 1993, 192-195). 
Leader and spokesman for the NSWBLF, Jack Mundey, developed and defended his 
position in leftist journals such as Australian Left Review, not in environmentalist 
media. (See, for example, his account of the connections between capitalism, 
communism and ecology - Mundey, 1976). While regarded with suspicion by some 
of the middle class environmentalists and NIMBYists his union assisted to save 
important sites, he was regarded with much greater hostility by the national 
leadership of the BLF, who opposed his democratisation ofthe NSW branch and its 
support for ecology. An unholy alliance ofleading Communists in the union and 
building trade proprietors eventually succeeded in getting the NSW branch of the 
union de-registered, thus smashing Mundey's career and the Green Ban movement 
together. 
Other early forms of environmental direct action in Australia included a 'People's 
Pilgrimage' of over 1,000 people walking the 20 kilometres of rough track into Lake 
Pedder in Tasmania in 1971. Jack Mundey came to Hobart to urge workers to place a 
'Blue Ban' on dam construction - though without success (Kiernan, 1990, 23, 32). 
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The origins of the first of Australia's 'forest occupation' protests, at Terania Creek, 
NSW in August 1979, go back to the early 1970s. At that time' ... numerous young, 
idealistic and well-educated new settlers, many of whom had been participants in or 
strongly influenced by the anti-war activities on university campuses in the late 
sixties and early seventies' became aware that virgin forest near their new homes 
was under threat oflogging (Hutton, 1999). For the first time in Australia NVDA 
methods (blockading forestry road construction with vehicles and people, sitting in 
front of bulldozers, sitting in trees marked for felling) were used for an 
environmental cause. Drew Hutton (1999) describes the way in which the people 
who flocked to support the occupation participated according to 'new politics' rules, 
organising themselves via facilitated meetings and conflict resolution and consensus 
decision making. He also covers the awareness the 'new politicians' had oftheir 
actions as theatre, citing Ian Cohen (who subsequently became a Green member of 
parliament in New South Wales) to this effect. tO • This theatrical media orientation 
was to be a feature of militant environmentalism in the USA in the 1980s - but first it 
was pioneered in New Zealand. 
At dawn on December 12, 1977, five years before Earth First! 'cracked' the Glen 
Canyon dam in Arizona (Manes, 1990,3-5), a helicopter lifted a geodesic dome on 
to a site just below the proposed Clyde high dam on the Clutha River in Otago .. 
'Clutha Rescue' had been carefully planned for some months before the action - with 
everything from a solar water heating system for the dome to good relations with 
local opponents of the dam taken care of. The action consisted ofan education and 
protest centre based in the dome. This continued throughout the summer, although 
harassment by hostile locals and the threat of arrest by the police meant that after 
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eleven days the dome had to be moved to another site (Johnston, 1978; Smith, 1978; 
Wilson, 1982, 64-65). The Clutha Rescue team did not give up the fight after their 
summer camp. They went back to Wellington and Auckland to continue to research, 
lobby and protest via the Values Party, Friends of the Earth and a new organisation 
dedicated to more democratic policy making, on energy and other issues, the 
Coalition for Open Government. 
A year later, one year before Terania Creek and seven years before the first 
American tree sitting protest (Manes, 1990, 14) tree sitters began occupying 1,000 
year old totara trees in Pureora Forest in the centre of the North Island. This forest 
was a nationally significant habitat of the rare and endangered kokako or wattle 
crow. While the sitters sat in the totara, logging of other ancient podocarps that 
provide food for the birds commenced around them (Wilson, 1982, 120-123). 
In December 1980 the largest and longest of the New Zealand direct action 
environmental protests was launched with the occupation of the proposed site for an 
aluminium smelter at Aramoana near Dunedin, and the declaration of the 
'Independent State of Aramoana'. Border posts were established on the one road 
leading into the tiny settlement of Aramoana, and 'passports' were issued to 
residents and sold to supporters of the campaign. Special Independent State of 
Aramoana postage stamps, designed by leading New Zealand artists, were also 
produced, and their sale to philatelists and supporters helped raise money for the 
cause. In 1981 a travelling embassy (a caravan staffed by two 'roving ambassadors') 
set offto travel the length and breadth ofN~w Zealand, raising funds and support. 
'Save Aramoana' groups were formed in other parts of New Zealand, sometimes as 
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part of existing environmental organisations, and sometimes under other names, such 
as Campaign Power Poll in Wellington, which concentrated on researching hydro-
power statistics (aluminium smelters use vast amounts) and lobbying politicians. 
The Save Aramoana Campaign was conceptualised from the beginning as a 'new 
politics' initiative. One of the founders of the campaign, Allan Cumming, had 
received training from George Lakey at his 1972 Christchurch workshop. Just prior 
to the formation of the S.A.C. he had been brushing up his NVDA skills, along with 
other environmental activists in Dunedin, at workshops led by Australian anti-
nuclear activist Peter Jones and New Zealand peace activist Rachel Bloomfield. 
Cumming was active in several new social movements (peace, people's sovereignty, 
environment) in the 1970s, and describes his politics as anarchist. The organisation 
ofthe Campaign rested on two principles that were foreign to the more formal and 
conventional Aramoana protection organisations that preceded the Campaign. These 
were that all decisions had to be made by consensus, and meetings had to be opento 
everyone. Cumming recalls that there were initial difficulties in establishing these 
principles (which were enshrined in the constitution of the S.A.C.), but once in place 
they worked well, with a pool of around twenty trained facilitators available to 
ensure that meetings were properly run. There was only one major illegal direct 
action at the site (the occupation of a newly erected site tower). Nevertheless the 
commitment of hundreds of people willing to occupy the site if necessary to 
permanently prevent work on it was stressed in letters to the company and face-to-
face meetings with company directors in Auckland and Australia, and it appears to 
have been believed (Cumming interview, 27.10.90). The Save Aramoana Campaign 
also had a sophisticated approach to police, media and community relations, which 
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meant that it was able to mobilise widespread support and achieve a lot - including 
its ultimate goal of the cancellation of the smelter project - without 'going to the 
wire'. 
This was in contrast to the most dramatic ofthe Australasian militant ecological 
protests, which was undoubtedly the campaign against the Franklin dam in 
Tasmania. In a carefully organised non-violent blockade of the dam site, beginning 
on 14 December 1981, and involving thousands of people (with 1440 arrested), it 
was the biggest conservation protest ever held in Australia, and a significant ad of 
civil disobedience (Burgmann, 1993, 199). It was organised (by the Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society) only after six years of conventional lobbying and participation 
in electoral politics had failed to convince Labor and Liberal politicians of the 
necessity of protecting the river as part of the South West Heritage area of Tasmania 
(Hutton 1999). 
Organised along NVDA lines, it was within the tradition inherited from the New 
Left and the student and peace movements of the 1960s, and therefore 'Green' not 
only in the environmental substance of the protest but also in the style of action. 
One of the leaders of the Franklin campaign, Bob Brown, was soon afterwards 
elected to the Tasmanian Parliament as an independent Green. Just before being 
elected to the federal Senate in 1996 (the fourth Green to become an Australian 
Senator - the first one, Jo Vallentine, came from the nuclear peace movement), 
Brown co-authored a book with another prominent Green and fellow senatorial 
candidate, the philosopher Peter Singer. As well as discussing the environmental 
crisis and a 'green ethic', the two Green authors pay considerable attention to a 'new 
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politics' and a 'new economics'. Their vision ofthe new politics allows for grass 
roots political participation, sees an end to party machines, and aims to ensure 'fair 
shares' for everyone in the new polity - including access to both material resources 
and to legal guarantees of human rights (Brown and Singer, 1996). 
Brown has always taken a strong public stand on human rights issues, especially 
homosexual and Aboriginal rights, regardless.of whether these are supported by the 
environmental/conservation constituency or not. This total Green package, as 
espoused and practised by Brown and other Green politicians, has been something 
that the environmental and conservation pressure groups in Australasia have 
generally refused to endorse. Indeed, they have usually sought to dissociate 
themselves from it, starting with the conservationists' suspicion of the United 
Tasmania Group (for details see Chapter Five). Leading Australian Green 
Drew Hutton, an anarchist New Leftist in the 1960s, was not tempted to join the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (now Australia's largest conservation 
organisation) when it was set up in 1965. It appeared to him at the time to be just 
another Establishment 'old boy's club', with a Chief Justice (Garfield Barwick) as 
the first President and Prince Phillip as the second one, and Liberal Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser on the Council of the Foundation (Hutton interview, 9.8.97) . 
. New Zealand's Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society had similar, albeit much 
earlier, Establishment origins in 1923, with MPs, lawyers, retired army officers and 
the like founding and leading the organisation (Dalmer, 1983). Thus the criticisms 
levelled at the American conservation establishment by the radical ecologists were 
also true for Australasia. 
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In Chapters Five to Seven there is a more detailed account of how the large (and 
growing) conservation organisations and campaigns in New Zealand in the 1960s 
were not responsible for the creation of the Values Party (or even connected to it). 
On the contrary - it was to be leading figures in the Values Party who turned their 
attention to environmental campaigns after they had founded/organised the party -
who were to make a major contribution to environmental politics in New Zealand. 
Examples include Norman Smith, first organiser of the Values Party, who was chief 
organiser of the Clutha Rescue action, in association with other Values members 
including founder member Gary Williams, Campaign Half Million organiser 
Raewyn McKenzie, and Margaret Crozier, the first woman Leader ofthe party 
(1979). Crozier's Deputy Leader, Richard Thompson, played a leading role in the 
Save Aramoana Campaign. Other Values members were heavily involved in, and 
played leading roles in, the anti-nuclear movement in both its anti-war and anti-
nuclear power wings (Fitzsimons interview, 1990; Hocking interview, 1990; 
Melhuish interview, 1990; Smith interview, 1990; Thompson interview, 1990). 
(And in a counter example, one of New Zealand's leading environmentalists of the 
1980s was not a member of Values in the 1970s, but rather a founder of what was 
probably New Zealand's first libertarian Right party - Wallace interview, 1990). 
In Australia The Wilderness Society, Australia's second largest conservation 
organisation, had its beginnings in a meeting in Tasmania in 1976 at which 80% of 
the attendees were members of the United Tasmania Group - an example of a 
conservation organisation coming out of a Green one, rather than vice versa. 
(See Chapter Five for details.) Thus while radical environmentalism may often be 
'Green' politics, this is not always or necessarily the case, and an investigation of the 
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specific connections between particular manifestations of radical environmentalism, 
and actual Greens and Green theory and practice, as I have done here, is necessary. 
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Rebels in retrospect 
Chronologies for New Left/new social movement and then Green activity that 
parallel those of the USA can be documented for Australia and New Zealand. 
Toby Boraman (1997) records the first New Left group in New Zealand as the 
Socialist Forum, which formed in 1958 and consisted of those disaffected with all 
strands of the Old Left, from the Labour Party to the Communist Party. 
In New Zealand, as in Great Britain, there were close connections between the New 
Left and nuclear peace activism; and most of the New Left groups were founded by 
students and other young people. The Christchurch Progressive Youth Movement 
(PYM) (1969-1973) was the clearest example of this type, and is described by 
Boraman as the New Zealand equivalent of the SDS. By 1970, when the second 
Radical Activists Congress was held in New Zealand, the New Left 
'anarchistfhippy/yippie/jesus freak' coalition was in the ascendancy. Members of this 
grouping disrupted a debate between Trotskyists and Maoists over who held 'the 
way forward for the New Zealand revolution' with music, shouting, paper darts and 
other missiles. Leading New Leftist (at that time - and an early member ofthe 
Values Party) Tim Shadbolt summed up the situation thus: 
'~ .. they are trying to tell us that "radical" means Mao or Trotsky, that 
"activist" means talking about them ... if this is going to be a public debate, 
then let's show that radicals are involved in numerous possibilities of 
revolution. Let's have an anarchist, let's have a Christian, let's have a yippie, 
let's have an artist.' (Boraman, 1997, 12). 
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The video Rebels in Retrospect (Campbell, 1991), which deals with the Christchurch 
and Wellington PYMs, is another source of evidence ofthe flamboyant 'youth' style 
which was also apparent in the early Values Party. Street theatre was a popular way 
of spreading the message (and creating some havoc). Participants recall that while 
one was expected to study the socialist canon, and there were (heated) debates on the 
'correct line', in any room often people there would be eleven different opinions, 
and no actual enforcement of a 'line'. Counter-culture attitudes and styles were also 
much in evidence, from tie-dyed ciothing and rock music to political poetry and 
sexual libertarianism. Chris Kra.us· recalls on the video that the PYM 'ideology' was 
to show off, to be playful, to use metaphors. She says that 'Ideology was like a 
costume you could try on and walk around in.' Her summation of the PYM 
experience was that being a 'yahoo' was more radicalising than being a Marxist-
Leninist. In her view it had a more lasting effect, and those who were part of it never 
re-entered the mainstream of society. 
It was from this radical youth ferment that the Values Party was to draw many of its 
early members and ideas. Tony Brunt's original name for his new party was the 
'New Zealand Youth Party' , and while the somewhat frivolous 1970s style has gone, 
the deeper principles of the acceptance of alternatives and diversity, and ofliving as 
well as preaching politics, remain part of the bedrock of Green politics.· 
The heterogeneous origins of the European Green parties, especially Die Griinen, 
have been well-documented (Boggs, 1986; HUlsberg, 1988; Parkin, 1991). By the 
time Die Griinen formed the German New Left as a movement (like its US 
counterpart) had largely degenerated into ideological sectarianism on the one hand 
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and terrorism on the other. The transmission of New Left theory and practice was 
therefore principally through the new social movements, especially the peace 
movement, the women's movement, and the Biirgerlnitiativen, rather than directly 
through the remnant New Leftist groups that were involved in founding Die Griinen. 
New Zealand provides a clearer as well as an earlier example of the transition from 
New Left to Green. 
If the theory and practice of Green parties in particular, and Green politics in general, 
owes more to its New Left predecessors than to its ecological contemporaries, then 
what are the principal features of the New Left parent that enable us to recognise the 
Green child? 
Massimo Teodori presents five theses that he believes characterise the core of the 
New Left. Each one is recognisably an identifying feature of Green politics, and each 
one of them is exclusively political i.e. it is a product of the power dimension in 
human affairs, rather than ecosystem interactions. In summary, they are as follows: 
(1) individual moral revolt expressed in terms ofan analysis of the way in which 
the economic system and social institutions exert power over every aspect of 
life, restricting fundamental rights to self-realisation and self-expression; and 
a corollary emphasis on personal as well as political liberation; 
(2) a focus on opposition to the system, whose racist, sexist, violent, 
authoritarian, destructive, exploitative, technocratic, elitist elements are seen 
as interdependent and closely connected; 
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(3) direct action as a primary means of democratic political expression; 
(4) participatory democracy as both an essential means and a major end of 
political activity; 
(5) decentralisation, diversity, self-government, inclusiveness, and abolition of 
bureaucracy and hierarchy as primary political organising principles. 
(Teodori, 1970,36-37.) 
It is easy to find examples of all these theses in both the New Left and early Green 
theorising and practice - in fact one is struck by the parallels. For example the 1962 
Port Huron Statement of the SDS, which is probably the definitive American New 
Left document, begins with a substantial discussion of values. It places personal 
authenticity and meaningful participation in human relationships at the centre of 
political endeavour, rejects the separation of means and ends, advocates replacing 
' ... power rooted in possession, privilege or circumstance by power and uniqueness 
rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason and creativity ... '. It finishes with an outline of a 
participatory democratic approach to politics, economics and other major social 
institutions, and the advocacy of non-violent conflict resolution at all levels (Jacobs 
and Landau, 1966, 157-161). 
In less eloquent and developed form, but with similar substance, this is what Tony 
Brunt, founder ofthe Values Party, says in his speech which launched the party in 
May 1972. He speaks of Values being a 'quality of life' party, responding to the 
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need to breathe warmth and humanity into society and stop the decline in our sense 
of community. He talks of the 'real Kiwi' [New Zealander] wanting to renew his 
[sic] links with nature and enjoy relaxed and warm relationships with other people, 
and questions why we live in this way only during the three summer holiday weeks 
of the year. He claims we can live this way all year round if' ... we have the courage 
to say "no" to the system .. .ifwe put men before machines, if we are prepared to 
place people before production and profits.' (Brunt, 1972,2). He cqncludes his 
speech by criticising the New Zealand government for choosing to import $96 
million worth of new cars in 1972, at a time when the economy of Bangia Desh was 
collapsing and the United Nations was appealing for increased aid. He asks 'Where 
is its sense of values? This is why we have chosen to call our party the Values Party. 
It stands for correct values in our society.' Brunt then claims that the ideas the 
Values Party is promoting constitute a new political synthesis, almost a new 
ideology, with a common thread, and ' ... the common thread is ... humanism. We 
simply want to meet the needs of the people and not the needs of the system.' 
(Brunt, 1972, 12) 
In the light of the fierce condemnation of'anthropocentrism' coming from deep 
ecologists (and also some Greens) a decade later, Brunt's advocacy of humanism as 
the foundation - and at the foundation - of a Green party may seem anomalous. 
However, unlike latter-day Greens influenced by deep ecology, Brunt and the first 
Greens did not see a contradiction between meeting human needs and respecting the 
environment. In fact they advocated environmental protection and conservation in 
order to meet human needs conceived in the widest possible, non-material sense i.e. 
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not just the need for economic resources but also the n,eed for spiritual development 
and aesthetic re-creation. 
This is certainly the position taken by the United Tasmania Group in its 1974 
manifesto statement 'The New Ethic'. The third clause of 'The New Ethic' begins 
thus: 'Concerned for the dignity of man and the value of his cultural heritage while 
rejecting any view of man which gives him the right to exploit all of nature' . It then 
goes on to outline how a harmony between man and nature (and man and man) could 
be achieved via creating social and political mechanisms for valuing individuals, and 
for creating communities in which all can participate equally. (See Appendix B for 
the full text of 'The New Ethic'.) 
As Brunt's speech and 'The New Ethic' make clear, there is a rejection of 'the 
system' and its moribund values and a desire to set up new and better alternatives. 
The means by which this will be done were also firmly in the New Left tradition 
covered in the third, fourth and fifth ofTeodori's theses. Further details on the 
Values Party and UTG 'direct action' style of election and issue campaigning are 
given in Chapter Five. 
Style and process similarities between the New Left and the Greens, and the 
antisystemic critique, are readily observable - the emphasis on personal liberation 
and individual moral revolt is somewhat more subtle. Yet the new Green departure in 
this area was readily discernible in the first study of this dimension conducted in 
New Zealand in 1972. Stephen Levine scored all the major parties contesting the 
1972 general election on Rokeach's scale of political values (which is derived from 
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analysing party manifestos and other political materials). He concluded that the 
Values Party' ... transcends Rokeach' s scheme classifying political movements solely 
according to the relative priority of the values of freedom and equality.' (Levine, 
1975, 120). The 1972 Values Party platform placed a strong emphasis on 'existential 
values' like beauty, pleasure, harmony, happiness, love, wisdom and so on, 
characteristics which it linked with a secure and equal society on the one hand and 
personal freedom on the other. Levine's analysis concluded that' ... data pertaining to 
the Values Party indicates that Rokeach's approach may be more applicable to the 
political choices of the 'old politics', in which struggle for basic rights and economic 
well-being are dominant, than to the 'new politics'.' (Levine, 1975, 122) 
Democrats with a difference 
Theorists of the American New Left were well aware of the novelty of their politics, 
and that an important new element was the seeming contradiction between the desire 
for personal liberty on the one hand and social equality on the other. Dick Flacks 
(1966) characterised the two conflicting extremes as 'existential humanism' and 
'radical transformation of the social order'. The New Left tried to achieve both goals 
simultaneously, and Flacks was positive that it must 'encompass both sets of 
orientation', and be aware of the dangers in privileging one position over the other, 
saying: 
228 
'It is clear that a politics apart from an existential ethic becomes increasingly 
manipulative, power-oriented, sacrificial of human lives and souls - it is 
corrupted. The danger involved in a social movement that is apolitical is, 
perhaps, less obvious .. .it seems to me [it] is that of irresponsibility: ofa 
search for personally satisfying modes of life while abandoning the 
possibility of helping others to change theirs; of placing tremendous hope in 
The Movement of the immediate community for achieving personal salvation 
and gratification - then realising that these possibilities are, after all, limited, 
and consequently suffering disillusionment.' (Flacks, 1966, 168) 
Flacks also saw problems in trying to achieve both goals at once: 
'The obvious difficulty with trying to encompass both existential humanism 
and radical politics is that they are not only plausibly independent, but 
sometimes incompatible. Thus the effort to be politically effective can 
involve one in efforts at manipulation and compromise. The effort to be 
morally consistent can radically separate one from effective communication 
with others.' (Flacks, 1966, 168). 
He felt that SNCC and SDS had done a reasonably good job thus far (from 1960 to 
June 1965) of maintaining the necessary tension between the two' orientations. 
He also thought that the fact that such a tension existed was an important difference 
between SDS and SNCC and other 'left' organisations (Flacks, 1966, 169). 
It is also a difference between Green organisations and most left organisations, now 
that the New Left has gone. A defining characteristic of Green politics is the 
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foundational principle of participatory democracy (often rendered as 'grassroots 
democracy' in English, Basisdemokratie in German). It appears in the first principles 
of every party using the name Green - with some significant exceptions. 
The Ecological Democratic Party in Germany, formed by ex-Christian Democrat 
politician Herbert Grubl and others, who departed from Die Griinen because that 
party was in their view too leftist, is one of the exceptions. It is a good example of a 
party where environmental concern is matched with conservative social and 
economic policies - with no electoral success. The New Zealand exception discussed 
below is an even better example of a party that arose out of an environmental 
organisation, yet failed to adopt any of the other Green principles, or a Green 
economic policy. 
The Progressive Green Party was a 'blue-green' party formed in 1995 to contest the 
1996 general election, New Zealand's first election using the MMP voting system. 
(This is the system used in Germany, with MPs coming from both geographical 
constituencies and party lists - it allows parties which can achieve over 5% of the 
total vote on their party list to enter parliament via the list vote). The Progressive 
Green Party had a 'free-market' economic policy, and did not place any emphasis on 
gender equity, non-violence, consensus decision-making or other Green principles. 
In a comparison of the three parties using the name Green in New Zealand John 
Prince judged the Progressive Greens to be the 'least Green', with the major 
differences being over economics and democratic process (Prince, 1995). 
The Progressive Green Party was set up by leaders of the Maruia Society, a 
conservation organisation that was formed in 1988 by a merger ofthe Native Forest 
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Action Council (NFAC) and the Environmental Defence Society. NFAC had once 
been a leading campaigner for forest conservation (Wilson, 1982, 108 -115; Anon., 
n.d.), and the Environmental Defence Society was an Auckland-based group of 
lawyers and scientists who fonned the society in 1971 to take public good 
environmental cases. While NF AC at its inception was a radical ecology 
organisation, with tens of thousands of members nation-wide, and hundreds prepared 
to take direct action (such as tree-sitting), the Maruia Society at the time of the 
fonnation of the Progressive Green Party had an on-paper membership of around 
1,000. None of those were prepared to take direct action. It was also engaged in . 
acrimonious exchanges with the rest of the environment movement, whose leaders 
were highly critical of the Maruia position on a range of issues. These included 
Maruia support for the West Coast Forests Accord, (which allows for continued 
logging of virgin native forest), and the sale of mountain lands to foreign owners. I I 
The Progressive Green Party (while predicting that it would achieve at least five 
percent of the vote, and being tipped by the National Party Environment Minister 
Simon Upton as a potential coalition partner), in actual fact received only 0.24% of 
the total vote in the 1996 general election. In contrast, three members of the Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, standing as part of the leftist Alliance of five 
parties, were elected to parliament. In 1998 the party fonnally disbanded, and its 
president and some of its members set up the Blue Greens, a lobby group working 
within the National Party. 
The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand has a more impressive track record with 
regard to the practice of Green democracy. It is the genuine descendent of the Values 
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Party, both legally insofar as the formalities of the New Zealand electoral system are 
concerned, and morally insofar as it derives its policies and practice from the Values 
legacy. With regard to its personnel, a significant proportion of its current leaders 
and activists were members of the Values Party. The Green Party's first female 
Co-Leader, Jeanette Fitzsimons, was a leading Values campaigner on energy and 
related environmental issues in the 1970s and strongly represents that strand of 
Green politics. The first male Co-Leader, Rod Donald, is an equally good exemplar 
of the participatory democracy strand, having begun his political career as a 
(voluntary) community organiser in an inner-city neighbourhood of Christchurch, 
where he founded a whole-food store owned and operated by a co-operative, and a 
community land trust. In the 1980s he became active on electoral reform issues, and 
in the early 1990s he fronted the successful campaign for changing the voting system 
to MMP. His politics are heavily influenced by communitarian anarchist thinkers, 
such as Kropotkin and Bookchin, and by eclectic social critics like Illich and 
Schumacher, and radical activists like Saul Alinsky, (Donald, pers. comm.), who 
were also influential in the New Left. 
Central to the New Left/Green concept of participatory democracy is that it is both a 
means and an end. This is discussed by Teodori (1970,50-52) and Flacks (1971, 27-
35) who both comment on the 'end of ideology' hypothesis which was first advanced 
by Daniel Bell (Bell, 1960). Bell was criticised by Noam Chomsky for his contention 
that there was now a consensus of political and social ideas in the West, and that 
politics from now on would be merely a technical activity of making minor 
adjustments to the system, rather than fighting over fundamentals (Chomsky, 1969, 
272-274). The New Left agreed with Bell that Marxism as an ideology was dead 
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(humorously proclaimed with slogans like 'God is dead, Marx is dead, and I'm not 
feeling too well myself and 'Je suis marxiste: tendance Groucho ). But this did not 
mean that the debate over fundamentals had been or should be replaced by 
technocratic management of the status quo. In fact, it was precisely this substitution 
of liberal corporatist management for democratic politics that the New Left was in 
revolt against. 
The New Left posited a new way of doing politics which was an alternative to both 
authoritarian communism and corporate liberalism, and participatory democracy 
applied on a nation-wide basis was one of its goals as well as the means by which it 
conducted its own affairs. Dick Flacks concludes his essay on participatory 
democracy thus: 
'The virtue of "participatory democracy", as a basis for a new politics, is that 
it enables these new sources of social tension to achieve political expression. 
Participatory democracy symbolizes the restoration of personal freedom and 
interpersonal community as central political and social issues. It is not the 
end of ideology: it isa new beginning.' (Flacks, 1971,35.) 
It was a new beginning enthusiastically adopted by Green parties at their beginning. 
Some documentation of this ·has already been given in this chapter, and more is 
given in Chapter Five. The 1972 Values Party manifesto advocated political 
decentralisation and 'community government' by neighbourhood councils, 
beginning in the areas where the need was greatest, i.e. in new housing sub-divisions 
inhabited by working class and immigrant Polynesian popUlations (New Zealand 
Values Party, 1972,29). The 1975 Values manifesto has a section entitled 
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'Community', which expands on the community development and political control 
theme. Under the heading 'Government Reform' there is a section entitled 
'Participatory Democracy, which states that 
'In a truly democratic society any citizen should feel that he or she can 
influence government.' and that the current situation, where the majority are 
powerless in the role of spectators of political games, isa situation which 
, ... cannot be changed except through a strong and active movement of people 
"at the grassroots level;'. Such a movement has emerged in New Zealand in 
recent years. It is still scattered, largely inarticulate, not very well organised, 
nor very confident ofitself...Manapouri [the campaign to save the lake], 
Aro St [inner city 'altemative'Wellington], Otara [new suburban Polynesian 
Auckland] are places where some of its battles have been won. It is a 
movement towards participatory democracy, and the Values Party is only one 
part of it. In its role as a social action movement, the Values Party seeks to 
demonstrate that the ordinary citizen is not powerless ... The Values Party does 
not need to become the government to enact its policies. Many can be 
enacted in their daily livesby members.' (New Zealand Values Party, 
1975,85). 
This personal approach to politics is quintessentially New Left, and shows that the 
Greens are the true heirs of the New Left, albeit in attenuated electoral form. 
The other New Left/new social movement themes that reappear in Green politics are 
many, and would require a separate volume to trace and analyse. I am able to list 
only the best sources that set out the arguments and/or make the links. They include 
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the critique oftechllocratic, scientistic, alienated society (Marcuse, 1964; Roszak, 
1970, 1973, 1978; Illich, 1973), of sexism (Dann, 1985; Echols, 1989; Evans, 1979; 
Redstockings, 1979), ofproductivism and industrialism (Bookchin, 1971; Gorz, 
1982, 1985; Illich, 1978), and ofnuclearism (Falk, 1982; Kelly, 1984, Thompson, 
1980, 1982). 
It is possible to find examples of New Leftists moving into prominent roles in Green 
parties, of whom Daniel Cohn-Bendit, currently a Green Euro MP, is probably the 
best-known. There are also plenty of examples of new social movement leaders 
making the shift (Petra Kelly being an excellent example). One can also find specific 
instances where New Left sources have been used to build Green platforms, and 
where New Left organisations shade into Green ones (an excellent example ofthis 
being the origins of francophone Green politics in Belgium in Democratie 
Nouvelle). 12 However, proving the genealogy in such strictly 'genetic' terms is 
unnecessary. The extreme similarity and congruity of New Left and Green 
programmes and practices speaks for itself. When it is stripped of the remnants of 
socialist rhetoric, which in any case was a feature of the later and moribund New 
Left rather than the New Left in its formative phase, most ofthe New Left platform 
is recognisably 'Green'. A typical example of this is the emphasis on community and 
participation. Or it was to be contested to become more 'Green' e.g. the women's 
liberation critique that led to the Green party emphasis on gender equity. 
In conclusion, while Green parties undoubtedly derive most (although not all) of 
their conservation and environmental policies from the analysis and practice of the 
radical wing of the environmental movement, they derive their politics from the New 
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Left and the new social movements. This is either via direct transmission of 
personnel, ideas and policies, or by indirect influences from shared processes, styles 
and goals. A more detailed description and analysis of the origins and political 
orientation of the first two Green parties, provided in the next three chapters, will 
show how this happened in practice. 
Notes 
1. A typical example of this is Denis Owen's statement that 'The ftrst important lesson to learn 
is that man is part of nature and that the rest of nature was not put there for man to exploit... , 
(Owen, 1991,23). Owen then goes on to discuss the way in which ecosystems are 'self-
regulating', and claims that unless humans learn to limit their energy usage and population 
growth we will overshoot our resource base and perish. Andrew Dobson explicitly endorses 
this 'laws of nature' approach to politics. He says 'We want to live according to universal 
laws rather than redesign them ... The science of ecology teaches us that we are part of a 
system which stretches back into an unfathomable past and reaches forward into an 
incalculable future, and that the whole interplanetary community is bound by ties which 
make a mockery ofmastery ... There is solace to be had once we realise that the wisdom of 
God passeth all understanding. Green politics responds to an age of uncertainty by teaching 
us to know our place.' (Dobson, 1991,8) (Emphasis added). Without wishing to labour the 
point, this is clearly a normative and not a descriptive statement. It is not a view shared by 
many Greens (including this author), who would certainly not dispute the value of ecology as 
a science which can help us understand, protect and sustain the diversity of life on this 
planet. 
2. An example of the way this assumption works is encapsulated in Andrew Dobson's 
statement 'In the same way in which our personal lives are political for feminism, and our 
economic lives are political for Marxism, so our dealings with the natural world have a 
political dimension for ecologism. In this respect, green politics makes an original 
contribution to a fundamental theme of political theory: the question of 'the scope of politics 
as a practical activity' (Dobson, 1993, 231). Insofar as this statement is true it is trivial. The 
political history of the second half of the twentieth century could be described as the era of 
enlarging the scope of politics as a practical activity. This it now includes all sorts of non-
parliamentary activity, including sports, arts, prisons, health care, food, and so on. Every 
sphere of human endeavour has a power dimension, and hence a politics. There is now a 
trend in critical political thought which questions this expansionism and seeks to apply a 
more rigorous and narrow defInition of political even within these new spheres of politics 
(see, for example, Beyme, 1996). What is problematic about Dobson's statement is not that it 
draws our attention to another new sphere for politics but rather that it begs the question of 
who conducts the politics in any given sphere, and in this respect the analogy with feminism 
and Marxism does not stand up. Feminism and Marxism both identify clear historical actors 
or agents on both sides of their respective political divides, namely men and women, wage 
workers and capitalists. While a few ecologists, such as Lovelock (1979) have asserted a 
bona ftde personalised identity for 'Earth', most do not claim that nature has historical 
agency equivalent to that possessed by human beings. Most would accept that while humans 
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may do politics with, by and through nature, nature does not do politics with, by and through 
humans. One of the earliest critiques of political ecology, by Hans-Magnus Enzensberger 
(1973) drew attention to this very point, arguing that much of what political ecologists were 
representing as 'universal truths of nature' was in fact an artefact of the politics of class. 
Feminist critics have followed on to consider the extent to which environmental destruction 
springs from the politics of gender (Lloyd 1984; Merchant, 1982; Plumwood, 1993; Seager, 
1993). Others who are interested in the environment as a political battleground have 
considered the religious roots of the exploitation of nature (White, 1967). What all these 
critics of political ecology have in common is an understanding of the politics o/nature 
being more truthfully described as a politics about nature. Hence the fierce criticisms of the 
'of nature' position espoused by deep ecologists and 'Earth First! 'ers, which come not just 
from liberal or 'shallow' environmentalists but also from those who consider themselves to 
be political radicals, such as social ecologists on the one hand and ecofeminists on the other. 
3. This brief summary of the move from New Left to Green may give the erroneous impression 
that this was the only option open to New Leftists who wanted to move from the heady but 
short-lived excitements of street revolt to a less thrilling commitment to a quotidienne 
politics of reform. This was not the case. In Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s there 
were some significant left parties which were well to the left of social democracy, but were 
not authoritarian communist sects. In France the PSU (Unified Socialist Party) attracted New 
Leftists, as did similar parties in Italy, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Holland 
(Kagarlitsky, 1990,119, 154). The absence of such socialist and communist parties in 
Germany (due mainly to their suppression, via outright bans and measures such as the 
Berufsverbot) undoubtedly facilitated the development of the Green party alternative. In 
other countries there was some degree of co-operation between libertarian socialist parties 
and Green electoral tickets. 
In France, for example, the first 'Green' presidential candidate (Rene Dumont, 1974), was 
defmitely an eco-socialist, and there was considerable co-operation between the PSU and 
political ecologists, until the 1988 presidential elections. Here the PSU decided to support a 
former Communist Party candidate, running a 'Red and Green' campaign supported by a 
variety of political groups, while the Greens ran their own candidate. The Green candidate 
polled 3.8% in the first round, and the socialist candidate 2.1 %. Bennahmias and Roche 
(1992,81) comment on this: 'L 'electorat ecologiste a choisi, iI pre/ere majoritairement Ie 
Vert au Rouge et Vert'. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the Groen Links (Green Left) 
party was formed by the amalgamation of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, the 
Pacifist-Socialist Party, the Political-Radical Party, the Evangelical People's Party and 
various independents in 1989. All of them had been slipping electorally. Together as Groen 
Links they have been more successful electorally than the 'pure' Green party, De Groenell. 
(Voerman, 1995). But both examples show that it is probably the Green rather than the 
socialist label which has more appeal today, and makes Green parties a better electoral bet 
for those who may still have leftist hopes or ambitions. Finally, while these small leftist and 
'alternative' parties have managed some 'rainbow' forms of co-operation (e.g. the GRAEL 
group in the European Parliament), they are not part of a global network in the way Green 
parties are. 
The failure of libertarian socialist parties in the West to make the running on anti-capitalist· 
environmentalism is certainly not due to a failure of its proponents to produce thoughtful, 
critical work on 'eco-socialism'. See, for example, Bell (1987), Benton (1989), Dumont 
(1975), Dunkley (1992), Ryle (1988) and Weston (1986, and the journal Nature, Capitalism, 
Socialism. The question of why eco-socialism has not been able to excite the same interest and 
support is an important one, which deserves more attention than I can give it here. For an 
interesting discussion of how the new social movement/orm has eclipsed the old socialist 
party form, and hence compromised the propagation of socialist analysis, see Probert (1986). 
4. Anti-consumerism was not the only connection between the Situationists and Green politics as 
practised by the Values Party. An awareness of making creative use of the media in order to 
subvert the status quo and proclaim the alternative is another common thread. (For more on 
this see Chapter Five - especially the Values Party production of state-of-the-art TV ads and 
print manifestos, and Dave Woodhams on 'Politics as Drama'.) However, the true inheritors 
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and propagators of the Situationist project, now gone virtual and global, would seem to be the 
members of the Canadian-based group The Media Foundation, which has been publishing its 
quarterly 'Journal of the Mental Environment' Adbusters, and hosting a website, since the 
early 1990s. The front page of their website (adbusters@adbusters.org), when visited on 
3.3.99, opened with the Situationist slogan' Vivez sans temps mort!' scrawled graffiti-style 
across it. They also practice the Situationist technique of detournement (subtly altering an 
event, artefact or artwork to make it subversive rather than normative). Their mission 
statement is "We are a global network of artists, activists, educators and entrepreneurs who 
want to build the new social activist movement of the information age. Our goal is to use 
guerilla media tactics to catalyze resistance against those who would destroy the environment, 
pollute our minds, and diminish our lives.' (The Media Foundation, 1997,64). The Media 
Foundation thus provides the best English-language exemplar of contemporary resistance 
through the media. 
5. Butterworth's ideas on appropriate meeting process were not acquired in the ecology 
movement. In the late 1960s he was a member of both YCND (Youth Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament) and of the Victoria University Anarchists Association. The latter organisation 
was formed in 1961, and engaged in direct action anti-war and anti-apartheid activities, 
including digging up a test cricket pitch in 1964 as a protest against New Zealand playing 
South Africa (Boraman, 1997,6). 
6. Details about·the origins and early development of the Women's Liberation Movement in the 
USA, including its foundational connection with the New Left and the civil rights movement. 
can be found in Evans (1979) and Echols (1989). For the New Zealand development and style 
of Women's Liberation see Dann (1985). Redstockings (1979) provides examples of 
theorising around feminist styles of organising. 
7. Wilson's thoughts on these matters can be found in the issues of the party's national 
newsletter Linkletter, which she edited (and largely wrote) in 1973 and 1974, and in her 
correspondence with other members of the party (all of which is archived in the Alexander 
Turnbull Library Values Party collection). In her opening address to the Values Party's 1974 
Conference she discusses the experiment with decentralisation and no national leaders which 
Values had been conducting for the previous eighteen months, and what had been learned 
from it. She was personally in favour of stronger leadership and organisation at the national 
level, but said that even if this happens ' ... we shall still be primarily a network of small, 
independent groups each with an egalitarian internal structure. The continuing autonomy of 
these local branches will ensure that the Values Party will remain mindful of the influence of 
structures on us as persons and that it will never exhibit the authoritarianism that we seek to 
cure in the wider community.' 
She quoted Bertolt Brecht's lament on would-be revolutionaries' ... who sought to build a 
caring world, but could not themselves be kind.' and said that 'We must nourish in each other 
the roots of a just loving world order. And it is the ordinary branch members of our party who 
will make it a working model of what life in the new society can be like, where men [sic] will 
live in harmony with each other and with their environment.' She stressed that members must 
remember that the party is just one vehicle for this vision. Also that 'We who comprise the 
party are more than the vehicle; we are a social movement concerned as much with the 
reorientation of society by the re-education of people and the changing of their basic attitudes 
as we are with conventional political machinery.' (Wilson, 1974). Wilson's speech contains 
much more which clearly differentiates the new from the old 'progressive' politics, and is a 
good example of how the first Greens conceived of their type of party and politics. 
8. The national executive of the party commissioned a group of Wellington region members in 
December 1975 to produce a paper on decision-making, which was circulated in March 1976. 
A typical example from that paper of the 'new politics' approach to defming responsibility and 
leadership is this 'checklist' -
'The concept of defmed responsibility involves therefore: 
- a rejection of rank or status 
- a rejection of both autocratic and anarchic structures 
- the concept of 'hats' or particular roles 
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- the idea that each function carries its own responsibility to its 
own area 
- a fluid idea ofleadership - it is present but the leader changes according to the function and 
the area and action .... ' 
(Wellington Region, 1976,6) 
9. The Mattachirte Society was founded by a Communist Party organiser and structured along 
secretive and hierarchical lines. The first signs that there would be some cross-fertilisation 
between New Left and gay politics occurred with the growth of the counter-culture in San 
Francisco in the 1960s. Some key figures there, such as the poet Allen Ginsberg, spanned the 
old Beat and new hippie counter culture and the gay 'scene'. For further details on the old 
and new styles of homosexual political organisation in post-war America see D'Emilio 
(1983) and Miller (1995). A similar pattern of conventionally organised and 'respectable' 
homosexual rights organisations and homosexual clubs preceding the Gay Liberation 
movement was followed in the UK. and in New Zealand. One such New Zealand 
organisation, the Dorian Society, even threatened to sue Gay Liberation for stating publicly 
that the Society was,a club for homosexuals (Martin Oelderink, pers. comm.) 
10. Hutton's quote from Cohen reads 'With the backdrop of river and ocean, police blue and 
forest green, gaudy boat and technicolour bulldozer, one has an exceptional setting for 
theatre. Theatre of the environment uses the vulture of the media (usually a tool of the 
establishment) to present the story; we dangle and perform, often in precarious 
circumstances, making ourselves and our act irresistible to the press. It is a play, an 
irreverent game, yet at the same time it provides a vital conduit for messages otherwise 
unable to be transmitted in a monopolistic realm. Lacking financial resources, we penetrate 
this powerful field as ifby magic and in doing so create an alchemy for change.' (Hutton, 
1999) 
10. Further documentation of the huge differences between the Maruia Society and the rest of 
the environment/conservation movement in New Zealand is contained in a paper (Anon., 
n.d.) distributed in late 1997 to politicians and the environment movement. Prepared by 
former office holders of the Maruia Society, it was written in response to information that 
Guy Salmon, the Maruia Society Chief Executive, had been privately lobbying government 
against the rest of the environment movement's campaign to end the logging of publicly-
owned native forests on the West Coast. This paper is merely the latest - and most developed 
- of the increasingly acrimonious differences between Guy Salmon and his organisation and 
the rest of the environment movement. These have included threats by Salmon to sue the 
former chair of the CanterburylWestland branch of the Maruia society (David Round, pers. 
comm.) for publicly criticising him and the Society. Salmon attempted to characterise his 
politics as 'post-modem' at the 1994 Ecopolitics conference held at Lincoln University. 
However his participation in the Mont Pelerin Society conference held in Christchurch in 
1989, his work for Australasian right-wing think tank the Tasman Institute, and his 
advocacy of free market economics in the Progressive Green Party's manifesto would seem 
to put him clearly in the New Right political camp - a long way from Greens in the Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand. Additional information on Salmon's divergence from the 
rest of the green movement can be found in Secrets and Lies by Hager and Burton (1999). 
12. Issue No. 10 of Democratie Nouvelle, a special issue for Spring 1975, consists of a report 
written by Gerard Lambert and Georges Trussart for the Economic and Social Commission 
of the organisation Democratie Nouvelle [New Democracy], developed from the principles 
given in the organisation's February 1973 manifesto. 
It begins with a critique of the social and environmental abuses of private capitalism, moves 
on to criticising state capitalism, and then develops a vision of a new society which would be 
opposed to growth for growth's sake. This new society would use democratic and self-
governing methods of rational planning for social, economic and environmental needs. 
The bibliography given at the end of the report shows a typically eclectic 'Green' range of 
sources, from libertarian socialists to technocratic environmentalists (Lambert and Trussart, 
1975). 
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Chapter Five 
'From Earth's last islands' 
The development of the first two Green parties 
Completely independently of one another, and without knowing of each other's 
existence until they had been going for some two years, the United Tasmania Group 
and the Values Party were founded within two months of each other in 1972. Their 
origins were quite different, yet they developed in remarkably convergent ways, and 
in retrospect they are clearly Green parties in the contemporary meaning of the term. 
In the origins and development of these two parties we can see the key themes of the 
new Green politics developing. These include: 
(1) the reaction against labour parties and politics for being (initially) pro-growth 
and (latterly) pro-globalist; 
(2) a continuation of the 'new politics' ofthe new social movements (including 
both policies and styles of activism); 
(3) the critique of industrialism and consumerism; 
(4) developing global awareness and connections, and participation in global 
networks. 
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In this chapter I present the first comparative history of the origins and initial 
development ofthe United Tasmania Group and the Values Party. I ground their 
stories within the specific histories of the two nation-states concerned, but in asking 
why Green parties first appeared in Australia and New Zealand I reject explanations 
based on any alleged environmentalist superiority of these places (Hay and Haward, 
1988), or on any comparable environmental campaigns (Rainbow, 1992). Especially 
as Rainbow's account is historically inaccurate. A more thorough historical 
investigation of the origins of the two parties, given here, provides an accurate 
genealogy. However, I do not restrict myself to setting the local historical record 
straight, but also endeavour to show how the specific recent histories of both 
Australia and New Zealand, and the first Green parties in both countries, are 
illustrative of the global themes given above. 
The scene and the spark 
Drowning Tasmania 
The state of Tasmania enjoys a more mountainous topography and a more consistent 
rainfall than the rest of Australia. It is ideal for wilderness tourism and for 
horticulture - and for generating hydro-electric power. As early as 1914 the Hydro-
Electric Department 'adopted a policy of encouraging large power-consuming 
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industries to Tasmania' (Thompson, 1981, 15). In 1930, by Act of Parliament, the 
Hydro-Electric Department became the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC). 
The minister administering the HEC Act was made responsible to parliament for the 
activities of the HEC, but the HEC was not directed by nor answerable to the 
minister, as is usual with government departments (Thompson, 1981, 16). Tasmania 
embarked on a programme of hydro-electric industrialisation, spending the bulk of 
its loan funds (70% in 1954, 54% in 1969-70) on hydro schemes. (This compared 
with an average of 18% for the other Australian states.) This excessive spending on 
hydro power distorted the development of the state, with the construction and 
modernisation of railways, ports, town water supplies and so on falling behind the 
rest of Australia. This in turn put Tasmania at the top of the queue for handouts from 
the Commonwealth of Australia government. Nearly 70% of new jobs in Tasmania 
between 1971 and 1976 were created by government instrumentalities, and the 
Commonwealth government returned to Tasmania double the per capita financial 
assistance received by Victoria and New South Wales (Thompson, 1981,23). 
Why was Tasmania able to persist on this path for so long? There was a rock solid 
consensus at the top of the political system, with the two key players being Eric 
Reece, Labor premier of Tasmania for fourteen almost consecutive years (1958-
.1969, 1972-1975), and Sir Allan Knight, the HEC Commissioner 1946-1977. 
Between them the two men had the will and the means to drown Tasmania 
(Thompson, 1981, 31), and the means of publicly promoting their schemes as 
necessary and desirable. 
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For some thirty-seven years the HEC planning and construction of hydro schemes 
continued unopposed. Then in 1967 the South West Committee (a watchdog 
organisation formed by bushwalkers and others concerned about the preservation of 
wilderness in South West Tasmania) became aware that the HEC's proposed Middle 
Gordon power development would involve the drowning of an extraordinarily 
beautiful lake, Lake Pedder. The lake was situated in a national park named after it. 
Public reaction was swift, with a petition against the move collecting 10,000 
signatures, the largest number of any petition to that date in Tasmanian history 
(Kiernan, 1990, 21). Government reaction was equally swift and forthright. On June 
14, 1967 the Legislative Council (Tasmania's upper house of parliament) accepted 
the suggestion by the South West Committee that it set up a select committee of 
enquiry. However the Legislative Assembly (the lower house of parliament) passed 
authorising legislation for the scheme on June 29, and the Legislative Council waited 
a mere two days after receiving the committee of enquiry's report before passing the 
same legislation itself on August 24 (Thompson, 1981, 19). 
A Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee was set up by conservationist 
organisations and individuals. It lobbied quietly and unsuccessfully. In March 1971 
Louis Shoo bridge, a Member of the Legislative Council, spoke at a meeting 
organised by Brenda Hean (later a UTG candidate), which packed the Hobart Tov.1Jl 
Hall. The meeting called for a referendum on the Lake Pedder issue. However when 
Shoo bridge put the motion for a referendum to the Legislative Council a few nights 
later, it was overwhelmingly rejected (Kiernan, 1990,23-24). 
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Public opinion, though, was running against the flooding of the lake and in favour of 
an alternative, less damaging scheme. This was made clear by opinion polls, letters 
to the Prime Minister of Australia, and by the 'Pedder Pilgrimage' of March 1971, a 
walk in to the lake organised by the Hobart Bushwalking Club in which over 1060 
people participated (Walker, 1986,5-6). In Apri11971 Brenda Heanjoined Dr 
Richard Jones and other independent conservationists in setting up the Lake Pedder 
Action Committee (LPAC), which took a more activist stance. For nine months they 
campaigned hard, collecting signatures on a petition, lobbying, and organising a 
major symposium on 'The HEC, the environment and the government in Tasmania', 
which was held in November 1971. Over a quarter of a million signatures were 
collected on the petition. However, when it was presented to the Tasmanian 
parliament the Attorney General refused to accept it, giving as the reason that it WaS 
' .. .in conflict with government policy .. .' (Walker, 1986,20). At this point all normal 
avenues to bring about change seemed to have been exhausted. 
Then in March 1972, for reasons unrelated to the Lake Pedder issue, a Member of 
the Legislative Assembly who was the sole representative of his party resigned. 
His party held the balance of power, and his resignation precipitated a general 
election that was held on 21 April 1972. The LP AC saw this as an opportunity to put 
Lake Pedder on the ballot paper. At a large public meeting on March 23, 1972, 
it was resolved that 'In order that there is a maximum usage of a unique political 
opportunity to save Lake Pedder, now an issue of global and national concern, and to 
implement a national well-researched conservation plan for the State of Tasmania, 
there be formed a Single Independent Coalition of primarily conservation-minded 
candidates and their supporters.' (Walker, 1989, 162). 
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Dick Jones, chair of LPAC, became the inaugural leader of the UTG, and the group 
fielded 12 candidates in four out of the five Tasmanian seven member electorates. 
Most of them stood in the two Hobart-based urban electorates of Denison and 
Franklin. With only a month to organise policy and process, the UTG did not emerge 
as a fully-fledged party at this time. In fact it did not become a formally constituted 
political party until 1974, and it was then that it developed an electoral platform 
entitled 'The New Ethic' (see Appendix B). Dick Jones made it clear from the outset 
that the UTG was a movement for social and political change as well as for 
environmental conservation (Jones, 1990,37-40; Jones, 1974, 1-2). 
For the 1972 election the UTG produced two key policy sheets, one on conservation 
and one on economics. The eight point economic policy (see Appendix D) was 
published for the UTG by the Australian Union of Students, and it stresses 
conservation of natural resources, economic diversification and improved research 
and marketing. In retrospect the policy does not seem particularly radical, but the 
thinking underpinning it was a departure from received economic wisdom, and the 
UTG moved easily into the promotion of 'steady state' economics at a later date. It 
must also be remembered that the UTG was providing a policy for a state within a 
diverse national federation, and wished to emphasise the particular part Tasmania 
should play within that commonwealth. The conservation policy was also quite 
specific to the Tasmanian context, listing actual sites to be protected and local 
environmental concerns to be addressed, although again it was easy to develop a 
'new ethic' which applied to local and global environmental issues from this specific 
stance. l 
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The UTG did very well for an 'instant' party in its first election, achieving 3.9% of 
the vote overall in the state, and nearly 7% of the total vote in the Denison and 
Franklin electorates, where it had concentrated its efforts. A UTG candidate just 
missed out on being elected in Denison (Walker, 1986, 24). Lat~r in 1972 the UTG 
put up a candidate for the federal House of Representatives seat of Denison, and won 
4% of the total vote, exceeding the vote oflonger established minor parties such as 
the Democratic Labor Party and the Australia Party. 
Despite such electoral support, the UTG was no closer to achieving the immediate 
goals ofthe Lake Pedder Action Committee, let alone a 'green' change in Tasmanian 
politics. The HEC had taken out an advertisement in all Tasmanian newspapers on 
the eve of polling day, warning of a steep increase in electricity charges ifthe Middle 
Gordon scheme was altered or delayed. The UTG call for a commission of inquiry to 
investigate this blatant attempt to influence the outcome of an election by a 
government-owned enterprise (using taxpayers' money) fell on deaf ears in the 
newly elected Labor government (Thompson, 1981,27). More petitions were 
presented - and rejected (Kiernan, 1990,26). In July 1972 LPAC sought a writ from 
the Attorney General to begin a Supreme Court action challenging the validity of the 
legislation which authorised flooding a national park. When the Attorney General 
referred the matter to cabinet and was refused pennission to grant the writ he 
resigned. This was a pragmatic rather than a principled resignation, since while as 
Attorney General he could not deny access to the courts, the Premier who replaced 
him in the role felt that he could - and did. Parliament was convened and the HEC 
(Doubts Removal) Bill was rapidly passed - to remove any doubts regarding the 
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powers of the government to authorise the destruction of the lake and to prevent 
court action against it. The Attorney General was then reinstated. (Thompson, 1981, 
32). 
Despairing of influence through Tasmanian channels, LP AC and the UTG looked for 
federal backing. On September 8 1972 LP AC founder member and UTG candidate 
Brenda Hean set off for Canberra in a Tiger Moth plane to lobby federal politicians 
and to skywrite over the capital. Hean and the pilot are still missing, their fate 
unknown. Despite the extremely suspicious circumstances· of the disappearance 
(which included threatening phone calls to Hean and a break-in at the hangar where 
the plane was kept), and despite the UTG placing a newspaper advertisement urging 
the government to set up an inquiry to investigate the incident, the government 
refused to act (Kiernan, 1990, 27). Public efforts to see the police files covering the 
incident have been consistently rebutted right up to the 1990s (Bob Burton, pers. 
comm., 4.7.96) 
The HEC certainly left no legal stone unturned in its efforts to silence its critics. In 
1972 it threatened legal action to prevent the publication ofPedder Papers, a critical 
review of the decision-making process within the HEC which led to the proposal to 
flood Lake Pedder (Thompson, 1981,28). 
The election of the Whitlam Labor government later in 1972 seemed to provide a 
window of opportunity for the Lake Pedder campaigners. A federal investigation into 
the issue in 1973 was favourable to saving the lake, but the recommendation of the 
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committee to save the lake was rejected by the Labor cabinet. But this was not the 
end of the matter. 
In October 1973 the federal Labor caucus agreed to underwrite the costs of a 
moratorium on flooding Lake Pedder (Kiernan, 1990, 28-30). However within hours 
of the federal caucus decision the Tasmanian Labor Premier Eric Reece was restating 
the Tasmanian government's intention to flood the lake. Nor were environmentalist 
attempts to get support from the labour movement at large any more successful. The 
inspirational environmental lead given by the New South Wales· Builders Labourers 
Federation with its successful 'green bans' on inappropriate developments was not 
supported or copied by labour unions elsewhere in Australia, and efforts to get a 
'blue ban' placed on Lake Pedder failed (Kiernan, 1990,32). 
The specifics of the battle to save the lake, which make dramatic and disturbing 
reading, can easily obscure the significance of this struggle. With the benefit of 
hindsight we can see that this was the moment when a new dimension opened up in 
Australian - and world - politics. The two great political groupings which had 
structured Tasmanian, and Australian, politics for the past 70 years were challenged 
by a third force, which emphasised the similarities rather than the differences ' 
between the LabQr and Liberal parties. The UTG coined the term 'Laborials' to refer 
to both these parties, as a way of symbolising how closely their policies and 
philosophies were intertwined as seen from the new, Green perspective. The UTG 
refused to identify itself as 'Left' or 'Right', claiming to draw a little from each but 
to stand on a totally new platform which was neither left nor right - a platform which 
proposed an alternative to heavy industrial development and economic growth for 
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growth's sake (Jones, 1974, 1-2). Central to this new dimension in politics was an 
emphasis on ethics and aesthetics as the basis of its political vision. (See Appendix 
B.) 
The same emphasis on ethics and aesthetics, the same opposition to industrial growth 
and economic 'progress', the same difficulties with the labels 'left' and right', and 
the same challenge to the two major parties was to be offered in New Zealand at the 
same time. However, it was in quite a different way in quite a different context. 
Opening up New Zealand 
In contrast to Tasmania, New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s was governed for most 
of the time by a traditional conservative party, the National Party. The brief Labour 
government 1957-1960 did little that was economically or social innovative, unless 
one counts raising the taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, which was an unpopular 
move. It attempted to diversify New Zealand's industrial economic base by 
encouraging manufacturing (which could also be perceived as a way of 
strengthening its own electoral base among urban workers), but in this it differed 
only in degree rather than kind from the National Party. It also signed an agreement 
with the transnational company Conzinc to supply electricity to an aluminium 
smelter at Bluff from a power station to be built at Lake Manapouri. To provide for 
the power station it introduced the Manapouri-Te Anau Development Bill to 
parliament, where it passed without opposition into law on September 1, 1960 
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(Wilson, 1982, 14). Thereafter the National Party supported the power scheme, 
despite growing conservationist opposition. 
Here the story diverges from that of Tasmania, for New Zealand was in better 
democratic shape than Tasmania, and it was eventually possible to save the lake by 
using the normal democratic channels. There was no need to set up a new party in a 
desperate bid to further the cause. The Labour Party gave its support to the save-the-
lake campaign and made electoral mileage out of being conservationist, which 
helped it win the election.2 Apart from an imperilled lake, there are few parallels 
with the Tasmanian experience. Long established conservation groups organised the 
three Save Manapouri petitions and did much of the lobbying. The popular 
movement to save the lake, the Save Manapouri Campaign, was initiated in 1969 and 
acquired impetus from normally conservative quarters. Its founder was a Southland 
farmer with no prior (or subsequent) political experience, and it included a soon-to-
be-prominent National Party politician, Norman Jones. Other senior political figures, 
including a former National Party Speaker of the House, publicly supported the 
campaign, and Establishment figures including doctors, lawyers, senior academics 
and knights of the realm were all outspoken in support (Cleveland, 1972; Peat, 1994) 
The Save Manapouri Campaign was a populist movement which touched a nerve in 
New Zealanders raised to believe that the possession and appreciation of pristine 
lakes and mountains is a significant part of their cultural heritage and national 
identity, and therefore not to be sacrificed lightly. While most of the 27,600 people 
who voted for the Values Party in 1972 would have signed the Save Manapouri 
petition, they represented only 8% of those who did so. Whatever else the Save 
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Manapouri campaign was, it was not a direct forerunner or progenitor of the Values 
Party. Nor was there any personnel overlap whatsoever between the founders and 
leaders of the Save Manapouri Campaign and the founders and leaders of the Values 
Party, as there was between LPAC and UTG. 
Unlike Tasmania, New Zealand was a state that was slowly groping its way towards 
an institutionalised environmental politics throughout the 1960s. While there was 
certainly a strong emphasis on hydro-electric development, the state of New Zealand 
was not diverting the majority of its resources towards electricity development °to the 
detriment of other forms of industIialisation, nor was it devoid of awareness of the 
downside of industrial growth. In 1959, ironically just before it signed the deal with 
Conzinc, the Labour government convened a conference on the Conservation of New 
Zealand's Scenic Attractions, and in 1962 the National government set up the Nature 
Conservation Council, a quango charged with advising the government on 
conservation issues. An Urban Development Association was formed in 1964 by 
professionals (engineers, planners, etc.) working in the 'environmental' sphere, and 
the Association successfully lobbied the National government to set up an 
environmental quango, the Environmental Council, and to appoint a Minister for the 
Environment. In 1970 a Physical Environment Conference was organised by a 
committee which had been formed at the 1968 National Development Conference. 
The 1970 conference was attended mainly by professionals, with few environmental 
activists present. Indeed, the first of the 'new wave' environmental groups to appear 
in New Zealand, Ecology Action, had not yet been founded. The professionals were 
supported in their approaches to government by an influential group of 'conservation 
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academics', professors of natural sciences at several universities (Buhrs, 1991,57-
63). 
There was thus a recognition of environmental issues at the highest levels, and by the 
late 1960s both the National and Labour parties were offering environmental 
protection policies to the electorate for the first time ever. However the approach 
taken to the environment by both Labour and National and their advisors has been 
described by Ton B iihrs as 'technocentric'. The key features of the approach are 
'(1) A belief in the possibility of continued economic growth for human purpo"ses; 
(2) A belief that difficulties arising from economic growth can be solved by 
scientific and technological means; related to that is an emphasis on 
rationality and expertise in the formulation of solutions and an avoidance of 
debate about values or principles; 
(3) Suspicion towards greater public participation; 
(4) A belief that environmental problems can be "managed" within the context of 
the existing political and societal order.' 
(Biihrs, 1991,72-73). 
All these elements were to be savagely questioned on the first pages ofthe Values 
Party 1972 election manifesto, Blueprint for New Zealand. An Alternative Future. 
Concern for environmental quality and conservation was not the only - or even the 
main - issue motivating the Values Party. More fundamental was a critique of the 
way in which modem society was organised, managed and controlled in all its 
aspects, including the environment. Some of this critique came from the new breed 
of political ecologists (as is hinted at by the use of the word 'blueprint', with its 
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echoes ofthe very popular political ecologist text Blueprint for Survival which 
appeared in the same year and was cited in the manifesto). But more of it came -
more loudly and in a more developed form - from the new social movements which 
had developed in the industrialised democracies, including New Zealand, in the 
1960s. 
News of global anti systemic events, organisations and ideas as diverse as the 
Berkeley Free Speech Movement, the civil rights summers of protest in the southern 
USA, the daily life critiques of the French Situationists, the Miss America freedom 
trash-can and the hexing of Wall St guerilla theatre by the Women's Liberation 
Movement, the anti-Vietnam mobes and teach-ins and draft card burnings, the 
Stonewall riots that sparked the Gay Liberation Movement, the definitive 'flower 
power' concert at Woodstock, the student/worker strikes and the street fighting in 
France, and the Aldermaston marches against nuclear weapons in Britain, had all 
reached New Zealand via the electronic and print media. The proliferation of 'free 
press' publications facilitated by the development of cheap off-set printing, and the 
development ofrural and urban 'communes' as an alternative lifestyle, overseas and 
in New Zealand, were all part of a kaleidoscope of dissent, resistance and the 
promotion of alternatives. 
Young New Zealanders also travelled widely in the Sixties and Seventies.3 
Mackwell (1977) found that 30% of the New Zealand-born membership of the 
Values Party had lived and/or travelled abroad (mostly in First World, English-
speaking countries). When this 30% is added to the 17% of members who were born 
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overseas it can be seen that the Values Party was a party which was better placed 
than most to 'think globally and act locally'. 
The increase in foreign travel phenomenon generated its own joke - a post-war 
New Zealander's education was said to be incomplete without first D.E. (University 
Entrance - a qualification usually obtained at age 16), and then O.E. (Overseas 
Experience). The global mobility of young New Zealanders was of course dependent 
on the rapid deployment of new transport technologies, principally civilian jet 
aircraft. Along with faster transport came faster verbal and visual communications 
technologies. What political impact did these have? 
When I asked Norman Smith, first organiser of the Values Party, for his personal 
explanation of why New Zealand had the world's first national-level Green party I 
was initially taken back by his reply, which was only one word - 'Databank.' Smith 
(who worked for IDM for several years prior to his Values Party job) explained that 
New Zealand was the first country in the world to have nation-wide overnight 
electronic cheque processing i.e. Databank. In other words, here at the bottom of the 
world was one of the world's first nation-wide electronic networks. This openness to 
innovation in communications and networking was characteristic of the 'new guard' 
in society, which included the Values Party. Obtaining and using the new 
communications technology in New Zealand is (relatively) expensive, as most ofthe 
hardware is imported, and the lines were formerly a real (state) and are currently a 
virtual (foreign transnational corporate) monopoly. Despite these barriers, New 
Zealanders acquire information technology with rapidity and avidity.4 The many and 
varied political implications of moving into an 'informational' mode of production 
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(which go far beyond Green politics) are thoroughly canvassed by Manuel Castells 
in his three volume work The Information Age (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998), and I 
consider what they mean for the twenty-first century development of Green politics 
in Chapter Eight. 
To return to the 1970s, it is sufficient to note that through heavy applications of 
energy and technology, on both a national and a global scale, New Zealanders were 
confounding both their 'Earth's last island's' geopolitical location, and their 
relatively challenging local topography. This was politically significant, both as 
regards reacting rapidly to the global tenor of the times, and in spreading new 
political ideas throughout New Zealand and then out into the world. 
The first signs of this process at work were visible in the peace and human rights 
organisations set up in the 1960s. These organisations preceded the political ecology 
groups by almost a decade. They began with small protests against the Vietnam War 
and nuclear war in the early 1960s. These built up to large anti-war mobilisations in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a record (for the time and place) 4,000 people 
attending a lunchtime demonstration in Christchurch in 1968 against a proposed US 
nuclear submarine navigation system to be sited in the mountains nearby (Wilkes, 
1973)." The Progressive Youth Movement was fonned in Auckland in 1965, and in 
Wellington and Christchurch in 1969. The first Women's Liberation groups began 
meeting in 1970. Gay Liberation was founded in 1972 and urban 'communes' were a 
nonnal part of life for young New Zealanders in a country where there were lots of 
big, old, stand-alone houses with plenty of bedrooms (but only one kitchen) which 
could be rented cheaply by those wishing to live collectively. Even established 
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institutions, such as the Christian church, were not immune from the ferment of the 
times, and inthe late 1960s and early 1970s the Student Christian Movement 
functioned as a conduit for progressive political ideas and actions. 
Racism was tackled via Maori land and language rights campaigns and groups, 
including the radical Maori youth group Nga Tamatoa Tuatoro ('the young 
warriors '), which was formed in the early Seventies, and in Auckland a group 
modelled on the American Black Panthers called the Polynesian Panthers started in 
1971. There was also an active anti-apartheid movement, Halt All Racist Tours 
(HART) formed in July 1969, which focussed mainly on stopping sporting contact 
with South Africa as a means of forcing it to field integrated teams and move to end 
apartheid. (New Zealand could - and eventually did - have more impact than most 
countries in this regard since the premier sport of both countries is rugby football.) 
Student protestors picked up all these issues and more. A representative selection of 
protest activities in New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s is covered by Rik Tindall 
(1994) in his brief history of a century of student protest at the University of 
Canterbury. This history includes an excellent visual example of Sixties style applied 
to a Seventies issue, in the form of a photo-poster of a long-haired, bearded youth 
wearing bush gear and holding a rifle, standing in a forest clearing, with the hand-
written message superimposed at knee height' leave our forests alone '. (Tindall, 
1994,22). 
The 'protest movement', broadly conceived, was thus very much alive and kicking in 
New Zealand in 1972. It was from this rich ferment of 'alternative' or 'new politics' 
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activity being driven by young people (many ofthem barely old enough to vote) that 
political science student and erstwhile journalist Tony Brunt drew much of his 
inspiration when he put together a platform for a new political party. When he came 
to present it to a crowd of some 'sixty curious souls' in the Student Union Hall at 
Victoria University, Wellington, on the evening of May 30, 1972, he made it clear in 
the first few minutes of his address that Values was a 'quality of life' party. He did 
not mean that in the sense of being anti-pollution. 'Fighting pollution and preserving 
nature are key planks in the Values Party platform and I don't think the Government 
is taking strong enough action in this area', he said, 'but reducing pollution is only a 
small part of the attempt to increase the quality oflife.' (Brunt, 1972, 1). 
(Interestingly enough, when polled on the issues that concerned them most before 
the 1972 election 14% of voters said 'pollution' - which was 3% more than the 11 % 
who were concerned about 'protesters') (Roberts, 1975, 103). 
In order to restore quality of life, Brunt argued, it was necessary to restore or create a 
sense of community, and to stop over-emphasising' ... economic growth, 
technological advance, the importance of consumer goods in our lives, increasing 
productivity, competition between people, individualism and increasing 
profits. '(Brunt, 1972, 1). The common thread connecting the Values philosophy was 
humanism, which Brunt defined as meeting 'the needs of people and not the needs of 
the system'. He claimed that this was the new political synthesis that was forming in 
society, especially among young people (Brunt, 1972, 12).5 
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The rest of the speech largely focussed on the actual changes that a Values 
government would introduce to New Zealand society to give fonn to this philosophy. 
These included: 
• . improving industrial relations via job enrichment programmes; 
• bulldozing the country's latest maximum security prison and re-thinking law 
and order policy from scratch; 
•. getting off the economic growth treadmill; 
• ' setting up a government technology surveillance committee to examine and if 
necessary ban or control the introduction of unnecessary or harmful new 
technologies; 
• restricting the use of cars in cities; 
• restricting display advertising (which Values saw as feeding the consumerist 
frenzy which in its turn fuelled economic growth); 
• reducing the hours in the working week; 
• paying more attention to regional development; 
• beautifying cities with better architecture, more greenery and more Maori 
decorative arts; 
• decentralising government; 
• instituting youth representation in parliament and lowering the voting age; 
• severing diplomatic relations with France if it persisted with nuclear testing 
in the Pacific; 
• stopping the proposed 1973 South African rugby tour of New Zealand; 
• increasing total foreign aid from 0.2% of GNP to 5%; and 
• increasing the proportion of aid going to the Pacific Islands. 
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The speech devotes only four sentences to the environment - but these are in the 
section on economic growth, and are at the heart of what was to become the Green 
critique. In running through the reasons why people should question the goal of 
industrial growth, Brunt comes to the most important reason - the ecological 
consequences of growth. 
'Growth is just not sustainable - or sustainable only at great cost to mankind. 
A study on the future of the environment at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in March of this year' predicted that unless we take action to halt 
growth the life support systems on earth will collapse within l30 years. So 
we are growing now at the expense of the lives of our great grandchildren. ' 
(Brunt, 1972, 6) 
Brunt then dropped the subject, and went on to devote much more attention to 
advertising, urban beautification and even to a critique of autocracy and inequality in 
Tonga. Yet in retrospect it is clear that this condemnation of economic growth, 
because of the harm it is doing and will do to people and planet, with the associated 
vision of a more caring and community-based way of life, is the Green equivalent of 
Labour Party foundational demands for full employment, industrial arbitration and a 
living wage. 
In April 1997, almost twenty-five years to the day after he founded the Values Party, 
Brunt addressed a symposium at Auckland University on the Values Party and 
twenty-five years of Green politics in Australasia. He chose to stress again that he 
saw Values as a 'humanist' party, concerned more with quality-of-life rather 
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standard-of-living issues. He said that in 1972 he ' ... desperately wanted a politician 
and a party to break out of minimalist, materialistic debate of the old left and right 
parties. The new concerns about the havoc being wreaked by unquestioned and ill-
directed economic growth, population growth and technological change owed 
nothing to the old left/right definition of politics.' (Brunt, 1997, 1) 
At first he thought of calling the new party the New Zealand Youth Party. 
He himself was twenty-four years old, and he couldn't imagine that the ideas the 
party was promoting would be of any interest, °let alone comprehensible, to anyone 
over thirty. This is an interesting reflection of the significance of the youthfulness of 
those engaged in the new politics of the 1960s and 1970s. This is a phenomenon that 
appears to be unique to this time in the twentieth century. It is also one that was 
certainly salient to the participants, as indicated by their slogan 'Never trust anyone 
over thirty'. That this particular era of 'youth unrest' was indeed new and different 
from previous youth activism of the twentieth century is continued by Klaus 
Mehnert, a scholar of youth in America and the Soviet Union, and himself a 
participant in the Genuan youth movement of the 1920s (Mehnert, 1978). Some 
participants stayed true to the principles they were promoting then and some 
betrayed them. But they all lost their youth, and the importance o/being young to the 
new politics has been lost by later analysts. 
Yet much of what happened at that time can only be understood by the light of 
Wordsworth's comments on an earlier 'revolutionary' period - 'Bliss was it in that 
dawn to be alive, But to be young was very heaven!' (Wordsworth, 1809). 
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The membership of the Values Party and the UTG (see Chapter Six for details) was 
markedly younger than that of other parties. The fact that the politics was new 
precisely because the participants were as new to politics as they were to the rest of 
life must be kept in mind. 
Brunt was dissuaded from using the youth label by a persuasive young woman met 
by chance at a party (of such quirky details is history made), and went back to the 
drawing board to come up with the name Values. He is adamant that he never 
conceived of the Values Party as 
' ... primarily an environmental or green party in the generally accepted sense 
ofthe term as it's now applied. It only became that in retrospective analysis, 
because the broad philosophical issues I started out talking about were too 
intangible and abstract to categorise in any alternative way. Emotional talk of 
the economic and technological juggernaut that seemed to be impersonally 
steamrolling society, community, the environment, tradition and the very 
amenities and civilities of life was pretty fuzzy stuff. Boiling off all this angst 
and existential unease left a residue of ecological concerns that has enabled 
much easier classification for academics and news media. My idealism was 
mainly a Values-driven one, and when I started the party and stepped over 
the precipice into the void, the ecological crisis and its emergent doctrines 
rose up to meet me. I had a soft landing on solid issues that I could use as 
actual illustrations.' (Brunt, 1997, 2) 
When it came to providing local illustrations Brunt was scratching, as by world 
standards New Zealand was not an over-populated or heavily polluted country. 
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He had to make reference to the unsustainable nature of global economic and 
population growth as described in the Limits to Growth (Meadows et aI, 1972) 
report. His main example of how this was manifesting itself in New Zealand was the 
way in which the demand for electricity was doubling every ten years, with 
widespread environmental impacts. He claims that 
' ... environmentalists - or the early examples ofthe breed - did not particularly 
like us. They regarded us as usurpers with no track record in specific 
environmental fights (such as the Save Manapouri Campaign) and felt that 
we'd compromise the work they were doing with the two main parties to gain 
environmental commitments.' (Brunt, 1997,3) 
So if Values was a Green party, its initial formation was very different from that of 
the UTG. It was not an ad hoc coalition of 'conservation-minded' candidates; it 
based its ecological concerns on a more radical philosophical analysis of the malaise 
of modern society. This meant it took issue with the core tenets of social democracy 
(which had a better environmental track record in New Zealand than it did in 
Tasmania), and it also considered the appropriate means by which its radical changes 
were to be achieved. Later Green parties were to take up these matters too, and this is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
Green Values on the campaign trail 
In the meantime for Values there was the matter of the 1972 general election, to be 
held a mere six months after the formation ofthe party. It is clear from Brunt's first 
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speech that he regarded the main opposition for Values as-being the Labour Party, 
not the National Party. He characterised the Labour Party as 'dying' several times in 
his speech. He also scoffed at its proposal to hold a referendum over the 1974 
Springbok tour thus: 'Do you believe that a party which is a prospective Government 
could send a whole nation to the polls - not over a declaration of war, not over union 
with Australia, but over a Rugby tour? These are the death throes of a dying party.' 
(Brunt, 1972, ~ 1) and predicted that Labour would never succeed to power again. 
However the Labour Party did win the 1972 election. It also called off the rugby 
tour, sent a New Zealand navy frigate to the French nuclear testing zone to protest 
the testing, petitioned the International Court of Justice seeking an injunction against 
the tests, prevented the raising of Lake Manapouri, set up a Select Committee on 
Women's Rights, and passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act. These are all moves that 
would have been approved of by the 'new social movement' constituency. 
The Labour Party was able to make progress in these areas, albeit slowly and 
partially. However, what it was not prepared to do was to question economic growth, 
to see the social negatives among the material positives. 
It was to be another two years before Values set about developing a Green economic 
platform that would provide an alternative to social democrat economics, and then 
candidates had to be chosen who could put forward the new Green approach. In a 
memo to branches in January 1975 Party Chairer Dave Woodhams stated firmly that 
'-We are a party dedicated to the fundamental restructuring of our basic social 
framework, not just a bunch of conservationists. The candidate should be 
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familiar with this wider perspective and able to discuss it logically both in 
general tenns and personal tenns.' 
Woodhams (who was and is a professional engineer) recommended that they should 
be familiar with the works cited in the bibliography of the 1972 manifesto, and 
especially with Erich Fromm's 1968 work The Revolution of Hope: towards a 
humanised technology. This was the approach advocated by Brunt in his inaugural 
speech. It was also the approach adopted by Woodhams when he was recruited as a 
1972 candidate on the basis of reading the manifesto and making a phone call to 
Tony Brunt from Wellington airport as he passed through town (Woodhams, 1997, 
1). 
Not everyone hearing Brunt's inaugural speech was so enthusiastic, and he recalls 
that he was attacked by ' ... a nasty young marxist and an equally nasty young 
environmentalist' (Brunt, 1973, 88). Others present at the meeting defended Brunt 
from the attacks, and some signed up as early members of the party. Brunt 
announced his intention to stand for the Island Bay electorate, where he lived, and 
held two successful political meetings there. In the next few months small, infonnal 
policy fonnulation meetings were held in Wellington, and branches were set up in 
the three other main centres (Auckland, Christchurch and Dunedin). Chief organiser 
at this point was Nonnan Smith, an ex-journalist colleague of Brunt's. The media 
experience of Brunt and Smith stood them in good stead when it came to publicising 
the new party, and a fonner colleague on the New Zealand Herald, Alison Webber, 
founded the Auckland branch. Also valuable was the experience of Bob Overend as 
chair of Values meetings in Wellington and spokesperson for the party - Overend 
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gained his first political experience when he started and organised a citizens group, 
the Wadestown Residents Association. Despite the talents of the founders, the party 
grew slowly and by October 1972 only nine candidates had been announced. When 
Smith told the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (the state broadcasting 
authority) that the party would require television advertising time during the election 
because it would be fielding twenty-five candidates, the Wellington members 
thought it was a great joke (Brunt, 1973,89). 
However the first manifesto, Blueprint for New Zealand An Alternative Future, was 
rolling off the press, and Values was invited to be the subject of a party profile on the 
premier television current affairs programme, Gallery. The twelve-min.ute 
documentary was screened on primetime network television on October 17, and the 
response was immediate and overwhelming. The trickle of correspondence that the 
party had been receiving grew to a flood. The 1972 correspondence file offers 
interesting insights into the formation of a Green party. 
In June 1972 Geoff Neill, a Ph.D. student and an assistant lecturer in economics and 
industrial relations, wrote to introduce himself. He had read an article about Values 
in the Otago University student paper, Critic, and thought he could get support for 
Values in Dunedin from disillusioned Labourites and younger people. Before too 
long he had been made Deputy Leader and was writing to advise on the content of 
the manifesto. Sue Clough wrote to Tony Brunt in July to say that she had lost faith 
in Labour and that her husband Reg, who was formerly a National supporter, 
' .. thinks that you are about the only one in the country talking sense.' Reg Clough 
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was soon the candidate for Remuera (Auckland), where he was the third highest 
polling Values candidate in 1972. In 1974 he was elected Leader of the Values Party. 
Edmund Hillary, first conqueror ofMt Everest (with Tensing Norgay), and one of 
New Zealand's most famous and respected citizens, wrote to Tony Brunt on 24 July 
1972 to say' .. .I do agree with many of your contentions. As to whether there is the 
interest and will in New Zealand to carry out such programs time alone will tell.' 
(Hillary, 24.7.72) A month later Aynsley Kellow, who became the candidate for St 
Kilda in Dunedin, told Brunt that the Values abortion law reform and homosexual 
law reform policies were 'damn near perfect', and explained why and how he 
thought the drug law reform policy could be improved. After confessing that he used 
to think that the Vietnam war was right, he added that he thought it would be ' ... a 
good idea to establish a liaison with groups like ecology action, law reform societies, 
etc. Co-operation with them should prove quite fruitful. Also, although it will almost 
certainly be knocking our heads against a brick wall, why not send some guff 
(especially the industrial policy) to the union branches. It will at least plant the seeds 
when Labour craps out.' (Kellow, 21.8.72). (The secretary of the Auckland Clerical 
Workers Union wrote seeking information of his own accord, but this is the only 
union contact in the 1972 file.) 
The president of a youth group in Westport, a small town on the West Coast of the 
South Island (New Zealand's 'scenic' province due to its thick rainforests and high 
mountains) asked for copies of the manifesto. He thought that' ... many of the 
policies ... would be very relevant to young West Coasters'. Tama Eruera, of Nga 
Tamatoa (the radical young Maori organisation) wrote to advise of Wellington 
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members who might be available to attend Values' first conference, though he 
warned 'In order to be fair to you, don't be surprised if they express lukewarm 
interest. Not because of any animosity to you personally but simply because we feel 
somewhat suspicious ofpakeha [non-Maori] organisations or motives. This may 
seem unfair but then, this is basically how it is, and that's how we like to tell it. Then 
again, they may pile in behind you boots'n'all. In the meantime, kiakaha tonu 
koutou - let you always be strong.' 
. Numerous groups and organisations got in touch, including the editors of university 
student papers (most of which ran features on Values), and the wonderfully-named 
Malcolm Gramophone of the Counter Culture Free Press (who dated his letter 
3 A.W. - After Woodstock). The Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand, 
Project Paremoremo (a prisoners aid and prison reform society based on the 
maximum security jail that Brunt wanted bulldozed), Action for the Environment 
Wellington, the Homosexual Law Reform Society (Brunt was invited to their AGM), 
the Student Christian Movement, the Women's Liberation Movement, the Youth 
Action Centre, the Wellington Tenants Protection Society and the United Nations 
Association also got in touch. So did the Labour and Social Credit parties who were 
interested in Values policies and wrote asking for copies. 
An analysis ofthe General Correspondence in which individual correspondents 
indicated their interests or views (rather than simply requesting information) shows 
the following hierarchy of concerns. The population issue (Zero PopUlation Growth 
and abortion) and issues to do with rights and liberties (divorce law reform, drug law 
reform, homosexual law reform, rights for women and the disabled) were of most 
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concern to correspondents. They constituted 20% each of queries/comments. Next 
came economics and environment, with 16% each. There was definite interest in the 
Values anti-consumerist stance. Social issues, like lifestyle, psychological fulfilment 
and alternative futures were next in importance, followed by women's issues 
(especially equal pay), education, and defence. 
In the correspondence with other groups there was a similar pattern, with half the 
queries/comments being in the area of civil rights and liberties (especially abortion 
and hoinosexuallaw reform), followed by popUlation issues and economics. There 
was only one contact with an environmental organisation. 
Wherever they came from. candidates rushed to the party after the Gallery 
programme, and the manifesto sold out in Wellington within a week, while the 
remainder of the first print run of 1500 copies was soon snapped up in the other 
centres. A second run of2000 was ordered before the first 1500 had been paid for 
(Brunt, 1973,91). A best-seller election manifesto was a first for New Zealand. 
Another first was clocked up when professional filmmakers enthusiastically 
volunteered to donate their services and worked into the wee small hours to put 
together a sixty second television advertisement in less than a week, at a cost 
(materials·only) of$NZ50. The first Values national conference held in Wellington 
on the third weekend in October was big news, and forty-two candidates eventually 
got their deposits in by the closing date of November 2, and began campaigning in 
earnest for the election to be held on November 23. 
268 
The candidates were all completely new to parliamentary politics. Some of them 
were new to politics full stop - the youngest was twenty-one, and the average age of 
the candidates was twenty-nine. This was also unprecedented in New Zealand 
politics, where members of parliament and parliamentary candidates were 
traditionally drawn from those who had reached senior ranks in farming, business, 
professional and labour organisations andlor political parties, who had some 
experience of taking representatiye positions within those organisations 
(Forster, 1969). 
Youth, political inexperience and a lack of centralised control (which the fledgling 
Values Party could not have exerted even had it wanted to) meant that Values 
candidates were a departure from the mould. So was the campaign itself. Candidates 
and delegates at the first national conference on the weekend of October 21122 got 
off to a fun start by taking a field trip to the Motor Show being staged in 
Wellington's big show buildings. Here they satirised devotion to the automobile by 
'worshipping' the cars on display - prostrating themselves before the vehicles, 
kissing the tyres, and so on (Smith interview, 2.4.96). 
Deputy Leader Geoff Neill opened his campaign for Dunedin North with a rock band 
in the Octagon (Dunedin's central civic plaza), while supporters wearing 'Values 
Guerillas' T-shirts ran around smiling at people and handing out leaflets. In Porirua 
Helen Smith had a pop choir performing at the local shopping centre, while in 
Auckland the Values candidates drew six hundred to a lunchtime meeting in a hall 
designed for three hundred. Wherever he went Tony Brunt spoke to packed houses, 
including nine hundred in Auckland's Intercontinental ballroom and one thousand 
269 
eight hundred in the Wellington Town Hall (a larger crowd than Prime Minister John 
Marshall drew to the same venue). In provincial Hastings one hundred came to the 
closing of the national campaign, held in the Valhalla discotheque. 
The policies the new candidates advocated were also startling to some and refreshing 
to others. In the area of sexual politics Values differed radically from the other 
parties, advocating Zero Populatio~ Growth, a liberal abortion law and 
decriminalisation of homosexuality. It was critical of consumerism and not afraid to 
condemn it. The campaign in Nelson featured a guerilla theatre stunt in which a 
human fifty-cent coin chased a human dollar note down the main street. Values also 
wanted to reform industrial relations for good and all by promoting worker 
ownership of enterprises. It had major plans for reforming government too, to make 
it more open, accountable and decentralised. It advocated a pacifist foreign policy 
(foreign troops out of Vietnam, no more nuclear testing and an end to compulsory 
military training), and wanted a reform of the drug laws, including decriminalisation 
of the possession of cannabis. 
The policies were underpinned by the philosophy hinted at in Brunt's inaugural 
speech, and in the introduction to the first manifesto. It was a philosophy not just of 
a political party, but also of a social movement. Brunt expressed the difference 
between the social movement character of Values and the narrow interest base of the 
older political parties as follows: 
'As the campaign drew towards its peak it became clear that Values was 
something more than a political party; it was also, to a certain extent, a social 
movement. It differed from Labour and National in that its compass was not 
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solely matters political, nor its cement an organisational fOlm. Its ideal of a 
stable population followed by a no-growth economy demanded as much a 
change in Values as a change in Government. It spoke to the growing need of 
young people for such things as friendship, peace, community and job 
satisfaction. Implicitly, though not explicitly, it pointed to a simpler life style, 
one that would accord with a society in which commercial expansion was not 
a goal, one in which there would be new motivational bases - idealism, 
fulfilment a sense of supportive community, creativity, and service. 
Competition, consumption, prestige, power and financial gain did not figure 
large in the priorities of those who were our keenest supporters. Rock groups, 
guerilla theatre and other diversions were used at many meetings to make 
politics fun again .. .!t came close to providing what the 1971 National Youth 
Congress had advocated: "A redefinition of politics which is integrated with, 
and not separated from, our lives." , (Brunt, 1973, 92-93). 
Four years later Dave Woodhams saw fit to reinforce the social movement basis of 
Values in his chairman's address to the 1977 National Conference. He reminded 
delegates that Values was rooted in the social movements of the 1960s which were 
concerned about the direction of society, with creating community, and with human 
liberty. He claimed that Values was a special interest group within that wider 
movement, and that 
'Its special interest is to be a political focus for the wide ranging concerns of 
the movement, to develop a viable political synthesis of these concerns and to 
use the opportunities that come our way as a political party to advocate these 
policies and the reasons for them ... The political commitment of the Party 
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takes on an added importance because it is our unique contribution to all the 
activity of the movement and if we fail, we let down not only ourselves but 
the rest of the movement as well.' (Woodhams, 1997,4) 
The ideas espoused by Values were not entirely new, as the reading list at the back 
of Blueprint for New Zealand shows. Although most ofthe books cited were very 
contemporary (published in 1970 and 1971) there were classics such as Lewis 
Mumford's Technics and Civilisation (1934), Erich Fromm's The Art of Loving 
(1970) and Edmund Leach's (1967) A Runaway World. There were also critiques of 
modem technocratic society and workplaces by Berkley (1971) and Townsend 
(1970). Tony Brunt recalls that he was particularly influenced by Charles Reich's 
(1970) The Greening of America, Alvin Toffler's (1970) Future Shock, and the work 
of lK. Galbraith (1967; 1971) (Brunt, pers.comm.). Nor were the ideas unique to 
New Zealand - on the contrary they were part of an international trend that had flared 
into revolt in many places in 1968. The main thing that was new and different about 
Values was that for the first time these ideas were put together as a political party 
platform and offered to a national electorate. 
The other factor that set Values apart from political parties to that date was the way 
in which it presented its ideas. Its street theatrical campaign style has already been 
mentioned. The other side of the novel Values communications strategy was its 
consummate use of national media. Here it made full use of the then single-channel 
television network in New Zealand, obtaining fifteen minutes of free television time 
to run an advertisement described as ' ... the most sophisticated political ad ever 
produced in New Zealand' (Luff, 1974,22). This advertisement, along with the 
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Gallery documentary, screened in October, and they both provided such positive 
pUblicity for Values that support in the opinion polls went up from 5% pre-October 
to 24% post-October. 
Bill Luff thought that unlike the other minor parties, which were lacking in media 
skills, Values fully exploited' ... most of the immense possibilities that the New 
Zealand media provides, to the extent that the Values Party is justifiably referred to 
as a "media party". (Luff, 1974, 23). Luff also - rather presciently - notes that 
national media coverage was vital to Values because it aimed at reaching sectional 
rather than geographical constituencies. It was aiming at the educated, the young, 
and the socially and politically progressive, who were not confined to any particular 
geographical electorate. (Although there were of course some electorates - in the 
1970s principally the better-off urban seats with younger voters - where Values did 
best.) 
Values activists themselves were acutely aware of the importance of the media to 
their politics. As we have seen, their campaign style was theatrical, and aimed at 
attracting media attention. Just prior to the annual party conference in 1978 Party 
Chairer Dave Woodhams reflected on theatre, media and politics in his summation 
of what Values had achieved and where it needed to go hext. In a paragraph headed 
'Politics as Drama' he opined: 
'If there is one area of the development ofthe party over the past five years 
that we have lost ground in, I would say it is our ability to treat politics as the 
high drama that it is. The Auckland Peace Squadron and the Native Forest 
Action Council have both made a dramatic impact on the political life of the 
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country this year. Political action is theatre on the grand scale. With the right 
script, the right setting and the right issue, a creative group of people can 
command the attention of the media, and bring to life an issue that would be 
dead if handled by the usual "press statement" routine. The May annual 
conference of the party has been planned to remedy this situation.' 
(Woodhams, 1978, 6). 
Whether it was the ideas, or the dramatic way they were presented, or both, at its 
first general election in 1972 the party appealed to some 27,600 voters who voted 
Values on November 23. Values took 1.96% of the total vote (out of eighty-seven 
seats) and 3.7% of the vote in the forty-two seats where it stood candidates. It was 
the third party in terms of numbers of votes cast in thirteen electorates (Luff, 1974, 
5-6). It was a promising start for a brand new party in a political 'tradition' which 
was so new the paint had yet to dry. Where could it go next? 
Party structure and development 
Before going on to discuss the actual historical development ofthe first two Green 
parties, and how they were structured, perhaps we need to ask why it was that New 
Zealand and Tasmania were so willing and able to start political parties based on 
Green principles and praxis. Why not just continue with pressure group and 
movement politics? 
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The UTG appears to be .clearly a case where there was no other option in tenns of 
exercising political influence. The pressure group and legal routes had failed, 
therefore fonning a party that contested elections seemed to be the only way of 
getting a democratic bridgehead in a situation of almost total political close-out. 
Once it was formed, the party proved an appropriate vehicle for bringing together 
like-minded people and providing them with mor~ support for each other, and more 
publicity for their ideas, than they had otherwise been able to find in a small polity 
which did not look kindly on non-conformists. 
But the New Zealand situation was rather different. New Leftist and new social 
movement organisations were active nation-wide, and attracting a lot of attention via 
their demonstrations, street theatre, media stunts and so on. Student protest was the 
'in' thing, and the youth branches of both the National and Labour parties were 
inspired by all this activity to ginger things up within their parties. So why was a 
new party felt to be a good idea? 
Norman Smith (Smith interview, 9.7.91) claims that Tony Brunt wrote an essay on 
the new politics for his political science course. In it he argued that the proliferation 
of new politics among young people in New Zealand, which was largely being 
ignored by the National and Labour party hierarchies, provided the basis for a new 
party to plug the gap in the political spectrum. His professor rubbished his argument 
- so Brunt went out and started the new party to prove him wrong. Whether literally 
true or not, the story certainly encapsulates the historical moment of opportunity that 
Brunt grasped so firmly. 
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But was fonning a Green party merely due to the whim of that particular person at 
that particular time and place, or was there some 'deeper logic' impelling the first 
Greens towards fonning parties in Australasia? On the one hand, the egalitarian, 
participatory, networking approach to political organising, put to work in relatively 
small societies, doubtless made it easier to set up parties there than in more populous 
nation-states. On the other hand, in New Zealand~s case the first-past-the-post 
electoral system was an enormous barrier to third party participation, with only one 
third party (Social Credit) getting more than one (and then only two) seats at anyone 
time in any post-war parliament. The European nation-states, most of which had and 
have proportional electoral systems, were and are much more rewarding places in 
which to start a new party than Australia or New Zealand, where majoritarian 
systems have been largely favoured over proportional ones. 
So it is not easy to fathom exactly why Green politics first took party form 'Down 
Under', and answering the question will certainly require a much more exacting and 
comparative analysis of electoral opportunity structures and national political 
cultures than was within my 'globalisation and the Greens' research brief. What was 
of more interest to me, which I turn to below, is the extent to which the development 
and structure of the first two Green parties are recognisably and typically Green, and 
provide the first examples ofthe type. 
Tasmanian experiments 
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Although the UTG had its origins in a _conservation campaign, it would be wrong to 
describe it as simply a conservation organisation with a party label. Pamela Walker 
notes that few of the UTGILPAC activists had backgrounds in well-established 
conservation organisations such as the Field Naturalists or the National Trust, and 
older conservation groups, such as the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT), 
questioned the radical behaviour of LP AC. In 1973 Sam Lake of the TCT said that 
' ... a significant proportion of Tasmanian conservationists are loath to indulge in 
political means to achieve environmental ends. This tendency has led to the 
somewhat unfortunate situation whereby both of the major parties view the UTG as 
being the political wing of the conservation movement.' (Walker, 1986,60). The 
Australian Conservation Foundation, Australia's largest and strongest conservation 
organisation (founded in 1965) decided not to get involved in actions to protest the 
destruction of Lake Pedder ' ... for fear that such activity would be "too political" , 
(Burgmann, 1993, 205). 
In fact, far from being the existing conservation movement in political guise, the 
UTG was to actually create the contemporary conservation movement in Tasmania. 
Nineteen out of the twenty-three activists (82%) at the inaugural meeting of the 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) in 1976 were active members of the UTG 
(Walker, 1989, 167). Walker (1986,66) also notes that some ten years after the 
formation of the UTG, one third of conservation activists operating in Tasmania had 
had their initial political socialisation in the UTG. 
Between the end of 1972 and the setting up ofTWS in July 1976, which marked the 
effective end of the UTG as a campaigning organisation, the new political grouping 
277 
set about creating a bonafide political party with a constitution, structure, set of 
policies and a budget. It began addressing the task seriously in 1974, when a member 
(who had been expelled for the Labor Party) drafted a constitution that was modelled 
on the ALP constitution. (Not much new politics there!) The UTG was branch based, 
with each branch meeting monthly or two-monthly at the local level. 
Branches had a committee consisting of a President, one or two Vice Presidents, a 
Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and Delegates to Divisional Council and State 
Conference. There was one Divisional Council for each of the five Tasmanian 
electorates, and they met quarterly (Home, n.d., 8-9). The state conference elected a 
state executive, a policy committee and a rules committee, and a state council was 
appointed' ... to direct and control the State executive on matters of administration 
and finance and to direct and control all election campaigns (Walker, 1989, 166). 
A State Secretary was employed full time and attended all branch meetings (Walker, 
1986,40). 
The first state conference was held in Launceston on 22 June 1974 - forty people 
were present. The conference set up policy committees on Agriculture, Education, 
Social Welfare, Local Government, State Resources, Transport and Energy and 
National Parks/Conservation and Wilderness (UTG Newsletter No 8 1974). This 
provides a clear indication of the UTG's intention to be a political party in the full 
sense. 
Given the later Green emphasis on alternative forms of political organising - the 
present day Tasmanian Greens make all decisions by consensus and have never had 
an internal election for a party position - what are we to make of the very formal and 
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traditional structure of the UTG? Did they get it 'wrong' because they were the first 
off the blocks, and had no Green party models to follow, or did they perhaps find a 
way to operate a conventional, fonnal structure in a consensual, participatory 
manner? Party founder and leader Dick Jones certainly spoke of the need for 
egalitarian rather than hierarchical fonns of organisation, seeing hierarchy as a 
component of the ecological problem and ' ... advocating participatory decision-
making and decentralisation within a network of co-operating groups rather than a 
hierarchical party machine' (Jones, 1990,39). Similarly, Chris Harries advises that 
although the UTG was structured this way on paper, in practice 'our constitution was 
breached virtually every day' , mainly because the party was not big enough to carry 
out all the functions and roles prescribed therein. In addition, Tasmania was behind 
New Zealand in terms of 'new politics' styles of organising, which were not widely 
known until the late 1970s. Harries describes Tasmanian UTG and Green decision 
making methods in practice as 'infonnal' - 'More like friends, making decisions by 
ad hoc and convivial interaction.' (Harries, pers.comm., 16.6.97). 
Further, despite its seemingly conventional fonn the UTG was not too conventional. 
A list of possible fund-raising activities printed in the newsletter, which included 
mannequin parades and car rallies, received a blast from a reader who condemned 
these activities because they waste resources (UTG Newsletter No.9, September 
1974). However the Radical Ecology Conference barbecue advertised in the UTG 
Denison newsletter of 15.3.75 advised people to bring their own grog, meat and beer 
mug. The UTG was perhaps not in the mainstream of Australian culture, but it was 
not that far way from it. Its fundraising was largely centred on folk music concerts, 
bush walks, slide evenings featuring wilderness images, wine and cheese evenings, 
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and barbecues. The fundraising was well supported and lucrative - the accounts for 
the UTG financial year ending 30.6.74 showed that only $358 of the party's income 
that year carne from sUbscriptions - the rest of the $3276 raised carne from donations 
and fundraising events . 
. Some inspiring green speakers chose to visit Tasmania at this time. The American 
environmentalist and pioneer of environmental education Joseph Sax came in 1972, 
and in 1974 the founder of Friends of the Earth, David Brower, also came to speak. 
UTG candidates stood in local body·elections, and by September 1974 three had 
been elected to councils (UTG Newsletter No.9, September 1974). In 1975 in a 
campaign for the Legislative Council seat of New de gate the UTG candidate secured 
9.9% of the vote, despite the sitting Labor candidate advising his supporters against 
giving their preferences to the UTG (UTG State Newsletter June 1975). 
In 1976 there was a strong debate over whether the party should change its name, 
with preferences being expressed for 'UTG - the Conservation Party' or just 
'The Conservation Party'. The State Secretary saw electoral advantage in such a 
move, and argued that it would be a more accurate label. Those against, such as the 
president of the University of Tasmania branch, stressed the wider policy range of 
the UTG, and the need to educate the electorate on how the relationship to the 
environment must inform all policies (UTG State Newsletter, July 1976). Policy 
development also continued in 1976, and in October the UTG announced that it was 
the first and was still the only party to adopt an Aboriginal policy for Tasmania. 
The seventeen-point policy was printed in the newsletter (UTG State Newsletter, 
October 1976). 
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Although by the end of 1976 the UTG had lost its organisational impetus, and much 
of the energy of the party had transferred to the newly formed Tasmanian Wilderness 
Society (Walker, 1989, 167), the UTG continued to campaign. It mounted nine 
electoral campaigns in all, with declining levels of success. The emergence of the 
Australian Democrats, in August 1976, as a competitor party for the environmental 
and socially liberal vote posed another problem for the UTG. The p.arty went on 
developing policy and building links with other environmental and political 
groupings (including the Values Party) after 1976; however by 1979 its 'We told you 
so!' ad in the Tasmanian press signalled the formal end of the UTG (Walker, 1989, 
167). 
The UTG was down, but the Green movement in Tasmania was not out. In 1983 one 
of the UTG's last candidates, Dr Bob Brown, became the first Green Independent 
Member of the Legislative Assembly. By 1989 he had been joined by four other 
Greens. Greens held the balance of power in the lower house and they negotiated an 
historic Accord with Labor. In 1992 Tasmania's second Green party was formally 
established, with five MLAs already in parliament, and in 1996 Bob Brown became 
Tasmania's first Green Senator in the federal Senate. 
New Zealand innovations 
In New Zealand the first Green party (Values) was stronger than the UTG, but it took 
longer for the second one (the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand) to achieve 
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success. However the Values Party almost didn't survive its first year. Once the 
election night euphoria was over and they had recovered from their exhaustion, the 
members of the new party had to consider what should happen next. New Zealand 
went into its usual summer shut-down mode, but some Values people put out a 
December newsletter reporting on the campaign and advising that a national 
conference would be held in Wellington on Feb 24/25, 1973. Christchurch and 
Dunedin had already held post-election debriefing meetings; regional. conferences 
were to be held in the Auckland region and in the lower North Island/top of the 
South Island region. The February national conference was to discuss 'organisation, 
constitution, future directions, local government elections, proposals for a party 
newspaper, etc.' 
In the event, the February conference almost caused the end, rather than the 
consolidation, of the Values Party. Guy Salmon, who had originally attacked Tony 
Brunt after his inaugural speech, but who made contact with Values in his capacity 
as a representative of the Youth Action Centre in Wellington, wrote a lengthy (eight 
foolscap pages, single spaced) proposal on party organisation. It was entitled 
'A Blueprint for Participation', and was prefaced with five more foolscap single-
spaced pages entitled 'Organisation: A personal view'. The gist of both papers was 
to argue against setting up a party structure with leaders, branches and a national 
executive, and to advocate a totally decentralised, leaderless organisation. Such 
arguments were consistent with the anarchist strain running through most of the 
'new politics' groupings ofthe time. They were acceptable to Tony Brunt and Geoff 
Neill, who endorsed Salmon's proposal to do away with leaders and devolve all 
policymaking, decision-making and pUblicity to the regions, leaving only an 
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administrative secretariat in Wellington. This secretariat was not to have a 
spokesperson role and was not to be able to lead or bind the party on policy or 
organisational matters. 
The debate on party structure recorded in the minutes of the conference shows that 
on the one hand there was a strong will to believe in and endorse participatory, 
~ommunity-based structures, which place a heavy emphasis on trust, power-sharing, 
spontaneity, personal integrity and enthusiasm. On the other hand there was also a 
significant concern expressed that a stronger organisational and democratic 
framework, with elected rather than self-appointed leaders, was necessary to avoid 
destructive anarchy and to get the Values message across effectively. 
The 'anarchist' tendency won the day, and the party entered what was to be a 
seventeen-month experiment in radical devolution. Reflecting on the 1973 
conference twenty-four years later, Dave Woodhams was still critical of the process 
by which the decision was made, and its outcome. Salmon's motion was moved 
without notice, and in Woodham's view the chair should have referred the decision 
to electorate committees. Since Salmon was never seen again at a Values Party 
meeting,6 Woodhams considered that the party was left with anarchy without the 
anarchist, and that this was the first of a number of self-inflicted wounds endured by 
the party. However in his view this anarchy led not to chaos but to stagnation, and 
the first long-term effect of the lack ofleadership and national co-ordination was a 
loss of momentum due to loss of members and loss of confidence. The second and 
more positive effect was that having experienced the limits of decentralisation the 
newly established Green party made it part of its collective understanding and had 
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the lessons of the experience in mind when it approached creating a new decision-
making structure from the bottom up (Woodhams, 1997, 1). 
An independent survey of nearly two hundred party members in Canterbury and 
Otago in mid 1973 (Luff, 1974) showed that complete decentralisation, and 
especially decapitation of the party, was not the preferred choice of rank and file 
members. Luff found that while a large majority (85%) supported the re-organisation 
ofthe party into thirteen autonomous regional bodies, an equally large majority 
(84%) believed that leadership was necessary, and 60% of those in favour of 
leadership felt that it was necessary all the time, not just in election year. 
For all of 1973 and half of 1974, however, one person was to carry the responsibility 
of keeping the party together without having the title or the power of 'leader', 
'chairperson' or 'president'. Catherine Wilson (now Catherine Benland) became the 
sole functionary of the 'National Secretariat' set up to carry out the central 
administrative functions of the party as defined in the Guidelines for Organisation 
approved by the 1973 conference. In May 1973 she put out the first party Linkletter, 
the newsletter that was to keep regions informed about each other, and about national 
level issues. In the very first issue Wilson had a complaint about the effects of 
'decentralisation' - specifically the lack of Values Party comment on the cancellation 
of the proposed 1973 Springbok rugby tour, an issue which Values had campaigned 
hard on and deserved to get some credit for. 
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Despite the gap at national level, branches were creative to begin with, with 
Invercargill developing alternative transport ideas; Dunedin holding a 'Greenprint 
for Dunedin' meeting; Wainuiomata replanting trees after a native forest fire; 
Napier organising a well-attended public forum on development plans for the 
Ahuriri estuary (which according to the Dominion reporter quoted in the newsletter 
was ' ... one of the liveliest and possibly most effective exercises in democracy this 
city has seen in years ... ') and doing a documentary survey of historic and interesting 
buildings. (Was this the beginning of Napier's subsequent career as architectural Art 
Deco capital of the Southern Hemisphere?): Thames was recycling glass and doing 
creek clean-ups; while Auckland was co-sponsoring a seminar with Ecology Action, 
marching against nuclear war on Hiroshima Day, and objecting to a proposed 
dumpsite beside a beach. Members of the North Shore branch set up a women's 
group which met in the day time, a transport group and a local body group, and 
attended a course on public speaking and running meetings. 
Timaru was involved in supporting a proposal to create a community centre, and 
with a road safety campaign. However, Linkletter chose to excerpt a particular quote 
from the Timaru newsletter, about the relative roles of community level and national, 
level organising, which went as follows: 
'The Values Party has two inter-linking,parts - the social activities and the 
political section. What has to be realised is that the community projects, 
essential as they are, will only achieve so much. To undertake such things as 
Zero Population Growth, penal refonn, homosexual law refonn and abortion 
law refonn, we need to gain power or to exercise enough power to get one of 
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the other parties to do what desperately needs to be done.'(Linkletter, No.3, 
August 1973). 
Two months later (Linkletter was delayed for several reasons, including the late 
return of branch survey forms and Wilson being involved in starting a feminist 
group) it was estimated that total membership of the party was about six hundred, of 
whom only one hundred and twenty eight were financial. By January 1974 Wilson 
was editorialising thus: 
' ... as I see it, the problem of whether we are a decentralised collection of 
environmental activists and liberal idealists or whether we are a viable 
political party, which harassed our last national conference, remains 
unresolved. Many whose eloquence was influential at the last conference 
have since deserted our ranks - those with more stamina and faith must 
reassess the decisions made at conference in the light of a year's further 
experience.' (Linkletter, No.6, Jan-Feb 1974, 10-11). 
In the March-April 1974 Linkletter Wilson advised that it might be the last one due 
to lack of support for the secretariat from the major centres. She then jettisoned the 
Guidelines for Organisation rule regarding the impartiality of the secretariat to 
advise that only one third of the thirty-six branches extant in mid-1973 were still 
functioning, and she gave her analysis of why that was. This largely centred on the 
power structure set up by the 1973 conference, with its lack of clear and effective 
roles for the regional and national levels of the party. She also concluded 
that "The party in its infancy was heavily dependent on the "charisma" and labour 
input of Tony Brunt. The former was deliberately dispensed with by the intrepid 
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anarchists at the last National Conference ... who may not have appreciated how much 
of the party's success with the non-intellectual man on the street was due to this 
aspect.' (Linkletter, No 7, March-April 1974,2). It was at this time that a wry joke 
on the leadership issue began to circulate, expressed by Dave Woodhams as 'It was 
widely rumoured at the time that a visiting Martian, wanting to contact the Values 
Party, was overheard saying 'Take me to your Post Office Box.' (Woodhams, 1978). 
In April 1974 Wilson and Dave Woodhams, after consultation with Tony Brunt, took 
it upon themselves to further contravene the 1973 Guidelines for Organisation. These 
allowed for conferences to be held only if a region wanting to host a conference 
obtained support for doing so from over two thirds of the other regions. They called 
a national conference to be held at Massey University in Palmerston North on 
August 24/25 1974. The conference duly took place, and Reg Clough was elected as 
Leader of the party, and Cathy Wilson as Deputy Leader - the first female deputy 
leader of a New Zealand political party. The party was restructured with a national 
executive and a regional organisation based on the provinces and main cities of New 
Zealand, processes for a more participatory style of decision making were discussed 
and agreed to, and a national newsletter/paper was decided upon. (The first issue of 
Values -later Turning Point - came out in September 1974.) Working committees at 
the conference produced remits which were voted on - these remits provided broad 
principles and a few specific details to guide the various policy and other working 
groups and committees which were set up. Perhaps the most important group set up 
at Palmerston North was the Working Group on Economic Policy - its achievements 
are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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This time the reorganisation of the Values Party was to prove effective, and to enable 
Values to lift its profile, increase its membership to around 2,000, raise sufficient 
funds to employ two full-time staff. (There is no state financial assistance to political 
parties in New Zealand.) It also conducted two more energetic and full-scale election 
campaigns (1975 and 1978). The first official party organiser was Norman Smith. He 
was appointed by the National Executive after the 1974 conference. Values achieved 
this degree of efficient organisation while still operating a less formal and more 
participatory discussion and decision-making style than the other parties, and 
without losing its community activist role. Members continued to be heavily 
involved with, and often to playa leading role in, community initiatives. These 
ranged from Campaign Half Million, the national campaign to collect 500,000 
signatures on a petition against introducing nuclear power to New Zealand, through 
to countless local level recycling schemes, tree planting projects, day-care centres 
and the like. This community activism was entirely in line with Objects ofthe party 
stated in its 1976 constitution, which began with the statement that 'The long-term 
objective ofthe Values Party is to build a just, sustainable, community-based 
society.'(Emphasis added.) The style of the party also continued to be more 
exuberant and publicity-focussed than that ofthe other parties, with street theatre 
events still playing a large role in getting the message across. Examples include a 
mock funeral procession in Wellington on the proposed route of the new motorway 
(which cut through an historic cemetery), and 'lead mining' on the car exhaust 
polluted streets of Christchurch. Christchurch also sold 'dirty' postcards to raise 
funds and draw attention to Christchurch's smog problem - the cards showed 
pictures of the city under a typical blanket of smog. 
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The second election manifesto, Beyond Tomorrow, was another first in political 
communication in New Zealand. A substantial document (90 pages) it was more of a 
book than a manifesto, with its full colour cover of children on a rocky shore and its 
liberal illustration with black and white photographs, cartoons and line drawings. 
Also different and unusual were its pithy quotes from Values gurus like Gandhi, 
Martin Luther King, E.F. Schumacher and J.S. Mill. There were also quotes from 
pop songs and folk songs as apposite as Joni Mitchell's 'Big Yellow Taxi' ('So it 
always seems to go that you don't know what you've got till it's gone They paved 
paradise and put up a parking lot. '). The manifesto sold for $NZI :65 retail- and so 
many were sold, lots of them by members going door to door, that the sales financed 
the 1975 Values election campaign. It undoubtedly helped secure Values 5.3% ofthe 
vote in that election. 
If the Values Party had been in Germany, this vote would have won it over twenty 
seats in the Bundestag. However, under the New Zealand first-past-the-post electoral 
system, without a concentrated geographical support base in any electorate, Values 
had an impossible task. The party's membership, funds and organisation grew 
between 1975 and 1978, and it reached a polling high of 12% with candidate Gwen 
Struik in the Nelson by-election of 1976. It also mounted a strong 1978 election 
campaign under its very personable leader Tony Kunowski. But ultimately it was the 
victim of negative voting to try and oust conservative National Party Prime Minister 
Robert Muldoon. Even financial members of the Values Party voted strategically for 
Labour in an (unsuccessful) attempt to get National out, and some left the party for 
Labour for pragm~tic reasons. One departing member explained her desertion to the 
Leader as follows: 'It's not that I'm wrapt in Labour's policies or vision for the 
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future - but because I think there's more chance of actually being part of a power 
structure and able to influence events. Again, my apologies for deserting you.' 
(Kunowski correspondence). 
The Values vote dropped to 2.8%, and the post-election conference at Rathkeale 
College in the Wairarapa in 1979 was thick with recriminations, proposals for radical 
reform, and personality clashes. There was heated debate over whether, or how, the 
Values Party was 'socialist'. A motion proclaiming that it was socialist was won -
but the chief proponents of the motion, a group of prominent Christchurch activists, 
lost their campaign to get Tony Kunowski re-elected as leader. The leadership went 
to Aucklander Margaret Crozier. The shine of being the first female leader of a New 
Zealand political party was somewhat dulled by having to cope with the split in the 
party that followed. It was the 'socialists' who withdrew their energy - a big loss to a 
party already demoralised by election defeat. Having chaired a conference in which 
the anarchist left leaving anarchy behind, Dave Woodhams now chaired a conference 
in which he saw a 'socialist' party devoid of socialists come in to being. 
(Woodhams, 1997,5). 
Crozier did her best to take a conciliatory approach and bring the party together 
again, but it was not possible. Membership dwindled throughout the 1980s, and by 
the end of the decade it was down to two hundred or so. Values was not able to 
mount a full electoral slate in any of the three 1980s elections, and in 1990 those 
remaining in the party agreed to merge with the newly formed Green groups which 
had contested the 1989 local body elections with some success. The current Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand was born, and contested the 1990 general election, 
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obtaining 6.9% of the national vote from the 71 seats (out of97) where it fielded 
candidates (Vowles, 1991,8). The genealogical connection between the two parties 
was fonnally recognised in 1990, when the Green Party applied for - and got - a full 
entitlement to state broadcasting time for party advertisements. This was on the basis 
that it was not a new party fonned less than a year before the poll, but rather an old 
one that had contested six previous elections. (The same genealogical/institutional 
link was established between the UTG and the Greens in Australia when Greens in 
Tasmania wished to contest the 1990 federal election and needed a party registration 
to run under - thus the last election technically contested by the UTG was the 1990 
federal election.) 
Global connections 
The Values Party and the UTG had therefore been born, had flourished and had 
declined before Die Griinen in West Gennany came into existence. Values' heyday 
was well over before Die Griinen brought the concept, policies and practices of 
Green party politics to world attention after its accession to the Bundestag in 1983. 
Attention has focussed (not unreasonably) on the Gennan Green parliamentary 
pioneers. Most observers of Green politics are therefore unaware that it was in New 
Zealand - a country which is historically low on intellectual debate, but one which 
has high levels of education, a passion for O.E. (Overseas Experience), and a 
tradition of innovative and practical DIY (Do It Yourself) approaches to all spheres 
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of life (from house repairs to the House of Parliament) - that a new political 
philosophy received its first full articulation in party form. 
Word that this was happening was to get to Australia in the early 1970s, and to 
Europe a little later, and to have some influence (impossible to assess how much) on 
Green politics there. The first Australian party with which Values made contact was 
not the United Tasmania Group, but the Australia Party, which was set up in 1969, 
largely on a civil rights and anti-Vietnam war platform. By mid-1973 the Australia 
Party was sending copies of its fortnightly magazine Reform to the Values Party, and 
in August 1973 Linkletter stated 'Happy fourth birthday to the Australia Party, our 
counterpart across the Tasman Sea.' It was not until mid-1974 that Linkletter 
recorded a query about Values from the chairman of the University of Tasmania 
Students Association. In the July/August 1974 issue there was a synopsis of a letter 
from Geoff Holloway, State Secretary of the UTG, who wrote to say that Values had 
more in common with the UTG than with the Australia Party, 'whose ecological 
awareness is debatable.' Holloway informed Values that the UTG had taken on the 
ideas expressed in The Ecologist's Blueprintfor Survival. It was setting up a 
state-wide, structured organisation. He enclosed UTG newsletters and other 
literature. This was to be the beginning of regular UTGN alues exchanges. 
The UTG was also receiving reports from foreign groups, mostly environmental 
ones, and the UTG State Newsletter of June 1975 gives some details and also 
comments 'Note: the Values Party doesn't get a mention in the FOE (NZ) report.' 
In 1976 Beyond Tomorrow was on sale for $A3 in the Tasmanian Environment 
Centre in Hobart, and the UTG newsletters lifted quotes and cartoons from it. 
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The UTG did a round up of green politics elsewhere in the world early in 1977, and 
stated enthusiastically if over-optimistically 'New Zealand - the Green Party is the 
third party!' It went on to say that Values had a programme very similar to the Green 
group 'Ecologie et Survie' in Alsace (UTG State Newsletter FeblMarch 1977). 
Tasmanian green activist Kevin Kiernan had visited New Zealand and seen Values 
ads on billboards, plus a display ofUTG literature in the Environment Centre in 
Christchurch. The same newsletter also corrected misinformation given in 
The Ecologist that the UTG had changed its name to the Values Party of Tasmania. 
(There had been an unofficial approach to Values asking if it would mind if the UTG 
took the Values name - in the end, however, the newsletter editor informed readers, 
it was the Australia Party which joined with the New Liberal movement and changed 
its name to Values). The Values Party International Secretary's report on the subject 
states that the Australia Party's economic policy is 'to the right of ours' and their 
support declining. When the executive of the Australia Party wrote to ask if Values 
would mind if it took the name it was decided to spell out the differences between 
the two parties and leave it to the Australians to decide. 
Values made contact with the People Party, (established in the United Kingdom in 
February 1973), very early on. This was through Britons who had experienced 
Values in New Zealand returning home and spreading the news. In 1975 when the 
People Party decided to change its name the two main options considered were 
'Values' and 'Ecology' (Parkin, 1989,219). 
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By the time a list of Values Party international contacts was typed up (there is an 
undated contact list document - it was probably made in 1976) it was in touch with 
sixteen groups in the UK, including the Ecology Party and Friends of the Earth. 
The contact with FOE was especially strong as the then FOE director and 
Ecology/Green Party candidate Jonathon Porritt is the son of a former Governor 
General of New Zealand, and makes regular visits to New Zealand. There were 
thirteen contacts with Europe, including France, Belgium, West Germany, Sweden, 
Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Denmark, twenty-seven with the USA, nine with Canada, 
eight with Africa/Asia/South America and nine with Australia and the Pacific. 
Most of these contacts were with environmental organisations of various kinds, some 
were with 'new politics' groups, and the rest with individuals (often expatriate New 
Zealanders) in those places. The penchant of middle class New Zealanders for living, 
working and travelling overseas for a few years (generally before returning home to 
raise a family) was important not just in bringing 'green' information back to New 
Zealand, but also in spreading 'Values' politics abroad. (1990s Green Party 
Co-Leader Jeanette Fitzsimons was living in Switzerland when she cast her first 
Values vote.) 
Values appointed an International Secretary at Easter 1976, and the first incumbent 
in the job, Dave Straton, began reporting back on his contacts via the party 
newspaper, Vibes. In April 1977 the paper ran a cover story headlined 'Values-type 
movements gaining ground in Europe', in which Straton reported on the actions and 
successes of political ecologists in France and Germany. He led with the success of 
Mouvement Ecologie in the March 1977 elections in France (an average vote of2% 
across the country, with 15% or more in some places). He also claimed that 'the 
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straight politicians are falling over each other to kiss trees instead of babies'. Other 
news was that Teddy Goldsmith had been appointed 'ecological editor' ofthe French 
news magazine L 'Express, and that one of his first moves was to commission an 
article on the Values party (Straton, 1977, 1). 
In June 1977 Straton made a formal report to the party on his activities as 
International Secretary. He entitled it 'Whole Earth Values', and it was a roundup of 
green achievements elsewhere in the world. These included the successes of 
'Ecologie et Survie' in Alsace in getting an average 10% of the vote, and of the 
Ecology Party local body candidates in Great Britain, where two out of the six who 
stood were elected. According to Straton 'One of them specifically referred to 
Values in his election leaflet, as proof that ecology parties can be successful. ' 
Straton comments 'This is the very sort ofthing that justifies us spending $500 on 
international correspondence. Whenever a new movement is starting, numbers are 
small, and the knowledge that others have had some success elsewhere can give 
people courage to keep going in spite of empty meetings and other setbacks. We can 
benefit too: donations from overseas are starting to trickle in as people realise what a 
boost ecological politics will get world-wide when we win an election. Rather like 
the boost that state socialists got in 1917.' 
To make sure that knowledge of the 'Values Movement' spread beyond the shores of 
New Zealand Straton was busy pushing Beyond Tomorrow out into the world. 
The Ecology Party considered air-freighting 200 copies over to use as their 
manifesto, but rejected it as too expensive. However, a class at the University of 
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Calgary, Canada, was reportedly using it as a text, and Straton didn't have enough 
copies to fill the bulk orders he received from bookshops in Calgary and Hobart. 
Seventy-five copies had been sold in the U.S.A., and a group of supporters was 
'translating' it into 'American' for wider sale. A New Zealand feminist working at 
the United Nations in New York (who was later to become a Green city councillor in 
Wellington, and then a Green MP) was sent a stock of Beyond Tomorrow to 
distribute. Straton reported that he was also investigating the feasibility of someone 
like John Lennon releasing the Values 1975 election song, 'It's a Question of 
Values', which had been quite·a hit when released by a local pop star in New 
Zealand. In Straton's correspondence file (Box 1, Acc 85-11, lOll, Alexander 
Turnbull Library) we find that he contributed articles on Values to the US magazine 
Environment Action Bulletin. Also that an article in the US Friends of the Earth 
paper Not Man Apart had generated lots of requests for more information. Straton 
noted that references to Values were starting to tum up in the most amazing places-
he had just received an Italian book entitled Spiritualismo e criminalita that 
mentioned Values. In just two months in 1977 he sent seventy-seven copies of 
Beyond Tomorrow to nineteen different countries, namely Finland, Iceland, the Cook 
Islands, Belgium, France, Japan, San Salvador, Yugoslavia, Germany, Canada, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ghana, Northern Ireland, Eire, Thailand, Holland and 
the UK. 
France was not spared the Values message - the first contact was with French 
political ecologist Brice Lalonde who joined the crew of the Fri, a boat protesting 
against French nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1973. Also in the crew was a member 
of the Values Party, who allegedly persuaded Lalonde that a political party was 
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needed to bring about ecological reform. On his return to France Lalonde convinced 
Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth) to contest elections, and stood himself in 
the Paris by-election of 1976, receiving 6.6% of the vote. (Values Party, Acc 85-11, 
Box 1, 10/13, Alexander Turnbull Library). Straton's report records that an 
expatriate American who was a member of Values was living in Paris and was 
translating Beyond Tomorrow into French. Copies of Beyond Tomorrow were sent to 
the French Mouvement Ecologie when it formed. Heinz Dessau, the International 
Secretary who followed Straton, says that Professor Jean Chesneaux, a French 
historian with an interest in the Pacific region, was one of his most invaluable 
contacts (Dessau, pers comm, 17.10.91). There was also contact with Germany-
initially with group called 'Work Group Alternative Development' and with a 
German branch of the World Citizens's Party. 
Virginia Horrocks succeeded Dessau as International Secretary in November 1977. 
She also had a busy schedule of responding to foreign queries (including one from 
Puerto Rico on how to set up an ecology party), receiving foreign publications that 
mentioned Values and providing articles for same, and receiving foreign visitors 
(including the president of the Australian Democrats.) 
In 1978 the Values Party decided to send its own ambassador out into the world, in 
the form of party Deputy Leader Margaret Crozier. A special appeal for funds for 
this purpose was made, and Crozier set off on a whirlwind three-week tour of the 
USA and the UK. Her activities overseas included: speaking to two hundred at 
a Friends of the Earth party in San Francisco; a lunch meeting with staff of the 
California state government; addressing fifty environmental lobbyists in 
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Washington D.C.; meeting with New Yorkers wanting to set up a Values-type party; 
interviews with alternative media; small group discussions with people interested in 
appropriate technology, economic alternatives and other green subjects; and 
attending three conferences. 
She summarised the significance of her trip and the Values connection thus: 
'New Zealand is back pioneering for the world, incorporating changing social 
and economic understandings into a political programme with the Values 
Party ... The conviction of party members that Values has an international role 
to play has been justified ... right round the globe there are groups of people 
working with similar aims: to involve the public in more satisfying and 
sustainable directions within a decaying world economy. '(Crozier, 1978, 3). 
The record thus shows that the first Greens were aware of their pioneering, global 
role - and that they were eager for contact and confinnation. The highly educated 
members of the UTG and Values were strongly motivated and very able when it 
came to getting the latest in information from overseas and sending out their own in 
return. They were also aware that they had something to offer which was new and 
unique, namely party platforms based on ecological values and party processes based 
on new definitions of democracy. There was a consciousness of international 
relations now being established on a new dimension, characterised by the metaphor 
used by Dave Straton in his first report - 'Spaceship Earth'. This sense of the 
connectedness of world problems and the need to work across national boundaries 
with a global consciousness has been a hallmark of Green politics ever since. 
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By the 1980s European and American Greens were visiting New Zealand and 
Australia to share their experiences ofthe new politics (Petra Kelly came in 1983), 
and by the 1990s (as advances in communications technologies allowed) they were 
able to do their networking in real time, on a global scale. But before the means, 
and driving it, came the will. The story of the origins and development of the first 
two Green parties clearly demonstrates the strength of that will to make global 
alternatives and the solutions to global problems. 
Who were the people who exhibited such determination to tackle the world's 
problems? In the next chapter I examine what is known about the first Greens as 
people, and how this may have affected their political orientation. 
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Notes 
1. UTG and Tasmanian Greens activist Chris Harries sums up Jones' contribution to original 
green thinking and practice as' ... it should be noted that Dick Jones's most important 
contribution was his recognition that Tasmania's environment was being wrecked owing to 
the state's ill-conceived economic path. His primary focus on changing the economic 
direction of the state was critically important to our eventual success ... Jones was also 
professionally an ecologist and therefore espoused the concept of interconnectedness and 
thus the need for broadband policies, including social policies.' (Harries, pers. comm., 
14.6.97). 
2. New Zealand's major conservation organisation, the Royal Forest and Bird Protection 
Society, organised three petitions to save Lake Manapouri. The third one, which was 
presented to Parliament in 1970, attracted 264,907 signatures - a New Zealand record to that 
date. 
A Committee of Inquiry was set up to look at the raising of the lake, and presented its report 
to Parliament in October 1970. While it confirmed conservationist fears that raising the lake 
would cause serious and permanenfdamage to the shoreline, it also held that the government 
might be bound by its contract with Conzinc. The petition then went to a select committee, 
which in June 1971 recommended that the lake not be raised' in the meantime'. On 
September 7 the Prime Minister announced that the raising of the lake would be postponed. 
In 1972 Labour made saving the lake a major election policy and this was highly popular, 
especially in the south of the South Island, where the lake is situated. Two 'blue ribbon' seats 
that had always gone to the National Party went to Labour for the first and last time. The seat 
ofinvercargill went to Labour for three years, to be recaptured for National in 1975 by 
Norman Jones, the founder and leader of the Southland Save Manapouri Campaign (Peat, 
1994). 
3. The extent to which New Zealand as a whole 'opened to the world' in this period can be 
judged by the information given in Plate 100 in the New Zealand Historical Atlas 
(McKinnon, 1997). Prior to 1961 no more than 100,000 people, including foreign visitors, 
entered or left the country in anyone year. That began to change in the 1960s, until by 1991 
the numbers exceeded two million per year. (The total population of New Zealand in 1991 
was around 3.5 million.) 
4. The New Zealand Web Directory (1999) (www.webdirectory.co.nz) claims that New 
Zealanders now have the highest per capita Internet usage in the world. No comparative 
figures are given to support this claim, but it is plausible - and there is obviously an 
enthusiasm on the part of suppliers of services and their users to make it so. 
5. Considering this summation of his political philosophy twenty five years later, Brunt was at 
pains to point out that he ' ... did not mean 'humanism' in its atheistic sense', as he has never 
been an atheist.' (Brunt, pers comm., 12.5.97) 
6. Not only did Salmon cease forthwith to participate in the Values Party, he then quickly 
switched his political aIlegiance. The non-executive 'National Secretariat' set up in line with 
his re-organisation proposal consisted of one woman, Cathy Wilson. In the second newsletter 
which she sent out after the conference, she noted that' ... Guy Salmon, prominent at the 1973 
national conference and the originator of the plan to do away with a national leader, has been 
elected to the executive of the youth-oriented National Party "ginger group", Pol-
Link ... '(Linkletter No.2, 1973, 5). 
Within two years of this about-face Salmon had obtained a position as the first full-time paid 
employee of the Native Forest Action Council, an executive and, leadership role which he has 
retained for over twenty years. He carried it on into the Maruia Society that was formed from 
a merger ofNFAC and the Environmental Defence Society. During this time he has acted as 
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a consultant and contributor to New Right societies and think tanks, including the Mont 
Pelerin Society and the Tasman Institute. In 1995 he became a founder and leader of the 
Progressive Greens party, which contested the 1996 general election with a 'more market' 
approach to solving environmental and social problems. With a small list and no 
constituency candidates it won 0.24% of the vote. 
Given the tenor of Salmon's post-Values career it is reasonable to ask whether his proposal 
to the 1973 conference was a deliberate (and very clever) attempt at sabotaging the new 
political party. Alternatively, it may merely have represented the terminal point of a very 
brief left/green phase in his political development. 
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Chapter Six 
Who were the Greens? 
First members and activists 
Where did Green activists come from? Who exactly were they? 
Did their origins and characteristics affect the politics they created; and if so, how? 
In this chapter I examine the sociological data on the members of the first two Green 
parties, to see if generalisations made about the connections between the new social 
movement activists and the Greens are valid. I pay particular attention to the 
community roots of Green politics, since a focus on community-based economic and 
social development, and community-based political activity, (as opposed to state-
oriented actions) is a distinguishing feature of Green party theory and practice, then 
as now. I conclude with a brief discussion of the three sociological variables which 
were of most interest to the first Greens themselves - their endorsement of their 
youth and their status as 'human beings', and their rejection of class ascriptions -
which are relevant to the politics they developed. 
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Political and social individuals 
Surveys of Greens (including supporters/voters as well as members of Green parties) 
in Europe in the 1980s confirmed intuitive and anecdotal impressions that the first 
European Greens shared the same social profile as the new social movement activists 
of the 1960s and 1970s. The salient factors were that they were young (born post 
1945). Also that they were, or were aspiring to be, members of the 'new middle 
classes' - i.e. they were people with higher education, mostly employed in skilled 
occupations in the tertiary sector ofthe economy, or else studying to become so 
employed. 
Tim Tenbensel (1994) provides a review of the studies which came to this 
conclusion, some of which, such as Ferdinand MUller-Rommel's 'The Greens in 
Western Europe Similar But Different' are collected as reprints in MUller-Rommell 
and Poguntke, (1995). Htilsberg, (1988, 108-118) summarises German studies on 
who the German Greens are and what they believe in, which also support this 
conclusion. The information available on the sociological profile ofUTG and Values 
Party members, given below, is consistent with the European data. 
It shows that the first Green party members were no different socially from the 
majority of people who were politically active in 'left' or 'progressive' politics in the 
1970s and 1980s. This suggests to me that the new social movement/Green political 
phenomenon is better analysed for its social roots and dimensions within a wider 
context of changes in the education, employment and leisure activities of the post-
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war 'baby boom' generation which was largely responsible for generating the new 
politics. 
There is an extensive literature on this, much of it stemming from or in reaction to 
Ronald Inglehart's 'Silent Revolution' thesis (Inglehart, 1977), which stresses the 
'post-materialist' values of the post-war generation, which include a concern for the 
environment. However, while such values may be a necessary condition for a Green 
politics (although, as Tim Tenbensel argues, it is not entirely clear what these core 
'Green values' consist of, nor what relation, if any, they have to actual political 
practices) (Tenbensel, 1995), they are certainly not sufficient. Hence the emphasis in 
this study on historical specifics rather than social generalisations. 
There is also a danger that by focussing on the characteristics of individuals who are 
Greens, and seeking an explanation for why they behave in the way that they do 
based on those social and personal characteristics, we may lose sight of the fact that 
politics of any kind is essentially a collective activity. Political beliefs and cultures 
do not develop in isolation - there is no necessary connection between fitting the 
'Green' social profile and being or voting Green (or vice versa). Therefore in this 
chapter I pay attention not just to who the first Greens were as individuals, but also 
to who they were in collectivity. This is especially relevant with regard to their belief 
in and practice of community-based politics, which seems to me to be the most 
salient difference between Greens and other types of party-political actors. 
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Tasmanian Greens 
So just who were the members of the world's first Green party, and what collective 
characteristics distinguished them from other political formations? The only survey 
information available on the United Tasmania Group comes from an unpublished 
and undated (probably 1975) study conducted by Beryl Home as part of her political 
science course work. At the time she conducted the study the party had two hundred 
and sixty-one financial members, of whom two hundred and one divulged their 
occupations on membership records. The membership pattern discernible in the 
United Tasmania Group was to be repeated by subsequent Green parties. 
Compared to the social democrat/labour and conservative/liberal parties the Green 
members were younger, better educated and more likely to be engaged in a 
professional occupation. There was also a much higher proportion of active female 
members. The single largest sub-group of the UTG was students, who made up 32% 
of the sample. Housewives were the second largest sub-group at 15%, followed by 
11 % in the education sector (teachers, tutors and lecturers) and 8% in the medical 
sector (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, etc.) Other professional occupations included 
engineers, technicians, artists and craftspeople, journalists, accountants, a surveyor, a 
computer programmer, a metallurgist and a research scientist. 7% worked in blue or 
pink-collar jobs, and 4% were farmers. So although heavily weighted towards the 
professions, the UTG was not exclusively a 'middle class' party. The exceptionally 
high student membership may be due not only to the appeal of Green politics for 
young people as the time, but also an artefact of the relative dominance of the 
education sector in the life of Hobart, the capital of Tasmania, where most of the 
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UTG membership lived. It is the only university town in Tasmania, and the 
university is a major employer. Nevertheless, other early Green parties also attracted 
students in large numbers. Werner HUlsberg documents the way in which the SPD in 
West Gennany lost ground with youth, who subsequently found the Greens more 
appealing (Hiilsberg, 1988,50). Also particularly characteristic of Tasmania, 
although echoed elsewhere in 'New World' Green parties, is the strong participation 
of members in outdoor fonns of recreation - in Tasmania's case this consisted of 
active membership in bush-walking clubs. 
With regard to gender, the June 1974 UrG Newsletter gives infonnation on the one 
hundred and twelve members current at that time. 37.5% were female, which is a 
high female participation rate for the period. In the UTG Denison newsletter of 
29/3175 Patsy Jones notes that she is a founder member ofthe Women's Electoral 
Lobby (WEL) (a cross-partisan women's lobby organisation which originated in 
Melbourne in February 1972). A number of other women members of the UTG were 
also WEL members. She urged women members to overcome their apparent 
reluctance to appear in the newsletter as 'UTG personalities'. 
Home claims that although the UTG membership was not large' ... the UTG can 
probably claim that relatively it has more active members than any political party in 
Tasmania ... Labor and LiberaL.branches usually have few active members other than 
office holders. UTG members, on the other hand, have good records of attendance at 
branch meetings and other activities.' (Home, n.d., 16). This high level of activist 
participation also seems to be characteristic of Green parties, at least in their 
fonnative stages. This may be partly a function of the great diversity of activities 
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engaged in by Greens, many of which do not fit standard definitions of 'political 
activity' as they are not focussed on parliament or parliamentary election campaigns. 
They include community-based projects like recycling schemes, tree planting 
initiatives, community gardens, food co-operatives, beach clean-ups and pollution 
studies. In 1974 the Huon Valley UTG branch drafted a catalogue of resources 
(plant, machinery, etc.) for the 'mutual benefit of organic farmers in the group' 
(UTG Newsletter No. 8., July 1974, 8). This is typical of the 'personal is political' 
approach of Green politics, which strongly emphasises practising what is preached 
and not divorcing means and ends. This is encapsulated in a phrase used by Greens -
'living the future today'. 
When this personal lifestyle dimension is added to the conventional political 
activities of lobbying, submission writing, petitioning, policy fonnation, 
campaigning, etc. it may seem that members of Green parties carry a heavy political 
burden. Conversely, though, activists can move between hands-on domestic and 
neighbourhood activities and more conventional politics according to their personal 
preferences. Further, as well as believing that the 'micro' politics is as important as 
politics further up the chain, members find it can also provide more sources of 
personal support and satisfaction. 
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Greens in communities 
It is in community initiatives that the 'culture' of Greens can be said to be rooted, in 
a parallel to the original formation oflabour 'culture' within unions and 
workingmen's clubs and pubs, and conservative/liberal 'culture' in farmer and 
businessmen's associations. The New Left in America was committed to 
community-level organising from the early Sixties onwards, from voter registration 
in towns in the Deep South through to community kitchens, gardens, law centres, 
child-care centres, etc. in the cities of the north. Coming closer in time and space to 
the formation of Green parties, Germany in the 1970s provides the clearest example 
of the proliferation of Biirgerlnitiativen (citizen's initiatives), many of them around 
pressing environmental issues, which fed into the formation of Die Griinen 
(HUlsberg, 1988,54-58). 
The same process, in an understated way, was going on in Australia and New 
Zealand in the early 1970s. Tasmanian examples include the Lake Pedder Action 
Committee, the Battery Point Society (an organisation to protect the historic 
character of Hobart's oldest inner city settlement) and the Save the Derwent 
Committee (the Derwent is the major river which flows into Hobart's harbour). 
Dick Jones saw these intitiatives as 
' ... the defence by the community of their own collective interests against 
attacks from industrialists, planners, speculators and politicians ... ' and as 
' ... examples of defensive confrontation by a working-class community as an 
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alternative to the protection of the environment by politicians and bureaucrats 
who respond on the basis of their own priorities, reinforcing their own 
over-centralised structures.' (Jones, 1990, 38-39). 
The most celebrated Australian example of green community initiatives is the 'Green 
Bans' on 'development' imposed between 1971 and 1975 by the New South Wales 
Builders Labourers Federation, (which were described in Chapter Four). The Lake 
Pedder Action CommitteelUTG attempted to import the Green Ban concept to 
Tasmania by inviting BLF leader Jack Mundey to address a public meeting in 
Hobart, where he proposed that Tasmanian unions place a 'blue ban' on constructing 
the dam which would drown Lake Pedder. But the unions in Tasmania, and also the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions hierarchy, would have none of it, and the last 
citizen-based hope of saving the lake was lost (Kiernan, 1990, 32-33). The lesson 
learned by the UTG, and by its successor the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, was to 
work more assiduously at community level to build up community support for 
environmental protection measures. This was a strategy which was used and was 
ultimately successful in the Gordon-below-Franklin dam dispute, and which paid off 
in terms of providing an electoral base for Green politicians in the late 1980s. 
The significance of community organisation to Green party political formation in 
Australia had become apparent to leftist political commentators by the late 1980s. 
In an Arena editorial entitled 'From Barcaldine to Wesley Vale' Doug White (1989) 
notes that Christine Milne was elected spokesperson for CROPS (Concerned 
Residents Opposed to Pulp Mill Siting - the citizen's initiative opposing the 
proposed pulp mill at Wesley Vale in north-western Tasmania) in March 1988. 
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This was the beginning of a political career which took her into Parliament as a 
Green Independent a year later (Curran, 1989, 13) and on to the leadership of the 
Tasmanian Green Party in Parliament. One year after Milne and her community 
group fought - and won - the Wesley Vale issue, White commented 'Nearly a 
century ago, striking shearers in the camps at Barcaldine and Clermont confronted 
squatters, police and the courts. Out of that confrontation the Australian Labor Party 
was born, and political life in Australia took a new shape. It remain~ to be seen 
whether Wesley Vale is the beginning of a new shaping of Australian politics, 
or whether it is a preliminary skirmish to such a reshaping.' (White, 1989, 6). 
White may have been wrong about whether Wesley Vale was the definitive moment 
in such a reshaping, as he was probably unaware of the basis of earlier UTG 
activities, which were not documented at the time he wrote his editorial. Yet he was 
certainly correct in identifying a key characteristic of the Green political support 
base, which was significant in the 1970s and 1980s. 
He also identified some ofthe difficulties of the 'community' approach. In summary, 
the communities that Greens seek to work in and for do not have the clear 
geographical or occupational boundaries of the traditional social democrat/labour 
and conservative/liberal parties. These include unions, big work sites and working 
class neighbourhoods for social democrats/labour, and farmers and rural districts, 
business people and wealthy suburbs for the conservatives/liberals. 
In fact a typical Green community initiative crosses class boundaries, redefines 
geography according to ecological rather than cadastral criteria, and seeks to breach 
gender, ethnic and other barriers. In 1973 Dick Jones spoke of the desirability of 
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having political groups' ... organised for infiltration, confrontation, or the creation of 
alternatives ... sharing a general style and basic principles of analysis and strategy.' 
(Jones, 1990, 39). Such groups would also share a willingness to take up issues and 
campaigns raised by each other, and would share information widely . 
. Jones favoured the small group approach because it ensured flexibility and 
adaptability to local situations, spread the capacity to take initiatives and avoided the 
danger of losing the critical abilities of people by submerging them in an enormous 
movement. However he felt it might be necessary for the movement to take on a 
formal organisational identity and that what would sustain such an organisation was 
co-operation in action. It should be a network of small groups, with links between 
members of a personal basis, rather than everyone identifying with a common centre 
or leadership. He thought this was about to happen in Tasmania, and the UTG was 
conceived as such an organisation. 
The UTG exemplified the 'new community' approach to party politics, and it was a 
theme that was carried on by the Values Party. As was noted in Chapter Five, the 
primary Object ofthe Values Party, as stated in its constitution, was to build ajust, 
sustainable, community-based society, and the many community-based activities 
engaged in by the party (recorded in Chapter Five and here) show that this was not 
just empty rhetoric. The first Green party in the United Kingdom, formed in 1973, 
explicitly picked up on the community theme by taking the name 'People Party', 
This was reprised again in Germany with the emphasis on 'citizens', Environmental 
health, protection and sustainability was a concern which citizens of all classes, races 
and religions could relate to in some way, and the challenge for Green parties was to 
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link. this concern with a participatory and egalitarian way of achieving ecological 
results. 
New Zealand Greens 
The Values Party drew its members from much the same socio-economic milieu as 
the UTG. Of the first batch of forty-two Values candidates for the 1972 general 
election nearly one quarter (21 %) were full time students. Those employed in the 
education sector were next equal (12%), with company executives and managers. 
Journalists, engineer/scientists and accountants took nearly 8% each, and there were 
two farmer candidates. Other middle class occupations among candidates were civil 
servant, lawyer, economist, budgetary officer and youth worker. A tailor, a plumber, 
a postal worker and a builder's labourer represented the lower rungs of the 
occupational ladder. 
This occupational spread is not remarkable for New Zealand political candidates, 
especially those who are successful. The Labour Party has always attracted education 
sector candidates, and its 'working class' candidates have generally been 
professional unionists rather than unskilled workers or trades-folk. The National 
Party has appealed more to business, professional and farmer candidates, resulting in 
parliaments containing MPs who are better educated and/or higher in class status 
than the majority of the popUlation (Forster, 1969). Values obviously drew from all 
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these groups, but not on the basis of 'class-interest' identification. (Tony Brunt 
recalls a 'fiery Marxist' accusing him of being a traitor to his class because he came 
from a blue-collar background.) (Brunt, 1997,4) What is a departure from previous 
political parties (as is also apparent with the UTG) is the level of involvement and 
support by young people. The candidates had an average age of 29 years, which was 
unprecedented then and still is today. 
A 1973 survey (Luff, 1974) of the membership ofthe Canterbury and Otago 
branches of the Values Party (n = 191) showed that 59% were aged 29 or under. 
Fifty-five per cent were in the twenty-thirty age group - this compared with only 
12% in the general population at this time. So Values was genuinely a youth party. 
It was also a party of the educated (as one would expect from the high number of 
students). Sixty-three and a half per cent had or were getting university education, 
which compares with only 2.2% of the general population who had a university 
qualification at that time. This involvement in tertiary education shows up in the 
occupations pursued by Values members. Twenty-four per cent of the male members 
and 15% of the female members were students, while 32.5% ofthe men and 25% of 
the women worked in professional occupations. As with the UTG, there was a high 
number of (educated) housewives (35%), and the next largest grouping for both men 
and women was office and sales workers (13.5%) while 12% ofthe males but no 
females were proprietors and managers. 
The religious preferences of the early Canterbury and Otago Values members are 
consistent with subsequent findings on the religious orientation of New Zealand 
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Greens (Dann, 1995b; Miller, 1991). The majority in the Luff survey (72%) 
espoused no religion, with 22% of these describing themselves as humanists. 
Of the remainder 16% described themselves as agnostics, 9% as atheists, 4% as 
rationalists, and 12.5% as 'Other'. The 'others' included the usual range of inventive 
and exclusive Green 'philosophies' - some of which may have been intended as 
jokes. Luffs sample came up with 'Chariot ofthe Gods', 'Cosmic Existentialists' 
and 'being myself. The 22% who describe themselves as humanists are interesting 
in view of Tony Brunt's use of the term to characterise the Values Party. 
Initially the youthful protestors of the 1960s and 1970s were described as al~enated 
from society, probably because they advocated a radical rejection of what they saw 
as the dominant values underlying the politics and culture of the industrialised 
democracies, which included racism, sexism, militarism, imperialism and 
environmental exterminism. However, further investigation of the 'new politics' 
groups (Parkin, 1968) showed that far from being social outcasts or isolates, the 
members of these groups were actively involved in all sorts of civil society 
organisations, both political and non-political. Values Party members were no 
exception. Of the one hundred and ninety-one people in the Luff survey 43% 
belonged to between two and five groups which attempted to influence social and 
political thought and practice, and 76.5% belonged to one or more groups. 
These groups were as various as the Woodcraft Folk (a non-religious, non-
establishment alternative to Boy Scouts and Girl Guides), the Mental Health 
Association, the Yippies, and the Hillsborough Residents Association. The highest 
percentage (28%) belonged to one or both of the two anti-racism groups active in 
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New Zealand at the time - the Citizens Association for Racial Equality and Halt All 
Racist Tours. Eight per cent belonged to the Committee on Vietnam, which 
campaigned against the war in Vietnam, and 6% to Ecology Action. Forty-nine 
percent of the Values membership had written letters to government or non-
government members of parliament, and Luff notes that Values members were 
political activists in all senses of the word, with active participation in the 'new 
politics' groups being as important as party membership. He quotes Julia Park, 
spokesperson for the Otago branch, as saying 'The Party is neither a political group 
nor a social movement, but a dynamic combination of both' , and Geoff Neill 
(Deputy-Leader, 1972) saying 'The Values movement is bigger than the party.' 
(Luff, 1974, 7). 
The next study of Values membership corroborated Luff's findings. Jenny Heal 
(1976) took a representative sample of 100 members (5% of Values membership in 
1976 - 47 from the North Island and 53 from the South Island). Thirty-one percent of 
her sample had university education; 52% had tertiary education of some kind, 
including university education. Of occupational groups the largest was teachers 
(19%). Only 7% were students, which is a big difference from the Luff sample, but is 
probably accounted for by the sample not being restricted to branches in university 
towns. Ten percent were clerical workers, and another 10% were in the higher 
echelons of business, especially computer systems and management. Farmers and 
scientists (6%) each, were the next biggest groups, followed by tradesmen and 
engineers (5% each). Four percent were doing research, while 3% each were 
homemakers, teclmicians, draughtsmen and storemen. The range of occupations 
included a shearer, train driver, airline pilot, manufacturing jeweller, psychologist, 
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lawyer, nurse, photographer and union organiser. Despite the variety of occupations 
the highest percentage (49%) were employed by local or central government either 
directly e.g. as a civil servant or council officer or indirectly e.g. as a teacher or 
hospital worker, 21 % were employed by private business and industrial concerns, 
and a high 20% were self-employed. 
Like the 1973 sample, the 1976 members were not invoh-:ed with mainstream 
religion. Sixty-eight percent were rationalists, humanists, agnostics, atheists or 
'other'. Alienated from the concept of God they may have been, but not from the 
concept and practice of society. Only 18% of the sample did not belong to another 
organisation, while 42% belonged to two-three groups and 27% listed 5 or more. 
Of the joiners, 52% held or had held elected posts in their organisations. Protest and 
reform groups were the favoured types of organisation (58%), community and family 
groups came next with 44%, and then came environmental groups (41 %). 
Membership was not confined to 'do-gooding' organisations -sports and hobby 
groups attracted 56% of the respondents, and 26% were involved in cultural and 
ethnic community activities. Heal therefore endorses the conclusions of Frank Parkin 
in his study of the members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great 
Britain (Parkin, 1968) that Greens are the 'integrated alienated'. They are alienated 
from dominant social values and institutions like monarchy, religion, private 
property, militarism and nationalism, but are integrated into alternative value and 
meaning-making structures, such as non-conforming families, and political and 
social groups. 
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Suzanne Maciewell (1977) also surveyed Values members in mid-1976. Her sample 
was much larger than Heal's, with 753 valid survey forms returned - this represents 
about two thirds of the total membership at that time. Three years after the Luff 
study the Values membership was still young, with 51 % under 40 years of age. 
Maciewell asked race and nationality questions, which Luff and Heal did not. 
These showed that only 1.6% of Values members were Maori - less than one quarter 
ofthe percentage of Maori in the total population at that time, while Pacific Islanders 
were also under-represented with 0.4%. 
The majority of the members (83%) were born in New Zealand, while of the 
foreign-born the largest number (12% of the total membership) were born in the 
United Kingdom. However a 17% foreign membership was higher than the 
percentage of foreign-born New Zealanders in the general population at that time. 
Overseas influence on Values could also have come from members travelling 
abroad. Mackwell found that in addition to the 17% who had been born overseas an 
additional 30% of the membership had lived or travelled abroad, mainly in First 
World, developed countries. There was especially strong contact with the UK and 
the USA - unsurprising in view of the common language and related cultures of these 
places. When asked why they came to New Zealand, 14% of those born overseas 
cited 'the physical environment' as a major reason - this compares with 2% ofthe 
New Zealand-born who gave it as a reason for returning home. 
This data on the foreign connections of Values members may go a long way towards 
explaining why and how the party had a global orientation from the beginning, and 
indeed why Green politics started in New Zealand, rather than in countries which are 
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more 'politically self-sufficient'. The actual firsthand experience so many of Values 
members had of the effects of industrialism, consumerism, pollution, racism, etc. 
overseas may also have been more important in shaping their political orientation 
than anything that was received through the 'alternative' media. In trying to discover 
where Values members got their 'alternative' ideas from, Maciewell concluded that it 
was not from reading 'alternative' magazines and journals. Less than one in ten in 
he~ sample read New Zealand environmental magazines, and the women in the 
sample were more likely to read conventional women's magazines than New 
Zealand's feminist magazine, Broadsheet. However, a large majority read daily and 
weekly news and current affairs papers, including foreign ones. Fourteen percent 
read the Guardian Weekly from the UK, and 8% read the New Statesman. A quarter 
had read Limits to Growth, and 22% had read Charles Reich's 1969 book The 
Greening of America. However, by far the most popular piece of proto-Green 
literature (62.5% had read it) was Alvin Toffler's Future Shock. 
Once again other social and political groups seemed to be the main source of 
inspiration and information. Environmentalist organisations, including local urban 
lifestyle groups as well as nation-wide organisations like Friends of the Earth, 
assumed more importance (26% belonged to them) than they did in the Luff and 
Heal studies, while anti-racist groups were less important at 8%. (The high 
percentage in the Luff sample may have been due to Christchurch being the national 
headquarters of Halt All Racist Tours.) However, the other new social movements 
are well represented, with members also belonging to women's groups (12%), peace 
and anti-nuclear groups (12%) and population control/abortion law reform groups 
(7%). Cultural and sporting organisations had more support from members than civil 
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liberties or gay liberation groups, and animal protection organisations made their 
first appearance with just 0.9%. Most members had participated in direct action 
political activities via their political organisations, with 42% having been on an anti-
nuclear war demonstration and 26% on an anti-Vietnam war demonstration. 
Only 6% had taken direct action on an environmental issue. 
With regard to educational levels, Madewell found the same patterns as Luff and 
Heal. Eighty-one percent had some form of tertiary education- 45.5% had university 
education. Occupational categories also paralleled the earlier findings, with lots of 
professionals, plus white and pink-collar workers and housewives. Sixty-five percent 
of the total was working for local or central government, 16% were self-employed 
and only 12% were employed by the private sector. As one would expect from this 
occupational profile, the average income of members was higher than that for the 
total popUlation of employees, with the Values average being $3,840 above the 
national average for 1975. 
Political origins and orientations 
What direction of the political compass did the Values members come from? Heal 
and Mackwell asked their respondents which party, if any, they had previously 
belonged too. Most had not belonged to any party - 82% for Heal and 86% for 
Mackwell. Of those who had belonged to a party, the most popular one was Labour, 
followed by the National Party. Socialist parties were the next most popular. 
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Aynsley Kellow (1975) corrected and re-worked the figures supplied by Luff (1974) 
about previous party affiliations and where Values votes were most likely to come 
from, to contest Luffs view that Values did not appeal to past Labour voters, and 
that Values was more likely to pull votes from National. On the contrary, Kellow 
demonstrates (1975, 75) that Values members were more likely to have voted 
Labour in the past. Opinion polls since 1972 also showed Values attracting two 
voters from Labour for every one from National. (My own small survey of 1990s 
Green Party members (Dann, 1995b) showed a dear pattern of 1970s Values voters 
switching to Labour in the 1980s and back to the Green Party in the 1990s.) 
When Mackwell asked who they would vote for if there was no Values candidate in 
their electorate 48% said Labour and only 7.6% favoured National. Heal found a 
similar pattern, with 46% opting for Labour and 30% preferring not to vote for 
anyone rather than support National (4%). So the impression given by both political 
scientists (Levine, 1975) and political commentators (Simpson, 1973; Tanner, 1973) 
at the time of the 1972 election that Values voters were 'limousine liberals' or 'green 
. Tories', who came from and would return to the National fold, seems to be 
inaccurate. The preferences ofthe members themselves show that they felt more 
comfortable with the left end of the political spectrum. The reasons for this were 
investigated by Kellow (1975) in his study of policy making developments in 
Values. 
When the party's first organiser, Norman Smith, was asked to characterise Values 
members and supporters he drew a circular diagram (Figure 2). The new social 
movements are clearly represented - women's liberation, ecology, the anti-nuclear 
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movement and the' globalists' who promoted international aid and human rights. 
There are also the single-issue campaigns - in Values case the most significant of 
these were the campaigns for drug, homosexual and abortion law reform. Then there 
are the would-be politicos who were disenchanted with the other parties, plus leftists, 
including ex-communists, who saw Values as a more holistic and/or realistic 
approach to left politics in New Zealand. The 'lost, lonely and wretched' category 
will be recognised by anyone who has had much to do with 'alternative' politics-
'lost souls' who were especially attracted to a party which placed such an emphasis 
on human values and promised a kinder way of doing politics. Most importantly 
there is the group of 'new evangelists', which includes Tony Brunt and Smith 
himself (probably significantly they were both brought up in religious homes -
Smith's was Methodist and Brunt's Christian Scientist). These people were the 
'prophets', the ones who felt that everything was wrong, and needed to be changed 
from the base up. They were not merely synthesising the demands of the different 
issue groups into a potentially incoherent package - they were basing their calls for 
reform on a re-prioritising of political means and ends, a re-prioritising which put 
quality of human existence before quantity of material goods and company profits. 
Smith's categorisation fits closely with the survey data, with the addition ofthe 
psychological elements of the 'lost' and the 'prophets' - who would have shared the 
class, race and other characteristics of the majority of party members. (Although 
Brunt and Smith were both from blue-collar homes, they had immigrant parents or 
grandparents - in Smith's case from Britain and in Brunt's from Samoa - and they 
both fit the education and occupation 'Green' profile.) 
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FIGURE 2 
From all this data about the first Greens, are there any especially significant trends, 
which are relevant to the development of Green politics, which require further 
exploration? Three specific factors were extremely salient to the first Greens 
themselves. One of them (youth) no longer seems to be relevant. The second one 
(class) has undergone significant changes in actuality and in analysis since the 
1960s. The third one (humanity) is the one that has been used as a Green rallying 
point and basis for global political analysis. I conclude this chapter with a brief 
description of each of these factors, and an indication of how they may (or may not) 
affect the future development of Green politics. 
Youth, class and humanity 
The youth of the participants in the New Left and the new social movements was an 
issue of extreme interest and constant comment at the time. In a publishing bulge 
which parallels the passage of the 'baby boomers' through the institutions of tertiary 
education in the 1960s and early 1970s, the social scientists and commentators of the 
time produced book after book and paper after paper on the 'youth revolt' 
phenomenon. 1 As we have seen, the first Greens were much younger than the 
members of other parties. The founder of the Values Party was self-consciously 
aware of the significance of this. 
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By the late 1980s the works on the 'youth revolt' were utterly passe and gathering 
dust. They no longer seemed relevant to a world in which books about youth 
focussed largely on the problems young people themselves were experiencing 
(suicide, crime, unemployment, sexual ill-health), rather than on their efforts to 
address the problems of the world. Even for those who lived through the time it is 
hard to recall the feeling that youth were the leaders, rather than the victims, of 
social and political change, and to assess the significance of this phenomenon. 
The conditions that facilitated youthful political activity in the 1960s and 1970s have 
certainly changed. Tertiary education in New Zealand and Australia is no longer free 
to the user at the time (with costs recouped for the next generation via taxation at a 
later date). Since the 1980s there have been substantial up-front study fees, little or 
no assistance with living costs, and loans schemes which leave students heavily 
indebted by the time they finish studying. The vocationally oriented faculties (law, 
commerce, management, nursing, education, etc.) have grown substantially while 
enrolments in arts, humanities and pure sciences have shrunk in comparison. 
The significance for this in terms of political activity by the young is not being 
studied, since 'campus revolt' is no longer a reality, and nor are young people off-
campus any more likely to be politically active. (With the possible exception of 
young people being socialised into neo-liberal politics via the. commerce, 
management and law faculties, and the firms and government agencies where they 
obtain employment post-university.) 
At any rate, young people as a group are no longer 'interesting' politically, since 
they no longer appear to have much ability to influence political outcomes (at least at 
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the nation-state level). Green parties today draw most of their members from the 
middle-aged sector of society, and in this respect they no longer differ from other 
political parties. With regard to voters, however, there is some evidence from both 
Australia and New Zealand (George et aI, 1997; Donald, pers. comm.) that first 
voters (i.e. young voters) favour Green parties. At the 1999 New Zealand general 
election, 30% of the Green vote came from first voters, including previous non-
voters. Both the Australian and New Zealand Green parties set up youth wings in 
1997 and 1998 respectively. Called 'Wild Greens', they aim to appeal to those more 
interested in direct action than conventional politics. 
The second salient factor that comes from the sociological studies is of course that of 
class. Much ink has been spilled on the significance of the class origins and 
allegiances of political actors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The class 
ascriptions of members of the UTG and Values Party given by those who researched 
them have already been recorded here. But how did the first Greens see themselves 
in class terms? 
Conscious that this was an issue for both activists and commentators at the time, 
Heal asked her sample to state which class they put themselves into. Forty-three 
percent replied 'I do not recognise classes', 44% said they were 'middle class', 9% 
described themselves as 'working class' and 3% were 'other'. (Heal, 1976, 12). 
The significance of this I must leave for others to investigate. There is recent work 
(see, for example, Pakulski and Waters, 1996) on the increasing redundancy of the 
category of socio-economic class as a descriptor and predictor of political allegiance 
and activity in the late twentieth century. Other ways of conceptualising what is 
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going on (Beck, 1995; Giddens, 1991) pay attention to cross-class factors, such as 
environmental risks and personal identity. Much of this work looks at other power 
dimensions in society (such as race, gender, sexual orientation, physical and 
intellectual ability) which appear to determine political and social outcomes for 
whole groups of people in a way analogous to class status. 
This 'de-centering' of class in favour of a broader approach is the third significant 
theme that one picks up from the Values and UTG membership data. The whole 
tenor of Green politics to date has been to identify risks that apply to human beings 
as individual or collective bodies. Risks such as nuclear war and radiation, 
environmental pollution and destruction, resource depreciation and loss, extinction 
of other species, ozone depletion, acid rain, climate change, over-population and so 
on. The simplistic version of this approach has been criticised by socialists 
(Enzensberger, 1988) and feminists (Salleh, 1997) for failing to recognise the power 
of capital and of patriarchy which distribute the risks to 'humanity' along class and 
gender lines. However even a severe critic like Enzensberger is well aware that 
nuclear radiation is no respecter of class privilege, and that the concept of 'the 
workers' bomb' is as stupid and dangerous as 'the bosses' bomb'. 
Therefore Green politics has disrupted the century-old focus on parties representing 
class interests as the most significant political actors, and has contributed to a 
breakdown in the salience of the concept of class in the interpretation of political 
behaviours. This is not the same as saying that Greens, because they arose from the 
middle class, were or are oblivious to the class dimension. On the contrary, the first 
Green attempts to construct a model of a sustainable economy were mindful of the 
325 
fact that a large gap between a few rich and many poor would be a destabilising and 
therefore 'non-sustainable' factor, as well as undesirable on ethical grounds. 
The relationship between the class status of the Greens and their political programme 
has already been canvassed by Robyn Eckersley (1989), and the sociological data 
from Australasia further supports the European data she used to ground her analysis. 
Whether more work needs to be done on this will depend on whether the social basis 
of Green membership changes. Are there any indications that this is happening? 
The only factor that we can be sure has changed is that of age. A quarter century 
after the creation of the first Green parties, most of the first Greens are still alive, 
albeit with more wrinkles and greying hair. Theodore Roszak, whose writings did 
much to contribute to the development of 'green consciousness' in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, predicted when being interviewed on New Zealand radio about the 
re-publication of his book, The Making of a Counter Culture, that when this 
generation retires, and gets back some of the 'free' time it had when its members 
were students without employment and child-rearing responsibilities, the world will 
see another surge of political activism. This may be the test of whether this was a 
genuine generational phenomenon in twentieth century politics. Alternatively, we 
may find that other more obviously political factors, like the escalating nature and 
awareness ofthe ecological crisis, which happened to occur at the same time, were 
more significant driving factors for the new politics. 
With regard to class, and identification with 'the community' and 'humanity' rather 
than workplace-based social groups, it is likely that the significant changes in social 
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structures consequent on 'structural reform' in the First World have already 
impacted on the Green party membership base. My 1995 study of sixty-five New 
Zealand Greens found that the average income for this group was below and not 
above the national average. This is in marked contrast to the above-average incomes 
of Values Party members in Mackwell's 1977 study (Dann 1995b; Mackwell, 1977), 
but confirming and analysing this possible trend requires much further research, 
which is not within the purview of this work. 
In summary of the global relevance of what I have been able to determine by 
canvassing the social origins and characteristics of the first Green'party members, 
I have discovered that there is ample evidence to connect them both with the global 
new social movements, and to show that they had more-than-average contact (both 
first-hand and mediated) with events and issues of global political significance. 
This meant that they had ready access to the building blocks of unique new party 
programmes, as I discuss in the next chapter. 
Notes 
1. Anyone interested in studying the 1960s youth revolt phenomenon will fmd it 
well documented in sources such as Altbach and Laufer (1972), Astin et al (1972), 
Fraser et al (1988), Glazer, (1970), Keniston (1968; 1971), Kupers (1990), McGuigan et al 
(1988), Mehnert (1978), Sampson et al (1970), Tindall (1994) and Whalen and Flacks 
(1989). 
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Chapter Seven 
Green economics and Green politics 
Left, right, both or neither? 
Once the first Green parties had established a social and political basis for their 
activities, what was distinctively new and distinctively 'Green' about the policies 
and programmes they developed? Further, in what ways did the new Green 
programmes represent a significant shift from the ideals and practice of socialist 
internationalism towards a praxis of global Green politics? 
In this chapter I take a close look at both the content of the economic policies of the 
first Green parties, and at their formation process. In each instance we see attempts 
to develop policies for local conditions which are informed by an understanding of 
the global limits to growth. This goes hand in hand with an awareness of both local 
and global inequities in the distribution of wealth. As I will argue below, it is the 
economic policies of Green parties which are unique, and which distinguish them 
definitively from social democrat and any other parties which may have strong 
pro-environmental and social policies. 
Fundamental to the first Green economic policies (although not particularly well-
articulated as such, since the first Green parties lacked the word 'globalisation' just 
328 
as they lacked the word 'Green'), is opposition to economic growth predicated on 
globalist over-production, distribution and exchange of material goods. Hence the 
line from the economic positions espoused by the first leaders of the Values Party 
(Tony Brunt and Geoff Neill) to the one taken by the current leaders of the Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand and Green MPs (Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod 
Donald) is direct and consistent. Fitzsimons and Donald, however, have to take into 
account the greatly changed conditions ofthe global and national economy when 
discussing the Green economic programme. (For what that programme looks like 
today see Green Party, 1999.) 
The other major contribution which Green politics makes to shifting 'progressive' 
politics from an international to a global discourse and practice is its confounding of 
the old political categories of Left and Right. It should be obvious by now that Left 
and Right are political categories that developed both with and from the conduct of 
politics at the nation-state level. The natioll-state's prime function was managing the 
economy. Parties could take a Left or Right position on how this should be done, 
with the Left seeking to limit the power of capital to direct the nation's affairs, and to 
redistribute wealth more equitably. The Right, on the other hand, was generally in 
favour of empowering capital, and sought to rationalise rather than eliminate or 
ameliorate social inequities. 
When globalism replaces nationalism as the preferred geo-ideologicallevel of 
operation of the erstwhile Left parties, the once-definitional political polarity ofleft 
and right is destroyed. While the social democrat/labour parties may say that they 
still stand for the redistribution of wealth, they have compromised their power to do 
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so via the nation-state, without gaining any ability to do so via global or local means. 
Hence the convergence of economic policy between 'opposition' parties which is 
apparent in all the First World democracies, with the Right position in the 
ascendancy, and fonning the basis of the 'new consensus' within and between both 
'Left' and 'Right' parties. The salient division at nation-state level politics is not 
between Left and Right, but (in the coinage popularised by Margaret Thatcher's 
government) between 'wets' and 'dries' i.e. between those within any particular 
governing party who are more or less 'hard line' on enforcing the structural reform 
agenda. 
When the first Green parties were formed these developments in the major parties 
were still to come, and yet it was apparent to the Greens from the beginning that 
something was badly wrong with the parliamentary Left (and much of the extra-
parliamentary 'old' Left too.) In the second half of this chapter I cover the discussion 
which was held at the time on whether the Values Party and the UTG were left, right, 
both or neither. Most ofthe thinking behind the pro-Green position was derived from 
the New Left and the new social movements, and hence this debate provides a good 
example of the Green genealogical developments that I began to trace in Chapter 
Four. 
The LeftlRight debate was extremely important at the time in helping to clarify what 
was new and different about Green politics. It remains important in a world in which 
the why and the how of the collapse of the traditional Left becomes more and more 
obvious as globalism advances apace. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that 
much of what was puzzling to the protagonists of the debate in the 1970s has had 
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light shed on it by the global developments of the 1980s and 1990s. The first Greens 
were still struggling for the vocabulary with which to express their new insights into 
the way the world was going, and they had to rely on old expressions used in new 
ways. Nevertheless, the debate retains its salience, although for different reasons, 
and I therefore cover its first emergence as fully as I can. I 
A new economics for a new politics 
The New Ethic of the United Tasmania Group 
, ... We know that we are living in a period of imminent breakdown - social, 
economic, political and psychological and spiritual. .. We believe in 
reconstruction; the radical regeneration of our dying society ... The study of 
history shows not a single just society, in any place at any time. But 
individual injustices have been successfully fought, and more vigorously 
today than ever before. We belong to this tradition ... We do not believe that 
modern society is specially good or specially bad. We do not believe that our 
own time is the best time ever, but it is our own, and we owe it our prime 
duty and affection.' (Jones, 1974, 1) 
Dick Jones, a founder and first leader of the United Tasmania Group, was a man 
with a new political vision. In answering the question 'Does the UTG align with the 
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Left or the Right?' in the June 1974 UTa Newsletter he carefully considered what 
both the Left and the Right had added to society, and what they had subtracted from 
it. He then advocated a new political philosophy which was based on substituting the 
unrestrained pursuit of quantity in material production and consumption, (which both 
the Left and the Right were now advocating), with a focus on approaching the 
question of the quality oflife directly. This was preferable to assuming that life 
. would get 'better' as a result of expanding economic activity. 
In the frantic one-month campaign that preceded the April 1972 Tasmanian election, 
there was little opportunity for Jones or the other UTG candidates to develop this 
new vision. Instead, the protection of one particular pristine lake became a symbol 
for a much wider and more general political orientation towards a conserver 
economy and a just, sustainable society. 
TheUTG went into the snap election of 1972 with very little formal policy. But the 
policy it did have covered the two critical areas - economics and conservation. The 
conservation programme was, as might be expected, wide-ranging. It included the 
retention of Lake Pedder, the protection and extension of national parks and reserves 
and historic buildings, a reform of public lands administration, the 
reduction/elimination of water pollution, an enquiry into the wood chip industry, 
environmental education via film, and a helicopter service to fight forest fires. 
The economic programme (see Appendix D), which is discussed in greater detail 
below, barely hints at the radical revision of mainstream economics which was later 
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adopted by the UTG. It was not until 1974 that the UTG took 'The New Ethic' as the 
founding manifesto of the new party (See Appendix B). 
'The New Ethic' is a genuine novelty among Australian political platfonns to that 
date, not the least for its focus on ethics as the basis for the platfonn. 'The New 
Ethic' flagged all of the issues that were to become the four founding principles 
adopted by Die Griinen in 1979. With regard to ecology it said 
' ... rejecting any view of man which gives him the right to exploit all of 
nature; [and] Moved by the need for a new ethic which unites man with 
nature to prevent the collapse oflife support systems of the earth; [we] 
Undertake to regulate our individual and communal needs for resources, both 
living and non-living, while preventing the wholesale extraction of our non-
replenishable resources for the satisfaction of the desire for profit; [and we] 
Undertake to husband and cherish Tasmania's living resources so that we do 
minimum damage to the web of life of which we are part while preventing 
the extinction or serious depletion of any fonn oflife by our individual, 
group, or communal actions ..... ' 
On social justice 'The New Ethic' is equally explicit 
'Concerned for the dignity of man and the value of his cultural 
heritage ... [and] Shunning the acquisition and display of individual wealth as 
an expression of greed for status or power; ... [we will] Provide institutions 
for the peaceful and unimpeded evolution of the community and for the 
maintenance of justice and equal opportunity for all people; ... Prevent 
alienation of people in their social and work roles and functions while 
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making scientific, technical, and vocational knowledge and practice free and 
open to all; Create a new community in which men and women shall be 
valued for their personal skills, for the material and non-material worth of 
these skills to groups and the whole community, and for their non-
competitive achievement in all aspects of life; Live as equal members of our 
society to maintain a community governed by rational, non-sectional law ... 
On the third Green party founding principle of democratic participation in 
decision-making 'The New Ethic' promoted group participation and private liberties 
as follows 
We shall ... Create new institutions so that all who wish may participate in 
making laws and decisions at all levels concerning the social, cultural, 
political, and economic life of the community; .. [and] Preserve specific areas 
of private and group life where private thought, speech and action is of 
individual or group importance and does not interfere unreasonably with 
others; And vest our individual and communal rights in a parliament of 
representatives chosen by all to enforce our law for as long as that power is 
not used unfairly to advantage or disadvantage any individual or group in the 
community.' 
On the fourth Green principle of non-violence, 'The New Ethic' is clear that 
physical violence is unacceptable - and so are other forms of illegitimate force 
'Condemning the misuse of power for individual or group prominence based 
on aggression against man or nature; [we shall] Change our society and our 
culture to prevent a tyranny of rationality, at the expense of values, by which 
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we may lose the unique adaptability of our species for meeting cultural and 
environmental change ... ' 
'The New Ethic' also contained a fifth element, which is unusual in the political 
context, but which was consistent with the emphasis on quality oflife. This is a 
concern for and commitment to beauty. It was expressed in this way 
'While acknowledging that Tasmania is uniquely favoured with natural 
resources, climate, form and beauty; [we] Undertake to live our private and 
communal lives in such a way that we maintain Tasmania's form and beauty 
for our own enjoyment and for the enjoyment of our children throu.gh 
unlimited future generations; [and we] Undertake to create aesthetic harmony 
between our human structures and the natural landscape where our individual 
and communal needs demand modification to the natural environment; .. .' 
This parallels the passionate concern for beauty in the urban environment expressed 
by Tony Brunt in his first political speech. Both the first Green parties were 
concerned that unrestrained industrial growth was not only unsustainable and 
accompanied by gross injustices, it was also ugly, and that enough people cared 
about this to make remedying it a viable political plank. While this has not been a 
major focus point for Green parties then or now, it has been inherent in Green 
environmental and social policies, which have concentrated heavily on preserving 
natural beauty and cultural heritage, and encouraging and supporting human artistic 
creativity. 
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The UTG was supportive of efforts to preserve or enhance attractive built 
environments (such as Battery Point in Hobart), but its main focus was on the 
protection of 'wilderness' - uninhabited areas of pristine old growth forest, 
unmodified landforms, wild and unpolluted rivers, and so on. The significance of 
wilderness as a mobilising factor for the Tasmanian Green movement can scarcely 
be over-estimated. It must not be assumed, however, that this was an idealist form of 
motivation, a romantic enthusiasm of jaded urbanites with little ",.ctual experience of 
wild places. Hobart is no harsh metropolis - to the contrary, fringes of forest push 
into the suburbs and native birds, reptiles and amphibians are plentiful in urban 
streets. Geoff Holloway notes that bush walking, tertiary education and political 
activism were overlapping categories in Tasmania in the 1980s - around half of the 
members of the major bush walking clubs had tertiary education and were active in 
environmental/Green organisations (Holloway, 1991,87). Most of the activists were 
personally familiar with the wild habitats they sought to protect, and could speak 
knowledgeably as well as enthusiastically in their support. 
The UTG Programme was therefore underpinned and complemented by an 
Economic Programme (see Appendix D) that sought to move Tasmania away from 
the 'gross over-emphasis on hydro-economics' towards industrial diversification, 
which included promotion of the tourist industry. It wanted conservation-based 
management and sustainable development of the natural resource based industries 
that are significant to Tasmania (forestry, marine fisheries and agriculture), and 
diversification of public works away from the concentration on hydro-
industrialisation. 
336 
These are very specific policies, devoid of new economic theory, although consistent 
with a move towards a 'steady state' economy. Two years later, when Dick Jones 
stood for a senate seat, he presented the UTG's first policy speech. He began with a 
critique of economic management, and the failure of existing political parties to 
address impending resource shortages and to see beyond economic growth. He 
insisted: 
'It is no longer sufficient for Labor to justify endless economic growth by 
dream of eliminating poverty. Poverty in Australia is on the increase, as it is 
in the United States and other rich nations. Economic growth does not 
eliminate poverty, it simply modemises it. Mr Whitlam's advocacy of a 6% 
growth rate in the national economy is the advocacy of the ultimate suicide of 
our society. But the Liberals would not have it any different. Their devotion 
to laissez-faire capitalism is based on an unlimited attack on resources 
backed up by the exploitation of publicly owned goods such as clean air, 
fresh water and environmental amenities. Both our big political parties, and, 
as far as we can see, all the independent candidates in this election, regard 
industrialisation and endless economic and population growth as inevitable 
and desirable for Tasmania.' (Jones, 1974, 1-2) 
Jones was not only critical of the way the economy was run - he was also critical of 
its purpose. He said: 
'We need a new society with a proper community spirit - we need to care 
more for each other. We must reject materialism in favour of making people 
individually important; we must recognise that materialism only encourages 
stress, loneliness, and inequality ... Material satisfactions are no substitute for 
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spiritual content; and spiritual content will be denied any society which has 
lost the ability to live in hannony with its environment.' (Jones, 1974, 3, 4) 
He noted that young people were the first to notice how dehumanising the urban-
industrial society had become, and to protest against it. Their protest had been taken 
up by the UTG in Australia, the Values Party in New Zealand, and the People Party 
in Great Britain. Jones then went on to use the wood chip industry in Tasmania as a 
specific example of economic, environmental and aesthetic bankruptcy. He was at 
pains to point out that the destruction of their natural resources was not earning 
Tasmanians anything - it was costing them in terms of pollution and other 
'externalities', as well as direct and indirect subsidies to the companies engaged in 
resource extraction. Nor was there a pay-off in terms of increased employment. 
Jones' economic alternative was labour-intensive, light manufacturing industry with 
a high design content, employing local labour and material, requiring much less 
capital investment per job, and shifting government support towards the tertiary 
training of designers. He also wanted proper valuation of the 'National Estate' 
(publicly owned lands and other material assets) and a requirement for developers to 
pay the 'National Estate' price for land/assets so as to ensure that any development 
was really in the community'S interest. This early foray into 'Green' accounting was 
supplemented with a call for establishing an Ecological Research Institute for 
Tasmania which (among other things) would do the studies upon which natural 
resource accounts could be based. 
The economic points in this speech were edited to produce the seven page 
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'United Tasmania Group Economic Policy for Tasmania' offered at the 1975 general 
election, along with a supplementary three page 'Economic Policy' which expanded 
on the sustainable development of forestry, tourism, fishing and industry as outlined 
in the 1972 'Economic Programme,.2 
A variety of policy groups were set up at the first UTG state conference in June 
1974, and eventually developed a full range of policies. However the fact that the 
Jones speech on which the 1975 policy was based was made in May 1974 suggests 
that there was not a great interest in developing economic policy. This is the view of 
Chris Harries, a founder member of the UTG, who was active in the party for its 
whole life. (Harries, pers comm.) 
Compared to the effort the Values Party put into developing economic policy, the 
salience the subject had at the 1975 Values conference, and the leading position it 
occupies in the 1975 Values election manifesto, for example, UTG economic 
thinking must be seen as minimalist. There is no development of alternative 
economic theory and no application of 'steady state' principles to the national 
economy. Nevertheless, the specific policies advocated are consistent with a 'Green' 
approach to economics as developed by Values and later Green parties. They are also 
consistent with the philosophical orientation that is apparent in 'The New Ethic'. 
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Values-based economics 
The Values Party did not produce a single clear statement of philosophy like 
'The New Ethic'. However, it did spend some time discussing its basic orientation, 
and a lot more time debating how 'Left' or 'Right' it was. Both ofthese strands of 
thought were important when it came to formulating policy, and especially economic 
policy. 
The 1972 Values manifesto began with a stirring introduction by Tony Brunt, which 
set out the raison d'etre ofthe new party (See Appendix C). It is possible to read the 
'Introduction' as the negative side of 'The New Ethic', for it sets out the problems 
which 'The New Ethic' restates as potential positives. It emphasises the spiritual 
poverty, alienation, destruction of environment and community, and mindless pursuit 
of material goals that 'The New Ethic' addresses with constructive alternatives. 
It is followed directly by strong advocacy for two utterly novel policies, policies that 
had never been promoted by any previous political party. They are Zero Population 
Growth and Zero Economic Growth. The two policies are linked, as part of an 
attempt to develop an 'Economics of Enough' . Economic growth was said to be the 
'chief cause of pollution and damage to the environment' (New Zealand Values 
Party, 1972, 11). Its once positive social role in promoting recovery from the 1930s 
Great Depression had become a negative environmental role, 'identified with global 
disaster' (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 12). 
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The Blueprint then moved on to critique the role of uncontrolled technological 
developments in facilitating economic growth, environmental destruction and 
unemployment; to examine the alienation of workers under the current economic 
regime; and to reject growth-oriented mass consumerism and associated growth in 
production as a 'solution' to rising unemployment. 
This critique of th~ economy and of conventional economics is common to 
subsequent Green parties (see, for example, Die Griinen, n.d., Program, 6-7), and is 
what serves to definitively differentiate them from other 'alternative' parties with a 
leftist orientation which were extant in the 1960s and 1970s. What it might mean in 
terms of concrete policies to place before an electorate, however, had to be slowly 
and painfully worked out - a process that took about a year of often-heated debate in 
New Zealand. 
When the 1972 manifesto was analysed for specific economic policies, as part of the 
development of economic policy for Values which began in 1974, only five were 
found. These were 
, 1. More steeply progressive taxation of personal income and a heavier 
tax on unearned income. 
2. A thorough inquiry into land and property speculation for capital 
gam. 
3. Newspaper and magazine display advertising and television 
advertising by profit-making bodies to be non-tax deductable. 
4. Support and encouragement (would) be given to efforts by workers to 
achieve a significant degree of worker ownership. 
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5. In order to maintain full employment without unnecessary economic 
growth ... there should be a movement to a shorter working week and a 
channelling of resources into areas of greatest social need.' (Kellow, 
1975, 76) 
An analysis of the 1972 manifesto using Rokeach's method of content analysis 
(Levine, 1975) seemed to indicate that the Values Party was more focussed on a 
'liberty' rather than an 'equality' dimension (compared, for example, to the Labour 
Party). But in fact its first economic policies show a strong egalitarian bent. There is 
a concern for directing both financial resources and proprietorial power towards 
productive workers. In this respect Values shared a welfare orientation with the left 
of the Labour Party. However the central role of worker control and management of 
productive enterprises (mainly via co-operative ownership by the workers), which 
Values went on to develop in explicit detail, was genuinely new within the New 
Zealand context. It became another factor separating Values from the Labour 
tradition of trades unionism as a route to worker power and control. 
When the party regrouped at the August 1974 conference, it convened policy 
committees at the conference to consider remits that would provide guidelines to 
subsequent policy working committees. The committee considering economics at the 
conference was provided with an 'Econopak' prepared by Jennie Wrightson and 
Doug Wilson of the Kapi Mana branch of the party. It consisted of summaries of 
'current economic thinking which seems to us to be consistent with Values 
philosophy' (Econopak, 1974, 1). It was prefaced with brief and apt quotations on 
economics by thinkers as widely spread in time and space as Hannah More, Plutarch, 
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Barry Commoner, lS. Mill and E.F. Schumacher. It also threw in a quote by 
Shakespeare ('So distribution would undo excess and each man have enough. '). 
It then moved on to a seven page summary ofE.F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful, 
four pages on EJ. Mishan's 1969 Growth: the price the pay, and one page from 
The Ecologist's Blueprint/or Survival. It concluded with two pages on 'How to 
stabilise the economy', an article by Herman Daly published in The Ecologist. 
With these words in mind Working Committee Three passed three resolutions on 
economic policy, as follows: 
'3/1 Nature of Economy: 
Resolved that the Values Party abandon the terms "No-Growth" and 
"Zero-Economic Growth" to describe the type of economy it is trying 
to achieve and replace it with the term "Steady-State Economy". 
312 Economic Emphasis: 
Resolved that this conference adopt as a basis of economic and social 
policy the assertion that social growth in the areas of health, 
education, and welfare is a greater priority than industrial and 
economic growth. 
3/3 Economics Policy: 
Resolved that the Values Party affirms its belief that neither private 
enterprise nor state monopoly is a viable economic lifestyle for New 
Zealand and asserts that it would seek to establish a steady-state 
economy incorporating the following features 
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a) The elimination ofG.N.P. growth as the measure of the 
strength of the economy. 
b) Social service rather than profit to be considered the 
responsible goal for an economic enterprise. 
c) Community and worker ownership in enterprises in every 
economic field. 
d) Worker representation on boards of management. 
e) A more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth. 
f) Delegation of administrative decisions to the lowest possible 
level of operation. ' 
(N.Z. Values Party, 1974, 'Resolutions of the 1974 
Conference', 7) 
Two related resolutions, on classification of industries and resource management, 
and on land policy, were then passed, and these became the basis on which the 
Economic Policy Working Committee (EPWC) set up by the conference began 
work. Convened by Kaz Wier, a Manawatu farmer, the EPWC originally had sixteen 
members (and later co-opted several more), who were distributed the length and 
breadth of New Zealand, from Auckland and the Coromandel Peninsula to Dunedin 
and Central Otago. It contained one academically trained economist (Geoff Neill), 
and one self-taught one (John Perkins, who had written a book entitled 
Understandi1.g money, unemployment and inflation: why New Zealand is a modern 
Utopia shortly before emigrating from the USA to New Zealand in 1964). Wier set 
out the working procedure for the committee one month after the conference, in a 
round robin letter of 30 September 1974. It was a system of circulating 
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correspondence and background papers to all members, with annotations and 
recommendations. A different topic would be addressed each month, and Wier 
suggested starting with Allocation and Distribution of Resources, Pricing System, 
and Ownership and Means of Production. The letter included quotes from an 
interview that the newly elected leader of Values, Reg Clough, did with the Massey 
University student paper Chaff, in which Clough emphasises the Values preference 
for individual responsibility and worker/community ownership rather than the 'Big 
Brother State' approach to social and economic equality. 
Wier was to return to this issue in his third round robin to the EWPC of 1 January 
1975. By this stage papers had come in from all round the country. They included a 
three page paper from a Wellington sub-committee ofthe EWPC which called itself 
'Eco-work', five pages on economics from John Veitch in Invercargill, a paper on 
'Finance and the Steady State Economy' by lA. Bartram, 'Some Observations on 
the New Zealand Economy' from Richard Belton in Blenheim, and several letters 
from John Perkins in Alexandra critiquing the work to date. Geoff Neill had written 
two (very similar) articles on economics for party newsletters (Values, September 
1974) and Turning Point, November 1974). Wier was moved to note that some of 
the suggestions sent in carried a subtext - ' ... New Zealanders [are] very keen to hand 
over responsibilities to Central Government...' and he asked the EWPC to remember 
that' " ... the Values Party is against establishing huge bureaucratic organisations to 
do the work of the community" !!'. 
Geoff Neill's articles were the most comprehensive and most distinctively 'Green' of 
the 1974 economics documents. The Values September 1974 article began by raising 
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two central concerns of Green parties - allocation ofresources/wealth within the 
economy, and the impact of economic activity on the environment. The latter 
concern is the one that is principally associated with Green parties, so it is interesting 
to see Neill giving primacy to the former. He considered that 'To date Values has 
made only two major statements on its economic philosophy', and that the most 
important one was made in the form of two motions passed at the Wellington 
Regional Conference as follows: 
, 1. "That this region of the Values Party believing that all aspects of 
economic activity should be subservient to the needs of social justice, asserts 
that the organisation of New Zealand economic structures toward a fairer 
distribution of wealth is necessary. This is despite the fact that there will be a 
generally lower material standard ofliving." 
2. "That this region of the Values Party deplores the Labour 
Government's apparent belief that a policy of increased productivity without 
a simultaneous redistribution of wealth can solve New Zealand's social 
problems." 
'Our other statement', Neill continues, 'was made in [the 1972] election manifesto 
i.e. " ... economic growth is the chief cause of pollution and damage to the 
environment.'" The implications of the two statements, Neill went on to say, are that 
'The second statement is the one associated with our electoral success and 
herein lies the decision for members of the Values Party. For if we are to 
have a real go at achieving a good society we must begin work on some 
things which will not be popular with some people; perhaps even some of the 
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people who have supported us previously. For some of the things we must do 
are plainly anti-capitalist and anti-power-concentration (for example 
totalitarian socialism). "Let us make no mistake about it, the Values Party is a 
genuine radical party or it is nothing." , 
Neill then went on to discuss a steeper, more progressive tax system. This included 
the concept of a national minimu:o: income scheme - the first time this is raised as 
potential party policy. Also discussed was a reform of production which went 
' ... beyond worker participation to industrial democracy based on a decentralised 
socialisation of production' , distribution via 'community co-operative wholesaling 
enterprises' and a reform of finance which would see all banks become community 
based trustee banks. Neill favoured a shifting of trade in favour of poorer countries 
which produce goods that are not easily produced in New Zealand, and controlling 
inflation via linking economic contracts (e.g. wage agreements and pensions) with 
the Consumer Price Index. He also advocated allowing the New Zealand dollar to 
float, and a redefining of the role of central government in the economy. Finally he 
discussed an ecologically sound economy, and advocated closely policed regulations 
relating to air, water, soil, and food pollution, plus three 'eco' taxes. These would be 
a raw materials tax proportionate to the availability of the resource, a depreciation 
tax proportionate to the life of the product, and an energy tax to penalise energy 
intensive processes. He concluded by emphasising the creative and democratic 
tendencies of people, and the necessity for self-empowerment via co-operative 
action. His last words were: 
'Part of the solution is co-operation and this is the heart of the above policy 
suggestions. Ifwe learn to co-operate with nature, with others and with 
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ourselves we are getting closer to truly loving mother nature, truly loving all 
our fellow travellers, and truly loving our own being.' (Neill, 1974, 10) 
In retrospect Neill's economic vision seems to combine anarchist and utopian 
socialist features, containing elements of both individual empowerment though 
community-based co-operative activity, (the anarchist dimension) and enlightened 
social and economic planning by government (the socialist dimension). Neill was 
more impressed by Guy Salmon than the other 1972173 leaders of Values were (see 
Values Party·MS Papers 1430,2:10, Otago Region) and strongly supported his 
February 1973 anarchistic reorganisation proposals. In 1977 he wrote a heavily 
critical article for the party paper Vibes, in which he was scathing about Values' 
, ... No. 1 aim ... to achieve political power as the government of New Zealand.' 
He asked whether this was' ... so that the new world may be administered into being? 
A new world of decentralised, largely self-sustaining communities, of participatory 
democracy, of minimum central government, of self-actualisation, co-operation, 
love, freedom, health, joy, etc. - administered in?' (Neill, 1977,9). 
Although Neill may have been the strongest advocate for the 'anarchist' economic 
position, his actual proposals were strongly supported by the majority of the EPWC. 
Most ofthe committee met for face-to-face consultation for the first time in 
Wellington on 15/16 February 1975, and this gathering produced an initial three 
page report. The report was expanded into a six page article ('Towards a Co-
operative Economy') for the party paper Turning Point (Vol. 1, No.5, April 1975). 
This was published just before the fourth party conference that was held in 
Christchurch on Apri125-27, 1975. 
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Acrimonious debate (by correspondence) on whether this was a 'majority' report 
(and ifso, what the views of the 'minority' were) then ensued. Party Leader 
Reg Clough made critical remarks about the report, and also inserted his own 
opinions ('Some Views on Our Economic Directions') in the April 1975 issue of 
Turning Point. His economic thinking and departure from constitutional 
policymaking process were hotly criticised in tum by EWPC member John Perkins. 
1975 Conference Organiser Ivan Finlayson then sought to advise and be advised on 
how to structure economic policy debate and decision-making at conference, and 
there was more confusion and plenty of cross words exchanged in letters which were 
usually signed 'love and peace'. 
By the time the 1975 conference came round, Values economics had been distilled 
into eight key points (see Appendix E). These were presented to Conference, and 
were then referred, along with specific remits, to an Economics Remits Committee. 
Only when the E.R.e. had passed a remit was it presented to full Conference for 
ratification. Aynsley Kellow (1975, 16-17) was present at the conference and 
attended all E.R.e. and plenary sessions. He records that by two clever expedients 
(obtaining consensus or strong majority support for remits in the E.R.e. before 
presenting them to Conference; and dividing the remits according to their probable 
time frame into 'immediate', 'transitional' and long-term' policies), decision-making 
on economics went very smoothly. Most remits that were accepted went through 
with full or near consensus, with only one card vote being called for. 
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The conference was unanimously in favour of general remits that advocated a more 
even distribution of wealth in society. The conference also agreed that the 
government has a major role to play in the economy, especially in promoting 
regional balance, and ensuring that economic enterprises support positive social 
purposes (albeit subject to independent, research-based advice on technological, 
environmental and social consequences). However, when it carne to the mechanisms 
by which equality of income should be pursued there was division. The first motion 
put forward on a national minimum income (to supplant existing social security 
benefit and superannuation schemes) was withdrawn while its sponsor (Geoff Neill) 
lobbied and rewrote it into two more carefully worded remits which passed with 
strong support (Kellow, 1975, 19-20). The other contentious matter was a proposal 
to equalise wage rates regardless of the nature of the work - the conference was not 
prepared to accept this, however, and when it went to a card vote the remit was lost. 
The decisions made at Conference were the basis for the economic policy presented 
in the 1975 manifesto Beyond Tomorrow. Before a manifesto committee began the 
task of collating the decisions and packaging them with explanatory prose Geoff 
Neill provided further elaborations ofthe principles involved via two articles. 
('A New Economic Recipe', Turning Point, Vol. 1 No.6, May/June 1975 and 
'Values Economics', Turning Point, VoLl, No.8, September/October 1975). 
He repeated the initial eight key principles (see Appendix E) and concluded' A New 
Economic Recipe' with an epilogue that once again drew attention to an 
understanding basic to Green economics. While everyone must have enough (the 
emphasis on equality), people can be happier with less and the world will be a more 
liveable place as a result (the emphasis on ecology). 2 
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'Epilogue (What It's About) 
A stable state world economy based on equitable distribution of resources 
and co-operative community control of the means of production, finance and 
distribution. 
An economic base enabling the satisfaction ofthe basic material needs of all, 
through people working at safe, satisfying jobs. 
An economic base which supports the satisfaction of non-material human 
needs. 
An economic base for our new way of life - a way of life that knows that 
people are more important than property, and ecology more important than 
being 'rich'. 
An economy based not only on the physical necessity of limiting our material 
expansion and humanist ideals of sharing what we have, but also on the 
realisation that many wise people have chosen what we have called poverty 
as part of their path to happiness.' (Neill, 1975,6) 
This definition of 'Green' economics would seem consistent with the 
characterisation of Greens as 'post-materialist' (Inglehart, 1977). Such a 
characterisation only holds if one accepts the definition of 'materialist' as referring 
to personal material advantage, to striving after personal wealth and possessions at 
the expense of aesthetic, spiritual, and other non-tangible gratifications. In this sense 
then Green economics could be called 'non-materialist'. There is another commonly 
used meaning of 'materialism', however, and that is the philosophical antonym of 
'idealist'. In this sense a 'materialist' approach is one which has reference to the 
material basis of life which grounds all other endeavours, including spiritual and 
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aesthetic pursuits. Using this definition a strong case can be made for Green 
economics as being more materialist than any previous fonns of economics. 
Certainly the 1975 Values manifesto Beyond Tomorrow devotes 40% of its space to 
materialism in this sense, with the first section of the manifesto consisting of topics 
grouped under the theme of 'Survival'. It starts with an explanation of the stable-
state economy and moves on through population, economics, agriculture, fishing, 
forestry, industrial relations, consumerism, technology, environment and energy to 
cover most ofthe material basis of social life. (A similar fonnat was followed by Die· 
Griinen in their first programme, again with roughly 40% of the programme devoted 
to survival issues, and with the economics issues put first - Die Griinen, n.d.) 
Over twenty years after the first Green economic programme was articulated, it is 
still a matter of some annoyance to Green politicians in New Zealand that Green 
parties are seen primarily as environmental pressure groups, lacking in economic 
policy or direction. New Zealand Green leader Jeanette Fitzsimons expresses the 
environment/economy relationship as 'Tell me what your economic policy is and I 
will tell you what your environmental policy will be.' (Fitzsimons, interview, 
4.4.90). She also expresses her frustration at the failure of other parties, including 
social democrat and libertarian left parties, to recognise that environmental values 
can not be protected by 'clip-on' environmental policies, which fail to understand the 
finite and/or fragile nature of most natural resources. These genuine physical 
constraints are what neo-classical economists quaintly call 'externalities'. Fitzsimons 
wants the economics profession to face up to the detrimental environmental and 
social impacts of much industrial production and consumption, and the necessity of 
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confronting the question of just allocation directly rather than deferring it to the 
mythical redistributive character of economic growth. 
Twenty - or even fifty - years may well be too short a time for a new economic 
paradigm to become widely known and understood, let alone accepted. Nowhere in 
the world have Green parties been in a majority in any national legislature and thus 
in a position to implement a full Green economic programme. Twenty-five years 
after Values first produced such a programme the acceleration of economic 
globalisation and the consequent compromising of national sovereignty would seem 
to make it much more difficult to put into practice, even if Greens were given an 
electoral mandate. Perhaps the biggest problem facing Green economists today is not 
the remaining contradictions and omissions in the programme, but rather the lack of 
a political route to implement it. 
Looking for a label on the wrong dimension? 
In the first five years of Green party formation and political development, however, 
the debate was focussed not on how different the Green platform was from other 
platforms, but on how similar it was (or was not) to other political tendencies. This 
was particularly acute in Germany, a country with a rich heritage of political 
intellectualising, and a Green party which in its formation stages included 
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representatives from both the extreme Left and the extreme Right (Hulsberg, 1988; 
Markovits and Gorski, 1993; Parkin, 1989). 
Whether Die Griinen is or was a Left party is still of interest to some academics 
(Markovits and Gorksi, 1993), and within Green parties themselves the debate waxes 
and wanes. It was an issue that plagued the Values Party, and it came to an 
acrimonious head at the 1979 Conference at Rathkeale. This conference marked the 
beginnings of the transition from a small but strong party of some 2,000 members 
and two full-time paid staff to a much smaller (two hundred members) and weaker 
group. This attentuated group nevertheless kept the spirit of Green politics alive in 
New Zealand until merging with new Green formations in 1990. Before the 1979 
blow up, however, there had been seven years of debate. 
Is the UTG Left or Right? - Jones 
It was an issue addressed head on by Dick Jones in Tasmania just prior to the first 
UTG state conference in June 1974. 'Our struggle to save Lake Pedder pushed us 
into the political arena', he said, 'Our values were so threatened that we were forced 
to seek political power. Along the yvay, we rapidly gained knowledg~ about society 
and the condition of the community that had become hung up on material 
well-being.' This forced the UTG into an examination of the Left and the Right 
answers to political questions. Jones thought there was something useful to be found 
- and much that was useless to be rejected - in both traditions. He said: 
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'The traditional fault of the Left is to believe that everything always gets 
better; tlie traditional fault of the Right has been to believe that everything 
always gets worse. The "tough" left-wing posture leads to a dehumanising 
progressivism, a modernist arrogance. It leads to contempt for the past; man's 
origins and personality are subordinated in favour of the planned society. 
The "tough" right-wing posture leads to a hatred of every hopeful element in 
the present for fear that it will upset the conservative's psychological and 
material comfort. ' 
What was the UTG ('Green') position on modernity? Jones went on to say: 
'We believe, with the Left, that rapid change is inevitable and that it can be a 
change for the good. We believe, with the Right, that a great deal of recent 
change has been for the worse and that, ifthe world is to be saved from 
galloping self-destruction, we need to recover certain lost wisdoms of the 
past. We are not so idiotic as to sneer at science, nor do we despise or seek to 
discredit religion and the arts. We know there has to be a retreat from an 
economy of indiscriminate growth, but this will be accomplished by many 
new feats of technology rather than by reverting to prescriptions concocted 
by some romantic medievalist.' 
With regard to the role of government, he identified the 'Green' view as: 
'A central government is necessary to deal with the great central problem of 
economic resources and their just distribution. But man is naturally at home 
only in a small and largely self-governing community. Within the framework 
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of central economic allocation, each small community must have the greatest 
possible freedom to decide how it wishes to live and administer itself.' 
Jones then abandoned his relatively even-handed approach to Left and Right to claim 
a position for the UTG to the left of the Left, thus: 
'But there is one vital respect in which the United Tasmania Group can not 
balance the virtues and the enlightenment of Left and Right. We see the need 
for equality in terms that place us to the left of almost the whole existing 
Left. Even if we do not believe this by nature and on principle, we have been 
forced to adopt this position by the sheer dangers and demands of the present 
economic situation. The imminent economic breakdown demands that we 
should aim at a genuine equality of living standards at least within our 
Australian community to start with .. .In the face of universal and drastic 
shortages, man must learn to share the available resources with absolute 
justice between them ... the only conceivable alternative to a determined policy 
of radical equality is a totalitarian rule by the wealthy. We can safely predict 
that its life would be nasty, brutish and short. A radical social revolution is an 
urgent necessity.' 
Jones advocated that this revolution should treasure and honour the past or it would 
be as psychologically intolerable as previous attempts at revolution, and would fail 
accordingly. New attempts at living in community should be encouraged, and above 
all: 
' ... we have to make our governments take drastic action to preserve and 
regenerate our small scale communities. Our task, over the next two years, is 
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to produce policies for this purpose. We seek political power to ensure their 
implementation. The squabbles of Left and Right are irrelevant to the need 
for reconstruction ... The United Tasmania Group can be the instrument for 
achieving the first worthwhile community reconstruction in the developed 
world ... Traditional politics has little place in the minds of those who would 
reach such goals.' (Jones, 1974) 
Is the. Values Party socialist or radical?" - McDavitt 
Early Values Party statements show a similar 'lefter than Left' commitment to social 
and economic equality, combined with an identical rejection of the Big Brother 
bureaucratic state means to this end, and an endorsement of co-operative, 
communitarian alternatives. Three pages of the 1972 Values manifesto were devoted 
to 'Fostering Community', and the economic principles enunciated by Geoff Neill 
(see above) and supported by the Economic Policy Working Committee show an 
equally strong commitment to this approach. Ifequality is seen as the salient marker 
of 'Leftism', then Green parties have always been left on this issue. In this matter the 
first two Green parties were (and still are) much closer to the 1968 stance of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit (currently a Green EMP), with his proclamation of the left-wing 
alternative to obsolete communism, than they were or are to the social conservatism 
of Teddy Goldsmith and his fellow ecologist writers/supporters of Blueprintfor 
Survival. 
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However, 'Left' is not only a matter of goals but also of means. Directly after the 
1975 election Terry McDavitt (a member of the Wellington 'Eco-work' group in 
1974, and later General Secretary of the party) wrote a long reflection entitled 
'Beyond Socialism' (McDavitt, 1975). He started from the point that during the 
election campaign many political commentators and voters had labelled Values 
'socialist', and that a lot of campaign energy had gone into answering questions on 
whether this was or was not the case. Noting that Values had addressed important 
questions such as 'Do you need to change ownership and management of economic 
and political structures in order to achieve your view of how society should be, or are 
existing structures capable of achieving this?' McDavitt conceded that the manifesto, 
Beyond Tomorrow, had failed to give a full justification for the answers it came up 
with. He therefore saw that Values would have to do more work to provide answers 
to the current (inconsistent) charges being levelled against it - that it was idealist, or 
that it was socialist. 
Going on to define socialism as 'scientific, materialistic and deterministic', McDavitt 
contrasts Values with socialism to show that Values is 'unsocialistic' thus: 
'Where traditional socialism proposes centralism (in the economy, in social 
services, for example) Values proposes decentralisation; where traditional 
socialism proposes material economic growth (to 'prove' that socialism is 
better economics, per Krushchev, or to pay for expanded social services, as 
per orthodox economists) Values proposes a stabilised popUlation and 
economy; where traditional socialism proposes the end of capital power, 
Values actually proposes that it should form 25 percent of Direction; where 
traditional socialism ignores, or if true to working class Tory prejUdice, 
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opposes liberalisation of legal restraints in the areas of individual freedom, 
Values espouses this as policy; where traditional socialism ignores the 
question of limits, Values takes this as a central theme; and where traditional 
socialism promotes sectional (workers') interests, Values espouses the 
co-operation of all interests in the process of decision-making at community 
levels. There are, of course, socialist countries and even stray socialists who 
would agree with some of these ideas. To that extent, I would say, they are 
not being true to traditional socialism.' (McDavitt, 1975, 17) 
Speculating on why there were these differences between Values and socialism, 
McDavitt decided that there had been two watersheds in history since the creation of 
socialism. These were the 1930s Great Depression and the late 1960s 'revolution'. 
The significance and relevance of these events had passed socialism by, so that it had 
become' ... rigid as an ideology, incapable of recognising new historical conditions ... ' 
(McDavitt, 1975, 17). Values, in contrast, was new and refreshing and non-
dogmatic, according to McDavitt - although he conceded that this brought problems 
of uncertainty and inconsistency. 
McDavitt also saw a second fundamental difference between socialism and Values, 
one that he saw as more significant. McDavitt saw Values as being part of the 
Radical, not the Socialist tradition, and he identified William Blake, Theodore 
Roszak, E.F. Schumacher and Ivan Illich3 as key exemplars of this tradition. 
He quoted extensively from another radical, the anarchist ex-Marxist Dwight 
MacDonald. MacDonald believed that radicals, unlike socialists, ' ... reject the 
concept ofProgress ... judge things by their present meaning and effect [on human 
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affairs], ... think the ability of science to guide us has been overrated, and ... seek to 
redress the balance by emphasising the ethical aspects of politics. [Radicals] feel that 
the firmest ground for that human liberation which was the goal of the old Left is the 
ground not of history (or science) but ofthose non-historical values (truth, justice, 
love [sharing, conservation, co-operation] which Marx has made unfashionable 
among socialists ... ' .. 
McDavitt seconds MacDonald by reiterating the ethical rather than the 'scientific' 
basis ofthe Values (Green) quest for social justice, and insisting that ends must not 
be divorced from means. He then discusses the way in which Kiwi [New Zealand] 
radicals could and should do what Kiwi socialists have failed to do, namely to 
develop a Kiwi radicalism where they failed to develop a Kiwi socialism. This would 
include rejecting the assimilation of the Maori people into Pakeha culture and society 
and instead supporting, fostering and actively identifying with the Maori 
Renaissance. 
However, an ethics-based radicalism does not add up to a total political philosophy, 
and McDavitt identifies other questions that must be addressed e.g. the question of 
scale (decentralist/centralist) and government (participation/representation). He also 
insists that 'We can not go beyond socialism until we have mined its riches, and 
there are many of them' , and these include its analysis and rejection of capitalism, 
and its methodical and consistent approach to practical problems. The latter 
McDavitt saw as a valuable corrective to the utopianism apparent in much of Values 
(Green) thinking. After offering a chart which acknowledged what was radical in 
socialism and defined what wasn't, (see Appendix F) McDavitt concluded: 
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'Values transcends socialism. It aims not at the socialist society but at a better 
society. In accepting the humanising aspects of the socialist legacy, Values is 
placed on the left of the socialist-capitalist continuum; in rejecting the 
dehumanising aspects of mechanism, Values is placed on the radical side of 
the radical-mechanist continuum It is precisely this extra dimension that 
makes Values relevant to New Zealand here and now, and the alternative 
political philosophy while at the same time making socialism irrelevant, not 
really an alternative because it is entrenched in the mechanistic status quo.' 
(McDavitt, 1975, 20) 
Economic radicals 
Radical was also the word used by John Perkins to characterise the Values position. 
In letters to John Stewart, editor of the Christchurch Values Party newsletter 
Out-Spoke, Perkins insisted that the Values Party was a genuine radical party (as 
proclaimed by Stewart), but wanted Stewart to drop the word socialist because it was 
out-dated, an electoral handicap, and did not describe what Values really was. 
The Otago region organising conference, according to Perkins, ' ... unanimously 
declared ourselves to be radical. We decided that the classifications 'left' and 'right' 
applied to old ideas and did not fit us.' (Perkins, 1974,3) In an (unpublished) 
February 1975 letter to Stewart (by then editor of the national Values paper Turning 
Point, Perkins claimed that' ... the radical element won all the votes at the February 
meeting ofthe Economic Policy Committee. The endorsement of the most radical 
concrete actions were for a wealth tax and social rent. These were proposed and 
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advanced by two old men who are strongly imbued with the individual freedom 
hopes of nineteenth century liberalism ... Such tax and rent are the means of breaking 
down the very strong remains of capitalism. They fitted right in with the young 
idealism of Terry McDavitt...and Geoff Neill's proposal ofa minimum income for 
everyone as of right. The danger is that old men such as ... may think this is a victory 
for socialism ... There are many who do not understand that socialist theory is a 
branch of materialist orthodox economics .... ' 
Perkins then went on to critique Marxian economics specifically, and classical 
economics generally, ending 'The Values Party must supply the economic thinking 
which fits the new views of popUlation, pollution and quality of life. We have no 
monopoly on recognising those problems. So far no one else has made even a start 
on the new VALUES ECONOMICS.' (Perkins letter, 20.2.75). 
Perkins was happy to endorse the nineteenth century socialist thinkers for their 
analysis and criticisms of the concentration of power and wealth. However he was 
utterly opposed to their solution of concentrating power and wealth in 'public' 
(i.e. government) hands, arguing that this leads to abuses like the 'new class' 
bureaucracy in socialist states, and to further abuses like the jailing or execution of 
those who oppose these bureaucracies. 
Although party leaders Reg Clough (1974-1975) and Tony Kunowski (1976-78) did 
not express their sentiments on the subject as thoroughly as McDavitt, nor as often as 
Perkins, their reactions to suggestions that Values was like, or should join with, the 
Labour Party were based on similar perceptions of difference. Clough was harshly 
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critical of Labour, saying 'It says it's for the ordinary working people and it's telling 
a complete lie', citing as an example of this 'The economic measures it brought in 
recently [which] hit solely on working people on wages and salaries.' (quoted in 
Ray, 1974). 
In February 1976 Clough hotly denied that talks that he and other Values leaders 
held with Labour leader Bill Rowling and three former Labour ministers were 
designed to forge links between the two parties, but said that' ... he explained some 
basic Values policy which the Labour members did not understand.' (Mail, 3/2/76, 
'Values man says no links talk') 
When the secretary of the Sumner-Redc1iffs branch of the Labour Party wrote to 
Tony Kunowski sounding out the likelihood of exploring the 'possibility of some 
kind of co-operation', Kunowski replied at some length to point out how difficult 
this would be. He explained that such a decision could only be made by consensus 
among DELEGATES (Kunowski's emphasis) at a quarterly Values General 
Delegates Meeting. This was a structural difference between Values and Labour 
(where such decisions were made by a National Executive) which Kunowski said 
' ... reflects ... the philosophical and ideological difference between our two parties. ' 
Further, 
'We believe that the Values Party is the only party facing up to the realities 
of rapid resource depletion and environmental degradation, to human 
alienation and community breakdown. Pre-supposing to represent the 
interests of the working people of New Zealand the Labour Party has and still 
is prepared to tolerate monopoly capitalism and the profligate growth that it 
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needs for its own survival. [Labour] will attempt once again to 'con' the New 
Zealand voter that they can manage the irrational capitalist system better than 
the capitalists themselves.' (Kunowski, 1977) 
Kunowski responded in much the same way to a letter from Bruce Beetham, leader 
of the Social Credit Political League, suggesting that Values, Social Credit and 
Labour should hold talks with a view to fonning one new party. The idea had been 
discussed at the Values General Delegates Meeting of August 1976, and delegates 
felt that neither Social Credit norLabour understood the 'core' concept underlying 
the Values philosophy, which was ' ... ajust, co-operative, sustainable, 'steady-state' 
economy in which decision-making is decentralised at the lowest possible level.' 
(Kunowski, 1976) 
In November 1978 Kunowski was required to defend Values against a pre-election 
charge made in a Christchurch Star editorial (,Values on the road to socialism', 
7.11.78), that the party was 'socialist'. Commenting on the 1978 Values election 
campaign opening in Christchurch on November 6, the Star described Values 
proposal that investment funds must be used in a socially responsible manner, and 
that the major banks, finance houses, insurance companies and stock and station 
agents would be converted into co-operative enterprises, as 'the most revolutionary 
proposal ever put forward by Values'. In the Star's view it was tantamount to 
proposing a 'completely Socialist state.' Kunowski responded that 'Socialism as 
popularly defined means the complete public ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange - and that is not what Values stands for.' If Values was a 
socialist party in that sense, said Kunowski, it would be supported by the Socialist 
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Unity Party and the Socialist Action League - which in fact support Labour 
(Christchurch Star, 8.11.78, 'Values denies Socialism'). 
This public rebuttal of socialism by Kunowski seems ironic (albeit politic) in the 
light of what transpired at the party's 1979 conference five months later. Kunowski 
was strongly associated with the 'socialist faction' within Values, which was based 
in Christchurch (where Kunowski lived) and which support~d his bid for re-election 
as party leader. In his re-election 'statement of intent' Kunowski said 
'We must recognise that currently State power, either Labour or National 
variety, is wielded in the interests of private capital, domestic and foreign. 
To achieve ajust, sustainable and co-operative economy this power must be 
challenged, overcome and redistributed. The stock of non-renewable 
resources must be socially controlled. The major economic institutions must 
be co-operatively owned and controlled and operate within the framework of 
a democratic plan. This is incontrovertibly a position of the Left. Call it New 
Left, Libertarian Socialism, or whatever - but this fact must be openly 
acknowledged in Party literature, speeches and action. We can hide no 
longer.' 
Kunowski lost his bid for party leadership to his erstwhile deputy leader Margaret 
Crozier - but the conference also passed a remit declaring Values to be a socialist 
party. Despite this success, the socialists in the party began to put their energy 
elsewhere, and the party suffered a rift from which it never recovered. Party Chairer 
Dave Woodhams, who had chaired the 1973 conference at which Guy Salmon's 
anarchistic organisation proposals were accepted, and had reflected that Values was 
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left in a position of 'anarchy without the anarchist', once again had the dubious 
honour of chairing a conference divided along ideological lines. This time he 
presided over a 'socialist party devoid of socialists' (Woodhams, 1997, 1, 5). 
Some members of the socialist group, which named itself Socialist Network, put out 
several issues of a smalljoumal called Straight Left, which attempted to develop a 
'green socialist' line and organisation - but this fizzled after about a year. 
Commenting on what this confusion over 'socialism' meant in a 1978 article which 
was reprinted in Vibes (Jesson, 1978), Marxist political journalist Bruce Jesson 
analysed what he saw as the 'leftward drift' in Values, and he emphasised the 
differences identified in Terry McDavitt's 'Beyond Socialism' article between 
'Leftism' and 'radicalism'. (Although unlike McDavitt he saw ethics-based 
radicalism as inferior to scientific socialism.) He also noted that radicals of the right 
- true conservatives - could be ethically opposed to capitalism, and that there were a 
number of such people within Values (he named names), which accounted for the 
difficulties in developing a consistent economic platform. However, he saw Values 
as a 'much more authentic expression of the politics of the protest movement' than 
other Left groups in New Zealand, and definitely as a party of the Left. In fact, it had 
'established itself as New Zealand's largest and best-known left-wing organisation; 
although it differs from the other left-wing organisations in that it belongs to the 
libertarian rather than the Marxist tradition.' Libertarian Socialism - or 'anarchism' 
- were poorly developed (almost unheard of) political trends in New Zealand, and 
this (according to Jesson) was the cause of much confusion for (ignorant) political 
commentators trying to categorise the Values phenomenon. 
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Left, Right - or in front? 
By concentrating solely on the strengths (or otherwise) ofthe 'socialist' component 
of the Values platform, Jesson and other critics failed to fully investigate the 
ecological as well as the social rationale for Values 'leftism'. There is still debate 
within Green parties (including the current New Zealand Greens) over whether, or 
which, 'left' or 'right' economic and social mechanisms are most appropriate to 
reach Green goals. Nevertheless, there is one obvious and vital point on which Green 
parties are united and clearly differentiated from left parties. Crudely expressed, they 
do not believe (with Marxists, social democrats, and other socialist tendencies) that 
the way to improved material well-being and increased social equality is to bake a 
bigger cake i.e. to increase the sphere of economic production. On the contrary, 
Greens continue to insist that economic growth is part of the problem, not part of the 
solution, and it is definitely not the solution to social inequality and injustice. 
Environmental problems created by accelerating industrialised production and 
consumption have gone stratospheric, let alone global, in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. Greens are therefore not about to abandon basing their politics on 
their unique political/material assumption, expressed in the 1990 'Green Charter' 
developed by the New Zealand Green Party as: 'This world is finite, therefore 
unlimited material growth is impossible'. It is from this assumption that Greens 
derive their second principle, the principle of social justice. This is expressed by the 
1990 New Zealand Green Party 'Green Charter' as 'Unlimited material growth is 
impossible, therefore the key to social responsibility is the just distribution of social 
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and natural resources, both locally and globally.'(For the full charter, see Appendix 
A). 
Some political ecologists have criticised this derivation of equality from 
sustainability as a non sequitur, and possibly prejudicial to the sustainability goal, 
and have discussed the possibility that conservative, hierarchical, authoritarian, 
non-egalit~an ways of ensuring sustainability are likely to be more effective 
(Ophuls, 1977). Socialists who are in sympathy with both the sustainability and 
equality goals of Green politics are still at odds with the Green prescription for 
achieving these ends, namely a rejection of the pursuit of material well-being via 
mass production and consumption. The conservatives are prepared to accept that a 
high standard of living can be had by only a few under sustainability conditions; 
traditional socialists want everyone to have a 'high' standard ofliving and either 
ignore or rationalise away the sustainability consequences. 
Greens shift the goalposts by insisting that quality of life, not standard of living, is 
the aim of the sustainable economy and the just society. This stance can be 
interpreted as both Right (value conservative) and Left (fair shares of both private 
and public, material and non-material goods). While not unique as a political 
position, being strongly advocated within the British tradition, for example, by 
politicised artists such as William Blake and William Morris, and associated groups 
of radicals, anarchists and utopian socialists, it has had little traction within 
parliamentary politics before. It is recognisable as the orientation of the New Left 
and associated new social movements of the 1960s, and as we have seen there is a 
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clear transmission of personnel and policies from the New Left into Green parties. 
But how 'left' does this make Green parties? 
As is clear from the debates canvassed above, Green politicians and commentators 
on the Values Party and UTG in the 1970s could not decide just what this new 
politics was. Was more left than right, more left than left, neither left nor right, left 
but not socialist, radical but not left, left in aims but not in means, or some other 
combination or permutation? No wonder, then, that the German Greens advanced the 
bold slogan 'Neither left nor right, but in front.' Unfortunately it has never been clear 
exactly what this means. Some have chosen it to mean that Green parties must be 
interpreted on a separate environmental scale, according to how 'deep' or 'reformist' 
they are on environmental issues. This is the line taken by Hay and Haward (1988) in 
arguing that the Tasmanian Greens, with their heavy involvement in wilderness 
issues, were 'more Green' than either the mainland Australian or West European 
Greens who were more concerned with nuclear issues. But since Green politics is not 
purely environmentalism, it seems to me to be unhelpful to judge Green parties 
solely on this criterion. Some Australians came to Green politics via the conservation 
movement, and some via the peace movement, yet leading conservationists (Brown, 
1987) and peace activists (Vallentine, 1990) have spoken of the need to 'Green' their 
respective movements. Further, both Brown and Vallentine have been Green 
senators espousing a full Green platform and not simply conservation or 
disarmament. 
Perhaps the quality of life dimension - which encompasses the material standard of 
living measured in terms of food, shelter, and essential possessions, plus free 
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enjoyment of public environmental goods, plus access to non-material satisfactions 
(from educational opportunities to aesthetic experiences) - is just too complex to be 
used as a yardstick in political debate. In a political universe dominated by the 
concepts and practice of hierarchy and scarcity, a discourse based on 'either/or' 
seems 'normal', and the Green insistence on 'both/and' appears to be 'deviant'. 
Green policies and implementation mechanisms therefore appear to be ideologically 
eclectic if a LeftlRight scale is applied. This makes them easy game for critics from 
the Right who exaggerate the 'leftist' character of Green policies. An extreme 
example of this is the New Zealand National Party Energy Minister Max Bradford 
describing Green leader Jeanette Fitzsimons' Energy Efficiency bill as 'Stalinist' 
because it contains provisions for a statutory national energy efficiency and 
conservation authority (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 10.9.98). Critics from 
the Left choose to highlight supposedly 'rightist' elements in Green policies, such as 
the concern for personal and community responsibility for meeting basic needs, 
rather than reliance on the state. 
There does not appear to be a means of resolving this debate and the seeming 
'contradictions' using existing yardsticks. It remains to be seen whether a new 
'Green' dimension of analysis has formed or is forming. Or whether it will be 
possible to judge other political tendencies with a Green yardstick. One thing that is 
clear, however, is that the debate highlights the increasing irrelevance of the 
left/right labels. Until or unless the Left can reformulate a politics which addresses 
the concerns of scarcity and distribution raised by the Greens on a global scale, 
rather than a national one, the Greens will adopt the 'left' position on the spectrum 
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by default rather than by design. Similarly, until or unless social democrat/labour 
parties or their like can fonnulate an economics which addresses the environmental 
destruction and social inequities which result from the unchecked growth of the 
global economy, the Greens will continue to be regarded as a 'Left'. Not least in the 
eyes of the New Right globalists who need no longer fear opposition from the 
parliamentary labour/social democrat parties. It is to how these questions may - or 
may not - be resolved in favour of Green outcomes that I turn in my concluding 
chapter. 
Notes 
1. At this point the reader may be asking - why am I focussing on Green party policies and 
positions to describe and analyse 'Green' economics and politics? The question may seem 
specious, but it is important to answer it fully, since there are distinct differences between the 
actual policies historically advocated by Green parties, and presented by them to electorates, 
and the positions and policies advocated by Green theorists. 
For example, in the introduction to his Green Political Thought, Andrew Dobson (1990,3-7) 
makes careful distinctions between environmentalism or small g 'green' politics, and 
'ecologism' (or political ecology), which he says is big G 'Green' politics. He then considers 
whether all Green parties are truly Green in this defmition, and suggests that Die Griinen 
might therefore not be a 'real' Green party. 
In examining the actual policies of Green parties, I reject this purist philosophical approach 
to defining 'Green', to allow the first Green parties and politicians to speak for themselves. 
The debate on what is or is not 'Green' is an important one, but it must be recognised tha[ a 
debate at the level of political theory is a very different exercise from an investigation of the 
actual historical beliefs and practices of political parties and activists. 
For who gets to define what is 'Green' in the end? Philosopher Robert Goodin says we 
should ignore the 'sillier' and 'crazier' aspects of Green politics (in which he includes 
alternative lifestyles, and New Age beliefs/practices, which he names 'green heresies') 
(Goodin, 1992, 17). In contrast, the philosopher Arne Naess, originator of the concept 'deep 
ecology', actively promotes a very frugal lifestyle as an essential part of being 'Green'. 
(Naess, 1995,259-261) Political philosophers can only do what political philosophers can 
do, which is debate and advocate normative positions. 
Political activists mayor may not make use of the work of the theorists as they develop 
defmitions of 'Green' through practice. In this chapter, which sets out actual policies of the 
fust two Green parties, it can be seen that there is considerable consistency in the approaches 
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adopted by parties which had no substantive contact with each other for nearly three years. 
Both parties were drawing on ideas already developed by the theorists of political ecology, 
but they were also reacting to circumstances in their political and material environments. 
Goodin might consider that far too much effort was devoted to participating in and 
promoting 'alternative' communities; Naess might think that there was too little emphasis on 
this aspect of Green politics. Neither criticism can invalidate what actually happened, or the 
label 'Green'. In this chapter I focus on what the first Greens actually said, wrote and did to 
develop the flrst Green policies and positions, in the belief that the historical record of party 
positions is at least as important as philosophical debate in determining what Green politics 
'really' is. It is also arguably more important in determining what gets translated into 
political practice as 'Green' politics. 
2. Neither of these documents are dated, but the use of content from the 1974 speech in the 
'United Tasmania Group Economic Policy for Tasmania' and the reference to Labor being 
out of power for three years in 'Economic Policy' means that they were not earlier than 
1975. The only other material dealing with economic policy in the UTG archive is a 
newsletter report on the UTG policy speech, State elections, 1976, which gives the same 
economic specifics. 
3 Ivan Illich's books were popular with Values readers. In her 1978 report to Values 
conference International secretary Virginia Horrocks reported that when I1Iich visited 
Auckland he had a breakfast meeting with Values Leaders Tony Kunowski and Margaret 
Crozier, and other leading Values members, and he visited a Values commune. In a letter to 
Tony Kunowski (McDavitt, 18.8.79) Terry McDavitt wrote 'Ivan IIIich picked up a copy of 
Critical Issues [a 1978 Values election booklet] ... while here, and read it and raved about it. • 
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Chapter Eight 
The future will be Green - or not at all? 
Research questions re-visited 
What does knowing where Green parties came from tell us about where they might 
be going, and how they might get there? In this concluding chapter I re-visit the four 
fundamental questions I raised in Chapter One, and then go on to briefly examine the 
extent to which the forces which created and shaped Green politics are still 
operating, and what this means for the future of the Greens. 
The cause behind the causes 
My first question was 'What waS causing the global environmental and social 
degradation and destruction that Greens were reacting to in their distinctive fashion, 
and when did it start operating?' 
The answer to this question was of course economic globalisation, defined as the 
world-wide expansion of profit-seeking economic enterprise, based on industrialised 
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methods of production and consumption. Lacking the term' globalisation', which 
was not coined until the late 1980s, the first Greens spoke of industrialism as an 
ideology as well as a practice, of over-consumption, and of economic growth, as 
'the problem'. But at the core of these facets of the problem was the fact that this 
economic model was being applied globally, with negative social and environmental 
consequences (outlined in Chapter Two) appearing right around the world, and often 
far from their original source. Geographically, New Zealand and Tasmania appear to 
be isolated islands; politically and economically, this is not the case. 
The implications ofthis displacement of the geographical concepts of centre and 
periphery, as political and economic networks form unevenly across the globe, 
I discuss further below, as one ofthe external challenges facing Green politics. 
The parties behind the cause 
The second question was 'Why were no other party political tendencies coming up 
with a 'Green' response?' As we have seen, the other parties, including (most 
significantly) the social democrat/labour parties, were enthusiastic and largely 
uncritical supporters of economic growth, industrial production, mass consumption 
- and globalisation. Why the social democrat/labour parties changed so dramatically 
(that is, the internal and external dynamic that caused them to abandon the nationalist 
route to their policy goals), was not within my research brief, and requires separate 
investigation. For the purposes of demonstrating that a space in the parliamentary 
political spectrum was opened up for Green parties it is sufficient to show that the 
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change did in fact take place, and that far from adopting the Green critique and 
programme the labour parties opted for globalism. 
In the intervening years, there have been no signs of the Australasian labour parties 
either making a return to nationalist economic management, or developing a critical 
response to globalisation. Indeed, they are now implicated in the suppression of 
anti-globalist politica~ activity, as I outline below. While the outward form of the 
mass left-of-centre party is therefore still retained by the labour parties, the content is 
sadly lacking, and it is both a symptom of and reason for the drop in party 
membership and overall political participation, which is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
The movers and shakers 
In answering the third question 'Who (which individuals and groups) actually 
created Green politics, and who were their direct political antecedents?' I began with 
the global political antecedents, in the form of the New Left and the new social 
movements on a world-wide scale, and I concentrated on theorists and practitioners 
who it seemed to me were the most authentic ancestors of the Greens in thought and 
deed. It was relatively easy to demonstrate the connections between the global 
beginnings of Green politics and the first Green parties in Australasia. Indeed the 
first New Zealand Greens, (as the comments by Dave Woodhams, Margaret Crozier 
and Dave Straton cited in Chapter Five show), recognised them at the time. 
Subsequent Euro-based interpretations have ignored or obscured them. The 1960s 
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political base and legacy of the Greens may be both a help and a hindrance to doing 
politics in the twenty-first century, and I look at how and why under 'Internal 
Difficulties', below. 
Thinking locally, acting globally 
The hardest question to answer has been the fourth one - 'What were the 
connections between the locally specific creation of the first Green parties and the 
global factors which give rise to Green politics?' In this regard I have given an 
account of how individuals, practices and ideas crossed national boundaries with far 
greater ease and frequency in the latter half of the twentieth century than was 
possible in the first half. However demonstrating these historically specific 
connections, while important to proving the case, is also in some ways beside the 
point. Behind the actual connections lies the more significant capacity for 
connection, and even more importantly the will to connect. 
As capital followed its expansionist imperative across the globe, it made use of and 
further developed capacities to connect and conduct business in faster, denser and 
more extensive ways than ever before, while backing this increased operating 
capacity with the relentless will to increase profits. An effective oppositional 
politics, therefore, has to develop the same capacity, and be driven by an equally 
strong will, albeit to different ends. Whether Green politics exhibits that will and that 
capacity, or can develop them, is another key question for the future of Green 
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parties, and I briefly consider some of the relevant factors affecting it in the coverage 
of challenges facing the Greens given below. 
Time and change 
On the eve of the second millenium, then, Green parties have been in existence for 
over a quarter of a century - or is it a mere twenty-seven years? Whether they are old 
or young in world historical terms is hard to judge, as the experience of living in a 
globally mediated world includes the feeling that there is an accelerating succession 
of historically significant events. But perhaps this feeling is more of an impression 
gained from daily banner headlines, hourly radio news bulletins, and continuous 
'news' channels like CNN than a reality based on truly significant changes, which 
may be happening more slowly. Making the case for a genuine acceleration, one can 
point to the big differences between the political, economic and social circumstances 
in which the first Green parties were formed, and the ones in which they find 
themselves today. For although I have argued that the underlying logic of 
globalisation connects the consumption boom and alienated lifestyle protests of the 
1960s with the global financial chaos and basic survival protests of the 1990s, 
nevertheless the times both feel and are very different, and seem to require a 
re-thinking of political strategies. 
377 
In the rest of this chapter I therefore explore the ways in which the times have 
changed to give us globalisation as we know it today, thus presenting a set of what 
I call external challenges to Green parties; and I then look at whether and how Green 
parties have been aware of the changing circumstances and have adapted or are 
adapting their political principles and processes to suit - the internal difficulties. 
From both sides I see a convergence of problems and issues, which can be 
characterised as a crisis of democracy. The first Green parties were reacting to what 
they saw as deficiencies in democracy in their respective nation-states, and calling 
for and practising greater participation. Twenty years on not only had overall 
participation decreased, but the very concept of nation-state-based democracy 
appeared to be a dying ideal. I illustrate how and why this is so with examples from 
New Zealand. This is not only because I have access to the most up-to-the-minute 
information from New Zealand. More significantly, New Zealand's long tradition of 
Green politics, and its peculiar recent history of voluntary and radical adoption of 
globalist economic and social reforms, means that New Zealand acts a bell wether in 
the global economy and polity. 
External challenges 
With regard to the external circumstances most likely to impact on Green politics in 
the future, then, the most important factor that will shape politics in the early twenty-
first century will continue to be the expansion of the global economy. This will be 
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both a result of and facilitated by the further development of the 'informational' 
mode of production. Manuel Castells summarises how it will happen thus: 
'The global economy will expand in the twenty-first century, using substantial 
increases in the power of telecommunications and information processing. It will 
penetrate all countries, all territories, all cultures, and all financial networks, 
relentlessly scanning the planet for new opportunities for profit-making. But it will 
do so selectively, linking valuable segments and discarding used-up, or irrelevant, 
locales and people. The territorial unevenness of production will result in an 
extraordinary geography of differential value-making that will sharply contrast 
countries, regions and metropolitan areas. Valuable locales and people will be found 
everywhere, even in sub-Saharan Africa ... But switched offterritories and people will 
also be found everywhere, albeit in different proportions. The planet is being 
segmented into clearly distinct spaces, defined by different time regimes.' (Castells, 
1998, 354). 
What (further) impacts will this uneven expansion of the global economy have on 
politics at the nation-state level? The most significant one appears to be on the re-
definition of the traditional security role of the nation-state. Take a country in which 
almost all of the economic enterprises (such as external transport, internal and 
external communications, power generation, forests), which were once considered to 
be strategic assets - and hence better off in public ownership - have been privatised 
and are largely foreign-owned. This is the case for New Zealand. In such a country 
the original point of military forces (to defend the country from a foreign take-over) 
seems largely redundant, and the emphasis shifts to suppressing anti-globalists 
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within the nation-state, and either ignoring or rationalising away the dangers posed 
by the rogue globalists without. 
Another significant aspect of the acceleration of globalisation, both then and in the 
future, is the role of the global media, and the impact they have on how politics is 
conducted locally, nationally and globally. I therefore look at what is happening in 
this area, and particularly at attempts to use the interactive sphere of cyberspace as 
an alternative to traditional political arenas. 
The third and vital external circumstance affecting the development of Green politics 
is the collapse of democratic participation at nation-state level, which has reached 
crisis proportions, and is a major circumstance limiting the growth of Green parties 
and politics. 
Insecure security? 
In the 'excluded' zones, which now form a 'Fourth World' of material and 
infonnational poverty, with associated ill-health, illiteracy, crime and violence 
(Castells, 1998; 70-161), the political response to exclusion is seldom pretty. 
From the hatred towards women enacted physically by the Taliban militiamen in 
Afghanistan through to the verbal hatred expressed towards Aborigines and 
non-white immigrants by Pauline Hanson's followers in Australia, we can find 
example after example of a retreat into fundamentalist, simplistic and violent 
'solutions' to the problems and stresses imposed by globalisation. The ancient 
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human characteristic of projecting fear and anger on to an easily distinguished out-
group, and rallying to defend one's own group, which was doubtless functional in 
the days of Viking and Tartar raids, is tragically inappropriate in a world of abstract 
networks of power. Neither Hutu nor Tutsi as ethnic groups were responsible for the 
beggaring of Rwanda through structural adjustment - the international financial 
institution technocrats and ideologues who were remain safely and comfortably 
behind their computer screens half a world away (Chossudovsky, 1998, 111-120). 
In the twenty-first century security for most of the world's population will depend 
not on strong national armies and/or armouries, but on gaining some control over the 
policies and practices of the international financial institutions, transnational 
companies and their nation-state based functionaries. This is vital so that social 
. welfare and amenity are not reduced to the point where 'molecular' or full scale civil 
war breaks out, and citizens live in constant fear of crime and terrorism. 
Global geopolitics will continue to be multilateralist, with regional security and 
economic blocs (e.g. NATO/the EU, ASEAN/APEC) playing an increasing role in 
shaping political geography. Such blocs will determine who is 'friend' or 'enemy', 
and will offer the chief means of preventing or ameliorating civil and border 
conflicts. I An increasing role for non-state providers of security is also already 
apparent and likely to increase.2 
Multi and transnational economic institutions, linked into global networks which are 
centred on the 'Paris and London clubs' (the G-7 nations) will continue to set the 
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ground rules and enforce the 'iron laws' of global capitalism. They will link formally 
through world and regional summits of various kind~. At such summits 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be permitted to hold parallel 
conferences so long as there is no geographical overlap and minimal personnel 
interchange (as per the Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero, 1992). (Although it is 
possible that the 'battle of Seattle' in December 1999 may have marked the 
beginning of the end for NGO passivity with respect to global trade negotiations.) 
However the NGOs will find it extremely difficult to even find out about, let alone 
influence, the informal global linkages taking place at exclusive gatherings from 
which the national and global publics are totally excluded. Such gatherings are both 
a product of globalisation, and a producer of it. The 1989 Mont Pelerin Society 
conference has already been discussed (Chapter Two). In 1999 New Zealand hosted 
another major globalist gathering, the 'World Economic Leaders Summit' of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (APEC). Around $50 million of public 
money was budgeted for this summit, most of it for the heaviest 'security' provisions 
New Zealand has ever seen. The summit budget did not include the costs, both 
financial and social, of amending the New Zealand Arms Act to allow the 
bodyguards of foreign leaders to bring their own weapons into New Zealand, a 
country where the police force has never been routinely armed (McKinnon, 1998a). 
Nor did it include the expense ofthe security dummy run, 'Lawman '98', where the 
New Zealand military, police and Security Intelligence Service co-operated in the 
largest counter-terrorist exercise ever held in New Zealand (Horton, 1998,4).3 
Foreign Minister Don McKinnon's official October 1998 announcement of APEC 
coming to New Zealand (McKinnon, 1998b) provides such a good example of 
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globalisation in action at nation-state level that it is reproduced in full as Appendix 
G. Among the salient points to note is the use of the tenn 'economy' to replace the 
tenns nation, state, or country. Even where these 'economies' appear to have nation~ 
state names. For example, 'From November the existing eighteen member 
economies will be joined by three new members - Russia, Vietnam and Peru. Other 
economies are queuing up. ,4 Also noteworthy is McKinnon's promotion of APEC as 
a trade event of considerable significance to New Zealand in and of itself. He states 
that the estimated $65 million that the 4000+ delegates and 2500 global media 
representatives will spend in New Zealand, plus the incalculable 'value ofthe 
international exposure' of New Zealand, constitutes a pretty good rate of return on an 
investment [of public money] of$44 million. McKinnon's comments on ABAC 
(the APEC Business Advisory group) are also infonnative. ABAC has three top 
business representatives from each member 'economy', meets at the same time as 
APEC, reports directly to the 'economic' leaders, and 'has assumed an important 
monitoring role within APEC.' To complete the confusion about where the economy 
ends and the state starts, which appears to be rampant in the New Zealand 
government, the chair of ABAC for 1999 is a former New Zealand Minister of Trade 
(who is also a millionaire businessman). The other two New Zealand representatives 
are Douglas Myers, another millionaire with transnational business interests (plus a 
stalwart ofthe Business Roundtable and attendee at the Mont Pelerin Society 
conference), and Fran Wilde, a former Labour MP, a former Mayor of Wellington, 
and now a business consultant. Somewhat disingenuously, in light of the roll call of 
movers and shakers he has just given us, McKinnon then pads his press release with 
the statement 'Globalisation is largely driven by technological change.' 
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Numerous other examples from New Zealand alone, let alone world-wide, can be 
given to show how the concepts of 'freedom' and security' have been deformed by 
the globalists. This poses a challenge to Greens and others seeking to even enter the 
global debate on trade liberalisation, economic reform, and related matters. Not all 
countries will have bothered to amend their security legislation to legally permit their 
security intelligence agency to direct its attention to 'subversion' of the country's 
'economic wellbeing', as New Zealand did in 1996 (with the support of both the 
National and Labour parties), let alone followed through by issuing non-specific, 
unlimited warrants covering the' breaking and entering of the homes of 'economic 
subversives'.s Of course this will seem very tame - even enviable - to Third World 
fair trade activists, who have to endure far worse than law-bending and petty 
harassment. But First and Third World activists would concur that what we see here 
is the paradoxical extension of the power and force available to the nation-state 
being exercised to further undermine the actual sovereignty of the state, and place it 
in the role of handmaiden to globalist interests. 
Which brings us to the key 'external' challenge facing Greens and other anti-
globalist political actors - the transformation ofthe nation-state from the defender of 
the public good of its citizens to the denier and betrayer of it. As Susan Strange 
expresses it, given that in the past two decades we have seen an increase in 
government interference in the lives of ordinary citizens, how is it possible to 
proclaim a retreat by government, a decline of the authority of the state within its 
territorial frontiers? The answer, Strange says' ... relates not to the quantity of 
authority exercised by the governments of most territorial states, but to the quality of 
that authority. It rests on the failure of most governments to discharge those very 
384 
basic functions for which the state as an institution was created - the maintenance of 
civil law and order, the defence of the territory ... the guarantee of sound money to the 
economy, and the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules regarding the basic 
exchanges of property .. .' (Strange, 1996, xii). 
Strange reiterates the views already canvassed (in Chapter Two) regarding the 
co-constitutive nature of the nation, the state and 'their' currency, expressing it as 
'The necessity of the state as a public good, in short, arose with the emergence of a 
developed market economy. Modem nationalism - as often imagined as real- was in 
large part the creation of modem capitalism. The market economy could not function 
properly without the political framework provided by the state. National sentiments 
of identity and loyalty provided the glue that gave social cohesion to the political 
framework. Where territorial states had existed before the birth of a capitalist 
economy, they had done so not so much as a public good but as a private perquisite 
ofthe powerful. The very idea of a social contract could not have been conceived 
without the economic necessity of civic co-operation between state and society.' 
(Strange, 1996, Xii).6 
Today we live in a world where most states are not prepared to defend their once 
constitutive currency, let alone sustainable livelihoods for their citizens. Hence the 
very real possibility that unscrupulous foreign exchange (forex) traders could 
collapse a small national economy as easily as one took down Britain's oldest bank 
(Fay, 1996; Gapper and Denton, 1996; Rawnsley, 1995). This almost happened to 
New Zealand in 1987 when a proprietory trader for Bankers Trust in New York 
began speculating on the New Zealand dollar (the kiwi) just after the Wall Street 
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crash. He extended his position in borrowed kiwi so far that when asked by a 
colleague 'How big is your short position in kiwi?' he deflected the question by 
answering 'How large is the money supply of New Zealand?' (Jesson, 1996). 
Eventually the 'over-valued' kiwi started to fall and the trader began selling his 
borrowed dollars, making a profit of over $50 million. Meanwhile New Zealanders 
remained oblivious to the fact that a foreign individual was gambling with the money 
needed to finance the New Zealand economy and hence the~r jobs, their pay packets, 
their schools, their hospitals, and so on. What was New Zealand's response to this 
situation? There was no official or public response - it is rumoured that the Reserve 
Bank wrote a stiffletter to Bankers Trust. (More information about the excessive 
influence of the finance sector on New Zealand politics, and New Zealand's 
economic vulnerability, can be found in Jesson, 1999.) 
The Asian financial crisis of 1998 was a product of this sort of speculative short-
selling behaviour (Chossudovsky, 1999), and illustrates just how vulnerable the 
world's money supply is. Such engineered crises of course affect the only sources of 
'security' most people know, (ownership and/or use of a piece ofland or paid 
employment), as crashing firms sack employees and banks call in loans to farmers. 
Society is thus further destabilised, and more vulnerable to internal violence - and to 
challenges to the globalist definition of 'security'. But how can the challengers 
seeking non-violent solutions, such as Green parties, propagate their alternative 
opinions and build a social consensus around them? 
386 
MQI,aging the media? 
Despite the plethora of local and global mass media, it was nine years before the 
'news' of the 1987 attack on New Zealand's currency became public in New 
Zealand, and then it came via a small, left-wing publication. This is just one minor 
example of the fact that the severing of the connection between economy, nation and 
state has been both facilitated and compounded by the rise of privati sed mass media. 
While it is not immediately obvious why or how the de-regulation of the media 
market, and the increasing freedom of print media and broadcasters from 
government control or interference (Castells, 1996,340-342; 1997,254-257) should 
further exacerbate the split between nation and state, in practice this is what does 
occur. For of course the large and potentially lucrative national broadcasting 
networks are sold to transnational corporates. While there has been a countervailing 
growth of local and specialised media as a result of de-regulation, none of these are 
mass media. Also very few of them are public media in the sense that the state-
owned broadcasters were, in that they were/are financed largely with public money, 
collected via licence fees and taxes, rather than by advertisements placed by large 
companIes. 
While TV audiences may not be as 'dumb' or manipulated by the increasingly inane 
and lowest common denominator programming which results when shows must 
avoid offending the advertisers' potential markets, as some commentators think they 
are,7 the idiocy of the content of the majority of broadcasts is not the real problem. 
The problem - for the health of democracy - is twofold. Manuel Castells focuses 
primarily on the fact that in the Information Age the media have become 
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'the privileged space of politics', thus without a presence in the media' ... there is no 
chance of winning or exercising power' (Castells, 1997,311; emphasis added). 
'Outside the media sphere there is only political marginality', says Castells. He 
further argues that' ... this framing of politics by their capture in the space of the 
media (a trend characteristic of the Information Age) impacts not only elections, but 
political organisation, decision-making, and governance, ultimately modifying the 
nature ofthe relationship between state and society.' (Castells, 1997,312). The end 
result of this is a shift from party-based representative democracy to mediacracy 
(Castells.1997,317). 
Media usurpation of the traditional spaces of politics may not be an unmitigated bad 
thing. Castells for one doesn't think so, since the old-style parties weren't that 
inclusive or representative and have become less so. (Although that could well be in 
part a result of media usurpation.) But there is still the problem that in the profit-
driven, globally-owned media the amount of time and space allocated to factual 
coverage and informed debate of the governance and government of the nation-state 
shrinks dramatically, and is replaced by a rapidly-paced 'game show' approach to 
coverage. Less attention is paid to what politicians and other political actors have to 
say, and they have to say it faster than ever before. As just one example of this, the 
average sound-bite length shrank from 42 seconds in 1968 to less than 10 seconds in 
1992. Further, in-depth interviews with political actors have been largely replaced by 
'pundit shows' that showcase garrulous, rude commentators who reinforce the 
perception that politics is a zero-sum game (Castells, 1997, 321-22). Under media 
lights, the definition of what is 'political' news also becomes increasingly soft and 
amorphous by picking up on the 'personality' approach adopted by the media to 
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other public figures deemed worthy of coverage. Hence the extensive coverage of 
politicians altering their 'image'. This phenomenon has reached new lows in New 
Zealand, where the two largest parties are both led by women. Hence when one of 
them changes her style of spectacles or the other gets her hair cut differently this can 
be 'political' news for a week. 
A politics based on media 'personalities' and gamesmanship is also a politics 
peculiarly liable and able to become a politics based on scandal (Castells, 1997, 
337). Hence the 'expose saga' approach to political reporting, which has become a 
dominant style since Watergate, which in itself has given a new coinage to the 
English language (the latest being the ClintonlLewinsky affair, a.k.a. Zippergate). 
This approach to politics brings it in line with the fictional soap operas that are a 
television staple. The focus on petty personal details effectively obscures the very 
real underlying issues of power, control and participation which political scandals 
generally raise.8 Further, the media scandal approach to politics shades very easily 
into the media dirty tricks approach, in which the ultimate score is to successfully 
smear the opposition one day before the election, i.e. in time for the smear to be 
widely disseminated by the media, but without leaving time for the opposition to do 
'damage control'. Anti-Green political forces in Australia have a very strong grasp 
of this tactic. This started as early as 1972 with the (publicly-funded) advertisement 
placed in the Tasmanian papers by the Hydro-Electric Commission on the eve of the 
1972 snap election, which claimed that voting for the United Tasmania Group would 
lead to a rise in consumer power prices. Some years later there was another attempt 
to throw an election via a story that came out two days before polling day claiming 
that 'greenies' were endangering lives by putting a bomb on a logging railway line 
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(Burton, 1995b, 4-7). These smears, of course, need not be true - so long as they are 
'good copy' they will run, and do their dirty work. Global public relations finns now 
include specialists in political spin doctoring (Beder, 1997) and have even developed 
ongoing ways to discredit green politics through the media, including the creation of 
fake environmental groups, such as Mothers Opposed to Pollution, which was 
financed by cardboard drink carton manufacturers to oppose the use of plastic 
beverage containers on 'environmental grounds' (Burton,1995a; Megalli and 
Friedman, 1991). 
New Zealand provides a good example of the way the media transfonns politics even 
as it provides a new space for it. The country now has four free-to-air nation-wide 
tdevision networks (for a population of only 3.6 million), instead of the one state-
owned and controlled national channel it had in 1972 when the Values Party 
launched itself via a current affairs show (see Chapter Five). Yet not one ofthose 
four channels runs a regular dedicated current affairs programme which conducts 
extended, in-depth interviews with politicians, would-be politicians, or other 
significant political actors. (In 1972 the one state-owned channel ran two such 
programmes weekly.) Only the state-funded, non-commercial AM radio network, the 
aptly named National Radio, still provides this fonn of public service. One of the TV 
channels does provide a 'live' political pundit show, named after the 'personality' 
who hosts it. At the time of writing this show was being promoted with the claim 
'Cause when it's live, the truth is written all over their faces.' (,Ralston Live', 
New Zealand Listener, 1999), which is of dubious veracity, but certainly underscores 
the point of the power of real-time, visual media. 
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The impact on political coverage and debate due to privatisation and foreign 
ownership of the broadcasting media seems to be particularly marked (although most 
viewers have more complaints about the steady and inordinate increase in 
advertising rather than the decrease in the quantity and quality of political 
journalism) (Rosenberg, 1996). However it is also occurring in the print media. 
Over 90% ofthe metropolitan daily newspapers in New Zealand are owned by 
foreign media transnationals (Hope, 1993), and the attention they pay to national 
politics has also decreased. The Press, the Murdoch group-owned daily newspaper in 
Christchurch, seldom features national level political news stories on its fTont page 
any mores. It has also largely replaced political and social opinion pieces written by 
informed local people (which it used to run four to five times a week) with 
syndicated columns written by out-of-town professional commentators. 
On television and in the newspapers this leads to a state of affairs that may be more 
accurately described as 'dumbing', rather than 'dumbing down'. On matters of 
national political importance the mass media are literally silent. Hence Bill 
Rosenberg (1996) argues that the commercialisation of the media has contributed far 
more effectively to the stifling of democratic debate in New Zealand than occasional 
government bans on the publication of 'sensitive' information ever did in the past. 
He considers that the only way to start reviving democracy is to revive genuinely 
public media - media which are owned by the public, operated for the public good, 
and reach a majority of the pUblic. 
The most important medium for this purpose is the one that is the most pervasive and 
the most seductive - television. As Castells expresses it 'The social impact of 
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television works in the binary mode: to be or not to be.' (Castells, 1996, 336). 
Television is the premier medium of 'real virtuality'; in the Information Age - it is 
the ultimate arbiter of whether something 'has happened' or not. Virtual seeing is 
real believing. As I discuss further on in this chapter, this poses particular problems 
for Green parties, which are a creation of the television era (see Chapters Four and 
Five), and have a symbiotic relationship with the media. The problems are both 
practical (how to get on to major networks in prime time as 'real' n~ws on a regular 
basis) and theoretical. Does participating in 'politics as spectacle' further debase the 
currency of discursive democracy and make it less rather than more likely that the 
Green ideal of active citizen participation in political decision-making will be 
achieved? 
Any exacerbation of the air of real virtuality that surrounds politics in the late 
twentieth century, feeding the perception that politics is something that one watches 
a global elite do on television rather than something that one does locally with one's 
fellow citizens, might only serve to deepen the current crisis of democracy. Nor, as I 
will argue below, is one of the twenty-first century attempts to address the problem -
the bypassing of mass mediated politics via involvement in the seemingly more 
egalitarian and participatory zone of cyberspace - as unproblematic and liberatory as 
it may first appear. . 
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The redefinition of democracy 
Ifthe constitutive and constitutional relationship between state and nation, the 
economic and social contract, no longer prevails, what hope is there for parties and 
other political actors trying to conduct democratic, progressive politics under the 'old 
rules' of national sovereignty? This is really the biggest challenge facing Greens and 
other pro-democracy forces today. For the fact ofthe matter is that the citizens of the 
First World democracies have been 'voting with their feet' for the past two decades, 
by simply withdrawing from involveinent in electoral politics at nation-state level. 
Voter turnouts and party memberships have declined dramatically. The phenomenon 
has been most marked in countries that were formerly leaders in extending 
democracy, and have latterly been leaders in promoting and practising globalist 
politics. These include the USA and New Zealand.9 There can be no question that 
the formal democratic process within First World nation-states is in crisis, a crisis of 
legitimacy that is both a cause and a result of a crisis in participation. 
Do the citizens who are 'dropping out' in their millions first go through a process of 
reaching a considered conclusion about where that the real power over decisions that 
directly affect their daily lives has gone? When they think about it, do they conclude 
that decision-making power over important issues - such as the quality and price of 
the food they eat, the safety of their streets, the employment options open to them, 
their educational opportunities, the range and cost of health care, and the transport 
available to them - no longer resides with the national government? That the 
government has been deliberately devolved to 'market mechanisms', international 
financial institutions, transnational corporations and other faceless, non-democratic, 
393 
non-accountable globalist constructs? Or do they simply respond in a less calculated 
way to the Zeitgeist? Whichever route they take, the net effect appears to be the same 
- an increase in cynicism and apathy about the possibilities of democratic politics, 
and a consequent decline in involvement in real time and space politics. 
Cyber-pollies? 
Has there been a corresponding shift to conducting politics in virtual time and space, 
which can make up for the reality deficit? I have already given an example of a 
successful anti-globalist campaign conducted via the Internet (Chapter Two). 
Castells (1997, 129) gives other examples of successful Net use by global 
environmental activists, while Appendix H provides an example of a 1998 
New Zealand Greens initiative to provide rapid virtual support (mainly via fax) for 
the campaign against the Jabiluka uranium mine in northern Australia. 
The first Greens were both the creation and the co-creators of the Information Age, 
and then and now tend to be enthusiastic about technologies which allow for 
networking. New Zealand Greens take this passion to the point of designating their 
provincial representatives on the party's national executive 'Executive Networkers', 
and the entire executive is linked by an e-mailing list on which it conducts its 
business between 'meeting' on monthly conference calls. The party also operates 
two national e-lists for members, GreenNews and GreenViews, for posting 
information and conducting debate, and these lists in their tum spin off to city-based 
Green e-lists, and to other addresses and sites of party and non-party green interest 
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and action. The Green Party website receives a lot of hits from overseas. In 1998 it 
even received two requests from the USA via the site for membership papers, which 
puzzled the membership secretary as neither inquirer appeared to be a New Zealand 
citizen or resident and therefore entitled to vote in New Zealand. (Collins, pers 
comm, 3.8.98) Was this a positive statement (a sort of 'citizens without frontiers' 
initiative), or merely indicative of the low level of American knowledge about world 
geography and politics? 
Quirky aberrations like this aside, the possibilities for politics in cyberspace seem 
exciting. Is this where politics will happen in the twenty-first century? Yes and no. 
The downside of all this cyber-participation is that it both reflects, and further 
exacerbates, the divide between the information and technology rich and the 
information and technology poor (which these days are increasingly one and the 
same thing). This in tum has important implications for democracy. Even within the 
comparatively well-off New Zealand Greens, only 10-20% of the membership is 
currently able (or in some cases willing) to devote the material and time resources 
required for cyber-democracy. By the mid-1990s the Internet was estimated to have 
25 million users world-wide, and the capacity to double in a year (Castells, 1996, 
345). But even ifby the twenty-first century the projections for increase come true, 
and hundreds of millions become connected, with a world population of six billion 
and rising this means that 80-90% will still be out ofthe loop. Many countries 
(especially those in sub-Saharan Africa) do not even have the necessary physical 
infrastructure for Net connection, such as a reliable source of electric power plus 
telephone line. If they do have access to a line they are largely dependent for 
connection on charitable organisations in the North, such as GreenNet, which is the 
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largest Internet Service Provider for Africa (Aurigi and Graham, 1998, 62; Castells, 
1998, 92-93; Haywood, 1998, 24-26; Holderness, 1998, 43-47). It is hard to 
impossible to enter the Information Age without the legacy of the industrial era. 
Since the' ... switched-off territories and peoples will be found everywhere, albeit in 
different proportions.' (CasteUs, 1998,354), attempting to use the Net as a sort of 
town meeting place for the purposes of doing politics on a global scale merely 
displaces existing social and economic inequities into cyberspacelO, and does nothing 
to address the crisis of democracy at the natIon-state (or global) level. The Net has 
been and will be an important tool for globa1 political campaigning (as we have 
already seen with the MAl example given in Chapter Two), but this must not be 
confused with democratic participation in the true sense of the term. 
Finally, it would-be somewhat naIve of Greens to think that they have got the 
political jump on the corporates via any superior ability to use cyber means of 
politicking. Already there is evidence that both corporates and government agencies 
make regular visits to campaign websites to check out and presumably try and 
anticipate the opposition. Chris Wheeler, (1999, 10), gives examples of Monsanto 
visiting a site devoted to exposing the toxicity of the artificial sweetener aspartame 
- which it markets as Nutrasweet - sixty-eight times in one week, while in another 
week the Federal Drug Administration visited the site one hundred and twenty nine 
times. Cyber-politics certainly has an agreeable air of freedom about it, but does this 
compensate for what it lacks in equality? 
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Doing democracy differently 
The political effects of economic and technological globalisation make clear the 
extent to which the standard definition of 'democracy' is based upon representation 
and negotiation at nation-state level. At the end of the twentieth century it seems that 
the struggle for the right of every adult citizen to participate in national level 
decision-mak.ing, which dominated the politics of the excluded for most of the 
nineteenth century, and was only won after great sacrifices, has been rendered null 
and void as the powerhouse of capital shifts from the national to the global level. 
Ifthat is so, is there any point in trying to invent or re-invent a democratic politics 
based on the nation-state? 
As Greens generally do much better in elections to the sub-national and 
supranational levels than to the national level, it is tempting to reply that they have 
their answer there. But that would be to ignore the fact that the nation-state will still 
playa role, even ifno longer a sovereign role, in detennining political outcomes, 
including outcomes at the sub and supranational levels. As Hirst and Thompson 
express it (quoted in Castells, 1997,304) 
'The emerging fonns of governance of international markets and other 
economic processes involve the major national governments but in a new 
role: states come to function less as "sovereign" entities and more as 
components of an international "polity". The central functions of the nation-
state will become those of providing legitimacy for and ensuring the 
accountability of supra-national and sub-national governance mechanisms .. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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It is certainly easy to find examples of the nation-state being important in 
determining outcomes at both sub and supranational levels - and also examples of 
those levels increasingly engaging in direct contact that bypasses the state. I I 
The issue of climate change is a good one for illustrating the linkage of the three 
levels. Action at the sub-national (local government and business) level is essential if 
national carbon emission reduction targets (reluctantly agreed to in supra~lational 
forums) are to be met, yet thus far in New Zealand national-level government has 
hindered rather than supported the sub-national level. For example, it was only 
through the initiative of Green MP Jeanette Fitzsimons, who in 1998 persuaded the 
Transport and Energy Select Committee to commission a researched report on the 
energy and emissions implications of the government's proposed roading 'reforms' 
(read: privatisation of road in g), that the environmental impacts of handing the 
construction of roads to transnational contractors and their nominal ownership to 
local government were able to be considered. 
This is just one of many instances where Greens can and have played a useful role at 
nation-state level. The Australian Green senators holding out for better Native Title 
legislation would be another one. But such examples do not of course 'prove' that 
this is where Greens should focus their political energies. What the analysis of what 
is happening to the nation-state as a result of globalisation does suggest is that 
Greens would be wise to assess the costs and benefits of participating at each level, 
and to set effort and expenditure priorities accordingly. They also need to look at 
how they participate, and whether and how their ideal of participatory democracy is 
achievable, and I look at these issues in the next section of the chapter, below. 
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Internal difficulties 
When Green parties first began fonning the nation-state still felt like a relatively 
secure and self-evident level of political activity. Even though the global changes 
which were going to destabilise the state were already starting to happen, and may 
well have helped tilt the new politics towards its emphasis on having a global 
perspective but acting locally, the national parliament seemed a sensible place to 
target. The Greens and the Labour Party in New Zealand could agree on an anti-
nuclear fonn of nationalism in the early 1970s, such as sending a frigate to the 
Moruroa test zone. In the mid-1970s (unlike the late 1990s) the Labour Party was 
opposed to extending the powers of the Security Intelligence Service and the 
Government Communications Security Bureau to spy on New Zealand citizens. 
So while the electoral system was not as favourably inclined towards fonning a 
successful new political party as it was by the time proportional representation was 
introduced in 1996, there was no question that the policies of the new Green party 
would be regarded as a threat to the state. (This is what we must now assume that 
they are, as opposition to APEC is currently construed as a potentially 'subversive' 
activity that warrants breaking and entering by the Security Intelligence Service.) 
(See Note 5.) 
The media/political party relationship was also comfortably nation-state based in the 
1970s, and as we have seen, this facilitated the growth of the Values Party. Now that 
the media are globally owned, opportunities for expressing alternative views have 
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become further constrained - occasioning cynical and sarcastic comment from local 
artists (see Figure 3). 
Lastly, .but most perhaps importantly of all, the Greens brought their own 
participatory, consensus-oriented style to doing democracy. Is it capable of 
transforming politics at any level, let alone the global one? Is it possible to realise it 
in an era i~ which representative democracy is under attack? Does it need re-thinking 
in the light ofthe increasing gravity of the environmental and social problems 
wrought by globalisation? 
In taking the following very brief and largely suggestive look at the internal 
difficulties faced by Green parties, I reprise the themes which were foundational to 
the politics, and ask whether they are adequate to deal with today's problems. 
New Leftism -ajuvenile disorder? 
Just what have the Greens inherited from their own past which can help or hinder 
them achieve their goals. As we saw in Chapter Four, even in its heyday the New 
Left was censured by those who were supportive of most of its goals but critical of 
some of its means. Reflecting on the New Left's successes and failures thirty years 
later American philosopher Richard Rorty praised the New Left thus - 'Had it not 
been for the zany protestors ofthe anti-war movement the US might have become 'a 
garrison state'. The student radicals 'saved us from losing our moral identity', 
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Rorty says, and they also cheered the Left up - 'reminding us that Dewey's image of 
American democracy as an orderly town meeting had its counterpart in Whitman's 
dream of the United States as 'the greatest poem', a country in which politics would 
have less to do with calculation and machinery than with beauty, self-creation and 
rapturous love.' (Ree, 1998, 8). 
But he also criticised the New Left for continually regressing into' ... an unforgiving 
moral fundamentalism: into the kind of preachy fixation on sinfulness that Whitman 
and Dewey had laboured to remove from the American soul... They thought 
theologically rather than politically, preferring purity of heart to effectiveness of 
action ... They preferred to let democracy drift to the right while they got high on 
contempt, priggishness and political voyeurism.'(Ree, 1998,8). 
Both the strengths and weaknesses identified by Rorty are present today in Green 
parties - and sometimes the line between whether a typical characteristic is a 
strength or whether it is a weakness can be whisker thin. For example, a 'moral' or 
'ethical' or 'values' approach to politics is typically Green, and Rorty obviously 
considers that a certain degree of it ('moral identity') is good, but that too much of it 
('moral fundamentalism') is bad. But who decides which is which, and how much is 
too much? 
When it comes to Green practices, it is also hard to make a judgement call on how 
far Greens should go. The elements of spontaneity, fun and creativity which Rorty 
identifies in the New Left - the 'street theatre' approach to politics - are still more 
likely to be found in the Greens than in other political parties. But is this approach 
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inherent in Green philosophy? Or is it a result of the psychological makeup of 
Greens? Or is it principally an artefact ofthe desperate need (then and now) of a 
minority political tendency to attract the attention of the media machine in order to 
propagate its ideas? And at what point does 'fun' degenerate into 'silliness,?12 
Both moralism and spontaneism can handicap a politics which has as both a major 
principle and a major goal the extension and strengthening of democracy. 
By examining the Green party approach to mediated politics, moralist politics and 
democratic politics I endeavour to tease out the contradictions and flaws in Green 
practice to date, and show where more work needs to be done before Green politics 
can successfully meet the challenges of the globalist twenty-first century. For in the 
final analysis, a politics that does not know itselffor what it is will be unable to 
re-create itself to meet new challenges. 
Mediated politics 
Both party and non-party greens (e.g. Greenpeace) have been media-oriented from 
the beginning. In fact, Green politics and the global electronic media are 
contemporaneous in world historical terms, and feed on each other. We have already 
seen (Chapter Five) how superior media savvy enabled the Values Party to 
definitively establish itself ahead of other minority parties in New Zealand 
(including small socialist parties with a similar message). But conducting politics 
through the media requires enormous effort, and may carry other costs as well. 
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Firstly, there is the cost of having to continually up the ante to gain media attention. 
Michelle Gabriel (1995, 4) has documented the greater efforts that non-party 
'environmental challengers' in Tasmania now have to go to get media coverage, 
compared to the relatively easy access enjoyed by elected Green representatives, 
who can operate within established frameworks of parliamentary media coverage. 
The fact that elected representatives find it easier to get coverage (and on a wider 
range of issues) than environmental groups is not merely an artefact of the 
institutionalisation of political media. It also reflects the perception that elected 
representatives have a democratic mandate to speak for political causes and the 
public good, which non-elected activists lack. 
The Fourth Estate still feels some obligation to follow parliamentary-based politics, 
whereas it feels free to pick and choose among non-governmental organisations, and 
may do so on 'non-news' criteria, such as the desire not to offend lucrative 
advertisers. Informal political actors are generally more vulnerable than formal 
actors to media close-out. Hence while their non-partisan approach can be a plus 
when it comes to mobilising a political consensus around an issue, I am not as 
sanguine as Castells (1997, 352-3) that the issue-based approach holds as much 
potential for progressive politics generally as he believes. Nor is it necessarily a 
positive re-framing of what constitutes 'democracy'. Indeed, as we saw in Chapters 
Five and Six, Green party activists were heavily involved in leading and supporting 
all the key 'green issue' campaigns of the 1970s in Australasia. Yet the successes of 
some of those campaigns (a forest saved here, a nuclear free zone there) have been 
largely hollow. For they have thus far failed to produce (or secure) a large enough 
constituency of people prepared to work and vote for a politics which is committed 
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to addressing the causes and not just the symptoms of contemporary environmental 
and social decay. They still represent a procession of ambulances and emergency 
medics at the foot of the cliff, rather than a sturdy fence and sustain ably employed 
people at the top. 
The tension between focussing on success in the realm of real virtuality, and 
succeeding in practising as well as preaching real democracy, is a very real one, and 
is', further explored under 'Democratic Politics', below. But there are still further the 
, costs of doing politics to be counted. The most frequent difficulty encountered is that' 
it is the media, not the Greens, which decides what will be broadcast or printed, and 
how it will be editorialised. Thus even a spectacle carefully constructed to convey a 
pro-Green message may be twisted to convey the opposite. 1J Todd Gitlin discusses 
the framing devices used by the media that may prevent accurate, unbiased coverage 
of leftist politics, and shows how photographs of a large anti-war demonstration 
were selected by the New York Times to minimise the size of the crowd, maximise 
the size of the opposition, and disguise the mixed-race nature of the demonstration. 
(Gitlin,1980, 27-28.50-51). He goes on to look at the ways in which the sudden hike 
in media coverage ofthe SDS in 1965 led to the recruitment of members and elites 
via the media. This proved to have a distorting and destructive effect upon the 
internal workings of the organisation (Gitlin, 1980, 130-178). This is a salutory 
caveat to Greens and others trying to do antisystemic politics through the media. 
Despite the costs, though, Greens will no more be able to give up their foundational 
relationship with the media than any other twenty-first century political tendency. 
but more reflection on how and why Green politics is a peculiarly 'mediated' politics 
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But more reflection in understanding how such a politics might become more 
democratic, rather than reserved for an elite who know how to play the media game. 
Moralist politics 
That the first Australian Green manifesto was entitled 'The New Ethic', and the first 
New Zealand Green party was called the Values Party, speaks volumes about the 
philosophical foundations of Green politics. 14 As we saw (in Chapter Six) the 
majority of Greens in Australasia have no affiliations with organised religion. Yet 
they do have a strong sense of what constitutes 'goodness' or 'the good life', of what 
is 'valuable'. This is expressed in many of the policies of Green parties. ls 
Green ethics, furthermore, are not confined to intra-human behaviour, but extend to 
interactions with other species, and with non-living components of ecosystems. 
Nor is Green morality restricted to talking the talk. In practice Greens place a high 
value on consistency between means and ends, so that people in party spokesperson 
roles are expected to practise what they preach, for example farming or gardening 
organically themselves now if that is what they advocate for others in the future. 
Saying that Green politics has an ethical base, and that that ethical base extends 
further in theory or practice than previous and/or competing political tendencies 16 
may seem like a plus for the Greens. Especially if one agrees with the policies 
derived from Green ethics - once one can determine what they are. (See Tenbensel 
1994 and 1995 for a discussion ofthe wide range of positions adopted by Greens on 
what exactly the 'core' Green values are.) However, as Rorty suggests, depending on 
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how it is practised, a politics based on 'fundamental' ethics may become a political 
minus. There is a constant tension between 'purity of heart' and 'effectiveness of 
action'. The more prescient founders of the New Left were well aware of this tension 
(see Dick Flack's characterisation of it given in Chapter Four), and the need to keep 
it constantly in view. Within Die Griinen and other European Green parties the split 
between 'rea/os' and '!undis' (see Brian Doherty, 1992, for a useful discussion of 
this split), which in most c~es has ended with the '!undis' leaving party politics, is 
more about tactics than goals, means than ends. Green parties are probably the only 
parties operating in the world today that have members (and ex-members) able to 
define electoral success as political defeat. 
The reluctance of Greens to take party politics' seriously', with all the compromises 
and trade-offs that it entails, is on the one hand a reassuring reminder that the dreams 
of the New Left for a politics of egalitarian self-management and discursive 
democracy are not dead. Yet seen from the urgent perspective of making vital 
changes in critically adverse global circumstances it can seem more like a diversion 
and an indulgence. A byway that will condemn the Greens and their ideas to 
perpetual minority status and political irrelevancy.17 A sort of 'Greens fiddle while 
rain forests burn' scenario; or as a frustrated peace activist once expressed it to me, 
reversing Emma Goldman's famous aphorism, 'I don't want to dance with you guys 
if you don't have a revolution.' 
These difficulties around conducting politics 'ethically' point to the conclusion that 
probably the greatest lacuna in Green theory and practice today is how to achieve 
Green goals within the context of the changes which globalisation has wrought on 
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the nation-states and their citizens. These changes have radically altered the 
perception and practice of democracy. Which brings us back to 'the crisis before the 
crisis' which confronts the Greens, namely the crisis of democracy. 
Democratic Politics 
Thus far most of the thinking on Greens and democracy has been conducted within 
rather narrow parameters. The emphasis has been either on the contradictions within 
Green political philosophy itself (see, for example, Carter, 1993; Doherty, 1996; 
Hayward, 1995; Saward, 1993), or on the problematic differences between Green 
philosophy and other political philosophies which hinder the achievement of Green 
political goals (Eckersley, 1996). While this work has an important place in the 
maturation of the Green tradition, none of it is located within the realities of the 
global political economy within which Greens must operate politically, struggling for 
sustainability, equity and democracy simultaneously. As should be clear by now, 
I believe that the political impacts of economic globalism on the nation-state 
constitute a major (if not the major) constraint on the development and extension of 
democracy at the present time. Therefore I conclude this chapter with some 
examples of just how far globalism is compromising Green democratic aspirations, 
and suggest that the problem needs further attention. 
The sorry state of democracy in the nation-state of New Zealand has already been 
touched on in this chapter. Following on the marked decline of citizen participation 
in electoral politics, the 'expatriation' of control over the economy, and the extension 
of the powers of the Security Intelligence Service to intensify surveillance of New 
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Zealand citizens, there came a further attack on representative democracy in the form 
of a successful Citizens Initiated Referendum petition. (So here's to you Mrs 
Robertson, Political Review, 1999,9). Heavily sponsored by the ACT party, and also 
promoted by one of New Zealand's foreign-owned tabloid newspapers, the petition 
calls for a cut in the number of members of parliament, from 120 to 99. The proposal 
was endorsed by a large majority when the referendum was held at the end of 1999. 
While it still has to be considered and voted upon by parliament before it becomes 
law, it represents a major resiling from the result of the 1993 referendum on 
proportional representation. This was the referendum that led to New Zealand 
extending representative democracy by changing from a simple majority, 
constituency-based electoral system to the MMP (mixed-member proportional) 
system used in Germany. This system ensures party proportionality through a mix of 
constituency and list positions. The effect of cutting the number ofMPs would be 
not only to reduce citizen access to an elected representative, but also to destroy the 
gains in female and minority group representation which were achieved with the first 
MMP election in 1996. It would also reduce the likelihood of Green representation -
as we have seen (in Chapter Three) the representation of Tasmanian Greens in their 
parliament has been cut simply by cutting the number of members. 
While proportional representation is well accepted in north-western Europe (with the 
exception of the United Kingdom), and has enabled Greens to participate in most 
parliaments and hence some governments there, the struggle for better forms of 
representative democracy is a big issue for Greens elsewhere. But as the sovereignty 
of the state dwindles, this task becomes both harder, and less potentially rewarding. 
It is also a far cry from the original Green goal of 'grass roots' democracy - a radical 
408 
democratisation not just of the national assembly but also of workplaces, cities, 
neighbourhoods and institutions. But then we are also a long way from the explosive 
energy of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with their large 
numbers of young people bent on participating themselves, and encouraging others 
to do so. Three decades later Greens are faced with a very different situation, and 
may end up in the invidious position of being the strongest defenders of a 
'representative' democracy at nation-state level, which now lacks legitimacy among 
the pUblic. Certainly New Zealand Green MP Rod Donald, who was firstly a 
community activist and then a leader of the successful campaign for MMP, is 
currently reduced to making the unpopular case for more rather than fewer 
parliamentarians. This is definitely not the 'Green' extension of democracy he had 
hoped to facilitate by becoming a Green politician. 
The dilemma facing Greens is then to what extent, and how, they should defend and 
try to reconstitute democracy at the nation-state level. Under conditions of 
globalisation this begs further questions about whether this is possible without 
regaining control of the national economy. Further, how this might be done?18 
Having ruled out violent means, Greens and other pro-democracy forces are 
restricted to democratic means - which are precisely what are being eroded at 
nation-state level by the forces and agents of globalisation. Catch 22. 
It is therefore tempting to Greens to leave this issue in the too-hard basket. Perhaps it 
is possible to trust to positive democratic initiatives at sub and supranational levels, 
where Greens find it easier to gain traction (and also, at the sub-national level, to 
practice participatory democracy) to make up the national level deficit. But while the 
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national level still retains the power (and literally the forces) to determine what is 
possible at the other levels, this 'alternative' may be severely limited. For the 
moment, no easy (or even possible) solutions suggest themselves. Perhaps all that is 
to be gained from an analysis of the extent of the problem is the capacity to proceed 
in a more informed and aware manner in seeking solutions. Politics in the twenty-
first century promises to be pretty much as Walter Benjamin characterised it in the 
mid-twentieth century - like playing chess on a three-dimensional board with pieces 
whose values are constantly changing. 
Working at the beginning of a story ... 
The founding German Green Petra Kelly entitled her first collection of Green 
speeches and essays (Kelly, 1984) Fightingfor Hope. On the door of her office in 
the Bundestag she had a picture of an inspirational fellow revolutionary who 
preceded her in that place - Rosa Luxemburg. 
Luxemburg and Kelly were both murdered - just two among the hundreds of 
thousands (perhaps millions) of not-so-well-known people world-wide in the past 
century who have had the will and the ability to actively participate in antisystemic 
politics, and have met their deaths through it. What price hope in a world of daily 
extinctions and obliterations, practised and mediated globally, a world of globally 
compounding emiserations and degradations of societies and environments? 
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The socialist and social democratic movements and parties that surged at the end of 
the nineteenth century and gained strength in the early part of the twentieth century, 
in response to the intemationalisation of capital, have no late twentieth century mass 
counterparts which are opposing the globalisation of capital. Some of the reasons 
why this is so have been canvassed in this and other chapters. Without a sense of 
mass involvement (even ifit is more apparent than real), it is hard to have a 
corresponding sense of 'making history', let alone the (misplaced but encouraging) 
confidence in the historical inevitability of socialism which characterised those 
earlier movements and parties. What we have instead, at the tum of the twentieth 
century, is a plethora of small, independent initiatives, including Green parties, 
linked nationally and globally via the Net. Perhaps this is what is required; perhaps it 
is better suited to the political realities of today than a mass movement based on only 
one socio-economic dimension (class), with delusions of historical grandeur? 
Perhaps even, as Michel Foucault expressed it: 
'A progressive politics is a politics which recognises the historical and 
specified conditions of a practice, whereas other politics recognise only ideal 
necessities, univocal determinations and the free interplay of individual 
initiatives. A progressive politics is a politics which defines, within a 
practice, possibilities for transformation and the play of dependencies within 
those transformations, whereas other politics rely on the uniform abstraction 
of change or the thaumaturgic presence of genius.' 
(Foucault in Macey, 1993, 195). 
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And perhaps Green politics is such a politics, and will succeed - or fail-
accordingly. Undoubtedly, we live in a time of stunningly rapid change, and where it 
is going, who can say? By the end of the twenty-first century, to take just the politics 
of food as an example, will the extremes of obesity and anorexia in the First World 
and starvation and gluttony in the Third World have been replaced by the enjoyment 
of an adequate and healthy diet by everyone? Or will satiation and deprivation have 
polarised even further? For those of us who do get enough to eat, will we all be 
consuming genetically engineered food produced in factory conditions, or will Green 
campaigns for organic, humane, 'natural', sustainable food production have 
succeeded? Will even more of us be cooking and storing our food in machines 
running on electricity generated by nuclear, coal and oil powered stations, and 
transporting it across our countries and the world in oil-powered machines? Will the 
resultant greenhouse gas-induced climate change be wreaking havoc on countries 
where women still walk for miles to find fuel for their cooking fires, and transport 
everything they eat on their backs? 
One can generate examples like this for every sphere of life, where environmental 
diversity and sustainability and social justice and development will either converge -
or diverge. From my traverse of the first years of Green politics as a world historical 
phenomenon I am not able to say whether a 'Green' convergence will happen, but 
I have been able to suggest how it will happen, ifit does happen. Beginning at the 
beginning, one sees how change occurs, and in itself changes. 
Meanwhile, most of those who began the Green direction of change are still alive, 
and many of them are still working at their 'new' politics. What does that feel like? 
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Are they, too, fighting for hope? A few months before he was brutally murdered by 
the forces of the junta that overthrew the democratically elected government of Chile 
in 1973, the singer/songwriter Victor Jara wrote a love song to his life's partner in 
the work for social and political change. The refrain encapsulates the hopes, fears 
and uncertainties of working at a politics that opposes the system of greed and 
power. The system that stripped Chile of its democratic government then and is 
plundering its natural and social resources now. The system that is replicating itself 
on a global scale. The system that is being opposed on a global scale. 
The song goes like this ... 
t ••• pienso en ti ... 
compaiiera de mis dias 
y del porvenir, 
de las horas amargas y la dicha. 
de poder vivir, 
laborando el comenzio de una historia, 
sin saber, elfin. ' 
, .. .I think of you ... 
compafiera of my life 
and of the future, 
of the bitter hours and the happiness 
of being able to live 
working at the beginning of a story 
without knowing the end.' 
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Cuando voy at trabajo/On my way to work 
(Jara, 1976,87-89) 
Notes 
1. We have seen such multi latera list attempts at keeping the peace work very well on a small scale. 
For example, New Zealand provided the peace talks venue, the mediators and the unarmed 
peacekeeping force to break the deadlock between Australia, Papua New Guinea and the various 
factions on Bougainville, thus bringing an end to years of conflict there. They can also fail 
dismally on a large scale (e.g. in former Yugoslavia). A big part of the problem rests with the 
roles played by the one remaining super-power, the USA, and the former super-power (now 
reduced to Russia) in multilateralist initiatives. The US is able to make a nominally 'multilateral' 
action by itself (as in its 1998 attack on Iraq), or break it (as in its failure to commit resources to 
keeping the peace in Somalia). 
2. Some of these non-state 'security' activities have been and will be very nasty. They include a 
return to domination, oppression - and protection - by old-style warlords, of the type we have 
seen in Somalia in the 1990s. Others will be non-violent and constructive, but still problematic. 
An excellent example of this is the recent case of fish poaching in Antarctic waters. In Feburary 
1999 the New Zealand government sent its brand new $600 million frigate, Te Kaha, to patrol 
New Zealand's 'area of interest' in the southern ocean and prevent illegal fishing of the 
Patagonian toothfish. Despite surveillance flights of the area as well as sailing around it, 
no poachers were detected. The Greenpeace boat Arctic Sunrise, however, also on poacher patrol 
in the southern ocean, managed to fmd a 'pirate' ship and scare it off fishing ('Greenpeace hunts 
down toothfish pirates', Press, 4.3.99; Greenpeace alerts French to fishing pirates, Press, 9.3.99). 
Greenpeace, of course, has neither the legal authority nor the physical capacity to arrest and 
detain poachers, and its entire fleet could probably be bought for the price of one new frigate, 
yet it appears to be able to provide a level of international fisheries protection which is beyond 
nation-states. In a further ironic twist, Greenpeace found the pirate ship in the French exclusive 
economic zone. This meant that it ended up asking the nation-state that had conducted a terrorist 
act against Greenpeace (France), on the territory of another nation-state (New Zealand), to send a 
frigate of its own to deal with the pirate. 
3. As it happens, there has never been a terrorist attack on a foreign leader visiting New Zealand 
(nor on any New Zealand political leaders). The only proven political terrorism ever to occur in 
New Zealand was the bombing of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour, 
which killed one Portuguese photographer who was working for Greenpeace at the time. 
The terrorists in this case were working for and paid by a nation-state, France (Szabo, 1991). 
4. Rod Donald, Green MP, tells me that when he queried this use of the word 'economy' he was 
told that it was intended to cater to the sensitivities of Beijing and Taipei. It gets around the 
'problem' of which is the 'real' state of China, and entitled to join APEC as such. If this is indeed 
the case, it merely reinforces the point that 'nation-statehood' is increasingly irrelevant to 
participation in geopolitics. 
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5. The 'subversive' known to be targeted in this instance is Aziz Choudry, a worker for New 
Zealand's oldest aid organisation, Corso, and the organiser ofa conference critical of APEC and 
GATT, which was being held at the time of the break-in to his home. Purely by chance two S.LS. 
agents were surprised on the property by a friend of Chou dry's, and the ensuing court cases found 
that it was indeed the S.LS. doing the breaking and entering, and that they had a non-specific 
warrant to do so. It also found that their activity was illegal under the terms of the S.LS. Act, 
which did not allow for breaking and entering. The government then promptly introduced a bill to 
legalise breaking and entering by security service agents. Commenting on this move, Choudry 
emphasised its implications for democracy, saying 'I think basically what the government has 
done is declare war on lawful dissenters. I think it's sending a really strong message to people to 
shut up, don't make a noise, don't disagree and don't talk. This issue goes to the heart of the sort 
of society we want and the kind of debate we want in the future.' (Henzell and Bell, 1998). 
6. More on the historical construction of the nation/state/economy edifice (and its current 
deconstruction) can be found in Castells (1997, 242-273). For another perspective, which 
characteristically focusses on the power dimension in the development of the nation-state, see 
Michel Foucault's account of the creation of the first nation-state (England). This proceeded via 
the realignment of the binary political discourse of the Middle Ages (rich/poor; 
oppressors/oppressed) with certain 'facts of nationality' , such as language, country of origin, 
ancestral customs, common history, ancient rights and laws, etc., so as to reconstitute the state on 
the basis of the 'rights' of the nation (Foucault, 1977). 
7. See Castells (1996, 330-335) for comment on the irony of intellectual history that it is 
, ... precisely those thinkers who advocate social change who often view people as passive 
recipients of ideological manipulation ... ', and also for references to the studies which show how 
viewers make meaning of what they see. 
8. In the second week of February 1999 a major national-level political news story broke. It was 
announced that the world-wide chief executive of Saatchi and Saatchi, the world's largest 
transnational advertising agency, (British-born and New York-domiciled New Zealand citizen 
Kevin Roberts) would be giving a motivational pep talk to the National Party caucus. This was a 
favour to his close personal friend, Prime Minister Jenny Shipley. The Labour and Alliance 
parties then speculated that Roberts' friendship with Shipley, and close association with the 
National Party, had given Saatchis an improper advantage when it came to securing a $30 
million dollar contract with the New Zealand Tourism Board to promote New Zealand. On the 
day this development in the story broke it was put on page 8 of The Press. The only political 
story on the front page was another instalment in the Clinton impeachment saga. That had to 
compete for attention with a lead story on DNA matching of local rapists, and a second 'major' 
story on the fate of a child cancer sufferer whose parents chose 'alternative' treatment. Also with 
a quarter page photo of some stars of the British soap opera Coronation Street on the Tranz-
Alpine Express train, and another photo of two radio presenters promoting a St Valentines Day 
dance. 
The story was consistently fitted into the 'scandaVsaga' framework of contemporary political 
reportage (complete with its own 'Gate' nickname - Jennygate), with lots of attention paid to 
who had dinner with whom and when and what they said. On the day Parliament resumed sitting 
for 1999 (February 16), the Prime Minister gave an explanation to the House of her dinner with 
Roberts, which denied all the accusations that she was improperly discussing a Saatchi and 
Saatchi contract with the Tourism Board. Instead she said that she was dining with Mr Roberts 
because' ... he was keen to work with me to see that the Labour-Alliance bloc never got into 
government again.' That neither the Prime Minister, nor the political pundits, see anything at all 
'improper' in the head of a transnational corporation (which has an annual global turnover of 
$US7 billion - Robert's annual salary alone is $2 million), conspiring to turn New Zealand into 
what would effectively be a one-party state, is as good an indication as any of how capitalist 
globalism is a now a greater threat to representative democracy on a world scale than 
cornmunism ever was. ('PM says links with agency not improper', Press, 12.2.99; 'PM attacks 
Labour "lies"', Press, 13.2.99). 
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9. For details on the crisis oflegitimacy of the federal government of America see Castells (1997. 
287-297). Especially telling are the figures for the 1996 presidential election - only 49% of 
eligible voters bothered to vote, and only 49% of that 49% voted for Bill Clinton. Hence the 
president of the world's most powerful 'democracy' was actively chosen by less than one quarter 
of the population. 
In New Zealand there have traditionally been high voter turnouts at triennial general elections. 
New Zealand was after all the first nation-state to extend the suffrage to women, in 1893, and 
exclusively Maori constituency seats, to ensure Maori representation in parliament, were 
established as early as 1867 and still exist. However, turnouts have been declining, dropping by 
about 15% in the last forty years, from an average of almost 90% pre World War Two to 77% in 
the mid 1990s. This means that whereas New Zealand once ranked highly among democratic 
nations, it is now at about the average (Vowles et ai, 1993, 139). Party membership in New 
Zealand was also high when the country was a prosperous nation-state, reaching a peak of just 
over 22% of the voting age population in the late 1950s. By the mid-1990s, however, it had 
shrunk to just below 6% (Vowles, 1999, Table 4). Bronwyn Hayward (1997) gives further 
information on the decline in public participation in New Zealand, and increased cynicism about 
politicians, and documents how restructuring has directly reduced representative participation 
e.g. the restructuring of the health service replaced democratically elected female representatives 
with government-appointed male managers. 
10. Analysis and criticism ot doing politics in cyberspace is of course very new. 
Early critiques came from feminists looking at the gender politics dimension of being wired 
(Adam and Green, 1998; Cherney and Weise, 1996; Spender, 1995). This work shows that the 
political economy of access to and use of the Net is as skewed for women as access to and use of 
other new technologies. Men dominate the discourse in virtual discussion groups just as readily 
as they do in real ones, and overt and covert sexual violence is as prevalent and frightening to 
women in cyberspace as it is in real space, and reduces their freedom to participate. This has led 
to the creation of virtual 'women-only' spaces on the Net, so women can be positive actors with 
and not mere victims of the technology - but this can hardly be considered to be an advance in 
democracy. Other recent analysis has criticised computer communication as ' ... the enemy of 
truly collective reason and debate ... ' and hence a danger to democratic freedoms (Haywood, 
1998, 27). There has also been an investigation of the attempts to create 'cyber-cities', such as the 
Amsterdam-based DDS. It was noted that 85% of the cyber 'residents' of DDS were male, almost 
75% had higher education and 58% were under thirty, so these innovations are not yet advancing, 
(and may never advance) a more engaged and representative form of democracy (Aurigi and 
Graham, 1998). It has even been argued that the ruling class has now gone virtual, and that the 
so-called 'information superhighway' is an artefact of bourgeois possessive individualism put to 
the service of commercial imperatives (Kroker and Weinstein, 1994). 
11. In New Zealand there was strong opposition to the MAl from the sub-national level, as local 
governments realised that they could be legally locked into contracts with transnationals and 
prevented from providing work to local firms and citizens. The city of Christchurch is also 
engaged in making pro-active 'gioballlocal' connections that bypass the nation-state. These 
include linking with other cities using transnational companies as the medium. 
For example Christchurch was a joint winner, with Phoenix, Arizona, of the 1993 Carl 
Bertelsmann Foundation prize for innovative local government, and with eight other 'top' cities 
is now part of a global 'Cities of Tomorrow' forum, exchanging ideas and practices. This has 
attracted the interest of the accountancy transnational KPMG, which in February 1999 sent a 
German 'specialist public sector advisor' to Christchurch to look at what was happening (Bruce, 
1999a, 2). Christchurch has also invited a promoter of the 'city-state' concept to the city recently, 
and is working on developing a GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator) for the city, along the lines of 
the one developed in Phoenix. The GPI aims to measure what citizens themselves derme as 
quality of life, and hence capture concepts like 'safety', 'aesthetic amenity', 'environmental 
quality', etc., which can't be measured in dollar terms. (The Green Party has been advocating that 
such indicators be adopted at national level for some time.) When Phoenix did this exercise the 
top indicator for the city turned out to be education. If a similar result were found in Christchurch 
this would pose an interesting political challenge in a country in which educational institutions 
have always been nationally funded ands controlled (Bruce, 1999b, 7). Not everyone is happy 
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with Christchurch's moves towards city-statehood, and refusal to run the city economy in neo-
liberal style. The nationally influential New Right lobby group, the Business Round Table, has 
been reduced to expressing its displeasure by dubbing the city 'The People's Republic of 
Christchurch' - which amused the city so much that it promptly had T-shirts made emblazoned 
with the city logo and 'The People's Republic of Christchurch'. 
12. Many examples of Green fun and creativity feeding on and off media seriousness and lack of 
originality could be adduced. One of the most memorable (and amusing) for me is from 1991, 
when Mike Smith and I presented the New Zealand Green Party's first economic directions 
statement at a press conference, and declined to play the 'freak show' game. Mike disappointed 
the media by being clean-shaven, suited and well-shod, while my longish hair was well clipped 
back, my plain beige blouse had a white lace collar and 'pearl' buttons, and my face was lightly 
made up. Neither of us arrived on a bicycle, nor was anyone smoking dope. The media actually 
complained about being cheated of their expected quota of beards, sandals, tie-dyed muslin and 
other 'freak' material. 
13. A good case study of what corporate/global media can do to make or break political organisations 
is the first friendly and supportive, and then hostile and destructive, relationship between the 
Whitlam-led Labor Party and the Australian.global media conglomerates headed by Rupert 
. Murdoch and Kerry Packer. This produced one of the best politics/media jokes of all time, in 
which Whitlam is reluctantly persuaded by his aides to show what he is made of and to rally 
support for Labor by walking across Lake Burley Griffm, the lake in front of Parliament House in 
Canberra. He is duly rowed to the centre of the lake, steps out and walks across to the other side. 
The next morning The Australian carries the barmer headline' Whit/am fails to swim lake!' 
I saw the same phenomenon genuinely in action in January 1999, at the New Zealand Greens 
conference that was held at a summer camp. Greens Co-Leader Jeanette Fitzsimons allowed 
herself to be persuaded by a Sunday newspaper into being photographed whizzing across a lake 
on a flying fox. She was told that this was 'less boring' than a head and shoulders shot, and that it 
was a choice between this photo or no photo at all. But the photograph when published was then 
used as 'evidence' that The Greens were 'desperate to get attention'. 
Knowing that this is what they are up against, the New Zealand Greens conduct media training 
sessions in which activists are instructed in how to maximise the message the party wants to get 
across, and minimise distractions or misrepresentations - particularly when dealing with visual 
media. 
14. In this section I deal only with the 'moral' or 'ethical' side of Green politics. There is of course a 
considerable literature on its 'spiritual' side, and some would say they are related, and should not 
be considered in isolation. However, I believe that they can legitimately be considered separately, 
since as we saw in Chapter Six the spiritual or religious affiliations and inclinations of Greens are 
diverse. Yet atheists, agnostics, Christians, pagans, Jews, Buddhists and others seem to be able to 
endorse documents like 'The New Ethic' without outraging their spiritual or religious 
sensibilities or non-sensibilities. Whether or how they link them to their religious or spiritual 
beliefs and practices (as a good many of them do) is not as important as the fact that they fmd a 
common ground around these key principles. ' 
15. Sources of Green debate around political ethics far outnumber those around 
political economy. They include the journal Environmental Ethics, which began publication in 
1979. Some of the major book-length works which focus primarily on the development ofa 
Green political ethic include Eckersley, (1992a), Fox, (1990), Goodin, (1992), Hayward, (1998), 
McLaughlin, (1993), Plumwood, (1993), Singer, (1993) and Zimmerman, (1994). 
16. The only real competition Greens have for the moral high ground position comes from the 
fundamentalist religious parties, but they are a somewhat different case than the Greens since 
they can claim both divine revelation and ancient scripture as the source of their morality, 
whereas the largely irreligious Greens must rely principally on discursive reason to reach their 
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ethical positions, (see Singer, 1993, as a good example of this approach), even where some of 
them hold their 'Green' views as a result of spiritual beliefs and experiences. 
17. A good example of this tension in action could be found in the New Zealand Greens between 
May and December 1998. This was the time it took the party to earnestly discuss and agree on a 
position regarding whether it would or would not go into a coalition with Labour after the next 
election. For a party that was polling less than 1% at the time, and was also behind in candidate 
selection and other key ~lectoral functions, this was either an indication of how seriously Greens 
take internal and external democracy - or of how an overly-principled commitment to democratic 
process severely handicaps Green electoral viability. Or both. 
18. Michel Chossudovsky gives examples of globalist take-overs of vulnerable nation-states 
at the most fundamental level. For example the Dayton Accord of November 1995, which aimed 
to settle the conflict in fonner Yugoslavia, included a new constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
written by the powers responsible for installing the new administration. 
Article VII of that constitution states that the first governor of the Central Bank for Bosnia-
Herzegovina will be appointed by the IMF, and ' "shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or a neighbouring state" , Nor is the bank permitted to function as a genuine, 
sovereign central bank, i.e. enabled to i~sue the currency of the new nation-state. (Chossudovsky, 
1998, 256). Chossudovsky found a similar usurpation of national sovereignty by globalist 
bankers when he talked to Citibank offIcials in Brazil in 1998, at the time of that state's currency 
crisis. The bankers were not discussing debt rescheduling and other fmancial matters - rather, 
they were focussing on constitutional reform (which in the Brazilian context could well mean the 
derogation of the land rights of indigenous peoples), and other social issues (Chossudovsky, 
1999). 
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APPENDIX A 
Green Charter 
The Greens/Green Party of Aotearoa-New Zealand 
1. _ 
Eco,logical Wisdom 
The basis of ecological wisdom is that human beings are part 
of the natural world.This world is finite, therefore unlimited 
material growth is impossible. Ecological sustainability is 
paramount. 
2. 
Social Responsibility 
Unlimited material growth is impossible. Therefore the key to 
social responsibility is the just distribution of social and natural 
resources, both locally and globally. 
3. 
Appropriate Decision Making 
For the implementation of the principles of ecological wisdom 
and social responsibility, decisions will be made directly at the 
appropriate level by those affected. 
4. 
Non-Violence 
Non-violent conflict resolution is the process by which 
ecological wisdom, social responsibility and appropriate 
decision-making will be implemented. This principle applies at 
all levels. 
TI-IE NEW ETHIC 
United 1clsmania Group 
We; citizens of T . .1 asmanra anu members of the United l"rtsmania 
Group, 
UllitC" in a gll,hal ml1\'('mt'l1! fllr survival; 
C~"(~,,,cd for. the dignity of man and the value of his cultural 
l.er,1!age whll~ rejecting any view of man which gives him the 
ng It 10 explOIt all of nature; 
Movcd by the need for a new ethl·c Wlll·cll unites man with 
nature to prevent the col/apse of the life support systems of 
the earth; 
Rejcc~i"g all e~c1usive ideological and pragmatic 
socIety as partial and divisive; . 
views of 
COlldwlllillg the misuse of power for il d· ·.1 I . b I IVluua or group prOll11-
nence ased on aggression against man or nature; 
5/JIII'" illg. the acquisiti(1n and display of individual wealth as ;111 
exp,esslOn of greed for status or power; 
\,,"Ilile ackllowledging that Tasmania is uniquely favoured with 
natural resources, climate, form, and beauty; 
Undertake to live u . , d I . ,? r pn" ate an communal lives in such a way 
:JI~t ,,\e mall1tam Tasmania's form and beauty for our own 
III?} I,nent and for the enjo}'mt'llt of our chi Idr-en through 
un IlJ1lted future generations; 
U"dertake to creat 1'"1 e aest letlc lannony bet ween our human 
structures and the natural landscape where our individual and 
communal needs demand modificaticlil to tile natural em'iron-
ment; 
Undertake to regulate our individual and communal needs for 
"TIlE NDV EIIllC 
n:c;011JCCC;, both living ;111<1 nOIl·living, while preventing the 
wholrc;ale extraction of our non-rrp1enishable reSOlUteC; for the 
satisfaction of the desire for profit; 
Underlallf: to husbal1tl and cherish Tasmania's living resources 
so that we do minimum damage to the web of life of which 
we are part whi Ie preventing the extinction or serious deple-
tion of any form of life hy our individual, group, or communal 
act illlls; 
And we shall 
Create new institutions so that all who wish may participate in 
making laws and decisions at all levels concerning the social, 
cultural, political, and economic life of the community; 
Provide institutions for the peaceful and unimpeded evolution of 
the community and for the maintenance of justice and equal 
opportunity for all people; 
Change our society and our culture to prevent a tyranny of 
rationality, at the expense of values, by which we may lose 
the unique adaptability of our species for meeting cultural and 
environmental change; 
Pln'ell/ alienation of people in their social and work roles and 
functions whi Ie making scientific, techn.ical, and vocational 
knowledge and practice free and open to all; 
Create a new community in which men and women shall be 
valued for their personal ski lis, for the nlaterial and non-
matcri;,1 worth of these skills to groups and the whole com-
munity, for their scrvice to the community, and for their non-
competftive achievement in all aspects of life; 
Live as equal membcrs of our society to maintain a community 
governed by ratiollal, non-sectional law; 
Preserye specific areas of private and group life where private 
thought, speech, and action is of individual or group import-
ance and does not interfere unreasonably with others; 
APPENDIXC 
I ntrod ucti on 
New Zealand is in the grip of a new depression. 
It is a depression which arises not from a lack of affluence but almost from too much 
of it. 
It is a depression in human values, a downturn not in the national economy but in the 
national spiri t. 
It is the inevitable culmination of 20 years of uninspired leadership by a Government 
whose goals have been almost entirely materialistic. 
It is not attributable to affluence itself, but to affluence without direction. to an 
emphasis on economic security as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. 
It is the outcome of an obsession with the growth of the economy rather than with the 
growth of the human mind and the non-economic capaci ties of the population. 
And it isspawning a disillusionment with our society and political system that is 
driving our youth to protest in the streets and filling the sensitive among their elders with a 
pecu liar despai r. 
It is a despair which comes usually with physical poverty. But New Zealand's 
peculiar malady is not physical poverty; it is spiritual poverty. 
For a generation New Zealand has been governed not in the light of discerned goals 
or morally based convictions in which a more perfect society and a more perfect world were 
the ultimate ends, but in a hand-to-mouth fashion in which the perpetuation of political power 
seemed to be all that mattered. 
The depressing expediency of the Government was met not with the offering of a 
relevant and uplifting alternative by its opponents but with an outmoded definition of social 
problems, a narrow vision of political solutions, and an opportunism which, like that of its 
adversaries, placed the winning of the next election ahead of moral considerations and con-
sistency. . 
While our citizens cry out for Government action to make their cities and lives 
livable, for an imaginative assault on the new social ills that are eroding the quality of their 
lives, the national leadership continues to overemphasise economic growth at the expense of 
both the environment and a more natural pace of life, increasing productivity at the expense of 
job satisfaction, technology at the expense of the human spirit,bureaucracy at the expense of 
more imagination and more public participation in Government, and individualism at the expense 
of a sense of community. . 
The real tragedy of New Zealand life is not that the Government iSignoringthe country's 
problems; it is perpetuating them. 
It is the unquestioning servant of an economy which must expand at an alarming rate, 
inventing ever more dubious goods, in order to maintain full employment. 
It sees the main problem of our times as an increase in the pace of inflation and 
ignores the increase in the pace of life; it frets over the dec ti ne i n the val ue of the do II ar 
and is heedless of the decline in the value of human friendship. 
It spoon feeds its citizens with affluence in order to keep them quiet instead of re~ 
shaping society and industry to meet their deeper, non-material needs as well. 
It proceeds on its unenlightened path, however. at an ever increasing risk to itself. 
For there is a new set of values emerging in society which will either transform it or destroy 
it. 
It is a set of values which shows in the movements to free members of our society 
from positions subtly fabricated by others and forced upon them. It shows in the movements 
to reje;:;t the de-personalising effects of our bureaucracy and technology. 
It wants to improve morals---the morals of a Government which gives tacit support to 
a country which institutionalises racial inferiority; the morals of a nation which initiates a 
men-far-meat deal in which it fights in a pointless war to foster its trading links with an ally. 
The new consciousness shows most simply of all in the movement by young people 
to establish a warmer and more meaningful relationship with each other. with society. with na-
ture. and wi th the land. 
There is a new current flowing in the country. The Values Party Ls just one product 
of this current. It seeks to give political expression to the new values. 
It says that for too long this country has been allowed to wallow and drift. 
It points to a better society, one in which men will recover their ability to gain hap-
piness from relationships with other men and with nature, from creativity and service rather 
than consumption and competition. It firmly believes that the people of New Zealand are 
perceptive enough to see this society and reach out for it. 
The people of New Zealand are once again rest less and when that happens the world 
should sit up and watch. For great change seems to come in this country in 40-year cycles. 
It was 40 years after New ZealaAd began developing in earnest that we had the great 
industrial reforms of the 1890s. New Zealand was the first country to gi ve women the vote. 
Forty years after that we had the great social reforms of the first Labour Government. 
The pattern seems to be that we go forward and then we consolidate. And when we go 
forward we lead the world. 
The third 40 years is almost up. 
2 
NTRODUCTION 
Tasmania is in a crisis due to gross over-emphasis on hydro-economics. 
iopulation has declined and Tasmania share of the workforce has not increased. 
~mployment opportunities for the State's youth are not improving. UTG de-
;lares that this grim position is accelerating towards a needless social disaster. 
IrG urges you not to be lulled into a sense of false security threatening your 
:1Uman dignity. freedom. and standard of living. It is imperative that the State 
!mbarks on a new-life economy. UTG offers the following: points for your 
;onsideration :-
APPENDIXD 
UTG 
The United Tasmania Group 
!Economic Program 
Please note that this program 
is only a portion of the total 
UTG political policy. 
1. E Xp 0 sur e of the 
Present Economic 
State 
UTG will move to bring: bdore 
the public the true SClLe of the 
econo my. The object Will !)e to 
disclose the gravity ot the present 
dangerous instability. and the 
steps that must be taken to re-
store coniidence in political 
administration. 
2. Industrial 
Development 
& Employment 
UTe is sharply aware that em-
ployment will continue to de-
dine unless existing industry 
is supported and balanced by 
,;maller diwrsified industries 
whi;:h co.n he developed irom 
the environmem. UTG Believes 
that rlle scope in the t:ltter as-
red IS nl:!glected and will explore 
.lOLl .,kvelop valid possibilities. 
UT(~ wili also institute :l per-
mJn~nt travel-rescan:h program 
[Q increase trade in Western and 
.-\sian murkets. 
3. Tourist Industry 
rhl:! Tourist lnduscry IS acutely 
handicapped by lack of loan 
funJs. and by too limlteJ pro-
motion. Tourism is an invest-
ment ot !mponance. It is now 
identified with knowledge-..;eek-
ing as well as with traditional 
pleasures. The world wants to 
know who we ~He, what we are 
dOlOg. and wllere we are going. 
LTC will see that such questions 
an: answerL'd. and initiate pract-
ical steps to revitalise this 
industry. 
I 
IForestry Industry 
I 
1& Enterprises 
I 
·rS!' are no! just wood. They 
'1 the guardians 01 the fertility 
~ur earth. With proper pro-
lion. harvesting and regen-
lion! hey are the most val-
)Ie of our land assets. UTG 
ogmzes that a scientifically 
Iducted wood-chip industry 
.:ked with development eap-
., need not be a threat to the 
·ironment. However. there 
au~e for ~oncern at the rate 
! manner 1I1 which iorests arc 
ng dt:slroyed on private land. 
C advocates the use 01 sound 
eSlry prin..:iplt:s on private 
d r 0 prt'\'elH the ills t har arise' 
1 resull 01 Insufficienr know-
g:: 01 methods of control. 
Forest Conservation 
is an Insurance 
Against Want 
'C declares t hat natural and 
.rivaled forests under systematic 
~ lrol are an insurance against 
nt. They provide for a large 
Id 01 employmt:nt and are 
IS la bou. instensin. UTG 
ieves in the following. object-
s:-
..... percentage of loan funds 
should be used to sponsor 
co-operatives. 
Similarly such aid should 
he given In the replanting 
of harvested forests. 
Similarly such aid should 
he gIven to rehahilit:J!e un-
econo mi.: farms as J form 
01 rural ~econstructJOn. 
ExemptIOn of probare duties 
duties LO private owners 
selling iorests to the wood-
chip industry who re-
forest tht:ir land. 
Increased research Jnd 
extensIOn iacilities for 
the Forestry Commission. 
6. Marine Fisheries 
Industries 
State marine iishenes are seriously 
compromised by foreign com-
petitIOn amountIng to:J mono-
poly of a multi-million doll<Jr 
enterpnse. L'T(; IS firmly 
(lrrosed to rht' int!rtia and 
unresponslw :.Irtitudes whi,h 
have pcrmirted thiS sweeping. 
take-OWL L'T(; j, ut'reTmined 
to st!ek a reasonable share at 
marine fisheries and will do 
~verythmg possible to encour-
J!!t' dc'ie!orm~nl. and restore 
II;veslmem confidence in such 
r"isht:rtes. The possibility oi 
building suitable competitive 
;I,hing vessels m this Stare 
,viii b; thoroughly inve~tiga[ed. 
The Commonwealth Govern-
ment will be requested to 
lr.,·rt:'Jse ;.5 marine resea.ch 
"'r.·;!;] 'T1 IT. T a,manlan 
Hhonsed by Chris Harwood. 70 Princes St .. Sandy Bay. Tasmania 
I. Agricultural 
Industries 
UTI I recognizes that mJn~ 
a~pccts of I Ill' rural ·.',onolll~ 
Jre "enously ne!!lccteti Jnti 
affect t:d lH lack or d<'\'ell1p-
mental fu nds. Jnti hy'1I1-
securIty 01' mJrketIng and 
frel\!hun\! IaL·Il)f~. L;TC WIll 
initiat e a r~st:;jr~h progra m 
into alt~rnal1ve, for f:.lihng 
inuustnc, . .Inc! Intt'nSlt~ 
dforts to ,el.·ure trt:lght 
jli:;rlce lor all industrtes. 
8. Public Works 
UTe rt.:o!!nlze,; rht' Import· 
ance of Public \Vork,; In main· 
taining empio"menl. Jnd Its 
essential role In the building 
of pubhc structures Jnd acces, 
way, throughout tht' Isiand. 
UTI, heiieve:; thJr Puhllc' 
Worb have been undul~ 
restricted hy hydro-econ-
omtCs. and rhat a much higher 
pronortion of funds shoulJ b.: 
devoted to State works In 
order to bring Tasmama mto 
pant~· wit h mainland Srares. 
The eTG believes that undt'r 
tht: present system of hydro-
economics that there tS a 
dupiicatlon ot services whIch 
should be ~:Jrried by the De-
partment or' Public Works. 
IVoteUTG! 
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ECOl\OMICS 
AN ECONOMLCBASE ,PQR, THE VALUES SOCIETY AND PERSPECTIVES Fon 
TIIE'-FUTURE. 
This presentation is bosed on the goals and objectives 
APPENDIXE 
initially spelt (Jut in the 1972 'Olueprint' and further developod 
redefined ond reconfirmed at the 1974 Conference In'pjlmer,,ton 
North. 
The presentation is not only a review of existing Values 
economic policies, it also outlines the cohesiveness of 
Values economics and its importanco for New Zoaland's 
future. 
The following is an outlino ·of VlIlues econolllic principles. 
1. The introduction of a ,stable-state world economy is 
nec .. a,sllry to ,the survival and well-being uf hwuanity. 
2. The establishment and maintenance of a stablo state economy 
is dependant upon an equitable distribution of' wealth 
both between nations and within nations. 
J. The Values Party's economic policies aro based upon long 
tormproposals to secure this typo of' stable state economy. 
In p.ursuing our long term aims our in termediate policies 
mu~t of' necessity be concerned with equitable distribution 
'of' the produc ts of our economy and the preservation of 
its basic resources. 
4. We hold that thore is a minimum lovol of' income below which, 
as of risht, no-one "hould fall.('This minimum would replaco 
tho necessity for social security benofits nnd superannuation.) 
We further believe that excessively high incomes nre a 
travesty of' human justice lind thorefore oppose the tradition 
of' inherited wealth and 'lupport a steeply' prograssive 
tax scheme.· . . 
5. The Values Party econoonic goals will l"ad towards comlDunity 
control and manRgement of' production, finance and distribution. 
Initial steps will be based on the concept of Co-operative 
8aterprise .. hich pr,?vides for equal control of an enterp,ise 
by its wor~ers" its' consumers, the suppliers of ita f'inance 
ilnd its locnl community. 
6. An 'important aspect 'of' New Zooland's f'utura is its role 0,9 
a maj9r'sup~lier ~r agriculturftl products and experti~ in 
a h.u.ngry world. Values policies would support tho fanning 
community in the f'ullest possible agricultural production 
compatible with sound environmental principles and the 
f'ood needs of' the world. 
7. The Values PftrtY,sees a major role of the government in 
economic, matter.s as one of promoting and maintaining 
region~l balance. Planning and co-ordination will also soek 
to ensure that economic enterprises serVe social ~urpo,ges 
compatible with :tho values ('of' the community.Government' will 
be guide~ in th.is by the ongoing public f'orum on the one 
hand arid on th~other by social, environonental and technolog-
icol rosearch units, indopendnnt of' the governmont. 
8. The ValUes ~arty seeks to promoto decentralisation of' 
political and economicDct!vit~e9-with delegation crr 
administrative decisions to the lowest possible 1evel oC 
operation. 
APPENDIXF 
VALUES AND SOCIALISM 
Acknowledging What Is Radical In Socialism 
I. The issues of ownership and management -
who controls? for what purposes? who contributes? 
for what return? who profits? by how much? 
2. The issues of social justice and equal opportunity-
do we accelerate, freeze, or break down inequalities? 
justice Y. freedom; community Y. individuul. 
3. The issues of analysis and policy-
what makes New Zealand society tick? how do we 
we find out? is our policy consistent '! is it utopian 
(unworl<able)? 
4. The issues of class interest-
what does class mean in New Zealand? is there class 
contlict? what attitude do we take to 'saboteurs'? 
5. The extent of ecunomic determinism-
to what dellree does conditioning determine interest 
and motivation? to what extent are 'vested interests' 
self or sectional interests'? 
6. The need for revolution -
structural as well as attitudinal change; community 
activism; the transition stage and continuing revulution. 
7. Developing an organisation-
discipline and commitment? accountability, to whom? 
broadening the social base of support, 
Defining What Isn't Radical In Socialism 
1. The poverty of scientific materialism-
cultural and spiritual aspects of humunity - art and 
ethics; values as a procedure of analysis. 
2. The limits of determinism-
the existence of mind and will, the central issue of 
alienation (political and social as well as economic) 
- nol confined to one class. 
3. The follies of (bureaucratic) centralism -
The issues of scale, accountability, community devel-
opment and participation. 
4. The limits to growth-
evaluatinll growth; depletion of resources; growth as 
accelerator not corrector uf inequalities; need for 
changes in economic style as well as structure (agricul-
ture and services as against industry and goods). 
5. The issues of civil rights-
tolerance of alternatives; scupe for individual free-
doms (which don't include the freedom co sabotage 
the community); scope for initiative; where private 
enterprise can begin and end. 
6. The need for a New Zealand analysis-
the primacy of land and farmers, the centrality of 
Maori traditions to the New Zealand revolution, the 
lack of a revolutionary pl'Olelariat, decentralisation. 
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New Zealand Executive Government News Release Archive 
Rt Hon Don McKinnon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister of Pacific Island 
Affairs Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control Minister for Ministerial Services· 
National List MP 
30 October 1998 
"APEC 1998 Scene Setter For NZ's Year In 
The Chair" 
By Rt Hon Don McKinnon, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
In just eleven months, NZ is to host a meeting that will thrust us into the world spotlight as never 
before. We have never had a better opportunity to showcase our country to the world. 
The APEC 1999 Economic Leaders Meeting, will bring to Auckland the leaders of20 major 
economies from the Pacific Rim, including the US, Japan, Russia and China. More than 4000 
international delegates will visit New Zealand. APEC will attract around 2500 of the worlds 
media, generating international exposure and pUblicity we could never afford to buy. 
Initial estimates indicate that APEC will attract more than $65 million into the local economy. 
Add to this the value of the international exposure, and its a pretty good return for an investment 
of $44 million. And these are just the short-term gains. 
Long-term gains amount to expanding trade opportunities and a stronger economy. This means 
more jobs and more money to spend on social goals such as health and education. APEC is 
important for all of us. 
NZ effectively takes the Chair of the APEC process for the 1998 -1999 year, following next 
month's APEC Leaders meeting in Malaysia. Here APEC's work programme for 1999 will be 
determined and our role more clearly defined. 
Naturally, the Kuala Lumpur meeting will be dominated by the Asian economic crisis. 
It is heartening to note that despite the pressures the crisis has put on the region, all APEC 
members have maintained their commitment to APEC's open market goals. These are to achieve 
free and open trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for 
developing ones. 
In fact, those economies hit hardest by the crisis - such as Korea and Thailand - are those most 
committed. They see the APEC agenda as part of the solution to the structural problems of their 
economies - many of the same structural problems that New Zealand has painfully worked 
through over the past 15 years. 
The commitment to APEC's policy agenda is vital as we seek to reinvigorate growth and 
investment in the region. If we've learned one thing from history, it's that economic isolationism 
doesn't work. 
Last year, in Vancouver, Canada, 15 economic sectors were identified as candidates for 
liberalisation even earlier than the 2010/2020 goal. This initiative, called Early Voluntary Sector 
Liberalisation, includes two important sectors in our economy - fisheries and forestry. Much of 
our total trade in these products is within the APEC region, and some regional economies have 
very high tariff barriers on them. 
It has been estimated that removal of tariffs in these two sectors could save our exporters $130 
http://www.executive.govt.nziminister/mckinnonldmn301098_2.htm 26/02/99 
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million a year. This doesn't include the value of any additional exports that free market access 
would gi ve our exporters. 
APEC also does much practical work in the area of trade facilitation - that is, making it easier for 
traders to get access to international markets by tackling the maze of red tape that slows up 
business transactions. It is estimated that around 7-10% of total world trade is tied up in 
unnecessary duplication and bureaucracy. APEC estimates that full implementation of its trade 
facilitation programmes would save an incredible US$46 billion a year for the region. 
The APEC process has long recognised the value of including private sector input. The APEC 
Business Advisory Group (ABAC) reports directly to leaders, and has assumed an important 
monitoring role within APEC. 
Each member economy has three representatives in ABAC. New Zealand's representatives in 
1998 are Hon Philip Burdon, Kerry McDonald and Rosanne Meo. Next year, Hon Philip Burdon 
takes the Chair ABAC.Our other representatives will be Douglas Myers and Hon Fran Wilde. 
Another group of New Zealand business people, including some involved in the growing area of 
Maori enterprises, will also be travelling to Kuala Lumpur to attend a Business Summit meeting. 
Globalisation is largely driven by technological change. Much of APEC's work is devoted to 
helping member economies deal with the challenges. The value of APEC's work is sho\\oTI by the 
commitment of members, and the desire of other economies to join. . 
From November, the existing 18 member economies will be joined by three new members -
Russia, Vietnam and Peru. Other economies are queuing up. 
Following Kuala Lumpur, the Prime Minister will be setting out further details of how New 
Zealand intends to approach its year as Chair of APEC. We will be working hard to ensure that 
progress in Kuala Lumpur provides a solid foundation for New Zealand's APEC year. 
Home II Ministers II Policies II Speeches II Searchll Departments 
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STOP THE MINE 
SUPPORT 
THE 
PEOPLE 
SAVE 
THE 
PARK 
The Stop the Jabiluka Mine Campaign needs your help URGENTLY. The two 
year fight by the Mirrar people and the Australian green movement against the 
construction of Australia's fourth uranium mine (the second in World Heritage 
Site Kakadu National Park) has reached crisis point. 
Despi te the fact that the World Heritage Committee of the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature is about to make a special inspection tour of 
Kakadu and consider declaring it a World Heritage Site In Danger; despite the 
fact that there are two cases against the mine pending before the Australian 
courts; and despite the fact that the usual Environmental Impact Assessment 
procedures have not been properly followed or completed, construction workers 
moved on to the proposed mine site in late June. 
A camp and blockade of peaceful protestors has been set up. In the first week of 
July there were hundreds of arrests, and also police harassment and violence 
against the protestors. It is important that international public opinion is now 
brought to bear on the Australian authorities to stop these gross abuses. 
Aboriginal anti-mine activist Christine Christopherson 
fishing in the Jabiluka billabong, Kakadu National 
Park. The health, safety and traditional livelihood of 
the local people are threatened by uranium mining. 
WHAT CAN YOU DO TO HELP? 
Please send a fax to any or all of the following people: 
Jabiru Police Station ................................................................................... 61 889792216 
Police Commissioner of the Northern Territory ........................................ 61 889223316 
Chief Minister of the Northern Territory ................................................... 61 88981 1621 
Prime Minister John Howard ..................................................................... 61 2 6273 4100 
Senator Robert Hill. Minister of Environment, Sport and Territories ....... 61 2 6273 6101 
Senator Warwick Parer, Minister of Resources and Energy ...................... 61 26273 4134 
In your message, say any or all of the following things: 
• stop police harassment of peaceful protestors 
• respect due legal process 
• follow the environmental impact assessment procedures properly 
• respect the wishes of the Mirrar people 
• don't endanger the traditional owners and their culture 
• don't endanger the unique flora and fauna 
• don't destroy a World Heritage Site 
• Australia/the world does not need another uranium mine 
• we are cancelling our Australian holiday and/or will not be spending any money on 
Australian products if you continue to mistreat your people and environment in this 
way 
~ *'*' M'~** i-K~*,*, M'~** i-K*'*' M'** *'*' M'~** ~*'*' ~** i-K 
For background information on the Jabiluka Campaign and the Mirrar Gundjehmi people 
and their land, visit the website at http://www.green.net.au/gundjehmi. 
For regular updates on the campaign and the situation at the blockade e-mail 
nonukes@foesyd.org.au and ask to go on the J abiluka list; for how you can be part of the 
action from New Zealand check the Green Party web page http://wwW.greens.org.nz 
For copies of campaign information and/or hire of the Jabiluka video send $5 for 
information and $10 for video hire to The Greens, Box 46, Diamond Harbour, Christchurch 
8030. (Make cheques out to 'Canterbury Greens') 
New Zealand contact, Jabiluka International: Christine Dann, Box 46, Diamond Harbour 
Phone and fax: (03) 329 4067; e-mail: christine.dann@Clear.net.nz 
Appendix I 
Interviews 
Persons interviewed on Green and environmental politics in Australia and 
New Zealand: 
Ralph Allen, Geoff Bertram, Molly Colbert, Alan Cumming, Mike Donoghue, 
.Rod Donald, Jim Falk, Jeanette Fitzsimons, Kevin Hackwell, Chris Harries, 
. Denis Hocking, Drew Hutton, Tim Jones, Keith Johnston, Sue Maturin, 
Molly Melhuish, Les Molloy, Craig Potton, Stephen Rainbow, Guy Salmon, 
Trish Sarr, Derek Shaw, Norman Smith, John Stewart, Denys Trussell, 
Richard Thompson, Warren Thomson, Cath Wallace. 
